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Setting the stage    

1  Introduction
Elin Lerum Boasson, Merethe Dotterud  
Leiren and Jørgen Wettestad
Introduction
Europe is going renewable – radically expanding its renewable electricity pro-
duction. Public policies are at the heart of this major societal change so crucial 
for combatting climate change. Domestic support schemes for renewables have 
developed and changed over more than four decades now, with the European 
Union (EU) playing an increasingly important role. In 2014 the European Com-
mission (the Commission) stepped up its steering of domestic support practices 
and required changes in many national support schemes. That development caused 
uproar in some EU member states, Germany among them, but was hardly registered 
on the political agenda elsewhere, for instance in Sweden.
Speeches held at a major renewable energy conference in Berlin, 27 March 2015, 
illustrate the differences between German and Swedish renewable electricity poli-
tics and policies. On that Friday morning, the German Minister for the Environ-
ment, Barbara Hendricks, stood on the podium at the Berlin Energy Transition 
Dialogue, addressing prominent figures in the booming renewable energy 
industry: corporate leaders, ministers and researchers.1 She said she was proud 
of how Germany’s extensive support of renewables had contributed to radical 
cost reduction and added: ‘We want to encourage other countries to follow our 
example’. Further, she explained to the audience that the German energy tran-
sition, the Energiewende, had not been easy: ‘We have learned some lessons’ 
(Clean Energy Wire 2015).
For years, German renewables support, a key element in the Energiewende, had 
been subject to fierce political struggles and many heated debates – with massive 
protests from the major electricity utilities, which claimed that Germany’s renew-
ables support policy was a key reason why they were now on the brink of bank-
ruptcy. There had also been tough bargaining with the Commission, in addition to 
legal disputes in the Court of Justice (CJEU). However, speaking in Berlin on that 
day in 2015, Hendricks did not dwell on all the impediments and hardships; she 
was proud of what Germany had achieved and pleased that representatives from 
many industries and countries had come to Berlin to learn.
However, even as Hendricks was speaking to delegates at the Berlin Energy 
Transition Dialogue, the long-established German practice of guaranteeing 
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different renewables technologies varying fixed prices for their electricity was 
about to change. Under this feed-in scheme, producers of expensive renewable 
energy technologies, such as solar, received higher support than did producers of 
less costly technologies, such as onshore windpower. In the future, large produc-
ers of renewable energy would have to compete for support in auctions. Only 
small projects would continue to receive traditional feed-in support: large produc-
ers would no longer receive a fixed electricity price, but rather an add-on on top 
of fluctuating market prices for electricity.
The next speaker was Nils Vikmång, State Secretary to the Swedish Minis-
ter for Energy and the Environment. In 2003 Sweden had adopted an electric-
ity certificate scheme, which had remained largely unchanged since then. The 
scheme provided the same level of support to all types of renewables, differenti-
ated between technologies, as in Germany. In addition, all Swedish renewables 
producers were exposed to fluctuating electricity prices, and the support level 
was itself determined by the supply and demand of electricity certificates. Like 
Hendricks, Vikmång represented a social democratic party, and they both came 
from countries that had radically increased their domestic renewables production. 
But Germany and Sweden had opted for very different approaches to renewa-
bles support. Unlike Hendricks, Vikmång and his colleagues had not experienced 
domestic support practices for renewables becoming entangled in complex juridi-
cal conflicts with the CJEU and the Commission. In Sweden, renewables policy 
discussions at the EU level were deemed largely irrelevant to domestic political 
deliberations on renewables policy.
However, the big utilities had started to criticize the Swedish scheme, which, 
they claimed, had led to overproduction of renewable electricity, ruining the prof-
itability of existing large hydro and nuclear plants. As many renewables tech-
nologies had become far less costly, they argued that extra support was no longer 
needed. But Vikmång and his allies in the Swedish Parliament did not agree. They 
vigorously defended the traditional approach – and one year after the Berlin con-
ference, the Swedish Parliament agreed to prolong the national electricity certifi-
cate scheme for another 15 years. That made Sweden the only EU country with 
electricity certificates as its main support scheme for renewables.
Germany and Sweden represent two contrasting approaches to renewables sup-
port in Europe: the technology-specific and the technology-neutral. Technology-
specific mixes for renewables support create a broad range of differing support 
levels: costlier renewables technologies receive more support; and decentralized, 
small-scale projects often receive more support than centralized, large projects. 
The technology-specific approach also allows support to vary across geographical 
areas, fostering a wide range of renewables technologies and helping to underpin 
new industry developments and local energy security. By contrast, the technology-
neutral approach is more aligned to the business models of big electricity produc-
ers operating in liberalized electricity markets. This approach favours large-scale 
investments in the most profitable technologies, with limited support for small-
scale renewables sources.
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The sheer number of actors involved in shaping policy and enabling these two 
countries, Germany and Sweden, to embark on different renewables policy paths 
is daunting. Even more confusingly, similar actors took strikingly different posi-
tions in the two countries. For instance, the Social Democratic Party in Germany 
promoted a highly technology-specific support scheme, whereas the Swedish 
Social Democrats promoted technology-neutrality. In order to understand how 
the two countries ended up with differing support-scheme mixes, we need to grasp 
how a broad range of factors and actors have interacted over time. Neither coun-
try developed its domestic policies in isolation from developments within other 
European countries or EU steering, but the roles played by what we refer to as the 
larger ‘European environment’ have differed greatly.
Challenging the many technology-focused accounts of the development of 
renewables support, this book takes a deep-dive into the political and social 
dynamics, developing a new analysis of this policy area as well as a new approach 
to policy studies in general. In addition to examining the cases of Germany and 
Sweden, we scrutinize and systematically compare the development of renew-
able electricity mixes in four other EU/European Economic Area (EEA) coun-
tries: France, Norway, Poland and the UK. Our overarching research question 
is: What explains the differences and similarities in renewables support-scheme 
mixes across countries and over time?
Germany, the UK, Poland and France all have technology-specific renewa-
bles support mixes; Norway and Sweden have technology-neutral support mixes. 
Some of these countries have had rather stable renewables support mixes; others 
have shifted over time. The UK and Poland switched from technology-neutrality 
to technology-specificity after 2010. Around that time, Germany and France 
started to expose new renewables projects more to market prices and competi-
tion than before, but without dropping technology-specificity. Countries in both 
groups have adopted a mix of support schemes, but whereas Germany, the UK, 
Poland and France offer technology-specific support to both small- and large-
scale renewables projects, Sweden and Norway have adopted more technology-
neutral schemes for both categories.
Renewable electricity production is central to climate-change mitigation. Glob-
ally, as well as in the EU, the combustion of coal, natural gas and oil for electricity 
and heat is the largest single source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (EPA 
2019). In 2017, the energy-producing industries, primarily producing electricity, 
were responsible for 28% of total GHG emissions in the EU (Eurostat 2019). 
Renewables support schemes play an important role in strategies for climate 
mitigation, although other measures, such as carbon pricing, energy-efficiency 
standards and improved public transport, also contribute. By clarifying the factors 
and actors that shape the development of renewables support, this book furthers 
a better understanding of the political dynamics of climate-change mitigation in 
general.
Like many other climate-policy issues, renewables support mixes are shaped 
by complex interrelationships involving several parallel and partly intertwined 
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societal processes. Economic liberalization, Europeanization, climate mitigation 
and technological change have underpinned the emergence, change and staying 
power of domestic renewables policies across Europe. Various strands within the 
political science literature – including EU implementation research, policy dif-
fusion studies, policy process frameworks and historical institutionalism – may 
help us to assess and understand parts of the policy process, but none of these 
alone can adequately capture the dynamic interrelationships between the many 
decision-making bodies and actor-groups involved. Combining these political 
science literatures in new ways, and adding elements from sociological institu-
tionalism and economic sociology, in this book we develop a dynamic multi-field 
approach.2
The multi-field framework
Whereas usual practice has involved analysing a few actor groups in isolation, 
exploring their positions and actions within limited time-periods, the multi-field 
framework can help us to identify the links between differing groups of actors and 
how political dynamics develop and unfold – features too often overlooked in 
studies of public policy, comparative politics, Europeanization and energy transi-
tion. The multi-field framework facilitates comprehensive analysis of organiza-
tional and political factors and how they interact and change over time.
Social scientists from a range of disciplines emphasize the role of fields, but 
the concept goes under various names, such as ‘segments’, ‘policy systems’ or 
‘policy monopolies’ (Baumgartner and Jones [1993] 2009; Bourdieu 2005; Flig-
stein and McAdam 2012; Kluttz and Fligstein 2016). Fields distribute power 
among actors and shape values, identities and interests. ‘Social fields’ are circum-
scribed spheres of political and social life with particular constellations of actors 
(Boasson 2015: 1). Each field has an identifiable social architecture: a distinct 
distribution of resources and particular cultural-institutional beliefs and logics. 
Fields are issue- or industry-specific configurations of governmental and private 
organizations, and their importance for policy development results partly from 
the structural interrelationships and cultural-institutional unity between these 
organizations (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Fields are not actors with defined 
objectives and strategies: they should be seen as socially distinct constellations of 
actors, with varying degrees of internal coherence and unity, more or less impen-
etrable boundaries and varying autonomy.
Modern societies can be seen as consisting of multiple fields. All fields are 
embedded in complex, multi-dimensional webs of dependence with other fields 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Kluttz and Fligstein 2016: 192). As Scott (2017: 
862) notes, most organizations ‘simultaneously operate in multiple fields and 
hence host multiple logics as well as alternative relational systems’. Examination 
of how multiple fields interact and change over time can help to explain changes 
and stability in public policy and facilitate more interdisciplinary dialogue – in 
relation to climate- and energy-policy developments, but also in other policy 
areas.
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Renewables support mixes change as a result of multiple fields interacting and 
responding to each other. In this book, we pay special attention to how domestic 
organizational fields of electricity production, domestic political fields and the 
European environment (described in the following list) interact over time, jointly 
influencing the development of national renewables support schemes. Some 
actors may be affiliated with several fields, but the main participants in the three 
fields are as follows (see also Boasson 2015: 38–46):
• Domestic organizational fields: commercial organizations, public regulators 
and administrative bodies, business associations and sometimes also other 
non-governmental organizations, such as environmental organizations.
• Domestic political fields: the whole range of political actors – political party 
organizations, legislative assemblies and parliamentary committees, govern-
mental executives and the political leaders of governmental ministries.
• The European environment: consists of a range of domestic political and 
organizational fields (in EU and EEA member states) but also includes 
EU-level fields and the social processes that unfold at the EU level. With 
renewable electricity support, processes relating to the development of EU 
governance of renewables, as well as EU competition policy and state-aid 
control processes, are of relevance.
The organizational, political and European fields are interrelated in many ways, 
and these relationships may change over time. For instance, whereas the big elec-
tricity utilities used to be embedded within domestic organizational fields con-
sisting of other electricity utilities, grid operators and domestic public agencies 
that regulate energy and electricity, today they can also be seen as part of the 
larger European field of electricity production, together with other major utilities 
and various EU organizations focused on energy regulation. Moreover, domestic 
political parties used to relate solely to other domestic political parties, but they 
may also participate in larger European political fields with party groups directly 
represented in the European Parliament. Further, there is a direct relationship 
between domestic political and organizational fields, not least because the politi-
cal executives (the ministers) have their key rooting in the political field, whereas 
the civil servants in the ministries belong to the organizational field.
Research questions and research design
It is not easy to see which factors can best explain differences and similarities in 
renewables support schemes mixes across countries and over time. The history 
of the development of renewables policy in Germany, the UK, Poland, France, 
Sweden and Norway is complex and full of idiosyncratic events, making it hard 
to pinpoint the similarities and differences on policy outcomes across countries.
Historically, the UK, Germany, France and Poland have rarely opted for similar 
industrial policies and economic development models (Dobbin 1994; Hall 2014; 
Nölke and Vliegenhart 2009), yet they developed roughly similar renewables 
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support mixes. While it is less surprising that Norway and Sweden should have 
similar approaches, it is intriguing that they opted for an electricity certificate 
scheme quite similar to the renewables portfolio standards dominant in the world’s 
prime liberal market country, the USA (Rabe 2007). After all, the Scandinavian 
countries are known for their very different approaches to industry policies and 
economic development approaches from those of the USA.
In order to detect causal regularities across countries and over time, we oper-
ate with six case studies of renewables policy development all guided by the 
same questions, namely, how is the development of renewables support mixes 
affected by:
•  the European environment?
•  domestic organizational fields?
•  domestic political fields?
And further: do developments in one field influence developments in others?
Main findings
Through systematic comparative assessments, we obtain new insights into the 
drivers of renewables policy developments in the EU and EEA countries, and we 
also understand and capture the policy-shaping dynamics often overlooked by 
other explanatory approaches to domestic policy developments. What, then, do 
we find?
Europeanization spurs differentiation
The European environment approach facilitates coherent and nuanced examina-
tion of how Europeanization affects domestic policy developments. In line with 
recent developments in EU policy implementation research, we take into account 
that EU influence may lead to both coherence and diversity among the policy 
approaches of the EU and EEA countries (Thomann 2015, 2019: 9). EU imple-
mentation studies tend to focus on vertical Europeanization, understood as top-
down EU steering resulting from the EU having gained formal authority within 
an issue-area (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 5). But we also explore the importance 
of horizontal Europeanization, understood as the diffusion of policy ideas across 
countries and fields within the European environment (Boasson 2015; Börzel 
and Risse 2012; Cowles and Risse 2001: 219; Jörgens and Solorio 2017: 12–13). 
Some scholars hold that, in order to qualify as ‘Europeanization’, policy transfer 
must emerge through EU policy or European integration processes (e.g. Radaelli 
2003); however, we operate with a broader conceptualization, where Europeani-
zation includes also voluntary transfers across member states, transfers that may 
not have passed through EU institutions first.
Admittedly, we are not the first to examine vertical and horizontal Europe-
anization in conjunction (Jörgens and Solorio 2017). However, we contribute 
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something new by examining the implementation of two interrelated strands of 
EU policy development in conjunction – EU renewables policy proper, and state-
aid policies – and by conducting a longitudinal study that covers more than four 
decades of Europeanization.
The European environment approach enables us to uncover several new dynam-
ics in Europeanization. We find that the European environment tends to shape 
domestic policy developments more in periods when strong vertical Europeaniza-
tion is combined with coherent horizontal Europeanization – implying that one 
specific support-scheme mix gains superiority in the European environment. But 
this is not the only situation in which the European environment is important. 
Impulses for change in the European environment are generally more important 
for domestic policy developments than we expected, also in situations where the 
EU lacks formal authority and no particular policy recipe dominates the Euro-
pean environment. The European environment has influenced developments in 
renewables support in all our case-study countries, albeit at varying times and in 
differing ways.
European policy impulses with respect to renewables support have changed sig-
nificantly over the years. Variance in the EU steering impulses and shifting trends 
in the design of European renewables support has contributed to differentiation in 
domestic policies. More specifically, the Europeanization of renewables support 
has amplified differences in renewables support mixes across the two groups of 
countries examined here, while also spurring convergence within the two groups.
While it has played an important role in many of the technology-specific coun-
tries (with the exception of the UK), the European environment had the greatest 
influence in the technology-neutral countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Our longitudinal research design makes possible a far more nuanced understand-
ing of the diversifying power of EU steering than studies that examine implemen-
tation of EU policies over a more limited time-span.
Organizational fields are crucial but can be over-ruled
Although electricity production in most countries is dominated by powerful 
actors with limited initial interest in renewables (domestic regulators and a few 
large nuclear or fossil-fuel utilities), forceful renewables support schemes have 
emerged. Often, the regulators and incumbents have been unable to prevent 
renewables industry actors and environmental organizations from having their 
way – which surely indicates that all those political science theories that bluntly 
assume that big corporate actors will have privileged positions in policy develop-
ment need to be re-assessed and refined (Carpenter and Moss 2014; Lindblom 
1977). Using the concept of organizational fields, we can explore why the roles 
and powers of such actors vary across countries and over time.
Moreover, the many policy frameworks aimed at facilitating assessment 
of how civil servants, big corporations, idealistic organizations and other non-
governmental organizations shape policy development – such as multiple streams 
(Herweg et al. 2018; Kingdon [1984] 2011), advocacy coalitions (Jenkins-Smith 
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et al. 2018; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and punctuated equilibrium (Baum-
gartner and Jones [1993] 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2018) – have failed to produce 
robust findings on the conditions under which actors other than big business tend 
to be most influential.
Cumulative research on the relative importance of varying actor groups under 
differing conditions has been undermined by seemingly endless rivalry between 
differing policy process frameworks. The seminal Theories of the Policy Process, 
edited by Christopher M. Weible and Paul A. Sabatier [2007] 2018) epitomizes 
this. This volume gives thorough and insightful presentations of the major policy 
process frameworks – a great leap forward for policy studies. But since the con-
tributors present each framework as unique, rather than identifying commonali-
ties across them, this spurs competition, rather than creating common research 
frontiers and cumulative research traditions. Instead of becoming embroiled in 
the competition among established policy frameworks, we have chosen to draw 
on insights from many of them in developing our organizational field approach.
We define an organizational field as segmented when most formal authority 
and information are concentrated within a few large corporations and the govern-
mental regulators and these actors approach and understand renewable electricity 
promotion in a similar way, i.e. they are embedded in a similar institutional logic. 
We find that shifts in institutional logics relating to renewables support in domes-
tic organizational fields underpin changes in renewables support mixes, in both 
segmented and less segmented fields. Some actors understand the promotion of 
renewables as mainly relating to a technology development logic, and they prefer 
governmental measures that provide investors with good, stable conditions for 
developing a broad range of technologies. Others follow a market-logic and rely 
primarily on technology-neutral measures: they prefer governmental measures 
that minimize the societal costs of renewables investment and favour the least 
costly technologies. Some fields are dominated by one of these views, but there 
can also be a high level of conflict between them, as it was in Germany for a long 
time. After 2010, the two contrasting approaches came to blend in the UK and 
France, but also to some extent in Germany, towards more technology-specificity 
in the UK, and in the other direction in France and Germany. The Norwegian 
and Swedish support schemes are dominated by technology-neutrality, and this 
can be partly explained by the dominance of market-thinking in their domestic 
organizational fields.
Although many segmented fields play an important role in ensuring both stabil-
ity and change, they rarely control policy development. Nowhere have powerful 
organizational field actors been in full control over the development of support 
schemes. Large electricity utilities tend to be more influential when the organiza-
tional fields are segmented, but segmentation may also empower public admin-
istrative organizations, as in the UK as well as in Sweden in the late 1990s. In 
several cases, renewables support schemes changed in ways that ran counter to the 
positions of electricity utilities with dominant positions in segmented fields – in 
Poland, France and Sweden. The German case shows that when the organizational 
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field is not segmented, there tends to be more room for influence from the domes-
tic political field and the EU.
The organizational field approach enables us to capture nuances in the role 
of corporate and public administrative actors. It will be exciting to see how the 
causal arguments presented in this book will fare when tested out on other coun-
tries and other issue-areas.
Political fields tend to drive policy developments when resources are 
distributed
The multi-field framework develops a new analytical take on the role and impor-
tance of politicians for policy development. In media discourse as well as aca-
demic debate over climate policy and politics, ‘political will’ is considered crucial 
to mitigation of climate change. For decades, climate activists, environmental 
groups, researchers, green industry groups and others have called for politicians 
to adopt ambitious climate policies, but we still lack adequate systematic knowl-
edge of how and to what extent political dynamics shape policy development. One 
reason is that political scientists and policy scholars seldom focus explicitly on the 
role of politicians and political fields in policy development processes.
We find that domestic political actors and political dynamics can influence 
domestic policy developments rather independently of what goes on in adjacent 
fields. Political fields tend to be more important when a political issue is salient 
and thus subject to political competition. But such fields often play an even more 
important role when structural resources are distributed among many political 
actors rather than only a few. This means that it is more likely that the politi-
cal field drives policy development when responsibility for renewables is shared 
among several ministries, when the Parliament has a strong position and/or when 
the government is made up of several parties. We find that, under such conditions, 
the political field has played a far more important role in Germany and Sweden 
than in the other case-study countries. In both Germany and Sweden, the political 
salience of renewables support schemes, the distribution of structural resources 
among several parties within the government and the existence of strong parlia-
ments contributed to enhance the importance of the political field.
This finding shows that political actors are more important than dominant pol-
icy process frameworks (such as multiple streams, advocacy coalitions or punctu-
ated equilibrium) and historical institutionalism lead us to believe. These tend to 
assume that politicians are important only at rare and brief points (‘punctuated 
equilibria’, ‘windows of opportunity’ or ‘critical junctures’). Further, historical 
institutionalists are deeply interested in the role of the state, but not in the role of 
politicians in particular. B. Guy Peters et al. (2005: 1283) highlight that historical 
institutional studies often ‘overemphasize the importance of civil servants and 
bureaucrats in policymaking processes, belittling excessively the continuing (and 
on occasions elemental) significance of politicians as creative actors’. Our find-
ings strengthen their argument.
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Spotlight on politics and culture as policy drivers
In this book, we show that political and cultural-institutional features are crucial 
drivers of changes and stabilities in renewables support mixes. Renewable elec-
tricity technology has made impressive quantum leaps during the period covered 
here, with particularly radical reductions in costs after 2008 (IRENA 2013, 2019). 
While this has enabled greater deployment of renewable energy, renewables have 
been constrained by entrenched fossil-fuel and nuclear energy infrastructures 
(Geels 2014; Lockwood et al. 2017; Meadowcroft 2011). These technological-
economic features have played into shifts in renewables support mixes in all the 
six countries examined here, but we show that we need to take politics and culture 
into account in order to understand differences and similarities in support mixes 
across countries.
We are not alone in recognizing that energy and climate transitions entail com-
plex social shifts, and that technological and economic factors are not the only 
enablers and constraints. In this book we offer one suggestion as to how political 
and cultural aspects may be examined. We show that differing cultural aspects, 
such as institutional logics and political cognitive scripts, can help to explain the 
behaviour of different types of actors. We also shed light on why political dynam-
ics are more important at some stages of policy development than at others.
Method: case selection, process tracing and systematic 
comparison
All contributors to this book have carefully mapped the nature of the fields in 
question empirically. We have aimed to be as transparent as possible regarding 
the analytical criteria employed in identifying the various fields and their interre-
lationships, and to build our assessments on detailed and rich empirical material. 
Further, we have taken care not to attribute agency to the fields, recognizing that 
this is an analytical construct that encompasses a broad range of actors.
Case selection and process trading
Our case selection is based on the features of interest as regards theory. In select-
ing cases, we sought to identify cases where it was either highly likely or highly 
unlikely that the European environment, the organizational field or the political 
field had played important roles for the development of support mixes (George 
and Bennett 2005: 121). Causal relationships can be detected only after significant 
empirical investigation, not a priori – indeed, it later became evident that some 
cases had different qualities than initially expected.
Older comparative methodology approaches emphasize selecting cases that 
allow for control over ‘independent variables’. Such procedures are based on a 
deterministic view on causation, while our case comparisons are based on proba-
bilistic, not deterministic, understandings of causality. Rather than searching for 
features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a certain outcome, we remained 
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open to the possibility of equifinality – that there might be multiple causal paths to 
the same outcome (Mahoney and Goertz 2006: 11). One feature may enhance the 
probability that a certain outcome will occur, but it will very rarely be necessary; 
and an increase in the value of a factor may cause different outcomes in different 
cases (Hall 2003: 315). Since all efforts to control cases through case selection 
implicitly assume that any causal relationships are of a necessary or sufficient 
nature, these procedures have been largely discredited (see Box-Steffensmeier 
et al. 2008: 24; also discussion in Mahoney 2003).
We aimed to select countries where the European environment had played dif-
fering roles. Research available to us at the time (2015) showed that German 
actors had repeatedly challenged EU steering, but they also indicated that there 
had been fewer conflicts in relation to implementation in France, Norway, Poland, 
Sweden and the UK (see e.g. Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Wurzel and Connelly 
2011). Further, the literature indicated that Germany had influenced many other 
countries as regards copying its renewables support scheme, whereas Norway and 
Sweden had less success in this respect.
Additionally, we aimed for variation in the impacts of the organizational field. 
This proved challenging, as the organizational field of electricity production tends 
to be rather segmented in all European countries. However, research indicated 
higher degrees of segmentation in Poland, France and Norway than elsewhere 
(Boasson 2015; Boasson and Wettestad 2013). Lastly, we aimed for variation 
in the importance of the political field. Previous research has indicated that the 
political field has played more prominent roles in Germany and Sweden than else-
where (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Åstrand 2005).
This book combines comparative qualitative case-study method with process 
tracing. The case-study approach entails detailed examination of historical epi-
sodes in order to develop explanations that may be generalizable to other events 
(George and Bennett 2005: 5). We conduct within-case assessments and system-
atic comparative assessments, and we assess interrelationships between cases. In 
each case study we pose the same set of general questions and relate to similar 
expectations, thereby ensuring standardized data collection and enabling system-
atic comparison (Collier 1993: 105; George and Bennett 2005: 67).
In all case studies, we follow the policy developments from inception until 
2016, scrutinizing developments in line with widely accepted criteria for process 
tracing. We understand process tracing as ‘the analysis of evidence on processes, 
sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purpose of either 
developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally 
explain the case’ (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 7). We have paid attention to ensur-
ing coherence in method and theory across the cases from all contributing authors; 
the three co-editors have been involved in writing all but one of the chapters.
Sources and data
We combine written and oral sources. The latter includes a unique assembly of 
79 in-depth, qualitative interviews with prominent actors, among them former 
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government ministers, high-ranking civil servants in ministries and agencies, rep-
resentatives of national and European industries, representatives of environmental 
groups and high-level Commission officials. We worked to ensure that the same 
categories were interviewed in all six case countries; but we encountered some 
challenges in Poland, where political conditions made it difficult to conduct inter-
views, so we opted to rely on transcripts from parliamentary debates. Since the 
author of the Norwegian case, Elin Lerum Boasson, had conducted dozens of 
interviews about renewable policy developments in Norway in prior work, we 
conducted fewer interviews in this case (see the lists of interviewees at the end of 
Chapters 4–10).
As to written sources, we have examined several hundred publicly available 
documents. These include (but are not limited to) consultation inputs, parliamen-
tary reports, party programmes, government/coalition agreements, written corre-
spondence between national authorities and the EU and news articles.
Moving back and forth between theory and cases has enabled us to formu-
late new concepts, discover novel explanations and refine pre-existing theoreti-
cal expectations in light of detailed case evidence (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
2003: 13). Most importantly, we have focused on understanding each case indi-
vidually, but we have also explored how they relate to each other. This research 
method is resource-demanding, but also rewarding.
Systematic comparisons
In Chapter 10, we perform detailed, systematic comparisons across cases as well 
as over time, aided by tables that illustrate similarities and differences. This com-
parative method has been possible because all contributing authors refer to the 
same time-periods in their chronological accounts. The method helps us to exam-
ine the roles played by the various fields across different time-periods: each of our 
six cases consists of four sub-cases, one for each time-period. Because relatively 
little of relevance happened before 1999, the first period covers two decades, from 
around 1970 to 1999, while the subsequent periods are five years each. The last 
period, post-2010, is slightly longer, as we conducted most of our empirical map-
ping in 2015 and 2016.
Rather than search for one precise, parsimonious explanation, we have been 
open to the possibility that different causal patterns may lead to similar outcomes 
and that complex interdependencies may be important (George and Bennett 2005: 
161; Hall 2003: 383; Rueschemeyer 2003: 315). Our objective has been to render 
observed regularities intelligible by specifying in detail how they were brought 
about (Hedström 2008: 321).
Presentation of the chapters
This introduction has briefly presented the topic, research questions and main 
findings of this book. There are three additional chapters in Part I. Chapter 2, by 
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Elin Lerum Boasson and Merethe Dotterud Leiren, shows how this book builds on 
and adds to existing research on renewable energy policy and climate transitions. 
It specifies the analytical dimensions that determine the degree of technology-
specificity and performs comparative assessments of the renewables support 
schemes of the six countries. Lastly, the authors show that research approaches 
that rely primarily on technological-economic features cannot fully explain cross-
country similarities and differences in support-scheme mixes.
The multi-field approach is presented in Chapter 3, by Boasson. The chapter 
specifies the special character of the European environment, the domestic politi-
cal field and the domestic organizational field, and presents our specific expec-
tations as to when and how the three will influence policy developments. In 
addition, cross-field interrelationships and interdependencies are discussed. The 
expectations developed in this chapter are systematically assessed in the empiri-
cal chapters in Part II, and later the findings are compared in Chapter 11. Chap-
ter 4 (authored by Boasson) is empirical in nature: it presents developments and 
changes in EU steering (vertical Europeanization), as well as broader European 
trends when it comes to renewables support schemes (horizontal Europeaniza-
tion). This chapter represents an important background for understanding how 
and to what extent the European environment have affected the policy develop-
ments in the six case studies.
Part II presents our six country case studies. The countries with technology-
specific support-scheme mixes are presented first, followed by the technology-
neutral countries. Chapter 5 focuses on Germany (authors: Merethe Dotterud 
Leiren and Inken Reimer), Chapter 6 on the UK (authors: Tim Rayner, Merethe 
Dotterud Leiren and Tor Håkon Inderberg), Chapter 7 on Poland (author: Kacper 
Szulecki), Chapter 8 on France (authors: Elin Lerum Boasson, Catherine Banet 
and Jørgen Wettestad), Chapter 9 on Sweden (authors: Elin Lerum Boasson, Hugo 
Faber and Karin Bäckstrand) and Chapter 10 on Norway (author: Elin Lerum 
Boasson). In all these chapters, the authors first present the renewables support 
mix of the country at the end of 2016, then turn to a causal account of the evolu-
tion of the support scheme in each country over four periods: from the 1970s until 
1999, from 2000 to 2004, from 2005 to 2009 and from 2010 until around 2016. 
All chapters examine the expectations put forward in Chapter 3.
Finally, Part III compares and concludes. Chapter 11 (authors: Boasson, 
Leiren and Wettestad) presents a detailed, systematic comparative assessment, 
with systematic comparisons of how and to what extent the European environ-
ment, domestic political fields and organizational fields have affected the six 
countries over the four time-periods. We also examine how the fields have inter-
acted and influenced each other over time. The final chapter, Chapter 12 (author: 
Boasson), presents the central general conclusions to be drawn from the com-
parisons performed in Chapter 11, with a focus on the implications for research 
of public policy, climate and energy transitions and EU implementation and 
Europeanization research. This chapter concludes the book with a discussion of 
the limitations of the multi-field approach.
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Notes
 1 The Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue was initiated by the German government, with 
the aim of spurring international interest in the German renewable energy transition: the 
Energiewende.
 2 This approach, first developed by Elin Lerum Boasson (2015), has undergone significant 
revision and improvement for the purposes of this volume.
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2  Comparing renewable 
support mixes
Elin Lerum Boasson and Merethe Dotterud Leiren
Introduction
Renewables support schemes may be designed and combined in various ways. In 
the 1990s most countries had only one renewables support scheme, and this scheme 
was relatively simple and easy to grasp. After 2010 most European countries 
adopted encompassing and complex support mixes (Kitzing et al. 2012). For sev-
eral decades, scholars have discussed how to characterize the most dominant sup-
port schemes, usually focusing on single instruments and not policy mixes. Adding 
insights to this literature, we offer a conceptualization of support-scheme mixes.
Support-scheme mixes differ along many dimensions; thus far the scien-
tific debate has focused on distinguishing between more or less market-based 
approaches. In contrast we develop a conceptualization of support-scheme 
mixes that distinguishes between technology-neutral and technology-specific 
instruments. We take two dimensions into account: the degree to which differ-
ing technologies are awarded varying support; and the degree of exposure to the 
electricity price. To capture the overall technology-specificity of a renewables 
support mix, we include both dimensions as regards both large- and small-scale 
support schemes.
Applying the new conceptualizations to support-scheme mixes in six coun-
tries, we find that whereas France, Germany, Poland and the UK had technology-
specific support-scheme mixes by the late 2010s, Norway and Sweden had more 
technology-neutral mixes. Explanations that rely primarily on economic and 
technological factors have dominated research on renewable energy and climate 
transitions. We review this literature and conclude that, although these approaches 
have many good qualities, they are poorly suited for explaining cross-country 
variation in renewable support mixes.
Technology-specific and technology-neutral  
support-scheme mixes
Differing categorizations of renewable support measures
There is a significant literature on single policy instruments, while policy mixes 
have gained less scientific attention. For instance, there is little scholarly agreement 
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on how to characterize various types of policy mixes (see discussion in Howlett 
et al. 2015). Like many other policy areas, this is also true for the literature on 
renewables support measures.
From the early 1990s until about 2010, investment support, fixed feed-in tariffs 
and electricity certificate schemes were the dominant games in town. Investment 
support was often calculated on a project-by-project basis (Community Guide-
lines 2001): non-reimbursable payments in the construction phase of a project 
(Kitzing et al. 2012: 195). Governments tended to calculate investment support 
by applying an ‘extra cost’ approach, where the cost of each renewable electricity 
project was evaluated against the cost of a conventional electricity plant, and the 
support corresponded to the additional costs of building the former.
Later, many countries developed fixed investment-support levels, which could 
vary between different technologies (Community Guidelines 2001, 2014). The 
first feed-in tariffs guaranteed renewables projects a fixed electricity price for a 
fixed period, often 15 to 20 years. The system differentiated among the various 
technologies, resulting in different subsidy levels per unit of generation for differ-
ent renewables technologies (Buckman 2011: 4105; Kitzing et al. 2012: 194). In 
addition, renewables electricity had priority dispatch to the grid, which ensured 
that the electricity from the renewables plant would be bought. This system cre-
ated predictable gains for renewables producers, but governments could not know 
in advance how much new renewables electricity would result from the system.
In contrast, electricity certificate systems mandate that a certain quota of the 
electricity consumed is to come from renewables (Darmani et al. 2016: 373). For 
every megawatt hour (MWh) of production, certificates are allocated to electricity 
producers. These certificates can be traded on a market, where the price is set by 
supply and demand. The demand hinge on the target the governments has set for the 
system. The price for certificates comes on top of the electricity price. Significant 
uncertainty relating to electricity prices as well as certificate prices created high 
investment risks for producers. Further, certificate schemes tend to be technology-
neutral, making a broad range of renewables eligible for the same level of subsidies 
(ibid.: 376). Such systems are referred to by various labels: for instance, in the USA 
and Australia, the term ‘renewables electricity standards’ or ‘portfolio standards’ 
is used, whereas in Norway and Sweden, and in EU documents, the terms ‘green 
certificates’ or electricity certificates are used more often (ibid.: 373).
Until recently, academic as well as political discussions about renewables sup-
port were marked by deep disagreement as to which of the two schemes should 
and could be called ‘market-based’ – or whether all economic support measures 
could qualify as market-based. Initially, the promoters of electricity certificate 
schemes labelled this approach ‘market-based’, whereas feed-in schemes were 
called ‘command-and-control’ schemes (Toke and Lauber 2007: 677). Eventually, 
scholars began to refer to certificate schemes as being market-based (Boasson and 
Wettestad 2013; Darmani et al. 2016: 373; Linnerud and Simonsen 2017: 560), 
but there was great variation in how feed-in schemes were labelled. In 2005, a 
report from the European Commission (the Commission) concluded: ‘both instru-
ments are equally market-based in that the regulatory body sets either the price 
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or the quantity and leaves the determination of the other to the market’ (Commis-
sion 2005: 54). Similar views emerged in scholarly debates, although here it was 
more common to underline the regulatory aspects of the measures in question. 
For instance, Reinhard Haas and colleagues argue that both feed-in schemes and 
certificate schemes
rely on a command & control approach of a planned economy. In one case the 
price is set, in another case the quantity is set; . . . [y]et on the other hand all 
of these systems are market-based: the goods are produced in a competitive 
market . . . it is important to note that this market in all cases is created by 
some kind of artificial demand.
(Haas et al. 2011: 2188)
Discussions were ideologically charged, and no consensus emerged. Eventually, 
as actual application of both types of schemes grew more complex, it became 
increasingly common to apply several support schemes in conjunction. Whereas 
the first feed-in tariffs set the full price, more recent feed-in premiums come as 
guaranteed add-ons to the electricity market price, or the electricity price is one 
of several elements that in conjunction decides the full price for renewable elec-
tricity. Feed-in premiums may apply for a fixed period or for a pre-determined 
production volume (Kitzing et al. 2012: 194). While producers of certain technol-
ogies tend to be given the right to receive fixed feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums 
are often awarded as a result of a tendering procedure whereby only the winners 
of the auction are granted support (Community Guidelines 2014). Since the sec-
ond decade of the 2000s, competitive tendering procedures have rapidly ascended 
towards dominance in Europe as well as worldwide (Fitch-Roy et al. 2019).
Auctioning systems can be organized in a technology-specific way – either with 
different auctions for different technologies, or with differing sets of technology 
criteria applied to the same auction (CEER 2018). Governments may also operate 
with specific reference prices (or ‘strike prices’) for different technologies, or they 
may develop differing support calculation equations for varying technologies. 
Auctioning combined with feed-in-premiums can be almost technology-neutral 
if all technologies compete on equal terms, but various technology-specific ele-
ments may be introduced. Similarly, many electricity certificate schemes have 
been almost technology-neutral, but a range of technology-specific elements may 
be introduced (Buckman 2011; Rabe 2007).
Two dimensions of technology-specificity variation
Countries may design and combine the various types of support schemes (such 
as feed-in and certificates) in many ways. The actual functioning will depend 
on a range of differing design elements, and how various support measures are 
combined. Two dimensions are particularly important as regards the technology-
specificity of a given measure: differences in support levels offered to varying 
technologies, and electricity price exposure. Based on these two dimensions, 
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Table 2.1 describes ideal versions of a technology-specific and a technology-
neutral renewables support mix.
First, the support level may differ across technologies. This can be achieved 
in many ways, for instance by developing differing support schemes for various 
technologies, or by allowing certain technologies to be included in more than 
one support scheme. It has become increasingly common for European countries 
to supplement large-scale schemes with highly technology-specific support for 
various types of small-scale technologies, for instance through diversified feed-
in tariffs or investment support rules for certain technologies, like solar. How-
ever, small-scale renewables may also be promoted by rather technology-neutral 
measures, for instance by offering the same investment support to a broad range 
of small-scale technologies. Under certain conditions, the very existence of dif-
ferent support schemes for small and large projects is an element of technology-
specificity in itself.
Electricity certificate schemes and the auctioning model are competition-
oriented solutions, but they rely on different types and degrees of competition. 
The extent of competition-orientation is, for example, dependent on whether 
renewables producers compete for funding in the market or for entrance to the 
market (Leiren 2015). In the ideal version of certificate schemes (Darmani et al. 
2016: 373), all renewable technologies compete in the same market and have the 
same support level. But adjustments can be made in order to achieve a technol-
ogy-specific support level – for instance, by issuing more certificates for some 
technologies than for others, or by creating sub-markets for specific technologies 
(Buckman 2011; Rabe 2007).
As to auctioning-based systems, the number of technologies included in each 
auction will influence whether differing technologies are given differing support 
levels: the more technologies that compete within the same round of auctioning, 
the more similar the support levels offered across technologies will be (CEER 
2018). We may also see geographical differentiation within auctioning schemes: 
differences in remuneration based on where a renewable energy project is located. 
Such criteria help to promote certain technologies in areas where developing these 
technologies would not otherwise be profitable. For example, in Germany, power-
plant location was adopted as a criterion in the renewable energy law, to ensure 
that wind turbines would be profitable also in less windy regions (Leiren and 
Reimer 2021, this book).
Table 2.1 Dimensions of technology-neutral and technology-specific support schemes




Electricity price exposure High Low
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The support that companies compete for within an auctioning scheme may be 
a fixed or premium feed-in. In feed-in systems, governments create technology-
specificity by operating with differing reference prices for differing technologies. 
In feed-in premium schemes, technology-specific support levels are created by 
employing differing methods and/or criteria to calculate support levels across 
technologies (CEER 2018).
The procedures applied for determining whether actors are eligible for sup-
port differ from one support scheme to another, and this may indirectly influence 
differences in support levels across technologies. Electricity certificates, fixed 
feed-in tariffs and investment support entitle the producers of certain renewable 
energy technologies to receive support, whereas auctioning schemes provide sup-
port only to companies who have won a competitive round for financial support. 
Details in the design of support schemes are important for whether the support 
levels across technologies differ. For instance, electricity certificates may be open 
to any producer of renewable electricity in principle, thus offering all renewable 
electricity producers similar levels of support, but this may not necessarily be the 
case in practice. For instance, under the Swedish/Norwegian scheme, the produc-
ers of new, renewable electricity (that is, added production under the scheme) are 
entitled to the same support per MWh delivered on the electricity grid – regardless 
of which technology is used, whether the plant is located in Norway or Sweden 
or whether the additional production comes from building a new plant or from 
updating and expanding an existing one. However, in practice small producers are 
excluded because of an entrance fee (Teknisk Ukeblad 2014).
Also, fixed feed-in tariffs tend to restrict who is eligible. For instance, Germa-
ny’s fixed feed-in scheme, which has been the key support scheme there since the 
1990s, was until 2004 closed to the participation of large corporations and utilities 
(Leiren and Reimer 2021, this book). After 2016, most fixed feed-in schemes have 
included only small-scale projects.
Through competition, auctioning largely ensures that the least costly projects 
are granted support, whereas projects that would be profitable also without sup-
port do not receive support. The outcome of the first German offshore wind tender 
round in 2017 has shown that this may result in no renewables support at all, as 
the two successful bidders received awards for three projects on the basis of a 
price of 0 Euro cents/kWh (Ashurst 2017; on renewable energy costs, see IRENA 
2018).
Second, renewables technologies may to varying degrees be exposed to the 
regular electricity price. In general, technology-specificity decreases where all 
renewable energies are subject to the same market exposure. As the Nordic cer-
tificate schemes are add-ons to the electricity price, all renewables projects in 
these systems are exposed to similar fluctuations in the regular electricity market 
(Darmani et al. 2016). By contrast, traditional fixed feed-in provided renewables 
producers with a fixed price, so few renewables producers were exposed to the 
electricity price at all. The shift to feed-in premium entails greater exposure to the 
electricity price, but this can be achieved in several ways and to varying degrees. 
A feed-in premium can be granted as an add-on, but it may also be calculated on 
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the basis of a more complex equation where the electricity market price is only 
one component (CEER 2018).
By taking into account both dimensions – the score on difference in support lev-
els across technologies, and the score on differences in electricity price exposure – 
we can determine the degree of technology-specificity of a given support-scheme 
mix. In a highly technology-neutral mix, all technologies are offered the same 
support, meaning that there tends to be small, if any, difference in support levels 
across small and large projects.
We do not a priori characterize specific renewables support instruments as either 
technology-specific or technology-neutral. Feed-in tariff schemes tend to be more 
technology-specific because support remuneration is calculated (in part or fully) 
on the basis of technology-specific criteria. However, when feed-in is granted via 
auctions, technology-specificity is reduced as a competitive element is introduced 
into the granting of financial support. The way the auctions are organized and 
their frequency influence the extent to which technology-specificity characterizes 
the setting of the level of remuneration. Electricity certificate schemes are usually 
technology-neutral, but various features can be added that lead to increased tech-
nology-specificity. This applies also to investment support: it may be technology-
neutral if all technologies are offered the same support levels and are equally 
exposed to the general electricity price, but it becomes less technology-neutral 
when varying technologies receive different levels of support. Moreover, most 
countries combine various types of support schemes. The schemes for large-scale 
and small-scale projects and technologies must be seen in conjunction in order to 
get a full picture of the renewables-support mix.
Categorizing technology-specific or technology-neutral 
support schemes
Turning to the mix of renewables support policies in Germany, the UK, Poland, 
France, Sweden and Norway, in which categories do they belong? Drawing on 
the case studies presented in Part II of this book, Table 2.2 summarizes the sup-
port mixes in these six countries.1 All six have specific schemes for small- and for 
large-scale support, although differing terms are used to describe the two.
First, we note that the degree to which different technologies are offered differ-
ent levels of support varies. Technology-specific auctioning is the most common. 
Even when projects based on different technologies are included in the same auc-
tions, differing criteria tend to be applied, so projects based on different technolo-
gies seldom compete directly with each other. Our case-study countries vary as 
to the number of technology categories they have and which technologies are 
accorded the most favourable conditions. All six distinguish between small- and 
large-scale projects – which in itself produces some variance in support levels 
across technologies. We see that whereas Germany, the UK, Poland and France 
apply technology-specific criteria for large-scale as well as small-scale renewa-
bles (except Poland for small-scale), Norway and Sweden offer the same level 
of support to almost all renewables technologies within each of the two broad 
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categories (small- and large-scale). Whereas the main scheme for renewables in 
Norway and Sweden – the electricity certificate scheme – ensures (in theory) that 
electricity from all types of renewables will be granted the same level of support, 
the feed-in premium schemes in Germany, the UK, Poland and France have sup-
port levels that vary with the technology. France has separate auctions for differ-
ent technologies, as does Germany – but from 2018 Germany has a pilot where 
both wind and solar participate in the same competitive rounds. The UK has had a 
few auctions that included many technologies but has still applied highly differing 
criteria for the various technologies.
Norway and Sweden have separate small-scale systems, but this is a very mod-
erate differentiation compared to the many technology-specific categories in the 
other countries. These two Nordic countries also have technology-neutral invest-
ment support schemes for small-scale renewables investment (where small-scale 
solar and windpower investments are granted the same level of support as a range 
of energy-efficiency technologies). The support in Norway is marginal, cover-
ing only installations in residential buildings. Hence, the overall differentiation 
in support level is far more pronounced in Germany, the UK, Poland and France 
than in Sweden or Norway.
Second, the support schemes differ as to the extent to which renewables pro-
jects are exposed to regular electricity prices. Countries with feed-in premiums 
apply various techniques to assess support levels, making comparison difficult. 
In Germany, the feed-in support is a clear add-on to the electricity price, whereas 
Table 2.2  Comparing renewables support schemes in the six case-study countries (2016 
as reference year)








GERMANY Large High High
Small High No
UNITED KINGDOM Large High Some
Small High No
POLAND Large High No
Small Low High
FRANCE Large High Some
Small Low High
SWEDEN Large Low High
Small** Low High
NORWAY Large Low (until 2021)* High
Small** Low High
*  No new Norwegian projects will be included in the electricity certificate scheme after 2021.
** Small projects may be granted large-scale support in addition to small-scale support.
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France uses complex equations to calculate premium tariffs, with electricity prices 
one out of many criteria applied. The British Contracts for Difference provides a 
top-up payment between the market price and a pre-defined ‘strike price’. Poland 
applies reference prices: bids must be below these prices in order to be granted 
support, but projects that are chosen will obtain the price proposed in the auction 
for the whole support period. Within the technology-specific group, Germany’s 
renewables projects are more exposed to the electricity market, making the profit-
ability of renewables unpredictable. Polish renewables are the least exposed to 
electricity prices, but, until 2018, auctions for new support were organized for 
relatively small volumes of electricity at a time.
In Norway and Sweden, electricity certificates and investment support are 
awarded on top of fluctuating electricity prices, making renewables projects far 
more exposed to electricity prices than in the four other countries. Norway is 
to withdraw from the common green certificate scheme with Sweden in 2021, 
although it will continue to offer support for projects that have already been 
included in the scheme. After 2021, possibilities for support in Norway will be 
limited to small-scale electricity production in residential buildings, and with no 
differentiation between technologies.
There are cross-country differences in the design of the support schemes, but 
Germany, the UK, Poland and France have all ended up with support-scheme 
mixes characterized by technology-specificity for both small- and large-scale 
renewable electricity projects. Hence, we group these countries together as having 
a technology-specific approach. In contrast, we place Sweden and Norway – with 
their rather similar technology-neutral support-scheme mixes – in the technology-
neutral category.
In all six case-study countries, the domestic support mix has developed and 
changed through intricate and at times rather opaque political and social pro-
cesses. Indeed, it has been argued that, due to the severity, complexity and scale 
of the climate crisis, energy and climate policy development processes may be 
even more complex than is the case in other areas (Peters et al. 2017).
The shortcomings of basing renewables policy assessment on 
economic factors and technological change
Students of renewable energy policy and energy transitions have applied a range 
of differing theory frameworks to explain renewable energy developments and 
politics. In particular, technological change and economic dependency on fos-
sil fuels are used as explanatory factors. These are obviously important when 
policy-makers decide whether to adopt, change or revise a given renewables 
support mix. For instance, it seems clear that when renewables schemes fail to 
boost the deployment of renewables, this serves as an impetus to change (see e.g. 
Mitchell and Connor 2004). Also, the costs related to different schemes create 
incentives for change (e.g. Boomsma and Linnerud 2015). Although economic-
technological conditions and changes play a key role for renewables deployment 
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and support-mix developments, such perspectives cannot alone explain the sup-
port-mix patterns identified in this book.
Macro-level political economy approaches tend to depict policy-makers as 
responding to economic-technical change, understanding changes in policy as 
related to shifts to instruments more efficient under the new conditions (Dob-
bin 1994: 7). Building on this tradition, Johannes Urpelainen and Michaël Aklin 
(2018: 180) argue that renewables will be more controversial politically in coun-
tries with large capital investments in fossil-fuel infrastructure, and that reduced 
costs of renewables will lead to convergence in domestic renewables policies as 
well as investments.
If economic-technological differences in the energy systems had strong explan-
atory value, then we should be able to identify similarities in energy systems and 
fossil-fuel shares within each of the groups (Germany, the UK, Poland and France 
on the one hand; Sweden and Norway on the other) and clear differences between 
them. However, with the exception of Norway, all these countries started out with 
high fossil-fuel shares in their energy systems in the 1970s; and although all have 
gradually reduced their fossil-fuel dependence, the reduction factors differ signifi-
cantly within the group of technology-specific countries (Global Carbon Project 
2019). Germany, the UK, Poland and France developed similar support schemes, 
even though their energy systems are very different and have followed varying 
change patterns. Whereas Polish electricity production has remained dominated 
by fossil fuels, Germany and the UK have lowered fossil shares, and the fossil 
shares in France have become marginal (Commission 2018: 23). Further, French 
electricity production has historically been totally dominated by centralized 
nuclear energy production; Germany and the UK have significant nuclear shares, 
whereas Poland has no nuclear whatsoever.
Lastly, the growth rates for renewables vary considerably. In 2004, 9% of Ger-
man electricity consumption stemmed from renewables, but this had risen to 34% 
by 2017 (Eurostat 2019). The UK had only 3.5% in 2004, but an impressive 28% 
by 2017. Poland had a meagre 2% in 2004, rising to 13% in 2017, while France 
had 14% in 2004 and 20% by 2017.
There are also sizeable differences in shares of energy source among the two 
technology-neutral Nordic countries. Although Sweden reduced its fossil-fuel 
dependency radically, it never approached the extremely high renewables lev-
els in Norway, where electricity production throughout the period was almost 
100% renewables-based (Global Carbon Project 2019). In Sweden the share of 
renewable-source electricity increased from 51% to 66% from 2004 to 2017 
(Energifakta 2019; Eurostat 2019); however, from the 1980s and onwards, Swe-
den has also had considerable nuclear production, whereas Norway has none 
(Commission 2018: 23).
Thus, we may safely state that investments in differing types of power plants 
and infrastructures cannot provide satisfactory explanations of policy variation. 
Might changes in the cost of renewable energy technology over time provide bet-
ter explanations of the differences and similarities in renewables support mixes?
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Since 2000, the costs of many renewables technologies have decreased. This 
has happened in unforeseen and unpredictable ways, with a surprisingly steep 
reduction process starting around 2008 (IRENA 2013, 2018). The rapid changes 
in costs made it challenging to develop support-scheme mixes that provided stable 
investment incentives without overcompensating renewables investors. The finan-
cial crisis from 2008 and onwards made it even more important for governments 
to control expenditures, including renewables-support spending. After 2010, the 
cost of electricity from bioenergy, hydropower, geothermal and onshore and off-
shore wind had come within the range of fossil-fuel-fired power generation costs 
between 2010 and 2018. In 2018 the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA 2018: 9) concluded that ‘by 2020–2022, all existing available renewable 
power generation options will compete head-to-head with incumbents’. These 
developments reduced the need for renewables support altogether – and yet, most 
countries in our study have adopted encompassing renewables-support mixes 
which are planned to continue until at least 2030. Along every step of the way, 
it has been hard to foresee how costs would develop, and many predictions have 
been proven wrong (see Vox 2015 for an overview of failed predictions). Moreo-
ver, there have been significant differences in cost developments across differing 
renewables technologies and countries (IRENA 2018).
If these dramatic cost reductions provided the key explanation to changes in 
renewables policy, we would expect all countries to respond in similar ways, 
which would also explain the similarities across cases. However, cost reductions 
play differing roles in the six cases presented in this book. Whereas achieving 
cost reductions in renewables was often an important impulse for changes in 
support schemes, the governments in the six case-study countries understood 
and responded to the rapid technological changes between 2005 and 2010 in dif-
fering ways. The UK and Poland responded by shifting away from technology-
neutrality and towards a more technology-specific system, while France and 
Germany responded by making their systems less technology-specific. They all 
ended up with systems that were more similar, but for different reasons. Moreo-
ver, Norway responded by abolishing its large-scale support altogether, whereas 
Sweden continued with its technology-neutral certificate scheme. As a result, the 
two Nordics came to differ more after the cost reductions then they had before. 
In contrast, the financial support for renewables in the technology-specific coun-
tries became more similar, although there is still considerable variation across 
the schemes.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced a new way to characterize and measure dif-
ferences across support-scheme mixes – technology-specific and technology-
neutral mixes. We find that Germany, the UK, Poland and France have largely 
technology-specific mixes, whereas those in Sweden and Norway are far more 
technology-neutral. We have noted some interesting variations, but the differences 
between the two groups are far greater than the similarities. Dominant analytical 
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approaches to explaining variance in renewables support have tended to focus on 
economic and technological factors. We find them poorly suited to explain differ-
ences in support-scheme mixes across countries. The material structure and func-
tioning of the energy systems in our six case-study countries, and global changes 
in the costs of renewable electricity technologies, provide a set of fundamental 
conditions for investments in renewables. However, actual domestic renewables-
support mixes are not a direct result of such technical and economic realities. An 
analytical framework is needed that pays far more attention to political and social 
factors – a major rationale for this book.
The multi-field framework presented in Chapter 3 (Boasson 2021) enables us to 
take into account various kinds of actors’ structural power, as well as the cultural-
institutional features that shape the preferences of these actors, and the many 
multi-dimensional relationships and interdependencies among the wide range of 
actors involved in policy processes.
Note
 1 Only schemes that offer support to new projects are included. Most EU countries also 
provide support to older renewables projects, based on support schemes in operation 
when the projects were originally granted support. Since this book aims to explain the 
state of renewables support as of 2016, the older schemes are not listed in this table.
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The multi-field approach is developed to facilitate study of organizational and 
political factors that shape the development of public policy. Many fields play 
into developments of domestic support-scheme support. Each field has an identifi-
able social architecture: a distinct distribution of structural resources and certain 
specific cultural-institutional characteristics (Boasson 2015: 1). The multi-field 
approach is a spatial, relational approach to understanding how actors interact 
with one another (Kluttz and Fligstein 2016: 186). This unit of analysis – a given 
field – is ‘neither a macro-social process that contains some underlying structural 
logic operating independently of actors (e.g., social class) nor is it a micro-social 
process that focuses on the idiosyncratic preferences and motivations of individ-
ual actors’ (Kluttz and Fligstein 2016: 186). A field is a socially distinct constel-
lation of actors, with varying degrees of internal coherence, unity and autonomy, 
and more or less impenetrable boundaries. Thus, a field is not an actor as such, but 
a distinct social space with some coherence across actors.
In this chapter, we conceptualize three specific fields – the European environ-
ment, the domestic organizational field and the domestic political field – and their 
interrelationships. All three can be seen as social arenas where the actors take one 
another into account; and all have a local social order that constrains, facilitates or 
enables certain behaviours and policy developments (Kluttz and Fligstein 2016: 
186; Scott [2001] 2014). In this chapter, we develop specific expectations that are 
examined in the six case studies presented in Part II of this volume. In turn, these 
expectations form the basis for the systematic comparisons in Part III.
The European environment
We see the European environment as a meta-field, embracing EU-specific devel-
opments as well as what goes on in EU member states. It comprises all the 
domestic political fields and organizational fields in states that are members of, or 
otherwise affiliated to, the European Union, as well as the European Commission 
(the Commission), EU-level agencies, the European Parliament, the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union (CJEU) and non-governmental organizations dealing 
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with specific issue-areas. All EU-affiliated countries are likely to be affected by 
the European environment, although not in the same way or to the same extent.
Vertical Europeanization
In principle, two European renewables policy processes may play out at the same 
time: vertical and horizontal Europeanization. We understand vertical Europe-
anization as top-down EU steering, resulting from the EU having formal authority 
within an issue-area (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 5). Vertical integration will be 
strong when the EU rules in question are detailed and specific; when the Commis-
sion can develop detailed guidelines or templates, monitor and facilitate imple-
mentation; when the Commission and the CJEU have juridical, coercive follow-up 
mechanisms available and when EU agencies and the Commission gather and dis-
tribute significant information (Boasson 2015: 53–58). Early studies of compli-
ance with EU regulations focused on their coerciveness (Mastenbroek 2005). For 
instance, in 2001, Thomas Risse and colleagues saw Europeanization primarily 
as ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance’ (Risse et al. 2001: 3).
The capacity of the EU system to influence policy development at the national 
level depends mainly on the extent to which the EU has formal authority and 
on the ability of the EU organization to gather and distribute information. The 
emergence of new European authority structures does not necessarily mean that 
domestic governance loses importance: such authority structures often supple-
ment national authority structures rather than replace them (Newman 2008: 121). 
Not only will more policy solutions be developed at the European level, but 
national implementation of EU policy is more likely to engage other participants 
than in the case of regular processes of national policy development (Schattsch-
neider 1960: 17–18). Only empirical investigation can show which national actors 
lose influence and which ones may benefit from this change (Jörgens and Solorio 
2017: 11–16).
Like many other policy issues, renewables support schemes concern more than 
one stream of EU steering. Since the 1990s, the EU has had a specific renewables 
energy policy, as well as rules on state aid that have also applied to renewables sup-
port schemes (Boasson 2021, this book). A key element of EU renewables policy 
is the directives on renewables that have been repeatedly revised through ordi-
nary EU legislative procedures (formerly called co-decision). Regarding state aid, 
shifts in the authority of the EU may result from changes in the state-aid rules in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (although this has not occurred 
in the period studied here), changes in the rulings of the CJEU and/or shifts in 
relevant state-aid guidelines adopted by the Commission. Such guidelines must 
draw on the Treaty and CJEU case law; whereas they are not legally binding on 
member states, they are binding on the Commission (Boasson 2021, this book).
As regards information, inter-governmentalists tend to argue that the Commis-
sion has few resources for gathering and distributing information (e.g. Moravcsik 
1999), but others disagree. Multi-level governance perspectives on EU studies 
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underline how the Commission, and to some extent the European Parliament, can 
enhance their structural power by creating and governing pan-European expert 
and policy networks (Eising 2004: 218; Hooghe 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2001; 
Kohler-Koch 1999; Mazey and Richardson 2006). Scholars of public administra-
tion hold that the Commission and the EU agencies have developed significant 
capacities that work rather independently of domestic administrations (Trondal 
2017). In this sense, the Commission may develop superior access to information, 
as well as a potentially superior ability to distribute information.
Vertical Europeanization captures the ‘domestic impact of Europe and the EU’ 
in the sense that domestic actors adapt and change domestic policies and institu-
tions in response to EU rules and regulations (Börzel and Risse 2012: 6). This 
mode of Europeanization will probably have more far-reaching consequences 
when backed by strict coercive measures, but it may also be influential when EU-
level impulses are of a softer character. For instance, member states may respond 
to the Commission’s preparation of new decisions, or political discussions at 
the EU level, and not only to outputs from formal EU-level ruling and decision-
making. After all, a broad array of EU and member-state actors repeatedly and 
continuously engage in discursive, deliberative processes, where new and old 
ideas are discussed, developed and either promoted or dismissed (Schmidt 2018).
EU actors, such as the Commission and the CJEU, may under certain condi-
tions influence domestic developments more than their formal, juridical powers 
might lead us to expect. After all, countries may do more than they are strictly 
obliged to – what Eva Thomann (2015) has called ‘customizing’, as when coun-
tries adopt policies in a way that leads to more and/or stricter rules and practices 
than required (Thomann 2015: 1370). For instance, member states may adopt 
more encompassing renewables support mixes than EU law obliges them to do, or 
interpret EU state-aid guidelines in a more restrictive way than strictly required. 
Still, we expect vertical Europeanization to shape domestic support-scheme mix 
developments more when the EU has gained superior structural powers (author-
ity and information) within the issue-area in question.
Because the countries examined here have differed in their relationships to the 
EU during the period under study, we do not expect them to be influenced to the 
same extent and in the same way by vertical Europeanization. For instance, a 
country that joined the EU late (like Poland) and one that is not a full member of 
the EU (Norway) will probably be less influenced by vertical Europeanization.
Horizontal Europeanization
Europeanization may also influence national developments through means other 
than top-down EU steering. Horizontal Europeanization refers to how ideas, 
measures or policy designs may diffuse across countries and fields within the 
European environment through socialization, contestation, deliberation, learning 
and the construction of broader systems of meanings and collective understand-
ings (Boasson 2015; Börzel and Risse 2012; Cowles and Risse 2001: 219; Jörgens 
and Solorio 2017: 12–13). This mode of Europeanization plays out irrespective of 
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EU-level developments and entails a broad array of horizontal linkages and inter-
actions. In 2001, Maria Green Cowles and Thomas Risse (2001: 219) pointed out 
how Europeanization consists of constructing systems of meanings and collec-
tive understandings, not merely systems of authority. Claudio Radaelli (2003: 30) 
has conceptualized EU policy development as an institutional process, centred on 
emergence and diffusion of ‘ways of doing things’ as well as shared beliefs and 
norms.
Horizontal Europeanization centres on the processes whereby actors redefine 
their beliefs and preferences as a result of what other actors are doing, and the 
socialization process they are part of (Dobbin et al. 2007: 452; March and Olsen 
1989). Horizontal Europeanization has been variously labelled ‘policy diffusion’, 
‘horizontal policy learning’, ‘policy convergence’ or ‘policy transfer’ (Börzel and 
Risse 2012; Jörgens and Solorio 2017: 12–16). Policy recipes begin to diffuse 
because countries mimic each other, learn from each other or compete with each 
other; the existence of European-wide networks or expert groups may enhance 
these effects (Dobbin et al. 2007: 452). For instance, a country may aim to develop 
a renewables support mix that is rather similar to what others have – although it 
is adjusted to special domestic circumstances (Dobbin et al. 2007: 457–459). The 
cumulative effect of many countries adopting the same policy recipe will create 
‘peer pressure’ among countries (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 903).
According to the neo-institutional literature, when a policy recipe diffuses, it 
gains legitimacy, and the pressure on individual actors to adjust to the new policy 
idea will increase (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 
1997; Meyer and Rowan 1977). The more countries that have adopted a certain 
model, the stronger will be the pressure for others to adopt it (Meyer and Rowan 
1977). The actions of large and dominant countries within an issue-area may be 
particularly important. Hence, the more a specific policy recipe dominates within 
the European environment, the more likely is it to affect domestic-level devel-
opments in any given country. This may take place when the idea for design-
ing a given support scheme is adopted by many countries at the same time and/
or the idea is discussed and promoted within organizational and political fields 
across the entire European environment. We expect horizontal Europeanization to 
dominate domestic support-scheme mix developments more when one particular 
support-scheme idea gains popularity across the European environment.
Expectations
Horizontal and vertical Europeanization may operate rather independently of each 
other – indeed, under certain conditions, they may even counteract each other – 
whereas at other times they may have a reinforcing effect. For instance, increased 
horizontal coherence may underpin the emergence of strong EU steering – or 
stronger EU steering may spark horizontal coherence.
Table 3.1 shows how the two dimensions of Europeanization may relate to each 
other, and how they in conjunction can have a bearing on how the European envi-
ronment will influence domestic support-scheme developments. EU governing 
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Table 3.1 Four modes of Europeanization
Vertical Europeanization The EU is superior Distributed responsibility
Horizontal Europeanization
Coherence EU GOVERNING HORIZONTAL 
Drives domestic policy HARMONIZATION
developments
Diversity UNPREDICTABLE EU 1000 FLOWERS
GOVERNING Domestic developments 
largely disconnected from 
European developments
Source: Revised version of Boasson (2015: 55).
and 1000 flowers are contrasting modes. With EU governing, the EU has the 
upper hand in the policy area, and one policy model dominates: the EU is verti-
cally superior, and there is horizontal coherence across the EU/EEA. In such situ-
ations, national actors will likely have few ideas for the design of an alternative 
renewables support scheme – but if they want to adopt different schemes, they 
will not have much opportunity to bend the steering signals coming from the EU. 
However, as EU steering relies on member-state support, this is not a completely 
top-down situation. Also in issue-areas where the Commission enjoys consider-
able leeway, such as state aid, the Commission will be partly constrained by the 
member states. There will be continuous and close dialogue between EU-level 
fields and domestic fields in EU governing situations, but in the end, the EU-level 
decisions will count more for domestic developments. Changes as well as con-
tinuities in domestic support schemes will be closely related to developments at 
the EU level.
The 1000 flowers (from the dictum made famous by Mao Zedong, ‘let a thou-
sand flowers bloom’) will operate when vertical Europeanization (formal respon-
sibility distributed among member states) and horizontal Europeanization are 
weak (wide diversity in national approaches). This will be the situation for new 
policy areas not yet covered by EU policy, but it may also occur where the EU has 
failed to agree on any specific policies and member states apply a panoply of dif-
ferent policy measures. In such cases, domestic policy developments will interact 
with the larger European environment only if instigated by national-level actors: 
it is the national conditions that determine whether the domestic support-scheme 
mix will be influenced by the European environment.
Horizontal harmonization will occur when strong horizontal Europeanization 
promotes a given renewables support-scheme design, but the EU has not been 
granted much formal authority to promote this design: the harmonization will 
result from countries influencing, mimicking, learning or competing with each 
other. Waves of similar support schemes may be created, but primarily because 
the domestic fields are open to European impulses. Also, there may be significant 
variation in how a particular support scheme idea is interpreted nationally. The 
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cross-country interaction between domestic fields increase, but with less interac-
tion between the EU fields and domestic fields.
Lastly, unpredictable EU governing may emerge in cases where the EU has 
been granted considerable authority but many policy models are in use. Conflicts 
over how to interpret the EU rules will be rampant, and the room for negotia-
tion between national governments and the EU considerable. Potentially the EU 
has considerable power, but its actual influence on national policy outcomes will 
hinge largely on the strategic capabilities of national actors and their bargaining 
skills.
The role and importance of the European environment will always depend on 
how it relates to and interacts with the domestic fields, but we expect the Euro-
pean environment to:
• dominate the development of national renewable energy policies more when 
vertical Europeanization is strong and horizontal Europeanization is coherent, 
so that one specific support-scheme mix gains superiority (EU governing).
Domestic organizational fields
John W. Kingdon ([1984] 2011) has argued that various policy issues will be 
embedded in different ‘policy communities’. In line with this, we hold that poli-
cies will be embedded in domestic organizational fields made up of specialists 
in a given policy area. An organizational field consists of governmental bodies, 
regulators, industry, business organizations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) relating to a certain policy, such as renewables support mixes. Organi-
zational fields are issue- or industry-specific configurations of governmental and 
private organizations, characterized by identifiable structural interrelationships 
and certain common institutional understandings. To understand how organiza-
tion fields influence policy development, we need to explore their social architec-
ture and how this changes over time and varies across fields.
Varying organizational fields will have varying structural and institutional 
characteristics. Initially, sociological institutionalists tended to define organiza-
tional fields as fairly unified, but it is now widely recognized that there will be 
major variation across fields (Wooten and Hoffman 2017). Further, as pointed 
out by Baumgartner and Jones ([1993] 2009: 6), historical factors will render 
some policy areas open to change at certain times but not others. Kingdon notes 
that some communities ‘are extremely closed and tightly knit’, while others are 
more ‘diverse and fragmented’ (Kingdon [1984] 2011: 118). In the 1980s, sev-
eral network scholars developed typologies aimed at capturing such variation 
(for a review, see Börzel 1998). For instance, Rhodes and Marsh placed their 
network types on a continuum ranging from highly integrated policy communi-
ties on the one end to loosely integrated issue networks at the other (Rhodes and 
March 1992). More recently, scholars of regulatory capture have explicitly rec-
ognized that different kinds of state–business relations will produce variance in 
policy influence. For instance, Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss (2014: 11) 
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distinguish between strong capture and weak capture, adding that ‘to the extent 
capture exists, it prevails by degrees rather than by its presence and absence’.
All the same, we need deeper and more general insights into how different 
industry–government nexuses may influence policy developments. Lack of a com-
mon terminology has hindered the emergence of a cumulative research tradition.
Structural resources
The social architecture of organizational fields may vary along structural as well as 
cultural-institutional dimensions. Firstly, the distribution of structural resources, 
such as authority and information, will influence the importance of the organi-
zational field for policy-making. The distribution of authority will be shaped by 
laws and regulations, economic agreements between firms, organizational charts, 
ownership structures and so forth (Scott et al. 2000: 358–400). Neil Fligstein and 
Doug McAdam (2012: 14) argue that a field may be hierarchically governed, or 
characterized by collaboration among fairly equal organizations; the latter opens 
the way to looser coordination and competition between several groups.
Whether public or private organizations possess more authority and control of 
information will vary from field to field. Governmental organizations may have 
the upper hand in more regulated industries, but strong regulatory traditions may 
also create firm bonds between corporate and public organizations (Carpenter and 
Moss 2014). Further, in industries dominated by a few corporations, authority 
may be concentrated among a small group of corporate executives, whereas it 
will tend to be more evenly distributed in industries with many small organiza-
tions (Egeberg 2003: 7; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Olsen 1983). Actors with 
superior authority may have significant control of information, but it may also be 
that other actors control the two sources of structural power (Boasson 2015: 49).
Concerning climate and energy technologies and investments, commercial 
organizations will generally have more information than public actors. A govern-
ment may remain independent of the information provided by industry only if 
it possesses substantial organizational capacity and in-house technical-economic 
expertise. If formal requirements give the government access to detailed com-
mercial information, this can create a more level playing field with respect to 
information distribution. Against this backdrop, we expect the organizational field 
to dominate policy development more when structural resources (authority and 
information) are concentrated.
Institutional logics
The influence and role of the organizational field will also depend on the degree 
of cultural-institutional unity. Early organizational field studies portrayed the 
institutional features of these fields as rather unified. For instance, DiMaggio 
and Powell ([1983] 1991: 65) argued that the ‘development of mutual aware-
ness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a com-
mon enterprise’ provided an institutional ‘glue’ that caused all actors in a given 
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organizational field to resemble each other, for instance by adopting similar norms 
and worldviews.
Similarly, Lowi (1964: 689) argued that established expectations and history of 
earlier decisions create particular understandings and mind-sets. Eventually, cer-
tain professional norms will come to define the ‘proper’ ways of doing things, and 
rules of the game that serve established interests will become entrenched (Lowi 
1969: 92). Hence, a field’s origin and the ensuing social processes shape its insti-
tutional hallmarks. The more closely knit the community is, the more likely it is 
to generate common outlooks, orientations and ways of thinking (Kingdon [1984] 
2011: 119; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006; Scott et al. 2000; Selznick 1957). 
Moreover, cultural-institutional unity is likely to contribute to making organi-
zational fields more influential, whereas internal conflict will have the opposite 
effect: ‘if the group is plagued by internal dissension, its effectiveness is seriously 
impaired’ Kingdon ([1984] 2011: 52).
The issue of change, rather than stability, has gained increasing attention in 
organizational field studies (Wooten and Hoffman 2017). The introduction of the 
term ‘intuitional logic’ has played a major role in this analytical transition. An 
institutional logic provides a basically coherent template for how to act in dif-
ferent situations (Boasson 2015: 50; Thornton 2004; Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 
2008). Logics are the basis for action: they shape which issues and problems to 
attend to, and what answers and solutions are available (Thornton 2004: 13–14). 
Different logics will embody different senses of rationality and create different 
expectations as to how persons may behave in various situations (March and 
Olsen 1989; Thornton et al. 2012: 9).
Shifts in institutional logics may lead to radical changes in the actions of field-
level members (see e.g. Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Thornton 2004; Wooten 
and Hoffman 2017). This means that if dominance shifts from one logic to another, 
field-level actors will change their views, perhaps promoting policy measures that 
they had previously rejected. The existence of multiple institutional logics enables 
actors to challenge existing orders as well as propose new policy options (Louns-
bury 2007: 302; Reay and Hinings 2009). For instance, actors who are dissatisfied 
with a given policy will be strengthened if they can argue that it contradicts the 
dominant logic, and if they can propose a new policy measure more in line with 
the dominant logic.
Thornton (2004) has specified several important institutional logics in modern 
societies; more recently, Boasson (2015: 50–52) has pinpointed the logics that 
play out in relation to climate policy development. Building on these contribu-
tions, we present two ideal types of institutional logics relating to promotion of 
renewable energy: the market logic and the technology development logic.
First, the market logic draws on environmental economics (Boasson 2015: 51). 
The basic assumption is that commercial organizations possess near-perfect 
information and are capable of acting strategically on this information. Firms are 
expected to strive to maximize their profits in a medium- to long-term perspec-
tive, and governments will work to ensure that renewables investments become 
more profitable. Support schemes should encourage market actors to compete in 
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developing the most profitable renewables projects. Thereby the ‘best’ projects 
will be developed, and the actors that manage to develop the most profitable pro-
jects will be rewarded with the greatest profits. While some economists argue that 
only those projects that require the lowest level of support in order to break even 
should be awarded renewables subsidies, others are open for support schemes that 
also award support to projects that are profitable at the outset (Boasson 2015).
Second, the technology development logic is based on technological rather 
than economic criteria (Boasson 2015: 50–52). It is assumed that emergence of 
increased renewables shares will hinge on technological innovation and its sub-
sequent refinement. Commercial organizations will aim to enhance technological 
development, with government ensuring good and stable conditions that enable 
them to do so. It is the technical quality of the alternatives to conventional produc-
tion that determines the support levels, so various technologies will receive differ-
ing levels of support. Further, in this logic, support schemes are designed to ensure 
long-term stability, so that commercial actors may invest the time and resources 
needed to refine the technologies in which they have greatest expertise (Sims 
et al. 2007: 306). In line with this approach are feed-in tariff schemes that guar-
antee renewable-energy producers access to the grid, a fixed level of operational 
support and varying levels of support for different technologies (Boasson 2015: 
50–52). Here the incentives for competitive behaviour and cost minimization will 
be weak. Whereas the market logic favours technology-neutral support schemes, 
the technology-development logic favours technology-specific measures.
We seek to detect these logics in our empirical case studies, expecting variation 
in logics across countries. As institutional logics ‘are historically contingent and 
evolve and change over time’ (Ocasio et al. 2017: 511), we may also be able to 
detect significant changes in logics over time. Not least, it is reasonable to assume 
variation in the extent to which organizational fields will be full of conflict. As 
noted, fields will tend to influence policy development more when they are united. 
Hence, we expect the organizational field to dominate policy development more 
when one institutional logic is superior, than if the field is rife with conflicts.
Expectations
Understanding how the organizational fields influence developments in renewa-
bles support schemes requires assessing the structural and cultural-institutional 
aspects in conjunction. Table 3.2 presents segmentation and pluralism as contrast-
ing modes. Segmentation will be in operation when structural power is largely 
concentrated and one professional logic dominates, implying a basically shared 
view on the promotion of renewable electricity. In such situations, ‘some pol-
icy experts enjoy tremendous freedom of action, seldom being called upon to 
justify their actions’ (Baumgartner and Jones [1993] 2009: 8); moreover, ‘there 
tends to be a single understanding of the underlying policy question’ (ibid.: 26). 
Various labels have been used to describe segmented organizational fields, like 
‘interest-group liberalism’ (Lowi 1969), ‘segmentation’ (Egeberg et al. 1978; 
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Hernes 1983: 290; Lieberson 1971) ‘iron triangles’ (Hernes 1983: 291), ‘regula-
tory capture’ (Carpenter and Moss 2014) and ‘policy monopolies’ (Baumgartner 
and Jones [1993] 2009: 7).
Such organizational fields have a fairly hierarchical structure, with one organi-
zation or a small group of closely aligned organizations at the top. Policy studies 
and sociological institutionalism literatures point in the same direction: that the 
importance of the organizational field to the policy outcome will be most signifi-
cant in such situations. The field can be expected to influence policy more when 
this mechanism is in operation. Note, however, that it is primarily the dominant 
actors that will leave a deep footprint in such situations, while marginal actors will 
be less important.
In contrast, the pluralism mechanism will be in operation when structural 
resources are fairly evenly distributed and many different logics are in opera-
tion. Various actors will have the opportunity to influence policy development. 
As there will be many parallel disagreements, a broad range of minor conflicts 
can be expected to erupt in relation to all kinds of decision-making situations. 
While many pluralist approaches to public policy have held that mobilization of 
some groups will automatically lead to counter-mobilization, we do not expect to 
see this in pluralist organizational fields (Lowi 1964; Schmitter 1974). Instead, in 
situations where few have an intense interest in an issue, the overall influence of 
the organizational field on policy-making is likely to be meagre. To the extent that 
the field influences designs for renewables support, this will underpin the devel-
opment of a set of a diverse and inconsistent mix. We may also see many shifts 
and turns in support mixes over time.
Not all fields can be subsumed within one of these two extreme modes. Col-
laboration is likely in fields where structural resources are rather evenly distrib-
uted and most participants follow the same professional logic. Actors will tend to 
have fairly similar viewpoints, and the level of conflict will be correspondingly 
low. There may be incremental change in support-scheme mixes, but as long as 
this mode dominates, major shifts are not expected. The turf battle mechanism is 
a tougher version of pluralism, where actors disagree strongly and mobilization is 
met with counter-mobilization. This mode of influence will emerge when struc-
tural power is fairly concentrated but varying logics are in conflict.
Table 3.2 Four modes of the organizational field
 Structural pattern Concentrated Distributed
Institutional pattern
One dominant logic SEGMENTATION COLLABORATION
Drives policy development
Several logics TURF BATTLE PLURALISM
Low importance
Source: Revised version of Boasson (2015: 48).
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Against this backdrop, we expect the organizational field to:
• dominate the development of national renewable energy policies more when 
characterized by centralized structural resources and one institutional logic 
(segmentation).
While political fields will relate to organizational fields, and often be influenced 
by them, they operate in a different way. Kingdon ([1984] 2011) is one of a few 
scholars who have argued for a clear analytical separation of organizational and 
political fields (which he often refers to as the ‘politics’ stream and the ‘policy’ 
stream). Since the two are ‘largely governed by different forces, different con-
siderations, and different styles’ (Kingdon [1984] 2011: 88), we need differing 
analytical tools to understand how and under which conditions these two fields 
influence policy development. Let us now turn to the nature and dynamics of 
political fields.
Domestic political fields
Political fields cover the whole range of political actors: political party organi-
zations, legislative assemblies and committees, governmental executives and 
the political leaders of the governmental ministries (Boasson 2015: 38–46). It is 
rarely meaningful to talk of one national political field. Rather, politicians in the 
various parliamentary committees, ministries and political parties will probably 
be involved in several different political fields, centred around differing policy 
issues. The structural and cultural-institutional character of the field in question 
will tend to influence the behaviour of political actors in significant ways. As in 
other fields, political actors take the actions and positions of others into account 
in deciding how to approach a given issue (DiMaggio and Powell ([1983] 1991; 
Kluttz and Fligstein 2016).
The comparative politics literature consists of an array of strong sub-
literatures – some focusing on political parties or parties on governments, oth-
ers examining the roles and voting behaviour of the legislature. By contrast, the 
political field approach aims at assessing the special role of the political realm at 
large, with respect to the development of specific policy issue-areas. The volumi-
nous political science literature shows that politics have immense importance in 
democratic societies, but significant disagreement persists as to how and to what 
extent domestic political governing plays into policy development. By combining 
insights from policy process theories, various comparative politics literatures and 
neo-institutional sociology, the political field perspective enables us to develop 
a more coherent understanding of the relative importance of politics for policy.
The political sociology literature of the 1950s and 1960s tended to regard 
political parties in European countries as representing certain ‘pre-defined sectors 
of society’, with strong ties to various societal groups (Katz and Mair 1995: 7). 
For instance, Stein Rokkan (1966) regarded political parties and interest groups 
as manifestations of underlying social cleavages. However, from the 1990s and 
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onwards, it has become common to regard political parties as less dependent on 
such ties and increasingly reliant on the electorate channel (Katz and Mair 1995: 7). 
In certain issue-areas and countries, there remain deep ties between organizational 
fields and political parties, but by analytically distinguishing between the political 
and the organizational fields we can explore their relative importance, as well as 
their interactions and interrelationship.
The political field approach contrasts with the ‘partisan influence’ literature, 
where it is assumed that there will be clear and consistent differences in the posi-
tions of left-wing and right-wing political parties, and that differences in the party 
composition of governments will lead to predictable variation in policy devel-
opment (see reviews in Schmidt 1996; Schmitt 2016). This literature primarily 
examines issues that fall in line with established societal cleavages, such as wel-
fare or fiscal policies. Climate and energy policy tends to cross across traditional 
cleavages, many voters have inconsistent views, and which climate sub-issues 
gain salience differ across countries (Gullberg and Aardal 2019; Pidgeon 2012).
Like other fields, the political field shares structural as well as institutional 
characteristics. Here we explore each aspect in turn, before examining them in 
conjunction and developing our expectations.
Structural resources
Structurally, political fields tend to involve considerable formal authority, but 
little expertise. The distribution of structural resources in a given country will 
depend on the character of its political system, election results, alliances between 
political parties in the Parliament and in government and the special characteris-
tics of the policy area in question. In the following, we discuss why concentration 
of structural resources within the political field contributes to reducing the policy 
influence of the field, whereas the distribution of resources has the opposite effect 
(see also Boasson 2015).
First, the distribution of political positions among political parties (the distribu-
tion of votes among parliamentary blocs and the composition of the government) 
delegates authority among the political parties. The relative importance of the 
legislative assembly, the government and the ministries will differ from country 
to country – depending on whether the political system is presidential, parlia-
mentarian, federal or whatever. Moreover, the distribution of authority may vary 
from one issue-area to another (Baumgartner and Jones [1993] 2009: 32; Egeberg 
2003; Skocpol 1985: 17).
Richard Rose (1969, 1974) and Richard S. Katz (1987) argue that a party will 
tend to have greater influence when it occupies the positions with highest author-
ity, when key decisions are made by elected officials, clear policy stands are 
developed through party internal processes, and the party occupies enough posi-
tions to be able to take active part in policy development. However, as has become 
increasingly clear, ‘these conditions are becoming marked more by their absence 
than by their presence in contemporary European politics’ (Mair 2008: 225–226), 
although less so in two-party systems, as in the UK. Today, coalition governments 
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of various types, as well as minority governments, have become dominant in 
Europe (Sagarzazu and Klüver 2017; Strøm and Müller 2000). This changes the 
conditions for political governing, also making it more important to capture the 
dynamics between the broad range of political parties, whether they are in govern-
ment or not. Even though single, large parties still play important roles as devel-
opers of policy positions, actual executive decisions tend to be developed through 
negotiations and bargaining between differing parties and legislative committees. 
In contrast to Rose and Katz, we do not focus on specific parties but hold that the 
political field as such tends to play a more important role when formal authority is 
distributed among many several political parties and ministries.
Second, authority is also rooted in the executive branch of the governmental 
apparatus. The issue-specific formal distribution of powers among different parts 
of the government will affect how many ministers pay attention to an issue. While 
the composition of parliaments and governments changes fairly often, the distri-
bution of authority regarding certain political arenas tends to be determined by 
formal rules, some of which are difficult to change, such as constitutions (Pierson 
2004: 120–121). In most European democracies, a cabinet minister is the political 
head of a major department of state. This minister directs a team of senior civil 
servants and has overall responsibility for policy initiation and administration in 
a key area of state activity (Gallagher et al. 2011: 33–37). However, with climate 
and energy policy, many issues fall under the authority of several ministers, dif-
fusing the authority over the issue.
Authority can be said to be more ‘concentrated’ when the results of an election 
create a clear majority – consisting of one party or a well-aligned coalition of par-
ties, and when one ministry is in charge of a given issue (like climate or energy 
policy). In contrast, it will be ‘distributed’ when there is a minority government or 
a coalition government with differing views on the issue, and the Parliament has 
formal decision-making powers over the issue-area.
As for the distribution of information, the most striking thing is the lack of it. 
Most politicians are generalists, who rarely rely on detailed, technical types of 
expertise (Kingdon [1984] 2011: 37). As Martin Minogue ([1983] 1993: 16) has 
noted, ‘information is frequently inadequate or simply not available . . . informa-
tion is a resource, to be used and manipulated’. Because the parties in government 
have access to experts in the administrative apparatus, they tend to have more 
information than parties that are represented only in the legislative assembly. The 
governing parties can also to some extent steer which information is available to 
others. The better the access of oppositional politicians to alternative information 
sources, the less of a power-tool control over information will be for the parties 
in government. And if the legislators are not formally involved in the decision-
making, they will be less informed and hence unlikely to evince interest in a given 
political issue.
We expect the political field to influence policy development more when struc-
tural resources (authority and information) are more broadly distributed. When 
structural resources are concentrated, an issue-area may escape political steering 
altogether. Under such conditions, the lack of political engagement will tend to 
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move problem-solving downwards to the ministerial bureaucracy, or be resolved 
in negotiations between civil servants and corporate actors (Boasson 2015: 166). 
Then, the responsible minister will have few incentives for paying much atten-
tion. If the minister happens to have a special interest in the subject, that person 
will be in a very powerful position. Things will be radically different if authority 
and information are spread within the political field: the more political actors 
who share responsibility for an issue, the more information the politicians will 
have, with greater incentives for engaging and giving priority to it. In organization 
fields, however, the contrary will apply: the concentration of structural power will 
enhance the fields’ influence over policy-making.
High- and low-salience scripts
The political field has other social norms, rules and understandings than those 
generally found in other parts of society. Because time is scarce, politicians often 
resort to institutionalized, cognitive scripts to make decisions about which issues 
to pay deeper attention to, and which to down-prioritize. In the following, we pre-
sent the two contrasting cognitive scripts for low- and high-salience issues. These 
scripts exist independently of specific policy areas; they are coherent recipes for 
how to behave in relation to specific issues. Whether the high- or low-salience 
script is attached to an issue will have major importance for how and to what 
extent the political field will influence policy development within that issue-area. 
This holds true for schemes for renewable energy support – in focus here – but 
also for many other issues as well.
Inspired by March and Olsen’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ approach (1989), 
Donald Searing (2012: xxv) has argued that politicians think a great deal about 
which behaviours are appropriate under differing circumstances. Pepper D. Cul-
pepper (2011: 180) draws on some of the same thinking when he highlights how 
the political dynamics of low-salience issues differ from those of high-salience 
issues. ‘Political salience’ here concerns how important (in relation to other cur-
rent issues) politicians from across the spectrum perceive an issue to be in the 
ongoing political debates – not how important the issue is for individual politi-
cal parties. When an issue gains high salience across the political spectrum, it 
prompts politicians to base their behaviour on a different political cognitive script 
from the one they follow in relation to low-salience issues. These scripts can be 
seen as two different types of ‘behavioural patterns or routines that legislators 
[and other politicians] adopt’ and ‘can be viewed as strategies for the employment 
of scarce resources’ (Strøm 1997: 155)’. High- and low-salience scripts are insti-
tutionalized, behavioural patterns – but which issue-areas are understood as high 
salience may change over time.
Multiple, interrelated objectives motivate politicians, but they undertake more 
strategic thinking in relation to high- than low-salience issues. Most political par-
ties aim to increase the number of votes, secure control over the governmental 
executive, and maximize their impact on public policy, but it is always challeng-
ing to assess how the three objectives influence each other (Strøm and Müller 
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2000). Because there ‘are plenty of competing demands on a legislator’s time 
and attention’, we need analytical tools that can help us make sense of political 
behaviour (Strøm 1997: 171). Distinguishing between political cognitive scripts 
for high- and low-salience issues can be one such tool.
Note that ‘salience’ is understood differently here than in election saliency 
research, which explores how salience of an issue varies across political parties, 
and focuses on how political parties selectively highlight policy issues in order to 
attract voter support (Budge 2015). Drawing on Culpepper (2011: 4), we focus on 
the perceived importance of given issues, relative to other political issues, across 
the political field. Whereas Culpepper argues that the salience of an issue is a result 
of its actual characteristics – its technical complexity in particular – we do not see 
the salience of an issue as something constant. Much like market actors adjust their 
behaviour to what other producers do, politicians position themselves in relation 
to other politicians (White 1981: 518). Modern political parties conduct polling to 
learn about public preferences, but they still have difficulty assessing the relative 
salience of an issue among the public (Culpepper 2011: 7). It is easier for political 
actors to get a sense of how salient an issue is within the political field. Table 3.3 
identifies five major differences between high- and low-salience cognitive scripts.
First of all, high-salience policy areas are subject to intense political competi-
tion – low-salience issues are not. Political actors have a shared sense of the posi-
tions of other actors in the field (Kluttz and Fligstein 2016: 191), but they pay more 
attention to how their peers relate to high-salience than they do to low-salience 
issues. With high-salience issues, politicians will develop their positions in reac-
tion to the positions of others and will generally be consistent with positions they 
have had before. By contrast, with low-salience issues, political actors will be 
much more open to inputs from organized actors. Here, individual policy-makers 
Table 3.3 Two cognitive scripts in the political field
       Salience High Low
Behavioural
cognitive elements
Awareness of others’ High, competitive Low, collaborative approach.
positions approach.
Preferences Highly normative, Unclear and ill-defined
simplified, general, 
differences amplified.
Consistency High. Incremental changes Low. Radical shifts over time.
over time.
Reason for engaging in Policy influence. Symbolic attention towards 
the issue voters. Bargaining chip to be used 
in negotiations.
Key cause of policy Change in political majority New inputs from outside the field, 
change or political compromises. or initiatives from politicians with 
additional time and energy.
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with special personal interest in the issue and time available to devote to the issue 
can have huge importance (Cohen et al. 1979: 26).
Second, in low-salience issue-areas, politicians will tend to have ill-defined 
preferences (Boasson 2015: 164–167; Cohen et al. 1979; Kingdon [1984] 2011). 
With low-salience issues, politicians will tend to adopt positions only after certain 
policy actions have been endorsed, as by a party in government or during parlia-
mentary decision-making (Boasson 2015: 134–156). Hence, with low-salience 
issues, preferences emerge through action, while preferences tend to serve as a 
basis for action in high-salience issues (Cohen et al. 1979).
Further, politicians will aim to simplify the lines of conflict in high-salience 
issues – for instance, by portraying the disagreement as being between high and 
low moral attitudes, and shying away from complexities related to the design and 
implementation of public policies (Boasson 2015: 83–109). Politicians may also 
portray their positions as more unique and different from those of other political 
actors than is actually the case. In relation to climate issues, politicians may char-
acterize their favoured policy option as the only possible position that will con-
tribute to mitigation – for instance, by presenting their favoured support scheme 
for renewables as the only scheme that will lead to higher renewables shares, 
while denigrating other design options as undermining renewables and climate 
mitigation altogether (Boasson 2015: 109–133).
Third, because shifting stances may signal uncertainty and weak leadership, 
in high-salient issue-areas, political actors will seek to frame their positions as 
stable and consistent over time. However, they will also be eager to influence 
policy development (Strøm and Müller 2000: 9). It can be challenging to align 
these two concerns. Politicians will aim to adopt positions that are ambigu-
ous enough to allow them to engage in compromises, but there are limits 
as to how far a political party can stray. Political positions on salient issues 
will tend to be rather sticky, but be more readily subject to change in low-
salience issue-areas (Boasson 2015: 134–156). Here, possibilities for brief 
positive media attention and symbolic gains can tempt politicians to jump to 
conclusions – and, unlike the case with high-salience areas, neither the politi-
cians themselves nor the electorate are likely to remember their prior positions 
in the longer term.
Fourth, in high-salience issue-areas, political actors like to portray themselves 
as influential (Kingdon [1984] 2011: 39) and work systematically to influence 
decision-making. To this end, they will try to learn as much as they can and be 
active, also in relation to small and detailed matters relating to the issue (Boas-
son 2015: 83–108). Bargaining and negotiations will play out in multiple arenas: 
within political parties, within the state executive, between parliamentary coali-
tions, and in the media. As the political landscape in most European countries has 
become increasingly fragmented, cross-party arenas have become more important 
for deliberations than party-internal processes. Political jockeying will be less 
evident in relation to low-salience issues. Here, politicians will tend to be reac-
tive, rather uncritically aligning with positions developed by others, and pay little 
attention to the issue in connection with major political bargains, for instance 
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when political platforms and governmental platforms are negotiated (Boasson 
2015: 134–156).
Since it is important to be on the winning team in high-salience issues, parties 
will be less willing to agree to policy sacrifices. In such situations, politicians 
will search for compromises that enable all parties involved in the deal to present 
themselves as consistent and as winners (Boasson 2015: 164–167). If they fail to 
identify such compromises, the political competition over the issue may move 
political opponents further away from each other.
Fifth, as political actors are unlikely to change their positions radically in high-
salience issues, governments tend to give stable, long-term steering signals in 
such issue-areas. Governmental policy will tend to shift if the political majority 
changes. By contrast, in low-salience issues with less at stake, politicians from all 
parties will be more willing to make concessions to other parties, and their posi-
tions will be far less stable.
It follows from this that the political field will tend to influence policy devel-
opment in high-salience issue-areas far more than in low-salience issue-areas. 
High-salience scripts can be coupled to only a handful of issues at a time, but 
while some issues are salient for only a brief period, others may remain salient for 
a decade or more (Boasson 2015: 164–167).
Expectations
By taking both the structural and cognitive script dimensions into account, we can 
better specify under what conditions the political fields will have most influence 
on developments in renewables support schemes. As Table 3.4 shows, legislature 
governing and ministerial governing are contrasting modes. Legislature govern-
ing will be at work when the structural powers (authority and information) are 
distributed and politicians act in line with the high-salience script. Here, almost 
all aspects related to the issue will be subjected to political deliberation, and poli-
ticians across the spectrum will do their utmost to win small and large decision-
situations relating to the issue. They will follow each other closely, and even very 
minor issues may become contended.
Table 3.4 Four modes of the political field
 Structural pattern Concentrated Distributed
Cognitive script
High Salience POLITICIZING LEGISLATURE 
GOVERNING
Drives policy development
Low Salience MINISTERIAL RANDOM DECISION-
GOVERNING MAKING
Low policy importance
Source: Revised version of Boasson (2015: 39).
A dynamic multi-field approach 49
In legislature governing situations, the political field will be relatively stronger 
as compared with other fields. Politicians will devote considerable energy to an 
issue, paying close attention to how it is dealt with in other fields. The issue will 
be high on the agenda when party programmes are to be developed, annual meet-
ings held, government coalitions formed and state budgets negotiated. Politicians 
will take the lead – not interest groups, bureaucrats or international developments. 
This situation can endure for many years, but not indefinitely (Boasson 2015; 
Downs 1972).
In ministerial governing situations, structural power is concentrated, and nei-
ther other parts of the executive government nor the Parliament have much formal 
authority. The low-salience script is dominant. Few other politicians are commit-
ted to the issue; it is up to the minister with the formal power to decide whether 
and how to intervene in a policy area. Because the issue has low salience, the 
minister will normally have little to gain (in terms of popularity and media atten-
tion) from becoming involved – and will therefore get involved only if that person 
has time to spare and personal motivation. In practice, this gives politicians only 
modest influence on the development of policy. Instead, the actual development 
of the policy in question is shaped by organizational field developments: problem-
solving is moved downwards, into the ministerial bureaucracy, or among civil 
servants and corporate actors.
The differences between legislature and ministerial governing will rarely be 
clear-cut, and more a matter of degree. Moreover, there may be intermediate situa-
tions. Politicizing is when an issue has become highly salient, but structural power 
concerning that issue is still concentrated. Despite their lack of formal powers, 
wider parts of the political field will engage in the issue, and political parties will 
compete over it. Some issues can be solved through politicizing, and the issue will 
then shift back into the ministerial governing positions – but the conflict may also 
escalate and shift towards the legislature governing situation. In political systems 
with strong parliaments and/or coalition governments, this situation will probably 
lead to the Parliament gaining more formal power regarding the issue – with a 
shift towards legislature governing. Whether this will happen will depend on the 
tactics of the sitting government as well as the opposition – and elections may 
have a significant role here.
Random steering will be seen in low-salience issues when many ministries 
and/or legislative committees share authority over an issue-area, or when formal 
decision-making authority over an issue is not clearly defined (Baumgartner and 
Jones [1993] 2009: 32). As regards other issues, there will be little political com-
petition, and few actors will have time and energy to focus on such matters. Here 
the importance of the political field will depend primarily on the strength of the 
organizational field.
Against this backdrop, we expect the political field to:
• dominate the development of national renewable-energy policies more when 
characterized by distributed structural resources and high salience (legisla-
ture governing).
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However, the political field will develop and change through a dynamic inter-
relationship with the domestic organizational field and the European environment. 
We end this chapter with a brief discussion of the dynamic interrelationships 
between the multiple fields presented here.
Multi-field dynamics and interrelationships
Understanding how and why renewables support mixes evolve and change over 
time calls for examination of the role and importance of the differing fields, but 
also of how they interact and relate to each other over time. In the following, we 
summarize the field-specific expectations before we specify some crucial inter-
field dynamics.
Figure 3.1 offers a simplified picture of the relationship between the many fields 
at one specific moment in time. Many countries may be involved, but the figure 
presents only three examples. The relationship between the two domestic fields 
may be weak, with only a few contact points – or they may be closely related, 
with strong ties or overlaps. Moreover, the domestic fields may be more or less 
integrated into the European environment. For instance, there may be strong bilat-
eral links between domestic organization fields and European fields. For instance, 
national energy agencies may collaborate extensively with sister agencies in other 
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Figure 3.1 Multiple fields involved in European renewables support-scheme developments
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a strong presence in many other EU and EEA countries. Under such conditions 
there will be significant overlaps between the domestic and European organiza-
tional fields of electricity. In contrast, regulators and agencies that rarely engage 
in European networks and corporations that are active in only one country are not 
well integrated in the European organizational field.
Secondly, while some domestic political fields are strongly linked to the Euro-
pean political field, others have weaker links. For instance, as Norway is not an 
EU member and thus does not take part in political deliberations in Brussels, it is 
likely to have weaker links to the European political field than full member states. 
In other counties, the dominant domestic political parties may have strong repre-
sentation in the European Parliament and on the Commission.
Figure 3.1 does not show how fields at all levels may evolve and change char-
acteristics and interrelationships over time. In examining the multi-field dynamics 
that have shaped the development of renewables support, we will aim to detect 
patterns as to multi-field correlations, causation and interrelationships as well as 
multi-field effects on policy developments.
Concerning correlations, we will search for answers to the following questions. 
Do certain organizational and political field-level modes tend to occur in tan-
dem? For instance, does the ‘ministerial governing’ mode tend to occur when 
the domestic organizational field has certain characteristics? Further, is there any 
pattern of certain domestic field characteristics that correlate with given European 
environment characteristics? For instance, does the ‘EU governing’ mode in the 
European environment occur at the same time as the domestic fields, assuming 
certain characteristics? As the interactions between the domestic and the EU-
level developments play out over time and at any point in time, the domestic and 
the European levels may interact (Saurugger 2014a, 2014b). In this volume, we 
understand Europeanization as a process and not as an exogenous influence on 
domestic developments. However, organizational and political fields in differing 
countries will interact with the EU in varying ways, and there is still much to learn 
about the possible relationships and interdependencies between domestic devel-
opments and EU-level developments, and how these patterns may differ across 
countries and over time.
If interesting correlations emerge, the next step will be to consider whether 
there are causal interrelationships between fields. In order to detect causation and 
interdependencies, we will pay particular attention to the timing related to shifts 
in modes across fields. If one field tends to change its mode after another field has 
changed its mode, that may indicate a causal relationship between the two. Alter-
natively, simultaneous changes in several fields may indicate interdependencies.
We also ask: Are changes in domestic organizational and political fields caus-
ally related? If so, does one field cause changes in another field – are they mutu-
ally interdependent? For instance, ‘legislature governing’ may spur uncertainty 
and conflicts at the organizational level, or the reverse: conflicts at the organi-
zational field level may cause an issue to shift from ‘ministerial governing’ to 
‘legislature governing’ within the political field. Further, because organizational 
fields are particularly dominant when segmented, this may spur developments 
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towards ministerial governing. But the reverse causal relationship is also possible: 
that political fields in ministerial governing mode allow the organizational field 
to become more segmented. By paying attention to how the two fields change 
over time, we may uncover certain patterns with respect to interrelations and 
interdependence.
Further, we will pay attention to causal relationships between the European 
environment and the domestic fields: Are changes in domestic- and European-
level fields causally related? If so, does one level cause changes at other levels, 
or are they mutually interdependent? In order to understand the role that the six 
countries studied here have had in relation to the wider Europeanization process, 
at least two differing features may be important. First, differing domestic fields 
may have played differing roles in horizontal as well as vertical Europeanization 
processes. Some domestic fields may be primarily senders of support-mix ideas; 
others may be primarily receivers. The latter group may be inspired by devel-
opments in other European countries as well as by EU-level actors and devel-
opments. Whether a domestic field mainly provides or receives support-scheme 
ideas may also change over time.
Moreover, countries may differ with respect to their dependence on EU-level 
developments. In some countries, prominent domestic actors, from the political 
or organizational fields, may assume pro-active roles towards the EU and call 
for stronger or different EU regulations. In other countries, actors may be fairly 
content with the existing EU rules and develop domestic policies less affected by 
discussions at the EU level. In countries where the political majority or strong 
organizational field actors find that EU steering is at odds with their favoured 
renewables support mixes, the EU rules in that issue-area will probably become 
controversial. Under such circumstances, the country will become dependent on 
future EU developments. In contrast, countries where the political majority and/
or strong organizational field actors regard EU rules as unproblematic may not 
become very involved in getting the EU steering to change, and it will not be 
contested nationally.
Our main reason for exploring the interrelationship between multi-field devel-
opments is to see how these change processes affect changes in support-scheme 
mixes over time. We want to find out whether certain multi-field configurations 
create specific, patterned constraints and enablers for certain developments in 
renewables support mixes.
Summary
This chapter has presented expectations related to the importance of the Euro-
pean environment, the organizational fields and the political field for renewable 
electricity support mix development. We expect the dominance of the three dif-
fering social spheres to be greater when they have certain structural and cultural-
institutional characteristics. More specifically:
• The European environment will dominate the development of national 
renewable energy policies more when the vertical Europeanization is strong 
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and the horizontal Europeanization is coherent, implying that one specific 
support-scheme mix gains superiority (EU governing).
• The organizational field will dominate the development of national renew-
able energy policies more when the field is characterized by centralized struc-
tural resources and one institutional logic (segmentation).
• The political field will dominate the development of national renewable 
energy policies more when the field is characterized by distributed structural 
resources and high salience (legislature governing).
These expectations focus on the effect of each of the separate social spheres, but 
without taking the interrelationship between fields into account. However, the two 
domestic fields and the many European fields that shape a policy issue like renew-
ables support may be interrelated, in differing ways across time and countries. 
This means that the social characteristics of the various fields may to a certain 
extent be shaped by developments in other fields. In systematically comparing our 
six case studies in Chapter 11, we ask:
• Do certain organizational and political field-level modes occur in tandem?
• Are changes in domestic organizational and political fields causally related? 
If so, does one field cause changes in another field – or are they mutually 
interdependent?
• Are changes in domestic- and European-level fields causally related? 
If so, does one level cause changes at other levels – or are they mutually 
interdependent?
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This chapter chronicles how the European environment of support to renewable 
electricity has developed and changed over the course of four decades. In some 
countries, promotion of new renewable energy began as a domestic policy issue 
in the 1970s. With the rise of attention to the climate issue in the 1990s, support 
schemes became a widespread policy measure, eventually becoming subject to 
significant EU steering.
For a long period, technology-specific feed-in schemes dominated in Europe. 
These offered beneficiaries a fixed price for electricity for 15 to 20 years, inde-
pendent of market-price fluctations, often ensuring different levels of support for 
different renewables technologies (Cointe and Nadaï 2018). To the surprise of 
many, in 2014 the EU adopted state-aid guidelines that steered countries towards 
shifting to competitive auctioning combined with feed-in premiums (support on 
top of the spot-market electricity price; see Fitch-Roy et al. 2019). This shift was 
not the result of changes in EU renewables policy proper, but of the introduction 
of new guidelines on state aid for environmental protection and energy.
The European environment is a meta-field, embracing developments at the all-
EU level as well as in the member states. It can be described along two dimen-
sions (Boasson 2021, Chapter 3 in this book). The horizontal dimension captures 
how the countries interact and influence each other, while the vertical dimension 
captures how EU actors and processes interrelate with actors and developments 
at the domestic level. This chapter asks: How has the European environment 
changed over time with respect to the horizontal as well as vertical dimensions of 
Europeanization?
Two strands of EU policies are relevant to developments in support schemes 
for renewables: EU renewables policy proper, as set out in the Renewables Direc-
tives, and the EU rules on state aid. The EU started to develop a renewable energy 
policy already in the 1970s, but the 2001 Renewable Electricity Directive was the 
first piece of legislation with relevance for national support measures (Boasson 
and Wettestad 2013). In 2001, the EU also for the first time developed guidelines 
on state aid for environmental protection that included renewable energy. Later, 
Europeanization of renewables support 59
these two strands of policies have changed. The member states have developed 
various practices in renewable energy schemes, sometimes in response to devel-
opments at the EU level, other times as a precondition for EU-level change, and 
sometimes rather isolated from activities at the EU level. The six case studies, 
presented in Part II of this book, explore in detail how and to what extent the 
European environment has played into these domestic processes.
Most assessments of EU renewables policy have focused on renewables policy 
proper (e.g., Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Bürgin 2015; Cointe and Nadaï 2018; 
Solorio and Jörgens 2017). This is an interesting issue-area in itself – but, when 
the focus is on renewables support schemes, we also need to explore the devel-
opment of EU state-aid policy. Indeed, it is not possible to understand the major 
revisions of support schemes for renewables in many EU member states after 
2010 without taking into account the changes in EU state-aid guidelines in 2014.
Whereas the development of EU renewables policy follows ordinary legislative 
procedures (formerly called co-decision), the European Commission (the Commis-
sion) has the upper hand in revising state-aid guidelines. In the ordinary decision 
procedure, the Commission presents a draft, the Council and the Parliament put 
forward amendments and, finally, the Parliament and the Council jointly adopt a 
decision. In contrast, the adoption of new state-aid guidelines is the prerogative of 
the EU executive – the College of Commissioners (Büthe 2016). The Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Energy (DG Energy) drafts renewables policy proposals, 
while the Directorate-General for Competition (DG Competition) drafts state-aid 
guidelines.1 It has been argued that the Commission has increasingly used state-
aid rules as its last resort to steer national developments (Blauberger 2009; Smith 
1998). As a main rule, the EU prohibits state aid, but under certain conditions, 
it may be accepted (Büthe 2016; Smith 1998). EU state-aid rules are inherently 
political: they involve choosing between competing political objectives, and the 
decision outcomes constrain the powers of national governments (Büthe 2016: 38; 
Kassim and Lyons 2013).
Such guidelines draw on the Treaty and CJEU case law, presenting principles 
for assessing the compatibility of aid (Banet 2020). They are interpretations of 
the state-aid rules in the basic Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (Art. 
7, Art. 87 TEC) as well as case law from the Commission’s DG Competition 
and Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The guidelines are not legally binding 
on member states, but they are binding on the Commission. Member states may 
challenge the guidelines, but this may entail long delays, affecting renewables 
investments while litigation drags on. Hence, the exact wording of the state-aid 
guidelines can be of crucial importance for the development of national practices.
This chapter presents the chronological story of renewables policy develop-
ments in the European environment, starting with the rather long and slow emer-
gence of this policy area from the 1970s until 1999, then moving on to the first 
five-year period with some EU steering of significance, from 2000 to 2004. Next 
we turn to the 2005–2009 period, with major conflicts at both the EU level and in 
many member states, and finish with the period from 2010 to 2014.2
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Renewables support: From rare and national to widespread 
and EU-governed
Prior to 1999: many ideas, little harmonization
From the 1970s and onwards, there was considerable trial and error, with differing 
countries adopting varying schemes, although primarily small in scope and simple 
in design (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Solorio and Jörgens 2017). During this 
period, a group of academics also developed differing ideas about more encom-
passing support schemes. Still, renewable energy was only a marginal policy 
issue, with few actors wanting the EU to gain the upper hand.
By the early 1990s, three different domestic renewables strategies had emerged. 
First, Germany, Denmark and, eventually, Spain embarked on technology-specific 
schemes that involved very little exposure to market forces (Boasson and Wet-
testad 2013: 82–83). They launched feed-in schemes, relying on fixed support lev-
els for rather long time-periods and guaranteed grid access. These schemes led to 
the emergence of small-scale domestic renewable-energy industries. The second 
group of countries – Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK – offered R&D 
support and some other measures but did not develop feed-in schemes. In these 
countries, the traditional utilities initiated a few renewable energy plants, but no 
new renewables industries emerged. The third and largest group of EU countries 
hardly promoted renewables at all.
In 1988, the Commission considered harmonizing renewables support, but this 
came to nothing (Rusche 2015: 25). The first renewables schemes were notified 
to the Commission in 1990; DG Competition found that both the British and the 
German schemes constituted state aid but swiftly approved both (Rusche 2015: 
81–82). A little later, DG Competition endorsed schemes in the Netherlands, Swe-
den, Finland and Denmark (ibid.: 82). In order to be regarded as state aid, renewa-
bles aid must: (1) be granted by a member state or through state resources in some 
form, (2) distort or threaten to distort competition, (3) selectively favour certain 
undertakings and (4) affect trade between member states in a way incompatible 
with the internal market (Community Guidelines 2008, Art. 7.1). Renewables aid 
that fulfils these criteria can still be exempted from the ban on state aid if the aid 
promotes ‘the execution of an important project of common European interest’ 
(Community Guidelines 2008, Art. 7.2). At this stage, EU steering attracted scant 
public attention. In the course of the 1990s, EU authority within the realm of state 
aid became contested, with respect to renewables support as well as a range of 
other issues (Büthe 2016: 39).
Germany subsequently changed its scheme, and the German Utilities Associa-
tion lodged a complaint with the Commission over application of the state-aid 
rules (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). In response, DG Competition sent a letter to 
the German government expressing doubt about the continued compatibility with 
state-aid rules and proposing amendments that would bring German law in line 
with EU state-aid rules, leading to a reduction in feed-in rates (CJEU 2000, Art. 
19–21). In 1998, Germany introduced a revised scheme but, despite consultations 
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with DG Competition, did not follow up any of the proposals from the Commis-
sion (CJEU 2000, Art. 34–38). Instead, it decided that the distribution system 
operators could pass on their additional economic burden from buying electric-
ity from renewables to the transmission system operators. Although CG Comp 
complained about this to Germany, it refrained from asking Germany to notify, 
because a new Renewables Directive was expected to introduce harmonized 
renewables rules.
At this stage, the electricity supplier PreussenElektra AG refused to pay the dis-
tribution system operator Schleswag the extra costs incurred in buying renewables 
electricity required by the German feed-in law (Kuhn 2001; Rusche 2015: 38). 
The issue was brought before a German court, which eventually requested the 
CJEU to clarify whether PreussenElektra was correct in arguing that the German 
scheme fell under the Treaty’s definition of state aid (CJEU 2000, 2001). In the 
two years that passed before the CJEU reached a judgement, a major political 
controversy emerged over EU steering of renewables aid in a new renewable elec-
tricity directive (CJEU 2000, Art. 38).
DG Energy argued that national support schemes were no longer compatible 
with state-aid rules. It proposed creating a technology-neutral pan-European 
‘renewable energy credit’ scheme, which would expose renewables to market 
prices on electricity, and began drafting a directive to that end (Boasson and Wet-
testad 2013: 84, 87; Rusche 2015: 30). Whereas the largest European electric-
ity utilities supported the idea, the renewable energy industry mobilized against 
it (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 84–85). Both industries had ties to Commis-
sion officials who supported their opposing views, and major conflicts erupted 
between the camps. The high level of conflict created uncertainty as to whether 
the EU would be able to develop a renewables policy of any significance.
The German government protested vigorously against the Commission’s initia-
tive for a Renewables Directive, but the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK were 
more positive. At the national level, the market idea got off to a rather bad start: 
the British quota system failed to yield much production, and the Dutch govern-
ment abandoned its voluntary certificate scheme soon after its introduction (Boas-
son and Wettestad 2013: 85–86). In the end, the EU energy ministers agreed that 
the Commission should develop a Renewables Directive, on the condition that it 
did not aim to steer the national support schemes. In parallel, DG Competition 
began more actively reviewing member states’ state-aid practices in a range of 
issue-areas (Büthe 2016: 56–58). Despite the lack of political consensus in the 
Council with respect to renewables support, many Commission officials contin-
ued to promote a pan-European scheme, based on a certificate scheme idea (Boas-
son and Wettestad 2013: 83–87).
By the late 1990s, the Court had largely confirmed that the Treaty gave the 
Commission substantial authority over state aid, but it was unclear whether most 
renewables schemes fell under the Treaty’s definition of state aid (Büthe 2016: 
56–58). The Commission had gained authority to require recipients of unlawful 
aid to repay aid, but many years would pass before it became clear whether the 
Commission could apply this authority to renewables schemes.
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We may conclude that by the late 1990s, the Europeanization process had barely 
started. Vertical steering was weak, with no clear horizontal patterns discernible. 
Rather, the few countries that had adopted renewables support schemes drew pri-
marily on their own domestic traditions and experiences, rarely looking to others 
for inspiration and learning. For most of this period, the EU had relatively few 
members, and it was unclear whether the EU would be able to exert any govern-
ance at all with respect to renewables support.
2000–2004: much EU conflicts, but feed-in diffuses
Around 2000, renewables support became increasingly salient at the EU level. The 
Commission’s understanding of how and to what extent it could influence national 
renewables support was also fundamentally challenged during this period. In the 
midst of heated discussions on the Renewables Directive, the Advocate General 
of the CJEU in 2000 issued an opinion in the PreussenElektra case, concluding 
that the changes that Germany had introduced to its feed-in law in 1998 were not 
sufficient to trigger the need for new notification – moreover, that the scheme 
did not constitute state aid (CJEU 2000, Art. 19; Kuhn 2001). As neither Preuss-
enElektra nor Schleswag was publicly owned, the money never actually passed 
through the state or through state resources, and thus the German scheme could 
not be regarded as ‘state’ aid (Rusche 2015:. 83). This intervention came as a 
great surprise to DG Energy, DG Competition and DG Legal Service, who had all 
defended the Commission’s view in the court case (Interviews 5, 6 and 8).
In 2001, the CJEU reached a decision, largely in line with the opinion of its 
Advocate General (CJEU 2001). By then, however, Germany had changed its 
system, introducing technology-specific support levels guaranteed for 20 years 
(CJEU 2000, Art. 34–38; Cointe and Nadaï 2018: 6, 61). It did not notify the Com-
mission, nor did France when it adopted a similar scheme, although the French 
scheme did repay utilities by means of state resources (CJEU 2013; Rusche 2015).
Many struggled to interpret the precedence created by PreussenElektra. Did the 
ruling imply that neither the Commission nor the CJEU could overrule national 
renewables support schemes? Or was the German case so special that it did not 
really create precedence (Kuhn 2001: 364; Rusche 2015: 85)? Interviewees famil-
iar with this case regard it as highly significant. One interviewee (6) stated: ‘It 
is amazing how much this [PreussenElektra] influenced the understanding of 
state aid’. DG Competition officials were confused, leading their decisions in the 
immediate aftermath of the judgement to lack consistency (Rusche 2015: 86). In 
any event, the Court’s decision legitimized a swift diffusion of feed-in schemes 
(Cointe and Nadaï 2018: 63).
In 2000, DG Energy published a draft Renewables Directive, proposing a dead-
line for EU-wide harmonization of support schemes. However, the deadline idea 
failed to gain support from the Parliament and the Energy Council. The Renew-
able Electricity Directive was adopted in September 2001 but made no references 
to market streamlining or harmonization (Directive 2001/77/EC). The same year, 
DG Competition launched the first state-aid guidelines in which renewable energy 
Europeanization of renewables support 63
was included. These guidelines did not promote market streamlining or harmo-
nization (Community Guidelines 2001). They distinguished between how invest-
ment support and operational support could be calculated, but they introduced 
no clear limitations on how much aid a renewables plant could receive over its 
lifetime. Calculations of investment support were to be based on the ‘extra costs’ 
compared to conventional plants. It was made clear that operating aid would ‘usu-
ally be allowable’; and different design options were presented: (a) the ‘extra-cost’ 
approach, providing aid ‘to compensate for the difference between the production 
cost of renewable energy and the market price’, and (b) the application of ‘market 
mechanisms such as green certificates or tenders’ (Community Guidelines, Arti-
cles E.3.3.2 and E.3.3.3).
In the following years, the countries that first adopted feed-in schemes stayed 
on their original path and many others copied them, making feed-in the most 
widespread way of promoting renewables. Most notably, both Spain and France 
adopted schemes inspired by Germany and Denmark (Boasson and Wettestad 
2013: 86–87; Leiren and Reimer 2021, this book). A few countries opted for green 
certificate schemes; for instance, Sweden adopted a scheme that immediately 
boosted renewables investment (Boasson, Faber and Bäckstrand 2021). Still, by 
2005 the academic literature as well as most DG Energy documents concluded 
that feed-in schemes were more effective and less costly than electricity certifi-
cates (Cointe and Nadaï 2018: 72).
Hence, the 2000–2004 period was marked by horizontal harmonization: Feed-
in diffused among the EU member states – but this was not a result of vertical, top-
down steering from the EU, but rather a result of horizontal socialization across 
countries. Despite the Commission’s campaign for technology-neutral certificate 
schemes, it was the technology-specific feed-in model that gained popularity. At 
this stage, it was still usual to have only one or a few support schemes, but from 
2005 and onwards, the support-scheme mixes became increasingly complex.
2005–2009: intensified feed-in diffusion and binding  
renewables targets
In this period, climate change became a high-level political issue. No longer dis-
cussed only by environmental and energy ministers, it became a key point of 
interest for prime ministers and an important issue in many general elections 
across Europe (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 87–94). Moreover, climate change 
climbed to the top of the agenda as the EU prepared for the global climate summit 
in Copenhagen in 2009. The conflict from a few years back, between technology-
neutral and technology-specific approaches to renewables support, resurfaced. 
A significant renewables industry had emerged, with strong ties to parts of DG 
Energy and the European Parliament. Renewables promoters were united in their 
scepticism towards market streamlining and EU-level harmonization.
By this stage, only seven EU member states had green certificates, whereas 
18 had feed-in schemes (Commission 2008a). While many in DG Energy were 
pleased with the diffusion of feed-in schemes, other Commission officials set 
64 Elin Lerum Boasson
about floating a new version of the old idea of a pan-European electricity cer-
tificate scheme (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 87–94). They envisaged a scheme 
where aid would be granted to the least costly renewables projects, market forces 
would determine the support levels and governments would no longer be able to 
favour specific technologies. The renewables industry, as well as German and 
Spanish ministries, criticized the idea. The tone was harsh; actors accused each 
other of fraud, lack of credibility and being reactionary.
DG Energy officials opposed to the market approach ensured that the draft 
directive was ‘leaked’ in December 2007 (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 91), only 
weeks before the Commission was to launch the draft. The renewables commu-
nity had little time to lobby against the draft, but it largely succeeded. One month 
later, in January, the Commission issued a new and rather inconsistent draft direc-
tive, opening up for certificate trading but without measures that would ensure the 
creation of a pan-European certificate scheme (Commission 2008b). At the same 
time, DG Competition launched revised state-aid guidelines. The 2008 guidelines 
were quite similar to the 2001 version and were not aligned with the draft direc-
tive. They did, however, give more weight to incentivizing lower support levels 
(Community Guidelines 2008, Art. 1.3.5). One interviewee (2) from DG Energy 
held that the state-aid revision was not strongly coordinated with the Renewables 
Directive revision, whereas an interviewee (5) from DG Legal Service stated: 
‘When they suggested developing a directive at the same time, it would be too 
blatant if they simultaneously included it in the guidelines. This was due to politi-
cal considerations’. A DG Competition interviewee explained: ‘nobody cared 
about state-aid guidelines in 2008. It is only more recently that it has attracted a 
lot of interest’.
At around the same time, the Court radically changed its interpretation of the 
Treaty. First, the CJEU Advocate General issued an opinion in January 2008 in 
the Essent Netwerk Noord BV case, on state aid in the electricity sector in general. 
Here, the Advocate General argued that the PreussenElektra case was very spe-
cial: the feed-in costs were not transferred through state resources, and no public 
entities or private entities created by the government were involved, but this was 
rare. Hence, the case had little general value for how state-aid rules should be 
understood (CJEU 2008; Rusche 2015: 103–104). The Court upheld this view in 
July (Mortensen 2008). According to two interviewees (5, 6), DG Competition 
had long wanted to challenge PreussenElektra, and the Essent Netwerk Noord BV 
paved the way for this.
Revision of the Renewables Directive was subject to fierce debate throughout 
2008. An increasing number of voices now raised the concern that many feed-in 
schemes provided over-compensation for renewables (Cointe and Nadaï 2018: 
90). One Commission interviewee even stated: ‘We had a lot of people we had 
never seen before coming to us in black limousines. We understood then that 
something was wrong’ (Interview 8). This hardly influenced the political delib-
erations, however. A major breakthrough for the strategy of the renewables actors 
came with the joint compromise proposal from the UK, Poland and Germany 
in June 2008 (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 92). The proposal ensured member 
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states’ control over their national support schemes. In the end, the Council and 
the Parliament adopted a directive that contained binding national renewables 
targets and required member states to continue to offer state aid to renewables, but 
they did not give the Commission new authority over domestic support-scheme 
designs (Directive 2018/2001). As noted, a new CJEU ruling enabled the DG 
Competition to start applying its state-aid powers on renewables support, but few 
energy actors seem to have noticed this significant shift in CJEU case law. Small-
scale and costly renewables technology gained increased interest, with many 
countries introducing special feed-in rules for these specific technologies or other 
types of special support schemes (see the following chapters in this book: Rayner 
et al. 2021; Leiren and Reimer 2021; Boasson, Banet and Wettestad 2021).
In the end, whereas the adoption of new, domestic renewables targets created 
indirect pressure on member states to offer more support to renewables support, 
the EU did not give any clear instructions on how member states should alter 
their existing support mixes. Any indirect vertical Europeanization was rather 
diffuse and gave domestic actors considerable room for interpretation. At the 
domestic level, the horizontal diffusion of feed-in schemes continued, in tandem 
with renewed interest in small-scale and costly technologies. The financial crisis 
that hit Europe after 2008, and the fact that many countries had schemes that 
over-compensated renewables investors, contributed to changing the dynamics of 
developments in the domestic renewables support mix. In this period, ideological 
conflicts hindered fruitful dialogue between new renewables actors and traditional 
energy actors. However, as we will see, such disagreements gradually became less 
severe.
2010–2016: shift to new support-scheme model and increased  
state-aid steering
The economic crisis constrained the ability of many member states to offer 
renewables support, and the costs of renewables costs had become dramatically 
lower. This led many to reconsider their views on renewables support schemes 
(Cointe and Nadaï 2018: 89–90). The debate now shifted from a trench war to a 
more nuanced, though still sometimes heated, exchange of information and ideas 
(ibid.: 95).
The introduction of a significant share of intermittent renewables changed the 
price-setting mechanisms in European electricity markets, largely to the disadvan-
tage of the large utilities. Around 2012 it became clear that the industry was fac-
ing severe economic challenges. The situation was particularly dire in Germany, 
where wholesale power prices were reduced by more than 50% from 2011 to 2016 
(Newbery et al. 2017: 7–8). Over the years, Germany had added several compen-
sation mechanisms to its support scheme, rendering the PreussenElektra ruling 
outdated. Hence, the German Association of Energy Consumers lodged a com-
plaint with the Commission, arguing that the scheme now constituted state aid 
(CJEU 2016). The CJEU had also considered whether the French feed-in scheme 
constituted state aid and, in 2013, ruled that it did (CJEU 2013). This decision 
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signified a shift in case law, and in late 2013 DG Competition initiated a formal 
investigation procedure with respect to the German scheme (CJEU 2016: 13).
By this stage, DG Competition was in the midst of a major ‘modernization’ 
of all state-aid practices, aimed at ensuring economic efficiency as well as legal 
certainty (Fitch-Roy et al. 2019: 85). DG Competition asked stakeholders to com-
plete a questionnaire concerning revision of the state-aid guidelines relating to 
renewables. In their replies, the renewables industry called for minor alterations to 
ensure more effective implementation of the 2009 Renewables Directive, whereas 
the electricity industry declared itself generally satisfied with existing practices 
(Commission 2016). These inputs showed that few expected major changes in 
the new guidelines. However, according to interviewee 4: ‘The member states 
had committed to the [renewables] targets, but it had consequences that few had 
expected. When the financial crisis came in addition, it was like a perfect storm’. 
DG Competition exploited this situation, and in 2013 it issued draft guidelines for 
consultation which proposed radically ramping up EU steering towards competi-
tive tendering, combined with feed-in premiums. Interviewee 8, who had been 
involved in promoting certificate schemes, stated: ‘We lost that in 2008. . . . I was 
okay with tendering. It was simply another way to ensure competition and cost-
efficiency’. And Interviewee 3 highlighted how auctioning fit the thinking of the 
Commission in general and that the possibility for bidding processes had opened 
up in many areas of state aid.
As very few EU countries applied feed-in premiums combined with competi-
tive auctions at this stage, the Commission’s proposal came as a great surprise 
and gave rise to protests (Fitch-Roy et al. 2019). The CJEU ruling did not specify 
how support schemes should be designed; it merely pointed out that most schemes 
constituted state aid. The draft guidelines received considerable attention and 
many inputs. The seven largest utilities and the business association Eurelectric 
supported the Commission’s new approach (Commission 2016). The renewables 
industry was more critical, arguing that the proposal conflicted with the Renewa-
bles Directive. Many interviewees, however, argued that the conflict over more, 
or less, market steering was not as prominent as before. DG Competition hailed 
the new UK and Dutch schemes as good models for national support schemes 
(Commission 2014).
Many member states, however, voiced scepticism. For instance, France, Ger-
many, Poland, Sweden and the UK all called for greater leeway, arguing that the 
proposal was too restrictive (Commission 2016). Interviewee 3 mentioned the 
considerable member-state resistance at consultation meetings – a point con-
firmed by a letter from France, Germany, the UK and Italy in December 2013 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energi 2016). The member states wanted 
leeway to continue with technology-specific feed-in to the extent they saw fit, and 
to avoid having to open up their schemes to renewables projects in other countries. 
The final 2014 guidelines were rather similar to the draft proposal, but included 
significant exemptions from the feed-in premium and auctioning requirement, 
allowing for more widespread use of technology-specific feed-in than the 2013 
proposal (Community Guidelines 2014)
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Germany had changed its scheme towards feed-in premiums combined with 
auctioning already before the Commission concluded in 2014 that the scheme 
constituted state aid (CJEU 2016: 16).3 Interviewee 6 held that Germany would 
never have adjusted its scheme had it not been for Commission pressure, describ-
ing the meetings between DG Competition and Germany as ‘really heated, really 
harsh’ and ‘they did all they could in this case’. Interviewee 5 expressed doubt 
as to whether the German government was really so displeased with the changes, 
commenting that ‘the revision was in a way modelled on the German situation’. 
Several German actors had long fought against the feed-in scheme, and they 
became increasingly able to influence the many smaller revisions of the German 
support mix in this period. New pressure from the Commission increased the lev-
erage of these actors even further (see Leiren and Reimer 2021, this book).
Interviewees (2, 6, 8, 9) mentioned considerable disagreements between the 
DGs over the new approach, and internal coordination seems to have been limited. 
Nonetheless, the College of Commissioners adopted the guidelines in April 2014. 
Several interviewees mentioned that the Commissioners cast formal votes, which 
was unusual.
The final 2014 guidelines differ radically from how renewables support was 
dealt with in prior guidelines and Renewables Directives. They prescribe that aid 
be ‘granted in a competitive bidding process on the basis of clear, transparent 
and non-discriminatory criteria’ (Article 3.3.2). Indeed, all new aid schemes are 
required to grant aid as a premium in addition to the electricity market price. The 
bidding process may be limited to specific technologies if certain conditions are 
met: if there is a ‘need to achieve diversification’, if the installed electricity capac-
ity is very small, if the number of projects is limited or if competitive bidding could 
result in higher support levels. Such exemptions may be made only if they do not 
distort the electricity market or if the energy markets are so poorly designed that 
market-based support schemes would not work. The Commission has argued that 
during the period 2020‒2030, established renewable energy sources will become 
grid-competitive, and subsidies should be phased out degressively (Article 3.2.4). 
The 2014 guidelines accept electricity certificate schemes as an alternative to auc-
tioning and feed-in premiums.
In the immediate aftermath of the adoption of the new guidelines, many coun-
tries changed their support-scheme mixes. By the end of 2017, 18 out of 29 EU 
and EEA countries (all EU member states except Slovakia, and Norway and Ice-
land in addition were assessed) had introduced tendering or were poised to do 
so (CEER 2018: 10). One year later, five EU member states (the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain and the UK) had implemented auctioning procedures 
with less technology-specificity, while France, Germany, Greece and Hungary 
planned to introduce more technology-neutral tenders over time.
Many countries adjusted their support-scheme mixes to the new guidelines, but 
there was also a surge of legal and political disputes relating to EU authority in 
relation to renewables support. In 2016, the CJEU ruled that German renewables 
support was indeed state aid, and thus all aspects relating to this would have to 
be designed in accordance with EU rules (CJEU 2016). Three years later, another 
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chamber of the Court decided that the German scheme did not qualify as state aid 
after all, once again jeopardizing the authority of the EU over renewables support 
(CJEU 2019). On the other hand, renewables support gained attention in relation 
to a recast of the EU Renewables Directive, and as a result the new directive con-
tained a long passage on this matter. Much of the language from the 2014 state-aid 
guidelines was copied into the new Directive (Directive 2018/2001). However, it 
should be noted that the text of the final directive included a long list of conditions 
that would allow the member states to ‘limit tendering procedures’, such as ‘the 
need to achieve diversification’ (Directive 2018/2001, Art 4.5). These criteria may 
obstruct the Commission in undertaking a more radical revision of the state-aid 
guidelines in the future. For instance, it may become difficult for the Commission 
to remove the exceptions that allow countries to retain technology-specific auc-
tioning, and not shift to fully technology-neutral auctions.
Introduction of the 2014 state-aid guidelines serve to increase vertical Euro-
peanization, providing DG Competition with far more authority over domestic 
support-scheme mixes than previously. A range of CJEU court cases accorded the 
Commission legitimacy to do so, and many years would pass before the CJEU 
made rulings that again created questions about the Commission’s authority. 
Despite the legal and political battles, the EU had gained significant top-down 
power after 2014, and the EU governing was underpinned by a new trend towards 
auctioning combined with feed-in premium.
Discussion and conclusions
This chapter has described the Europeanization process relating to renewables 
support schemes, mapping how the state of the European environment changed 
significantly in the course of four decades, with respect to horizontal as well as 
vertical Europeanization aspects. From the 1970s until the late 1990s, there was 
relatively little Europeanization. Although the EU had passed some general poli-
cies, and there existed a general ban on state aid, it was not clear that any of 
this would influence the development of domestic support schemes. This was a 
1000 flowers situation, with weak vertical and horizontal Europeanization. The 
few countries that did adopt renewables support schemes before 2000 chose dif-
fering models. Whether member states supported renewables, and how, depended 
largely on domestic initiatives and circumstances. While some EU actors, such as 
Commission officials, had ideas and clear opinions about how support schemes 
ought to be designed, these positions were not enshrined in EU law. EU member 
states, and later also the EEA countries, could generally do as they wished con-
cerning support to renewables. As later chapters in this book show, Germany, UK, 
Poland, France, Sweden and Norway were to exploit this freedom in radically 
different ways.
We find greater coherence across EU member states after 2000. The years 
between 2000 and 2004 were a period of horizontal harmonization. Vertical 
Europeanization was weak; the EU adopted its first Renewables Directive, but 
this did not offer clear guidance as to renewables support. Moreover, the 2001 
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PreussenElektra court case prevented the EU from applying Treaty rules on state 
aid to develop stronger vertical steering. The strong horizontal Europeanization 
process contributed primarily to the diffusion of feed-in schemes, although a few 
countries adopted electricity certificate schemes. As shown in the country studies 
in Part II of this book, Germany was a great inspiration for other countries in this 
period (UK, Poland and France); further, France and Poland were affected by the 
diffusion of feed-in, Norway and Sweden hardly at all.
Between 2005 and 2009, the horizontal harmonization continued, with the 
feed-in diffusion gaining speed and electricity certificate schemes becoming less 
popular. At the same time, the EU added binding domestic renewables targets 
to its revised Renewables Directive. Many member states ended up with targets 
that required them to do something to increase domestic renewables produc-
tion, in turn creating pressure towards the adoption of more encompassing sup-
port schemes. Many actors saw this as underpinning more technology-specific 
schemes that would ensure that also more costly technologies were used, although 
the Directive did not require the member states to adopt such schemes. The verti-
cal Europeanization of renewables support was fairly modest. More of our six 
case-study countries were affected, with Norway being the only one that did not 
introduce greater technology-specificity in its support-scheme mix in this period.
After 2010, the picture changed significantly, towards less technology-
specificity and stronger EU steering. By 2010, the CJEU had handed down sev-
eral decisions legitimizing a more aggressive approach from DG Competition in 
renewable support cases (see Boasson 2019 for an assessment of Commission 
entrepreneurship in this respect). Moreover, many important countries, including 
France, Germany and the UK, had introduced or were in the process of introducing 
more competitive elements in their support schemes. This new support-scheme 
trend, or ‘horizontal Europeanization’, enabled the adoption of new state-aid rules 
that represented a radical increase in vertical Europeanization. Legal and political 
battles over the EU authority in this issue-area continued, but for many years after 
2014, it appeared that the EU had gained new muscle in this issue-area, radically 
decreasing the leeway available to the member states. Hence we can say that this 
period was marked by EU governing.
Interviewees
1 Renewable industry representative, WindEurope (European business associa-
tion for the wind-energy industry), 19 May 2016, Brussels
2 Civil servant, European Commission, DG Energy, 18 May 2016, Brussels
3 Civil servant, EFTA Surveillance Agency, 10 May 2016, Brussels
4 Electricity industry representative, Eurelectric (European business associa-
tion for the electricity industry), 18 May 2016, Brussels
5 Civil servant, European Commission, DG Legal Service, 10 May 2016, 
Brussels
6 Cabinet-level civil servant, European Commission, DG Competition, 22 
November 2016, Brussels
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7 Renewable industry representative, Eurosolar (European business associa-
tion for the solar-energy industry), 22 November 2016, Brussels
8 Cabinet-level civil servant, European Commission, DG Climate Action, 23 
November 2016, Brussels
9 Lower-level civil servant, European Commission, DG Competition, 23 
November, Brussels
10 Renewable energy representative, European Renewable Energies Federation 
(EREF), 16 February 2017, Oslo
Notes
 1 The titles of these DGs varied during the period covered by this chapter. For simplicity, 
they will be referred to as ‘DG Competition and ‘DG Energy’.
 2 Much of the empirical material presented in the following was first published in Boas-
son (2019).
 3 The CJEU confirmed this decision in 2016.
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Part II
Case studies    

5  Germany
From feed-in tariffs to  
greater competition
Merethe Dotterud Leiren and Inken Reimer
Introduction
As an industrialized nation, Germany has attracted considerable attention for its 
efforts to expand renewable energy and abandon fossil fuels, while saying fare-
well to nuclear energy. This massive challenge, known as the Energiewende, is 
closely linked to the Renewables Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz; EEG) and its rules for a specific renewables support design, the feed-in 
tariff instrument. Administered by the government, it is characterized by tech-
nology steering, where different technologies are granted different fixed prices 
or premiums when fed into the grid. As one of the first European countries to 
introduce feed-in tariffs in the 1990s, Germany soon became a feed-in champion, 
showing good results in deployment of renewables. Other countries followed suit, 
and feed-in tariffs became the most popular support scheme for renewable energy 
in Europe (Boasson 2021a, this book).
Nevertheless, two and a half decades later, Germany introduced major changes 
to its approach to promoting renewable electricity, largely breaking with its feed-
in tradition. It continued with technology steering, but now based on competitive 
tendering. Since 2017 only small projects still receive traditional feed-in support: 
larger producers typically have to compete for support in auctions. This move 
towards greater competition was largely in line with the approach favoured by 
the European Commission (the Commission). That in itself is interesting, as Ger-
many is known as an important veto player at the supranational level when it 
comes to harmonization of renewable energy policies (Vogelpohl et al. 2017). 
Ever since the late 1990s, the Commission has advocated a shift towards more 
‘market-oriented’ mechanisms and has tried to get Germany to change its feed-in 
scheme (EU COM 2014: 7). However, Germany has continuously resisted pres-
sures to introduce greater competition.
Having served as a feed-in role model for other countries, and having gained 
extensive attention for its successful support of renewable energy, why, then, did 
Germany change its renewables approach towards greater competition? Is this a 
radical break with the feed-in tradition, or is it rather a path-dependent develop-
ment of a long tradition of technology steering? Have the changes to the German 
feed-in been introduced primarily due to pressures in the European environment 
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or conditions in the political or organizational field, or due to the relationship 
between them?
In seeking to explain the development of Germany’s support policies for renew-
able electricity, it is of special interest to explore the influence of the EU, given the 
Commission’s advocacy in trying to get Germany to introduce greater competi-
tion (Commission 2014: 7). According to the multi-field framework, the effect 
of the European environment on national renewables support is greater when the 
Commission exerts coercive pressure and peer pressure among the member states 
is particularly strong (Boasson 2021a, 2021b, this book). Several scholars have 
assumed that the EU is behind the changes in the German support scheme, with 
its shift from feed-in tariffs and increasingly favouring auctions after 2014 (Beer-
mann and Tews 2016; Tews 2015). In this chapter, we assess how the EU level 
and national factors have interacted, asking: What has been the role of the supra-
national level in this process, and how prominent has it been?
In studying the historical development of the German support scheme for renew-
able electricity, we look for explanations also in the organizational and political 
fields (see Boasson 2021b, this book). The multi-field framework assumes that the 
national organizational field will be particularly influential at times when this field 
is segmented, with a few big, closely coordinated commercial and private organi-
zations, dominated by one way of thinking. On the one hand, the corporatist char-
acteristics of the German political system and its coordinated market economy 
tradition would lead us to expect that the organizational field has been important 
for the policy development (Hall and Soskice 2001). On the other hand, stud-
ies of German renewables policies (see e.g. Kungl and Geels 2016) have shown 
that the organizational field has been characterized by deep conflicts between the 
traditional electricity industry and renewables actors. Has this undermined the 
importance of the organizational field?
Lastly, the multi-field framework holds that the effect of the domestic politi-
cal field on policy development will be stronger when the legislative assembly 
has formal decision-making power and renewables policy is highly politicized. 
In Germany, renewable energy has been politically salient for decades. Does this 
mean that the German political field has been the major driver of the develop-
ments and changes in the renewables scheme over time?
We begin by describing the key characteristics of the German support mix – the 
rules for granting support in the EEG.
Technology-specific renewables support
By 2016, Germany had a technology-specific renewables support mix, which 
provides different variants of support depending on the size of projects. There 
are three key types of support (RES Legal 2019). First, large-scale projects must 
participate in tendering procedures to receive support; the tenders set the level of 
this support. This is the rule for onshore and offshore wind projects from 750 kW 
and upwards, solar projects from 750 kW and upwards (as of 1 January 2017), 
biomass plants from 150 kW and upwards as well as existing biomass plants. Sec-
ond, operators of renewable energy plants exceeding installed capacity of 100 kW 
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which are not obliged to take part in the tendering procedures are supported by a 
market premium for electricity they sell directly. The amount of this market pre-
mium is calculated every month. Third, power plants up to 100 kW are eligible 
for a feed-in tariff, which the grid operator pays to the plant operators. The tariff 
amount is set by law and is usually paid over a 20-year period. Plant operators 
may opt for the market premium instead. This offers higher remuneration and sim-
plifies the reporting procedures for system operators. In exceptional cases, plants 
with capacity higher than 100 kW can be supported through the feed-in tariff.
In 2014, Germany started to award most large renewable plant projects a mar-
ket premium – an add-on to the electricity price on the spot market EPEX. This 
was calculated on the basis of a technology-specific reference tariff (RES Legal 
2019).1 Also in 2014 the government introduced a tendering process for freestand-
ing photovoltaics installations as a pilot project; the first auctions were held in 
2015. The aim was to test the viability of auctioning to determine future support 
levels (Bundesregierung 2013: 54). In 2016, the government transposed the auc-
tioning system for various renewable technologies (photovoltaics, onshore wind, 
offshore wind, biomass) into law, which was enforced in January 2017. The auc-
tion design is tailored for each of the different technologies; hence, it continues to 
be technology-specific, as was also the feed-in scheme. However, through a pilot 
project running from 2018 to 2020, Germany also has some auctions that are com-
mon for wind and solar (Ministry for Economic Affairs 2017).
The German government has adopted technology-specific growth corridors, 
specifying annual capacity targets for various technologies (Apunn 2016). In 
line with the growth corridor, the government auctions off a specified amount of 
capacity volume each year. Which renewables installations will be granted sup-
port are determined via competitive processes (Apunn 2016). The lowest bids are 
accepted until the volume of capacity auctioned is reached. A maximum price is 
set in advance. Under certain conditions, installations located in other EU member 
states may participate in the German auctions (5% of annual bidding capacity).
There are special rules for citizen energy projects (CEER 2018: 9). When com-
peting in auctions, they enjoy benefits such as automatically receiving the highest 
feed-in tariff accepted in the tender, even if their own bid was lower. Further, with 
onshore wind, the procedures for citizen cooperatives are simpler and more trans-
parent (Apunn 2016). However, this does not apply for wind farms with fewer 
than six turbines.
German support arrangements for renewables are the result of gradual changes 
since the 1990s. We now turn to how Germany has changed its approach, from 
being a feed-in champion to adopting greater competition.
Historical phases: leading while incrementally altering the 
support mix
Prior to 1999: the emergence of the German feed-in
The Energiewende, for which Germany became famous after 2010, has its roots 
in the historical conflict over nuclear energy policy. The adoption of the feed-in 
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tariffs in 1990, a central feature of the Energiewende, can be understood only in 
light of the growing resistance to nuclear energy. The first commercial nuclear 
reactor in Germany went on the grid in 1961, marking the beginning of the nuclear 
industrial business in West Germany (Kirchhof and Trischler 2018). Germany 
was heavily reliant on fossil fuel for electricity generation, so the oil crises of the 
1970s hit Germany hard. Alternative energy sources became increasingly interest-
ing. This provided an impetus for the national government to continue to search 
for new nuclear sites (Agora 2015) but met resistance from societal protest move-
ments. Particularly famous are the Wyhl protests, where a small local community 
in southwestern Germany was able to halt nuclear plans through direct action and 
civil disobedience in the 1970s. The success of this community inspired nuclear 
opposition throughout the country (Morris and Jungjohann 2016). In 1980, sev-
eral anti-nuclear activists wrote a publication about replacing fossil and nuclear 
by renewable energy and energy efficiency, introducing the term Energiewende 
(Krause et al. 1980). This concept has later been associated primarily with the 
transition since 2011.
The 1986 Chernobyl accident occurred just after a range of new nuclear reac-
tors had been set in operation, increasing the nuclear share of German electric-
ity production to over 20% (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019). Chernobyl was to 
change society’s perceptions of nuclear risks: after the accident, 86% of Germans 
supported a nuclear phase-out (Hake et al. 2015: 536). It also triggered the estab-
lishment of the Federal Ministry for the Environment in 1986 (Lexikon der Nach-
haltigkeit 2015), which was given responsibility for nuclear safety. Previously, 
environmental responsibility had been spread across several ministries, with the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs in charge of energy matters.
Despite societal resistance, the conservative coalition government in power 
from 1982 to 1998, made up of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its 
Bavarian sister party the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and the liberal Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), favoured nuclear power (Hake et al. 2015). After the 
Chernobyl accident, the Social Democrats (SPD) focused on phasing out nuclear 
power, although the party was divided on the issue. The Greens (Bündnis 90/
Die Grünen), established in 1980 from the anti-nuclear movement, demanded the 
immediate suspension of all nuclear power plants in Germany.
Climate change was put on the agenda in 1987, when an Enquete Commission 
was created to address the issue. A broad consultative process that included lead-
ing MPs, prominent scientists and large industrial associations created a broad 
consensus for political action (Hatch 2007).
In 1988 the Federal Ministry for the Environment was given responsibility for 
the climate issue. Two years later the conservative government adopted Germa-
ny’s first Climate Change Action Plan. The government supported nuclear energy 
and saw climate change as an opportunity to counterbalance the opposition to 
nuclear: nuclear energy produced no CO2 emissions (Hatch 2007). However, the 
governing coalition of conservatives and liberals did not support CO2 taxation 
or other tough climate measures (Hatch 2007). Concerns about climate change 
threatened further division of the SPD, which had strong ties to the powerful coal 
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interests. The party became more united in its rejection of nuclear power after 
Chernobyl, but the issue of global warming gave rise to questions of the feasibility 
of a nuclear phase-out. The SPD struggled for years to reconcile environmental, 
anti-nuclear and pro-coal factions within the party (Hatch 2007). The FDP and 
most conservatives viewed renewables as a complementary energy source (Jacob-
sson and Lauber 2006).
Large utilities reliant on coal and nuclear generation dominated the electricity 
supply system. These utilities deemed renewable energy uneconomic (Jacobs-
son and Lauber 2006). They benefitted from exclusive supply contracts with the 
municipalities and established regional monopolies, and they could refuse feed-in 
to their grid by local renewable energy producers (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). 
With German reunification in 1990, the utilities sought to position themselves in 
the restructuring of the East German power sector, where six nuclear power plants 
closed down and coal power plants were modernized (Agora 2015).
Under these circumstances, two backbenchers, representing the CSU and the 
Green Party, proposed the feed-in tariff, referring to a successful Danish scheme 
introduced a few years earlier (Zeit Online 2006). While the CSU representative 
was concerned with the situation of small hydropower plant-owners in south-
ern Germany, who got a very low price for their electricity to the utilities, the 
Green representative called for investments in new renewable energy sources. 
The two managed to gain support from other MPs who were interested in renew-
able energies, and eventually from all parliamentary factions. The Grid Feed-In 
Law (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, StromEinspG) was adopted in October 1990, and 
entered into force in the following year (Stefes 2010). The Bundesrat (the leg-
islative body representing the 16 federated states of Germany) also approved of 
the support scheme. The German states had previously supported renewables in 
various ways, and the new law would reduce their financial responsibilities. The 
utilities failed to mobilize against this new legislation: focusing on the East Ger-
man energy sector, they had underestimated the future economic and political 
consequences of a feed-in tariff.
The Federal Ministry for the Environment, which led the government’s work on 
climate change, supported the new law and received strong political backing from 
the CDU Chancellor. In comparison, the Ministry of Economic Affairs played less 
of a role in the discussions (Stefes 2010). Eventually, however, the slowdown in 
economic growth and the mounting costs of reunification strengthened the posi-
tion of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (Hatch 2007).
The Grid Feed-In Law obliged power companies to purchase electricity from 
producers of renewable electricity, granting to those who fed into the system a 
compensation of at least 90% of the average cost of private customers. The law 
built on the approach of the ordo-liberal Freiburg School that stressed the impor-
tance of governmental intervention to foster competition and avoid monopolies 
(Eucken 1990; Morris and Jungjohann 2016). Moreover, the enthusiasts behind 
the first small renewables plants underlined that energy production should be dis-
tributed, democratic and foster a broad range of technologies (Jacobsson and Lau-
ber 2006; Wassermann et al. 2015: 67).
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The introduction of the Grid Feed-In Law created an incentive for small, new 
actors to invest in windpower. Eventually, a range of federal business organiza-
tions for renewable energy emerged (Schmid et al. 2016: 266). However, renewa-
bles did not fit the utilities’ business models, and the law offered no incentives 
for them to invest in renewables, as corporations were excluded (Interview 5; 
StromEinspG 1990 §1.2; also EEG 2000 §2.1). In the mid-1990s the established 
utilities attempted a rollback of the Grid Feed-In Law. In 1996 the German Utili-
ties Association sent a complaint to the Commission, which had asked Germany 
to reduce its feed-in rates (CJEU 2000, Articles 19–21; Jacobsson and Lauber 
2006). The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs supported the German Utilities 
Association, but metalworkers, farmers and various groups mobilized massive 
demonstrations against this proposed rollback. However, the Parliament decided 
that the distribution system operators (DSOs) could pass on their additional eco-
nomic burden from buying electricity from renewables to the transmission system 
operators (TSOs) – and the feed-in rates remained (Boasson 2021a, this book).
Moreover, although the Commission’s DG Competition had initially argued 
that Germany should decrease the rates, the Commission approved the law 
because the amount of the aid and its impact on electricity prices were minimal 
(Commission 2001). However, in 1998 the German court asked the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU (CJEU) about the interpretation of EU law related to the proceed-
ings between the electricity supplier PreussenElektra AG and Schleswag AG (de 
Lovinfosse 2008). In this case, the supplier had refused to pay the DSO the extra 
costs incurred for buying renewables-produced electricity (Boasson 2021a, this 
book). The renewables energy feed-in tariff policy was challenged as being inap-
propriate state aid (Gawel and Strunz 2014). This marked the beginning of a long-
lasting controversy between Germany and the Commission.
In the meantime, Germany had introduced a tax, imposed on electricity con-
sumers as part of the law on the initiation of the ecological tax reform. The tax 
was incorporated into the basis for calculating the feed-in price. The Commission 
(2001) held that the increase in feed-in price was incompatible with the rules for 
state aid, but because the German government repealed the Grid Feed-In Law in 
2000, the Commission closed the investigation.
The Grid Feed-In Law encouraged small, decentralized energy generation (indi-
viduals and citizen initiatives) and contributed to creating jobs and tax income. 
Broad participation led to widespread acceptance among the public and politi-
cians. In 1998, the Green Party went to the polls with the motto, ‘we want 100,000 
roof-top photovoltaics’ (Interview 8). The campaign was inspired by the Social 
Democrat Hermann Scheer, who, together with the Green politician Hans-Josef 
Fell, initiated the German feed-in tariff system. The topic became part of the coali-
tion negotiations between the SPD and the Green Party, resulting in the first red-
green coalition government under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
(SPD) (Interview 8). A Green politician held the post of Minister of Environment 
from 1998 to 2005. A Social Democrat with close ties to the coal industry and its 
trade associations served as Minister of Economy from 1998 to 2002. However, 
one of the fathers of the law, Scheer, managed to break the opposition from the 
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coal interests in his party and form a coalition in favour of renewables, by propos-
ing to make mine gas eligible for feed-in (see Morris and Jungjohann 2016: 213). 
This led to the introduction of a more generous feed-in tariff, described in the next 
section.
In summary, a societal protest movement against nuclear power managed to 
stop nuclear projects in the 1970s and gave rise to the Green Party, with its visions 
of a transition towards renewable energy. However, the CDU, CSU and FDP saw 
climate change as an opportunity to continue supporting nuclear power. The SPD 
had been divided on the issue but took an anti-nuclear stance after the Cherno-
byl accident. Further, after Chernobyl, the government established the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, which played a major role in promoting Germany 
as a leader in fighting climate change. At this point, two backbenchers took the 
opportunity to promote the Grid Feed-In Law, which was implemented in 1991 
and led to the rapid diffusion of wind turbines. When it became apparent that this 
law had greater effects on deployment of renewables than expected, the large utili-
ties together with the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs tried to get the law 
rescinded. However, the wind coalition had already gained considerable public 
and political clout. Then the Commission questioned the law as being illegal state 
aid, and the CJEU started its investigation of the PreussenElektra case.
2000–2004: renewables gain ground despite  
the Big Four’s opposition
In 2000, the government replaced the Grid Feed-In Law with the Renewables 
Energy Sources Act (EEG). In the following years, investments in renewables 
grew exponentially (Wassermann et al. 2015: 68). This growth in investments of 
renewables occurred despite opposition from the large utilities.
The EEG provided a feed-in tariff not only for renewables but also for mine 
gas from coal mines. In contrast to its predecessor, the EEG differentiated to a 
larger extent among various renewable energy sources. Whereas the initial feed-in 
remuneration had been uniform across technologies, the EEG tariffs differenti-
ated between energy technologies, capacity and location of the plant. Location of 
the plant as a criterion was introduced to ensure a profitability of wind turbines 
also in less windy regions, aimed at achieving a more equitable distribution of 
windpower plants all over the country (Ohlhorst 2015). The remuneration of each 
technology was based on scientific estimates of the production costs of various 
renewable energy sources (Mendonca 2007). As the costs of installing solar were 
particularly high, photovoltaic operators received the highest reimbursement.
The EEG set a target of increasing the share of electricity generated from 
renewable sources from 5% to 10% by 2010. Grid operators were required to 
prioritize renewable electricity into the grid, and renewable electricity produc-
ers would get a fixed rate of return over 20 years, ensuring predictability for the 
power producers. The rate would decrease every year, so that each year the level 
for new plants was reduced by a certain percentage. This combination of a fixed 
rate and an annual decrease in support ‘has been of global importance for the 
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introduction of renewables and the development of such technology’ by bringing 
the price down (Interview 8; see also Zeit Online 2006).
In order to adhere to the Commission’s guidelines on national regional aid,2 the 
government incorporated into the EEG a set of provisions on making an annual 
progress report of the status of costs and deployment of renewable energies (Men-
donca 2007: 32). Making location a criterion for remuneration was also a way 
of complying with the guidelines on over-compensation: the government would 
avoid having to pay too-high compensation rates for wind energy (Mendonca 
2007).
However, pressure against renewables grew. The CDU/CSU and the FDP 
opposed the introduction of the EEG – with few exceptions – as they regarded 
‘renewables growth targets [as] utterly illusory’ (Gründinger 2015: 238). Moreo-
ver, as the new act would drive up electricity prices, the Federation of German 
Industry was concerned about German competitiveness, arguing that the law 
would create excessive burdens for the industry (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). 
Similarly, the German Utilities Association criticized the law for imposing higher 
costs on consumers. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs supported such 
concerns, but its role was weakened as the second red-green coalition (Octo-
ber 2002–October 2005) shifted responsibility for renewable energy to the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment. Support for the Greens had increased since the last 
election, in contrast to the SPD, bolstering the Greens’ ability to strengthen the 
standing of the feed-in approach at the cabinet table. As a result, the energy sector 
was spread over two ‘hands’, one in favour of renewable energy and feed-in tariffs 
and the other promoting the interests of the utilities and market-oriented support 
schemes (Interview 6). The ministerial transfer of responsibility for renewable 
energy brought greater awareness of renewable energy in the German govern-
mental administration and strengthened the support for the feed-in tariff system 
(Bruns et al. 2009: 15).
This took place despite the increasing power of the utilities. Several energy 
companies merged at the turn of the millennium, eventually leading to the ‘Big 
Four’: E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall. This was a result of Germany’s accom-
modating the EU’s first Electricity Directive (Kungl 2015). Together with the Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Big Four spoke in favour of developing an 
electricity certificate scheme, preferably at the EU level (Fouquet and Johansson 
2008). While the feed-in tariffs made possible the emergence of new renewable-
energy firms (Kungl 2015), the Big Four were hardly interested in investing in 
renewables: specializing in coal and nuclear, they regarded the renewables rates 
of return as too low (Interviews 5 and 8).
Nuclear energy remained disputed. All the political parties agreed on the need 
for international action to combat international climate change, and for more 
rapid growth in renewables, but disagreed about the role of nuclear (Hake et al. 
2015). A major election promise of the Greens had been to phase out nuclear 
power plants. The SPD was not particularly fond of nuclear, either, but had inner-
party conflicts on how to implement a phase-out (ibid.). In 2000, after difficult 
negotiations, the red-green coalition and the energy utilities reached a ‘nuclear 
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consensus’ (Bundesregierung 2000), transposed into law two years later. This 
nuclear consensus gave Germany’s remaining 19 nuclear power plants a lifetime 
of 32 years. The phase-out was a major political accomplishment, even though 
Green supporters felt the pace was too slow (Morris and Jungjohann 2016: 200). 
The nuclear phase-out strengthened the case for renewables, which became the 
only climate-friendly energy source.
At the EU level, the Commission incorporated concerns about renewable 
energy in its state-aid guidelines in 2001 (Boasson 2021a, this book). The Preuss-
enElektra verdict in 2001 settled the issue, when the Court of Justice of the EU 
decided that this feed-in tariff, under the given conditions, did not count as state 
aid, because there was no involvement of financial sources by the state. As a 
result, the Commission could not prevent other EU member states from copying 
the German feed-in tariff.
The EEG was never meant to be static; it was continuously evaluated and 
changed accordingly. The first reform was scheduled for 2004 ‘to adjust tariffs 
and other provisions to technological and market developments’ (Gründinger 
2015: 241). Some changes had also become necessary after the first EU Renewa-
bles Directive 2001 had entered into force; this directive set for Germany a non-
binding target of a 13% renewables share in electricity production by 2010. The 
German government wanted to achieve this by introducing an even more differ-
entiated tariff structure (Boasson 2021a, this book). The Federal Ministry for the 
Environment’s first draft of the amendment led to a conflict between the Green 
Minister of Environment and the more coal-friendly Minister of Economics from 
the SPD (Mendonca 2007). Arguing that the rates were too high, the Minister of 
Economics proposed a tendering system instead.
In 2003 the Parliament, following a proposal from the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs, decided to exempt energy-intensive industry from the EEG 
surcharge (Special Equalization Scheme Act 2003). Industrial interests and power 
suppliers wanted exemptions for industrial consumers to protect German firms 
so that they would continue to be able to compete internationally (Gründinger 
2015). This surcharge exemption was important for maintaining consensus about 
the EEG (Interview 7).
In 2004 the red-green majority in Parliament decided to revise the govern-
ment bill, largely against the proposal from the Minister of Economy (Mendonca 
2007). In the Bundesrat, Länder, which had conservative governments, opposed 
the bill. While the course of the EEG was not fundamentally altered, the law 
became much more detailed – with adjustments made ‘to account for increasing 
market complexity, minimize unjustified windfall profits and to strengthen incen-
tives for innovation and cost reduction’ (Gründinger 2015: 245). The revised act 
introduced clear regulations for grid costs: plant operators were responsible for 
paying for grid connection, whereas the grid operator would have to cover costs 
related to upgrading the grid (Mendonca 2007). The fee structure was differen-
tiated further, and payment conditions for biomass, biogas, geothermal and PV 
energy improved. Increased tariffs made photovoltaic more attractive commer-
cially, leading to a solar boom.
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Larger corporations and utilities were made eligible for feed-in tariff support 
(EEG 2004 §2). However, large utilities, parts of the industry, the FDP and CDU 
politicians began questioning the necessity of a feed-in tariff with such high rates. 
They argued that the EEG was too expensive, contravened market rules and led 
to more regulation and a vast extension of the grid (Mendonca 2007). The indus-
try and big energy corporations had the financial resources for lobbying against 
the EEG but also important ties to policy-makers. How to deal with the expan-
sion of renewables was contested. The renewable industries began to join forces, 
establishing better-organized and more professional lobby structures (Gründinger 
2015: 252). These circumstances played an important role in the 2005 national 
elections where energy issues became politicized, as shown in the next section.
In summary, German renewables support became more generous, encompass-
ing and technology-specific – possible because the CJEU had ruled that the Ger-
man scheme did not fall under the Treaty’s definition of state aid. The issue was 
highly politicized. While all the parties agreed to speed up the growth of renewa-
bles, there was disagreement on how to support renewables and on the size of 
such support – also among the ministers in the red-green government. However, 
renewables gained clout at the cabinet table when the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment was given the responsibility for renewables in 2002.
2005–2009: increasing remuneration rates generates feed-in 
opposition
Renewables issues became increasingly politicized due to increasing expenses 
and the argument that the feed-in tariff distorted the electricity market. In the 
2005 election campaign, all parties (CDU, SPD, the Greens, FDP, die Linke) 
addressed climate or energy concerns and called for renewable energies as part 
of the German energy mix, but they continued to disagree on nuclear phase-out 
and how to support renewable energy (Greenpeace 2005). The Green Party and 
the SPD expected the EEG to make Germany an industrial world leader in terms 
of PV and wind energy (SPD 2005; Bündnis 90/Grüne 2005). In contrast, the 
CDU/CSU and FDP wanted to change the scope of German renewable energy 
policy. The CDU programme called for reducing subsidies for renewables but 
aimed at keeping at least a 12.5% share of renewables in the overall electricity 
mix (CDU 2005: 19). The FDP wanted to abolish the EEG and replace it with a 
more market-friendly model and called for retaining nuclear power in the energy 
mix (FDP 2005: 18).
After the elections, the CDU/CSU and SPD created the ‘Grand Coalition’ with 
Angela Merkel as chancellor and Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) as Minister of the Envi-
ronment. Although industrial interests called for Germany to drop its climate-
leadership ambitions (Jänicke 2010), the coalition agreement between CDU/CSU 
and SPD continued along the same climate and energy policy path as the former 
red-green coalition (Bundesregierung 2005). In the coalition agreement, the gov-
ernment called for a reform of the EEG without any major changes. For Merkel, 
known as the ‘Climate Chancellor’ because of her efforts in getting climate action 
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on the agenda internationally, it was important to implement climate activities and 
to set ambitious national climate targets to gain international credibility.
According to the 2005 coalition agreement, the EEG should be retained in its 
basic structure, but some specific matters (like tariffs) should ‘be adjusted to the 
economic efficiency of the different technologies’ (Gründinger 2015: 258). In 
2009 the government introduced amendments making the EEG 2009 far more 
detailed than the previous act. It increased the renewables target (to 30% by 
2020), extended industry privileges, and introduced a growth corridor with flex-
ible degression. In order to react flexibly to market growth, the degression rate for 
solar was made dependent on the size of installations (Hermanns 2008). This new 
method of calculating the renewable energy surcharge boosted windpower pro-
duction, while contributing to making the spot-market electricity price negative at 
that time. In this situation, power generators preferred to pay buyers to take elec-
tricity rather than ramping down their plants (Agora 2014). The 2009 amendment 
made the EEG levy jump abruptly, without providing any compensation payment 
to those who had to cover the costs of the support scheme (Interview 10).
The inflated returns strengthened the opponents of the support instrument 
(Interview 10). Promoters of the feed-in tariff highlighted that the high rates of 
return contributed to greater investment and cheaper solar energy production 
worldwide (Interview 10), but renewables interest groups, like the German Solar 
Association, which benefitted from the high rates, lost credibility by continuing 
to promote conservative prognoses (Seibt 2014). The increased renewables shares 
threatened the dominance of the Big Four: in 2004 they had 90% of all electricity, 
but by 2010 this was reduced to 77% (Bundesnetzagentur 2011).
There was another important change in energy policy at this time. The EU’s 
Third Energy Package brought new rules for unbundling (i.e. the obligation to 
separate energy supply and generation from the operation of transmission net-
works, to avoid unfair infrastructure access) (Commission 2017). This regulation 
resulted in ‘engraving changes’ (Interview 9), forcing the integrated power com-
panies to sell their electricity transmission network operators (Hesse and Bauch-
müller 2010; Kloc and Koska 2012). Required to sell off revenue-generating 
activities, the big utilities found themselves in a difficult situation (Interview 12).
In summary, in this period, German renewables policy followed the same path 
as under the previous government. The solar and wind industries grew rapidly. 
The introduction of a new way of calculating the renewable energy surcharge 
made the levy jump, fuelling opposition to the feed-in tariff.
2010–2016: introduction of auctioning after state-aid inquiry
In the ensuing period Germany gained worldwide fame for its Energiewende, 
while domestic opposition increased.
The conservative-liberal coalition (elected in 2009) initiated the Energiekonzept 
(an energy strategy adopted in September 2010), aimed at achieving national 
consensus on contentious energy issues, such as the development of renewable 
energies and the electricity grid and plans for dropping the nuclear phase-out 
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(Bundesregierung 2010). The concept – especially concerning the nuclear phase-
out – was heavily criticized by the opposition as well as environmental NGOs. In 
March 2011, six months after the concept was adopted, the Fukushima disaster 
occurred. Four days later, Chancellor Merkel announced a temporary three-month 
halt of the plan to extend the life of nuclear power plants, a safety check of all 
nuclear power plants and permanent shutdown of the seven oldest ones (Schreurs 
2012). Suddenly there was consensus among all the parties in Germany that 
nuclear power was no longer an option (Huenteler et al. 2012) – and this at a time 
when some 20% of electricity production was nuclear (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2019). Fukushima had demonstrated that nuclear mishaps of major magnitude 
could also occur in technologically advanced countries. The accident ‘tipped a 
precarious political balance . . . against nuclear power and towards renewable 
energy sources’ (Schreurs 2012: 31). Supporting nuclear power was no longer 
politically feasible. In July 2011, the Parliament decided to reverse the 2010 deci-
sion to grant nuclear power plants a lifetime extension, voting overwhelmingly in 
favour of shutting down eight plants and phasing out the remaining nine by 2022 
(Wassermann et al. 2015).
This development was accompanied by the rapid acceleration of electricity and 
heat generation from renewable sources. However, many were concerned by this 
rapid development. In addition to the increasing surcharge on power, there were 
technical challenges and high cable costs related to offshore wind parks and bring-
ing the electricity onshore (Schreurs 2012). Resistance to onshore wind increased 
in areas with high windpower potential. Another issue was the lack of a high-
voltage grid infrastructure that could transfer electricity from the northern states, 
which produce considerable amounts of wind electricity, to the southern states, 
where there is a demand for more electricity (Schreurs 2012). Pressure on the grid 
from the growing windpower capacity in northern Germany made it relevant to 
curb the feed-in tariff for renewables (Apunn 2015).
The organizational field had changed significantly. In 2012, renewables pro-
vided more than 20% of domestic electricity production, and almost half of the 
renewables capacity was owned by local actors, such as individual citizens or 
farmers, cooperatives or other citizen organizations (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2019; Schmid et al. 2016: 265–266). The number of such cooperatives soared, 
from 35 in 2005 to 365 in 2013. In addition, a diverse group of new renewables 
investors entered the field: between 2010 and 2013, local governments created 70 
new public utilities, but also actors from other societal sectors diversified the field, 
including energy intensive-industry, banks and insurance companies and project 
developers. These actors tended to be located near the generating facilities and 
favoured an EEG that promoted the construction of a wide range of small-scale 
renewables plants where the electricity was needed – not at sites that would entail 
the lowest production costs (Schmid et al. 2016: 272; Schmid et al. 2017).
Conflicts between renewables actors and the established utilities were less 
prevalent, with many actors seeking to find ways of ensuring that the increase in 
renewables created fewer market distortions, such as negative electricity prices 
(Schmid et al. 2017). Several renewables plant owners tested out new business 
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models, such as opting out of feed-in and getting consumers to pay a little extra for 
an electricity portfolio heavy in renewables (Wassermann et al. 2015). Such direct 
marketing of renewables became increasingly prevalent after 2010, although 
there was significant disagreement on how to regulate this.
The Big Four increased their renewables investments but were hesitant to 
embrace direct marketing (Wassermann et al. 2015: 70). They continued to lose 
market shares, with their total generated electricity decreasing by almost 16% 
from 2010 to 2013 (Bundesnetzagentur 2014: 30). They faced a dire economic 
situation created by the financial crisis, with the closure of many of their nuclear 
sites and increasing shares of intermittent renewable energy changing the price-
setting mechanisms in the electricity market. E.ON was hardest hit: it recorded 
a profit fall of €1.9 billion in 2011 – the year in which the German nuclear 
phase-out was decided (bpb 2013). While the EEG surcharge soared between 
2009 and 2013 (Wassermann et al. 2015), annual remuneration for renewable 
technology fell rapidly (Nestle 2016: 2) and the government struggled to adjust 
remuneration levels accordingly. Against this backdrop, the Big Four stepped 
up their calls for a less expensive, more cost-efficient EEG and for better plans 
on how to achieve a cost-effective system of climate-friendly energy supply 
(Kungl 2015). A representative from a business association argued that, since 
2011, ‘the system was running against the wall. No one can bear this, the costs’ 
(Interview 4).
The political debate on whether to control the volume of renewable energy 
became very heated (Interview 9). The conservative-liberal government agreed 
that renewables needed to become more responsive to market signals and modi-
fied the EEG Act again in 2012. Inspired by the direct marketing business mod-
els that had emerged, they presented a market premium scheme as a voluntary 
alternative to feed-in tariffs (BEE 2013; Wassermann et al. 2015). When renew-
ables (and mine gas) operators decided to sell their electricity directly, in line 
with the voluntary alternative, they could claim support in the form of market 
premiums paid on top of the market price for electricity, substantially covering 
the gap to the feed-in tariff amount. The plant operator, and not the transmission 
network operator, would be responsible for selling the electricity on the market. 
This was expected to increase flexibility of renewables plants, including volun-
tary curtailment at times of negative prices, thereby reducing system integration 
costs (Purkus et al. 2015). However, politicians from the Green Party and the 
left-oriented die Linke, environmental groups, several renewable-energy provid-
ers and many researchers criticized the introduction of direct marketing, arguing 
that it would reduce the diversity of renewable energy producers (Interview 14; 
Wassermann et al. 2015: 71).
Under such circumstances, the liberal FDP’s Minister of Economy, Philipp 
Rösler, called for drastic cuts in funding and tariffs, and a photovoltaics cap at 
9000 megawatts by 2020 (Enkhardt 2012). During the federal election campaign 
in September 2013, renewables support and the related costs were a key issue. The 
Environment Minister, Peter Altmaier (CDU), indicated that the Energiewende 
would cost about €1000 billion until 2030 (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2013). 
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Together with Rösler, he proposed reducing the feed-in tariffs for new plants by 
€1 billion annually.
The pressure was great. The neoliberal German think-tank and advocacy organ-
ization New Social Free Market Initiative conducted a massive campaign to ‘stop 
the EEG and save billions’. Low-income earners were addressed as part of this 
campaign (Interview 6), but energy poverty has otherwise generally attracted 
scant attention (Interview 5; see also Morris and Jungjohann 2016). Referring to 
rising costs, Altmaier increased the pressure on the opposition, the Green Party 
in particular (Der Spiegel 2013). Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) followed suit, arguing 
that it was necessary to stabilize costs and protect German industry (Sturm 2014). 
Industrial competitiveness was a key topic (Interview 5):
The energy transition will become a model of success only if it is economi-
cally feasible. Germany has a very privileged position and can afford a lot of 
investments, but only if, in the end, German industry becomes substantially 
able to compete through the energy transition, otherwise it will fail.
(Interview 7)
CDU/CSU won the 2013 elections and created another Grand Coalition with 
SPD. The new government transferred responsibility for renewable energy from 
the Federal Ministry for the Environment to the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs (Interview 15). The aim was to concentrate energy responsibilities in one 
ministry, under Vice-Chancellor Gabriel as minister (Interviews 7 and 15). The 
entire department working on the energy transition in the Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, about 80 civil servants, was moved to the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs (Interview 7).
Interviewees argue that the shift of responsibility weakened the Federal Min-
istry for the Environment and increased the weight accorded to large industrial 
interests represented by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (Interviews 
4 and 8). Others indicate that the emphasis on costs increased after the shift, but 
primarily because ‘He [the minister] took office to reduce the costs’ (Interviews 
6 and 7).
Three alternative ways of controlling deployment, thereby cutting costs, were 
discussed, based on scientific and economic consultations: cap (a limit to how 
much renewables could be installed), electricity certificates (where the govern-
ment sets the quota and the remuneration level is set by the market) and auc-
tions. ‘My impression was that many were fundamentally opposed to deployment 
control [e.g. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, German Trade Union Federation, 
the Greens]; however, if volume control were to be conducted, then procurement 
by tender would be the best alternative’ (Interview 9). Since the early 2000s, the 
utilities and FDP had supported a certificate system, but they turned to support 
a bidding system prior to EEG 2014 (Lauber and Jacobsson 2015). The CDU 
favoured market premiums until about the same time, with some members in the 
business wing promoting a bidding scheme. Shifting to a certificate scheme would 
entail less technology-specificity, thereby favouring the least costly technologies 
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and projects (Ecofys 2014: 74). This debate showed how political and economic 
actors discussed the fundamental principles of the EEG, a price-oriented support 
scheme with technology-specificity.
The utilities, fearing bankruptcy, favoured auctions and put the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Affairs under strong pressure (Interviews 3 and 8). They considered 
auctions advantageous for large companies, as such companies have more large-
scale projects, making it easier for them to develop competitive offers (Interview 5). 
Environmentalists argued that the utilities had only themselves to blame for not 
having invested in renewables; however, there was some understanding in the 
green camp about bankruptcy concerns. One interviewee (3) stated, ‘Mr Gabriel 
made an argument, which I can personally understand. He says that if one of the 
Big Ones goes insolvent, then the Energiewende will no longer be a good role 
model for the outside world’. Germany may be able to pay the remuneration rates, 
but they are too expensive for other countries to follow suit (Interview 5).
Smaller renewables actors feared the introduction of more market exposure and 
competitive bidding, and a citizen energy alliance was created in 2014 (Schmid 
et al. 2016: 266). The CDU/CSU and SPD coalition agreement gave priority to 
cutting costs related to the renewable energy support scheme, introduced growth 
corridors with annual technology-specific targets and mentioned procurements 
by tender as one such support-scheme design (Bundesregierung 2013). One civil 
servant argues: ‘At that point it was relatively clear that we would get procure-
ments by tender and goals [volume] that would be controlled’ (Interview 9). One 
opposition politician agreed: ‘We realized early what the deal [auctions] was, and 
couldn’t change much’ (Interview 8). He was referring to how the influence of 
the opposition is limited under the conditions of a Grand Coalition (Interview 6).
The Grand Coalition government stated that it would start dialogue with the 
Commission and other member states as soon as possible about how to develop 
the support scheme for renewables in accordance with EU law (Bundesregierung 
2013). In December 2013, the Commission opened a formal investigation into 
whether the EEG was compatible with EU state-aid rules (Commission 2013). 
The Commission argued that Germany had substantially amended its EEG Act 
since the PreussenElektra judgement, and that the EEG was now considerably 
different. Since 2008 the new CJEU rulings had also broadened the application 
of the EU state-aid rules concerning support for renewables (Boasson 2021a, this 
book).
Among the issues that the Commission addressed was the ‘green power privi-
lege’, which provides a reduced surcharge for suppliers if 50% of the electricity 
portfolio is based on domestic renewables (Gawel and Strunz 2014). This may dis-
criminate between domestic and imported electricity – in contravention of state-
aid rules. The Commission also criticized the levy reduction for energy-intensive 
industries. This exemption is aimed at preventing relocation of such industries to 
countries with lower electricity costs (Gawel and Strunz 2014).
The Commission’s focus on the exceptions from the EEG levy for energy-
intensive industries was particularly difficult for the German government, as 
‘the industrial exceptions from the EEG levy are essential for creating political 
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consensus on the Energiewende’ (Interview 7). Some companies needed this 
exemption in order to be able to compete internationally (see n-tv 2014). As one 
interviewee (7) argued, ‘Without the exceptions for industry, the EEG system and 
the whole Energiewende can’t achieve consensus in Germany. I have to say, their 
[the Commission’s] focus was cruel, building up maximum pressure’.
The Commission’s initiation of a formal investigation into the EEG created 
uncertainty. If the Commission should conclude that the recipients had been 
granted unlawful aid, they would have to repay (Boasson 2021a, this book). One 
interviewee (7) pointed out that company repayment obligations could run to bil-
lions of Euros. Hence, the government negotiated with the Commission, trying 
to reform the EEG while ensuring that it was in line with the state-aid rules. That 
the EU itself was in the midst of revising its state-aid guidelines made the pro-
cess even more challenging. One MP found the process opaque, as the Parliament 
did not receive continuous information; he saw the EU as a ‘shadow negotiator’ 
during domestic German EEG discussions (Interview 15). When the Minister of 
Economics presented the draft to the Parliament in early June 2014, he argued 
that it could no longer be changed because it had already been negotiated with the 
Commission (Fischer 2017). Commission representatives have confirmed that the 
revision of the EU state-aid guidelines and the Commission’s negotiations with 
Germany were closely intertwined (see Boasson 2021a, this book).
In July 2014, three months after the EU had adopted new state-aid guide-
lines, the German government substantially amended the EEG. First, EEG 2014 
applied growth corridors to all technologies and provided detailed figures about 
the planned increase in installed power for the various energy sources, outlining 
global targets: at least 35% of gross electricity consumption from renewables by 
2020, 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040 and 80% by 2050.
Second, the government introduced ‘breathing caps’ for onshore wind and bio-
mass. This left the market premium as the only way of direct marketing for new 
installations – however, depending on the extent to which newly installed capacity 
is in line with the corridors. Thus, financial support for onshore wind and biomass 
under the new law is reduced quarterly (not annually) as of 2016 and may be 
increased or decreased if growth exceeds or falls below the corridor targets.
Third, the revised act made direct marketing (introduced in 2012 as a volun-
tary option) obligatory, but not for small renewables plants. The market premium 
became the primary support instrument (Purkus et al. 2015). However, the tra-
ditional feed-in continued for small-scale projects. This was important because 
it is individuals, farmers, small companies and communities who have installed 
solar panels on their roofs and invested in windmills who have driven the Ener-
giewende forward. This actor diversity has created widespread acceptance for the 
Energiewende, exceptional in terms of strengthening public participation as part 
of the technological energy transition (Morris and Jungjohann 2016).
Further, the EEG 2014 introduced pilot tendering for freestanding PV installa-
tions. The first auctions were held in 2015, which was very controversial politically 
(Interview 9). Bidding procedures were already a discussion topic in Germany, 
but interviewees (7, 9, 15) indicated that the state-aid inquiry speeded up the shift 
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towards a tendering system. One policy advisor argued that this ‘would certainly 
not have been so fast . . . if the Commission had not said, “no matter what you do, 
we need the tender as default” ’ (Interview 7). For example, while the Commission 
questioned the exemptions from the EEG levy for energy-intensive industries in 
the opening letter (Commission 2013), the final letter accepted such exceptions on 
condition that Germany introduces procurements by tender (Commission 2016). 
However, two interviewees (7, 9) held that auctions would eventually have been 
introduced even without EU pressure.
Although Germany changed its law in line with the EU 2014 state-aid guide-
lines, tensions remained between the Commission and Germany.3 One inter-
viewee (9) explained that it was generally unpopular among German politicians 
across all factions for the Commission to encroach on national responsibilities in 
the nationally sovereign energy-policy area, as this limits the alternative policies 
options for national legislators (see also EurActiv 2014).
The EEG 2014 continued to be debated after its entry into force, especially due 
to concerns about actor diversity and the effects on cooperatives, ‘seen as the most 
important institutional innovation coming out of the energy transition’ (Szulecki 
2018: 33). The German government confirmed that it wanted actor diversity 
to continue (see § 2, para. 5, sentence 3, EEG 2014), but it remained disputed 
whether this was possible (Ohlhorst 2018). As part of the pilot for PV, the Federal 
Network Agency conducted six competitive tenders, with the first round in 2015 
(Ministry for Economic Affairs, n.d.). Competition increased with each round, 
contributing to steadily falling price levels. Based on this experience, the govern-
ment concluded that competitive tendering as an instrument was successful. Also, 
relatively small bidders and projects were awarded contracts.
As shown, the German support scheme changed significantly in this period. 
While there was agreement that the support instrument should differ among tech-
nologies, there was much controversy about the shift to greater competition. This 
happened in a situation where the big utilities promoted auctions, the feed-in pro-
moters were politically no longer a majority and the EU was adopting a new 
approach to state aid.
Discussions and conclusions
The German renewable support scheme has undergone several incremental 
changes. While, at the turn of 2016–2017, the feed-in support remained for small-
scale renewables plants, the change towards more competition for large-scale 
producers marked a radical change in approach, albeit following a long German 
tradition of technology steering. Also in the auctions, various technologies are 
granted different levels of support – but the level of support is based on actors’ 
bids in the competitive tenders and is not administered by the state. What explains 
this development towards a combination of technology steering and competition 
of renewable electricity support in Germany? Have these changes to the EEG 
occurred primarily due to pressures in the European environment or conditions in 
the political or organizational field, or the relationship between them?
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While Germany has played a relatively independent role in developing its sup-
port scheme for renewable electricity, the evidence still provides support for the 
expectation that the effect of the European environment on national renewables 
support is stronger in periods when the Commission exerts coercive pressure. 
However, the effect of member-state peer pressure on policy development is less 
clear in the German case. In the 1990s, when the original German technology-
specific feed-in support scheme emerged, the EU had scant authority over renew-
able electricity policies and there were no clear European support-scheme trends 
(Jacobs 2012). As expected, in this period the EU hardly influenced the develop-
ment of the German feed-in support scheme. Although there was no peer pressure 
among member states in this period, Germany was inspired by the Danish feed-in, 
which existed prior to the German scheme.
In later periods, the German scheme has developed in parallel with changes 
in EU-level renewables policy and state-aid practices, but not without German 
resistance. In particular, there has been considerable controversy related to the 
Commission’s attempts to use the state-aid rules to force Germany to abandon its 
feed-in tariffs, and Germany’s defiance. Importantly, the 2001 PreussenElektra 
judgement, where the Court decided that the German feed-in instrument did not 
constitute state aid, weakened the Commission’s ability to influence the German 
renewables support scheme and left Germany at peace to determine its own sup-
port scheme for more than a decade.
However, Germany had regularly adjusted its support scheme. This gave the 
Commission a renewed opportunity to instigate an inquiry into state aid and the 
EEG, putting considerable pressure on the German government to change its sup-
port scheme. By this time, new CJEU rulings and new state-aid guidelines had 
increased the clout of the Commission (Boasson 2021a, this book).
We find that the EU created a political context that strengthened domestic 
actors who wanted to change the EEG, but that the key explanation for changes in 
the German renewables support scheme in 2014 lies in the political and organiza-
tional fields. Given the entrenched debates on controlling deployment and costs, 
the data suggests that the German government would have introduced a tender-
ing system even without pressure from the Commission. However, such pressure 
helped promoters of auctions to speed up the process (Fischer 2017: 336), as the 
possibility of blaming Brussels enabled the government to overcome the decision-
making trap much sooner.
Many countries have been inspired by Germany and copied its technology-
specific feed-in scheme. From 1990 to 2010 Germany influenced EU renewables 
support steering and support-scheme trends in Europe more than the European 
environment influenced Germany (Jacobs 2012; Vogelpohl et al. 2017). In line 
with Vogelpohl et al.’s (2017) characterization of Germany as a ‘foot-dragger’ in 
connection with its role as a veto player at the supranational level, we find that the 
European environment has had a greater effect on German policy change when 
domestic conditions have been open to such influence.
How has the domestic organizational field affected policy change in Germany? 
Given Germany’s corporatist and coordinated market economy tradition (Hall and 
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Soskice 2001), we expected to find particularly favoured interest groups in the 
organizational field who would be able to bypass political forums and be particu-
larly influential for the development of the support scheme. However, as Hager 
(2015) notes, the development of the German feed-in tariff grew ‘outside the pre-
vailing channels of institutional power’. Hence, the influence of the organiza-
tional field has played out differently from what comparative capitalist literature 
suggests, partly because the organizational field in the renewable energy sector 
has not been particularly segmented in this case.
There were two institutional logics. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, 
with close ties to the big utilities, has favoured cost-efficient, large-scale develop-
ments; the Federal Ministry of the Environment and green NGOs have favoured 
the feed-in tariff, which was informed by the ordo-liberal German tradition of 
the government taking sizeable responsibility for new industry development. The 
multi-field approach assumes that such divisions in terms of logics will weaken 
the influence of the organizational field on policy change. In the German case, the 
feed-in scheme (once enforced) resulted in structural fragmentation within the 
organizational field, and the technology-specific logic of the Energiewende was 
strengthened among renewables actors, while the utilities became increasingly 
embedded in a market logic.
In the first period, multiple change processes were underway in the 1990s, 
including the unification of West and East German energy systems, and a grow-
ing focus on nuclear power. These attracted more attention among the dominant 
organizational field actors (like the utilities) than did the renewable energy sup-
port scheme, which was not expected to contribute to major growth in renewable 
energy. In this period, the large utilities (before the merger that created the Big 
Four) had certain privileges in the regions.
After the turn of the millennium, conflicts between the two logics grew more 
intense, and repeated turf battles played out. On the one hand, the energy liber-
alization reforms initiated by the EU strengthened the market logic and resulted 
in the merger of energy companies, leading to the ‘Big Four’. On the other hand, 
renewables actors became more professional and better coordinated, gaining 
influence when the Federal Ministry for the Environment was given responsibil-
ity for renewables. There were enduring tensions between these two turfs in the 
organizational field. Under such conditions, political engagement increased. In 
the multi-field approach, this means that the organizational field has been less 
important in explaining policy change than the political field.
This is also evident later on. In the period 2005–2009, the organizational field 
remained rife with conflict, with the increased renewables share creating new and 
unforeseen technical and economic challenges. Conflicts over the renewables 
support scheme continued in the 2010–2016 period; but the split between utilities 
and supporters of a competitive approach, on the one hand, and renewables actors 
and environmentalists, on the other, lessened somewhat as new business models 
were tested out, helping to making the increased renewables share less disruptive 
to the German energy system. Key actors now started to combine the two institu-
tional logics that had represented opposites (for a similar change in preferences 
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among energy industrial actors in Europe, see Lindberg 2019). The possibility 
that the Big Four might face severe economic challenges was of great concern 
to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, which took over responsibility for 
renewables from the Federal Ministry for the Environment. Hence, in this period, 
the field became more segmented, with more agreement between the actors. These 
developments underpinned the 2014 decision to change the support scheme. This 
in turn supports the expectation that the influence of the organizational field on 
policy change will be greater when the organizational field is segmented than 
when it is not.
We have already indicated that the political field can explain the change in pol-
icy better than the organizational field. Has there been intense political salience, 
and has the German Parliament been powerful over time? The German political 
system is known for the importance of its legislative assembly, with its many veto 
powers and distinct bargaining style. Bargaining between the coalition parties in 
government at the federal level, and between the federal level and the states, is 
necessary in order to disarm veto players and to enable agreement on policies. The 
renewable energy support scheme has almost constantly been high on the agenda 
in parliamentary negotiations. The feed-in tariff policy, originally expected to 
have only minor effects, proved remarkably successful regarding deployment. 
This success made it both more popular and increasingly contested in terms of 
how to control deployment of renewables, and thereby how much funding should 
be channelled to renewables, and how. Prior to 2000, nuclear was subject to more 
political competition than renewables, but individual politicians managed to cre-
ate alliances in the shadow of the more salient energy-policy issue. Two back-
benchers were able to mobilize in favour of the first feed-in law.
Already in 2000, opposition to the feed-in tariff became evident, as both the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP were against adoption of the EEG. However, increasing 
electoral support strengthened the standing of the Green Party and its Environ-
ment Minster, and thereby the feed-in approach, at the cabinet table, where there 
was also a more coal-friendly Minister for Economic Affairs from the SPD. One 
important condition for continued support for the feed-in tariff in the second period 
concerned the exemptions for energy-intensive industry from the EEG surcharge.
Despite consensus about the Energiewende, renewables policy remained politi-
cized in the period 2005–2009. The government coalition between CSU/CDU and 
SPD followed the path of its predecessor, increasing the EEG levy so much that 
some beneficiaries of the generous feed-in tariff lost political credibility. By the 
end of the period it had become clear that renewables support design was more 
complicated than political discussions had indicated: the largely unexpected chal-
lenges related to higher renewables shares required the politicians to pay greater 
attention to the many technical details of the support scheme.
Then, after the 2011 Fukushima disaster, when Germany’s political parties had 
agreed on nuclear phase-out, thereby increasing the importance of renewables, 
the issue of approaches to renewables support became more politicized. It became 
crucial to have a smoothly functioning support scheme for renewables, also in 
view of the political disputes about controlling the deployment of renewables, 
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and hence costs. This continuing controversy about whether and how to control 
deployment highlights how the political field has been particularly important to 
the development of renewables electricity policy in Germany.
Our findings indicate that the influence of the political field on policy develop-
ment has been strong throughout the history of renewables policy in Germany. 
Even in the first period when the feed-in support scheme was adopted, at a time 
when renewables were not a salient issue, the political field was important: Ger-
man politicians played a key role in initiating this scheme, when two backbench-
ers were able to get considerable support. This shows how it may be easier to 
introduce a policy at a time when it is not considered crucial. This period in itself 
does not give support to the multi-field assumption that the issue must be salient 
for the political field to be influential; rather, it suggests that when formal author-
ity rests with the Parliament, the issue need not be politically contested for the 
political field to be influential. In later periods, the influence of the opposition 
was limited when the government consisted of the Grand Coalition (the two larg-
est political parties in Germany). However, policy development in these periods 
shows that the political salience of renewables policy has been more important in 
explaining why the influence of the political field has been greater than that of the 
organizational field. In light of the multiple streams approach in the public policy 
literature (e.g. Kingdon 1984), which tends to assume that politicians pay atten-
tion to an issue only at brief moments (e.g. in open policy windows, in response 
to external shocks), the story of the German renewables electricity support is note-
worthy: this policy has remained politically salient for more than 15 years.
To conclude, the changes in the German renewable electricity support policy 
have occurred as a result of an interplay between conditions in the domestic organ-
izational and political fields and pressures in the European environment, which 
are also intertwined. However, the factors in the political field have been the most 
decisive. The political field proved unexpectedly important for the introduction 
of the feed-in tariff in the 1990s. Backbenchers were able to attract support from 
a majority of MPs at a time when renewables policy was not high on the agenda, 
and this support instrument was seen as a minor issue. However, once introduced, 
the feed-in tariff scheme broke up the largely non-competitive electricity genera-
tion structure by creating new renewable-electricity generators, with two turfs in 
the organizational field, each following its own institutional logic. These turfs 
contributed to exacerbating the political conflict between those favouring the 
feed-in instrument and those that were opposed.
The support instrument for renewable electricity has remained a highly salient 
political issue for almost two decades. This highlights the role of the political 
field in explaining policy change in Germany. In this situation, the European envi-
ronment has played an important role. By pressuring the German government to 
change its support scheme, the Commission strengthened the role of change agents 
(here, opponents of the feed-in tariff instrument) in the domestic organizational 
and political fields. While the feed-in tariff enjoyed general popularity, there were 
costs and economic consequences for the utilities. Starting with pilots in 2014, 
the German government made competitive tenders compulsory for large energy 
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producers from 2017. This new competitive approach marks a radical break with 
the feed-in tradition, as those interests (the electricity utilities) that had fought 
against the support scheme could claim a victory. However, the policy change is 
still the result of a path-dependent process of incremental changes towards greater 
market-orientation. The competitive approach may be new in the German renew-
able electricity sector, but the element of technology steering clearly builds on 
long traditions in the sector.
Interviewees
1 Representative of civil society interest group Bürgerenergie Berlin, 28 
November 2016, Berlin
2 Renewable industry lobbyist, Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien, 28 
November 2016, Berlin
3 Environmental organization representative, Greenpeace, 28 November 2016, 
Berlin
4 Energy industry representative, Energieeffizienz Unternehmen, 29 Novem-
ber 2016, Berlin
5 Large energy utility representative, E.ON, 29 November 2016, Berlin
6 Political advisor, Green Party, 30 November 2016, Berlin
7 Policy advisor, Agora Energiwende, 29 November 2016, Berlin
8 Former minister and Green Party MP, 30 November 2016, Berlin
9 Civil servant, Ministry for Economic Affairs, 30 November 2016, Berlin
10 Former politician, Green Party, 30 November 2016, Berlin
11 Renewable energy industry representative, German Wind Energy Association 
(BWE), 1 December 2016, Berlin
12 Consultant at a group of companies providing services for customers in 
energy and finance industries, 21 February 2017, telephone interview
13 Renewable energy lobbyist, European Renewable Energies Federation 
(EREF), 16 February 2017, Oslo
14 Environmentalist, Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU), 2 
December 2016, Berlin
15 Political advisor to CDU energy representative, 2 December 2016, Berlin
16 Freelance renewable energy policy expert, 23 February 2017, telephone 
interview
Notes
 1 The feed-in premium is equal to the difference between the technology-specific refer-
ence values and the average monthly reference market value of electricity for the respec-
tive renewable technology. The market value of dispatchable renewables is equal to the 
monthly average of hourly contract values on EPEX (i.e. the electricity spot market) 
(Energypedia n.d.).
 2 This was prior to the Energy and Environmental State Aid Guidelines (EEAG) which 
the Commission adopted in 2001.
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 3 This is highlighted by the fact that Germany took to court the Commission’s 2014 deci-
sion that the EEG 2012 constituted state aid. In 2014 the Commission argued that the 
EEG 2012 fell under state aid but largely accepted the aid, while ordering partial recov-
ery (Commission 2014). The CJEU supported this decision, ruling that the EEG 2012 
involved state aid (CJEU 2016). However, in 2019, the CJEU annulled this decision, 
ruling that it does not constitute state aid (CJEU 2019).
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6  The United Kingdom
From market-led policy towards 
technology steering
Tim Rayner, Merethe Dotterud Leiren and  
Tor Håkon Jackson Inderberg
Introduction
The policy instrument mix by which the UK government has sought to promote 
renewable electricity has undergone a remarkable journey of twist and turns. This 
chapter aims to makes sense of 30 years of ongoing change and revision. The 
energy sector has featured prominently in the UK’s quest for market liberaliza-
tion since the 1980s. Moreover, as a ‘first-mover’ in liberalizing energy markets, 
the UK has helped to shape EU energy policy (Padgett 2003). The European 
Commission (the Commission) endorsed the UK’s promotion of market-oriented 
instruments such as tradeable green certificates, at a time when EU-level policy-
makers were seeking to harmonize support schemes in the process leading to the 
2001 Renewable Energy Directive (Rowlands 2005; Solorio and Fairbrass 2017). 
In 2002, the government implemented a system of the green certificate type, the 
Renewables Obligation (RO). However, a decade later the UK moved to replace 
this with a ‘Contracts for Difference’ system. Moreover, it introduced a feed-in 
tariff to support small-scale renewable electricity generation.
These shifts have been regarded as significant turns away from the hitherto pre-
ferred market-led approach (Kern et al. 2014; Stagnaro 2015), in favour of more 
technology-specific, centralized planning of the electricity sector (Keay 2011). 
In this chapter we ask: why did the apparent taboo on detailed state steering lift, 
to the extent that the UK developed a technology-specific support mix featur-
ing ‘Contracts for Difference’ for large-scale, and a feed-in tariff for small-scale, 
renewable electricity?
Given that the feed-in tariff has been the most popular support scheme among 
EU member states, while the Commission (in its 2014 state-aid guidelines) pro-
motes feed-in premium auctions, the question of whether and how the ‘European 
environment’ has influenced national policy decisions is a complex one. With 
few exceptions (e.g. Stagnaro 2015), the literature on UK renewables support 
has paid little attention to the EU (e.g. Connor 2003; Mitchell and Connor 2004; 
Toke 2011; Kitzing et al. 2012; Kern et al. 2014). In this chapter, we attempt to 
do more justice to the European dimension of UK policy. According to the multi-
field framework, the European environment can be expected to influence national 
renewables support most when the EU has significant authority over the issue and 
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there is strong peer pressure to adopt a given scheme. As EU steering has become 
more coercive, and many countries have turned towards feed-in premiums com-
bined with auctioning after 2014, we would expect stronger European influence 
on UK renewables policy over time – but is this what we find?
We also identify how the domestic organizational field plays into policy devel-
opments. The multi-field framework assumes that the organizational field will be 
particularly important under periods of strong segmentation (where one dominant 
institutional logic and concentration of authority and information prevails). How-
ever, the UK is generally considered to be a relatively pluralist system (Leach 
et al. 2011: 152), with numerous and varied pressure groups that may influence 
decision-making. As the UK was early in liberalizing its electricity system, we 
might expect rather loose ties between governmental regulators and industry 
actors, and a great variety of actors, giving an organizational field characterized 
by low segmentation and thus rather low policy impact. But perhaps the instabil-
ity in the British organizational field can help explain the repeated shifts in the UK 
renewables support policy mix?
Furthermore, the effect of the domestic political field can be expected to be 
stronger when renewables policy has become politically salient and when for-
mal decision-making power rests with the legislative assembly (Boasson 2021b, 
this book). As the UK often experiences strong majority governments, we will 
expect that these conditions are seldom met – but perhaps renewables policy has 
become sufficiently politicized at key moments to make political steering impor-
tant nevertheless?
Technology-specific renewables support mix
As of this writing, large-scale renewables projects are offered feed-in premi-
ums, awarded through competitive tenders (Contracts for Difference) whereas 
small-scale generators receive feed-in tariffs (RES Legal 2019). Contracts for 
Difference are long-term contracts between government (in the form of the Low 
Carbon Contracts Company) and large renewable (or nuclear) electricity genera-
tors, which provide a top-up payment between the market price and a pre-defined 
‘strike price’, over a defined period.
Generators compete for long-term contracts for provision of capacity through 
auctions (CEER 2018). In these, technologies have been divided into established 
(‘Pot 1’, including onshore wind and solar) and less established types (‘Pot 2’, 
including offshore wind, geothermal and tidal), with each pot assigned its own 
budget. ‘Allocation rounds’ have been held through auctions in 2014 and 2017. In 
the former, both established and less established technologies were included, but 
only less established technologies were included in 2017. A third allocation round 
opened in May 2019 to eligible Pot 2 technologies. Although multiple types may 
be included in one auction, prices received per MWh and contract lengths vary by 
technology. Different ‘strike prices’ are determined through the auctioning pro-
cess but must not exceed an ‘administrative’ strike price. When a strike price is 
higher than the market price, the Contract for Difference ‘Counterparty’ must pay 
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the generator the difference between the two. Funding for these contracts is gener-
ated from levies on consumers’ bills.
From 2010, the small-scale Feed-in Tariff required participating licensed sup-
pliers to pay fixed tariffs to small-scale generators for renewable electricity gener-
ated and transmitted to the national grid. The scheme has been available to anyone 
who has installed, or is looking to install, solar, wind, combined heat and power 
(CHP) below 50 kW, or hydro or anaerobic digestion (biogas production) up to a 
capacity of 5 MW (or 2 kW for CHP) (RES Legal 2019). However, in 2015 subsi-
dies for household-scale solar were cut by 64%, and support for community-scale 
projects was removed (ENDS Report 2015). Bandings for size of installation were 
changed, and the pace of the decrease of support over time was accelerated. As 
a result, installation rates have fallen significantly across all technologies in this 
size category.1
UK renewables support is highly technology-specific for large as well as small-
scale projects. To a certain extent, large-scale projects are exposed to fluctuat-
ing electricity wholesale prices, but the strike-price feature reduces uncertainties 
more than in other feed-in premium systems. Whereas small-scale renewables are 
entitled to feed-in support, only large-scale projects can take advantage of auc-
tion allocation rounds for Contracts for Difference. Since 2015, no auction has 
included the most established renewables technology: onshore wind.
The UK has operated several renewables support schemes over time; we now 
move on to describe and explain the key developments.
Historical phases: 30 years of testing and revising
Prior to 1999: launch of a tendering system
Historically, British electricity production has benefitted from plentiful domestic 
coal resources. From the 1950s, nuclear capacity was developed, and gas-fired 
power stations proliferated in the 1990s. The 1970s saw the status of energy 
policy elevated, particularly because of the 1973 oil crisis (Pearson and Watson 
2012). After a series of industrial disputes that affected energy supplies, in 1979 
the Thatcher-led Conservative government was elected. Citing energy security 
concerns, it planned an expansion of nuclear power. Although an anti-nuclear 
movement was active in the UK from the 1950s, the issue never reached a high 
level of political saliency (Cox et al. 2016; Thomas 2016: 426). While many in the 
anti-nuclear movement were Labour supporters, the party’s trade union base has 
meant that in government, Labour has tended to look favourably on the nuclear 
sector. Due to a range of technical and economic challenges, it took several dec-
ades until the nuclear share peaked at 25% of electricity production, in the early 
1990s (Cox et al. 2016: 7, 25; Pearson and Watson 2012).
Informed by free-market principles – government intervention in the economy 
should be avoided, while privatization and competition would serve the public 
good – the Thatcher government aimed to transform public sector monopolies 
into more efficient private enterprises. After a bitter strike, from the mid-1980s 
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the government prevailed in its goal of closing uneconomic coal mines. The 1989 
Electricity Act privatized electricity generation and deregulated the energy sector; 
the Department for Energy was abolished and its responsibilities transferred to the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). An independent governmental agency, 
the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), was given responsibility 
for ensuring fair competition. The formal mandates of the DTI and Ofgem were 
centred on consumers and competitive markets (Kern et al. 2014).
Until privatization, the electricity industry in England and Wales comprised 
a vertically integrated generation and transmission business: 12 regional boards 
responsible for local distribution, and the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB). With privatization, the CEGB was divided into four (Newbery 1997): 
two conventional non-nuclear generating companies, PowerGen and National 
Power, privatized in 1990; one nuclear generating company, Nuclear Electric, 
which remained in public hands owing to the continuing need for subsidies; and 
one transmission company and Transmission System Operator, the National Grid 
Company. The restructuring led to efficiency gains (which translated mostly into 
greater profits, not lower prices), and increased the market power of fossil genera-
tors (Newbery 1997). It also led to a spate of (unforeseen) foreign take-overs, for 
example by the French EDF (Meek 2012).
The 1989 Electricity Act heralded the UK’s first low-carbon generation sup-
port instrument: the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation. Funded by a fossil-fuel levy, 
this instrument was originally intended to provide subsidies to the UK’s nuclear 
generators (Kettle 1999). When the government applied for EU state-aid clear-
ance one year later, the instrument was described as a ‘non-fossil fuel obligation’. 
This wording, the precise source and motivations of which have remained ‘never 
clarified or widely agreed’, allowed renewable energy an unexpected ‘foot in the 
door’ (Mitchell 2008: 124).
The Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation introduced a centralized bidding system for 
generation contracts, which required suppliers to order a certain level of electric-
ity from non-fossil fuel sources. The process involved the government announc-
ing the intention to set an obligation and specifying the technologies, triggering 
the non-fossil purchasing agency to launch a competition. The electricity suppli-
ers contracted with the cheapest bidders to fulfil their license condition (Kettle 
1999). Environmental and climate considerations were at best co-benefits from 
the energy-sector reforms of the 1980s, although the salience of these issues was 
growing (Rawcliffe 1998; Rayner and Jordan 2017).
The ‘New Labour’ government elected in 1997 was committed to more ambi-
tious climate-mitigation targets, and growth in renewable energy as one compo-
nent. Its manifesto committed to 10% of electricity supplies from renewables by 
2010: ambitious compared to levels at the time – less than 3% of total electricity 
supplies (de Lovinfosse 2008). At the same time, the new government accepted 
the liberalization agenda, believing that competitive markets would promote effi-
ciency. But it also stressed social objectives like affordability as well as energy 
security, highlighting worries about supply and diversity of sources of electric-
ity generation and the increasing reliance on imported gas (Pearson and Watson 
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2012). By the late 1990s, environmental NGOs were questioning the market-
based approach and demanding more government action on climate-change miti-
gation (Kern et al. 2014).
EU influence in this period was only weak; national targets for the share of 
energy for renewables and instruments for their delivery were essentially the 
product of domestic politics and administration (de Lovinfosse 2008). The UK 
was the first country to notify its renewables support scheme, and the Commission 
swiftly granted approval (Rusche 2015: 82).
Already by the end of the 1990s, the market logic had become the dominant 
institutional logic in the British organizational field, epitomized by the relegation 
of energy policy to a subdivision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
Policy in effect became de-politicized: while the DTI maintained the regulatory 
framework, responsibility for implementation rested with a new, independent reg-
ulator. This development enjoyed wide political support. The UK’s first renewa-
bles support scheme was nicely in line with the emerging market logic.
2000–2004: emergence of the electricity certificate scheme
After a period of inaction in energy policy (Edge 2006) following its election in 
1997, the New Labour government launched a major legislative initiative: the 
Utilities Act 2000, which included a provision to replace the Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation with a new instrument, the Renewables Obligation. This Act, in con-
junction with the government’s formal adoption of the manifesto commitment to a 
10% renewables share by 2010 (as part of its climate policy programme), marked 
a significant turning point (de Lovinfosse 2008). A lengthy consultation period 
produced an impressive level of consensus among key industry actors, regulators 
and NGOs on both the need to replace the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation and the 
form of the new instrument. The Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation was widely seen as 
having failed to deliver sufficient renewables growth – true to its original purpose, 
it supported the nuclear industry far more handsomely. Moreover, it no longer fit 
with the New Electricity Trading Arrangements ushered in by the 2000 Act.
With some exceptions (including the Major Electricity Users Group and local 
environmental groups) most stakeholders, also the large environmental groups, 
approved of the new instrument (de Lovinfosse 2008: 254). More detailed design 
issues featured in two additional rounds of consultations in 2000 and 2001. The 
Association of Electricity Producers (after 2012, Energy UK), individual energy 
companies and the British Wind Energy Association (later RenewableUK) were 
the most prominent participants in the process (ibid.: 254). Neither the RO nor 
the 10% target it was intended to deliver provoked any significant party-political 
controversy.
As well as increasing the contribution of renewable electricity to meeting GHG 
emissions reduction targets, the new instrument was aimed at creating a more 
competitive industry sector (DTI 2000). The Obligation was a tradable electricity 
certificate system, requiring suppliers to source an increasing proportion of sup-
plied electricity from renewable sources. The responsible government department 
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(DTI) set the obligation level each year, leaving detailed management to Ofgem 
(Truman 2016). Suppliers met their obligations by presenting Renewable Obli-
gation Certificates to the regulator (Mitchell 2008). Those without sufficient 
certificates to cover their obligation were obliged to pay into a ‘buy-out’ fund. 
Despite this apparent market-orientation, Conservatives were initially cool in 
their response (Toke and Nielsen 2015), although this was not a matter for party-
political controversy of any note.
The market-led approach continued to dominate UK climate policy (Kern et al. 
2014). At the EU level, from 1998 onwards electricity certificate schemes were 
hailed as superior by the Commission – making state-aid approval of the new 
instrument unproblematic (C(2001)3267fin) – but were strongly opposed by many 
EU member states that preferred to adopt feed-in schemes (Boasson 2021a, this 
book). We have not detected any indications that this controversy was strongly 
influenced by UK developments.
During this period, the structure of the electricity supply industry was shifting. 
From 2000, independent energy suppliers, seeking to establish niches for small-
scale and often renewable electricity supply, began to proliferate. Such companies 
represented about 7.5% of the market in 2000 (Cornwall Energy Associates Ltd. 
2014). At the same time, the unbundling and privatization of supply, distribution 
and energy production in gas and electricity markets led to the creation of the 
‘Big Six’ UK utilities (Meek 2012). In 1997 British Gas was established; EDF 
Energy emerged from a series of mergers in 2003. E.ON UK was formed as a 
result of the acquisition of Powergen in 2002; nPower arose from RWE’s pur-
chase of Innogy in the same year. In 1998, SSE emerged from the merger between 
two Scottish electricity companies. Kern et al. (2014: 517) highlight ‘a particular 
set of power relations between the non-interfering state and the private sector 
in energy, whereby dominant market players had a high degree of influence in 
policy-making circles’. For the coming decade, the Big Six were almost fully in 
control of the electricity supply market (Ofgem 2019). Energy market regulations 
incentivized large companies to maximize their profits through cost-cutting, and 
utilization of existing assets, rather than reinvestment in new capacity (Kern et al. 
2014). The large nuclear operator British Energy was not able to make profits 
in the new market, and in 2003 the government intervened to avoid bankruptcy 
(Thomas 2016: 422).
Despite this increasing segmentation of the organizational field, the govern-
ment nevertheless proved itself capable of contemplating bold policy choices 
concerning the future of energy. The Energy Review undertaken in 2002 by the 
Prime Minister’s Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) (PIU 2002) represented 
a significant departure from traditional practices, commissioned as it was outside 
the established institutional infrastructure of energy policy-making and staffed 
by a team drawn largely from outside government (Cox et al. 2016). The result 
was a review that advocated relegation of the role of nuclear, and more decisive 
promotion of decentralized renewables and energy efficiency. The PIU’s findings, 
including its scepticism towards nuclear, were largely echoed in a 2003 White 
Paper (DTI 2003; Thomas 2016: 423).
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The government also introduced support schemes specifically targeting small-
scale generation of electricity from renewables. Inspired by Germany, in 2002 and 
2003 the UK introduced two grant-based support schemes for micro-generation 
(less than 5 MW photovoltaics or windpower mounted on household or SME 
rooftops). Although this happened in the aftermath of heated discussions in the 
EU and the adoption of a directive with an indicative UK electricity-specific tar-
get (a 10% share by 2020), these EU-level developments apparently attracted little 
attention in the UK and did not drive decision-making there (de Lovinfosse 2008).
We may conclude that the government initiated a new, market-oriented renewa-
bles support measure for large-scale renewables and a new investment support 
scheme for small-scale in the absence of significant party-political competition or 
debate. Mergers reduced the number of utilities and the Big Six emerged, as did a 
range of new renewables companies. Developments occurred with little reference 
being made to the major controversies about renewables support at the EU level.
2005–2009: parties attempt to ‘out-green’ each other; nuclear makes 
a comeback
In this period, growing concerns about rising prices (for oil as well as electricity), 
insufficient competition, security of supply (with the looming prospect of coal-
station closure because of tighter EU air-pollution legislation) and climate change 
all raised the political saliency of energy policy. Around 2006–2007 came two par-
ticularly important developments. First, Labour significantly changed its position 
on nuclear, indicating a new willingness to invest in expansion (Thomas 2016). 
As part of this, in 2005 a new energy review process was launched that, in time, 
would come to influence the renewables support mix. Second, climate change 
rose to a prominence on the political agenda not seen before. Parties’ attempts at 
‘out-greening’ each other (Carter and Jacobs 2014) contributed to maintaining the 
public profile of climate and energy policy. The Friends of the Earth-led campaign 
for a legal framework to ensure delivery of significant emissions reductions by 
2050 garnered strong cross-party support, prompting the Labour government to 
introduce the pioneering Climate Change Act (2008). In this political climate, a 
new renewables support instrument was able to break through.
Interviewees (1, 3, 4, 10) mention one event as being particularly significant. 
At the March 2007 European Council, Prime Minister Tony Blair departed sig-
nificantly from the customary UK line by arguing that the EU needed binding 
national-level targets for renewable energy as part of its global leadership on cli-
mate change (Financial Times 2007). At this time, Blair was competing to be the 
EU’s most climate-progressive head of government, and showing unprecedented 
prime-ministerial willingness to develop EU-level energy policy (Boasson and 
Wettestad 2013: 88). In advocating national targets, he over-ruled his Trade and 
Industry Secretary and defied wider scepticism within the government, including 
from the powerful Treasury (Interview 1). At the same time, and apparently moti-
vated by both energy security and climate concerns (Pearson and Watson 2012), 
Blair committed strongly to more nuclear stations. On both EU targets and nuclear 
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expansion, Blair’s knowledge that his tenure in office was shortly to end appears 
to have boosted his freedom to take political risks (Interview 1).
However, the government’s 2007 Energy White Paper (DTI 2007) drew criti-
cism for its apparent complacency in the face of a looming new national target 
(ENDS Report 2007). While restating the goal (set in 2000) for renewables to 
supply 10% of UK electricity by 2010, and noting an aspiration to double this 
by 2020, it neglected the fact that the UK had committed to new, binding targets 
in the negotiations over a revised EU Renewables Directive. It was clear that the 
Renewables Obligation, as then formulated, would not be sufficient to reach such 
targets (DTI 2007; Interview 9; ENDS Report 2008b). At the time, barely 6.7% of 
electricity in the UK was derived from renewable sources.2
The Renewables Obligation failed to boost deployment rates significantly. Sev-
eral researchers have argued that this was because it created too much financial 
risk for renewables investors, in the form of short-term contracts and uncertainty 
about future payment levels, and failed to take into account differences in risk 
levels across technologies (Connor 2003; Mitchell and Connor 2004; Wood and 
Dow 2011). As a result it tended to favour investments by the larger companies 
and in the cheapest technologies (wind). The National Audit Office and various 
parliamentary committees voiced similar criticism, leading to a re-design being 
proposed in the 2007 White Paper. The main innovation was to introduce ‘tech-
nology banding’: differentiated levels of support for five different groups of tech-
nologies, taking into account levels of maturity and risk, and overseen by Ofgem.3
The proposal prompted Ofgem, which administered the Renewables Obliga-
tion, to express major concerns about the practicalities and costs of reform (Ofgem 
2007). It highlighted that rising wholesale electricity prices and the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme had improved the prospects for renewable generation, and it sug-
gested long-term, fixed-price renewables contracts as a means to stabilize rev-
enues, reducing the costs to customers if the wholesale price should rise. Ofgem 
also argued that setting renewable technology bands would conflict with its own 
role of ensuring energy-market competitiveness. However, representatives of 
the larger players in the renewables industry, like RenewableUK, welcomed the 
reform (Interview 8), as did several of the Big Six. A notable exception was EDF, 
the world’s largest nuclear operator, whose position had been strengthened in the 
UK after its purchase of the nuclear company British Energy (House of Lords 
2008; Thomas 2016: 424), and as a result of the prime minister’s conversion to the 
technology. EDF now promoted a revenue stabilization concept broadly similar 
to what Ofgem had proposed, while also calling for the UK’s goal for renewable 
electricity share to be lowered (with a correspondingly higher target for renew-
able heat). At its existing level, EDF complained, the renewable electricity target 
compromised the prospects for new nuclear (ENDS Report 2009).
There were few smaller players in the UK, but those that would profit more by 
a system of feed-in tariffs became increasingly vocal (under the auspices of the 
Renewable Energy Association) in their criticisms of the Renewables Obligation. 
They were supported by environmental organizations and academics (e.g. Mitch-
ell et al. 2006; Toke 2012), who advocated a fixed feed-in tariff as the primary 
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support mechanism, based on the apparent successes in Germany and Spain. 
Feed-in tariffs were seen to be much simpler and to allow ‘all plausible projects 
developed by all types of developer to come to market’ (Toke 2012: 5). The debate 
was sometimes heated, with established renewables lobbyists defending the RO 
(Interview 8).
With cross-party competition and politicization over energy and climate issues 
growing, Conservative Party leader David Cameron’s installation of a roof-top 
wind turbine at his London home received wide publicity (BBC 2007). A group 
of Conservative politicians returned from a fact-finding trip to Germany enthus-
ing over feed-in tariffs (Interview 14). Labour ministers were keen not to be 
out-done, despite the instrument’s potentially regressive effects that dispropor-
tionately affected low-income bill payers (Interview 14; Monbiot 2010). Resistant 
at first, the Labour government eventually agreed to calls from backbench MPs 
to develop feed-in tariffs – but only for small-scale renewables (ENDS Report 
2008a).
From 2008, Blair’s successor Gordon Brown continued to support both renew-
ables and nuclear. One political advisor noted a linkage between the two: ‘If 
you want to win public support for nuclear you have to do renewables as well’ 
(Interview 1). In 2008, Brown created the Department for Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC), to bring greater coherence to energy and climate-change mitiga-
tion policies. The Department’s first Secretary of State, Ed Miliband, was keen to 
implement ‘a move away from the obsession with market mechanisms as being 
sufficient’; ‘he started talking about the need for small scale feed-in tariff from 
day one in DECC’ (Interview 10).
The political imperative to develop the instrument over-rode a degree of civil 
service scepticism. As a representative of the renewable industry argued,
it has been quite clear that feed-in tariffs is not so popular among civil serv-
ants . . . It was forced by this major backbench drive. . . . It was a sense of Ed 
Miliband going, ‘ok, I get the message’, it was passed on to the civil servants: 
‘Do something about this!’
(Interview 8)
Further factors driving the decision were that small independent producers consti-
tuted a fledging industry that New Labour wanted to encourage, and Miliband’s 
close relationship with the environmental and other organizations campaigning 
for the pioneering Climate Change Act (Carter and Jacobs 2014; Interview 8; 
see also FoE 2011). Lobbying from environmental and renewables organizations 
clearly contributed to the government incorporating a provision for small-scale 
feed-in tariff into what became the Energy Act (2008). The design was modelled 
on feed-in schemes directed at large-scale projects in other European countries, 
but in the UK it remained targeted towards small-scale investments only (Kitzing 
et al. 2012; Lockwood 2016).
The 2009 EU Renewables Directive committed the UK to a 15% overall share 
for renewable energy. To meet it, the government proposed three production 
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sub-targets: 30% in electricity, 12% in heat and 10% in transport (DECC 2010a). 
But this was not before a last-ditch attempt to dilute the UK target, undertaken 
by high-level civil servants who had never quite reconciled themselves to Blair’s 
2007 renewables gambit. Embarrassingly, this behind-the-scenes action was 
leaked to the press (Guardian 2007). Ultimately, UK policy-makers found them-
selves ‘trapped by their own climate change leadership discourse’ (Solorio and 
Fairbrass 2017: 111) and forced by public opinion to reaffirm the national com-
mitment to ambitious and binding renewables targets.
Given the high profile of the issue, in developing a renewable energy strat-
egy to deliver on EU-level commitments (HM Government 2009a), staff from 
the Prime Minister’s Office were in effect making decisions alongside DECC 
(Interview 1). Foreshadowing the instrument introduced by the subsequent gov-
ernment, the strategy expressed support for a ‘contracts for difference’ scheme 
to prevent generators from receiving excess profits when electricity prices were 
high, but envisaged it operating alongside, rather than replacing, the Renewables 
Obligation (HM Government 2009a).
To summarize, during this period, renewables support became politicized in an 
unprecedented way. The organizational field was now somewhat less unified in 
its preferences, with small-scale actors successfully calling for a feed-in scheme, 
whereas most large utilities were happy with the Renewables Obligation. Ofgem 
called for reform to rein in costs through fixing long-term renewables contracts 
that could reduce the costs to customers if wholesale prices rose, an idea favoured 
by the increasingly powerful EDF. In addition, the establishment of the Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) brought the promise of a more 
coherent climate and energy policy. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 
did not immediately influence the debate greatly. As explained next, however, this 
changed after 2010.
2010–2016: technology-specific electricity market reform – and 
uncertainty
By 2010, it was clear that huge investments would be required to deliver on 
renewables targets and replace around a quarter of the existing capacity (mainly 
coal and nuclear) expected to close by 2020, primarily due to old age (Leiren et al. 
2019: 4). The constraints imposed by the financial crisis increased the emphasis 
on meeting the targets at acceptable cost to consumers.
During the 2010 election campaign, both Labour and Conservatives champi-
oned a mix of renewables, nuclear and ‘clean coal’ (using carbon capture and 
storage), while the Liberal Democrats opposed new nuclear. The election resulted 
in the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats creating the UK’s first coalition gov-
ernment since 1945. The two parties agreed to establish ‘a full system of feed-in 
tariffs in electricity’ and to ‘reform energy markets to deliver security of supply 
and investment in low carbon energy, and ensure fair competition’ (HM Govern-
ment 2010). To ease tensions over nuclear, it was agreed that there would be no 
public subsidy for new plants but that, subject to parliamentary ratification, a new 
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National Planning Statement could in principle allow aging stations to be replaced 
(BBC 2010; HM Government 2010: 17).
In December 2010, the new government initiated public consultations on a new 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR). Since DECC had already reviewed a range of 
support schemes under Ed Miliband, the process could begin quickly, but time 
pressure was high and the government lacked staff with relevant expertise (Inter-
views 9 and 10; NAO 2009). In a controversial move, mistrusted by many stake-
holders, staff numbers working on EMR were boosted by various secondees from 
the Big Six energy companies (The Guardian 2012).
The initial consultation document presented Contracts for Difference as the 
favoured option, broadly in line with what Ofgem (and EDF) had proposed ear-
lier, but highlighted feed-in premium tariffs (which it defined as a static payment 
to generators in addition to their revenues from selling electricity in the wholesale 
market) as an alternative (DECC 2010b). Several factors led government (DECC 
and the Treasury) to favour Contracts for Difference, rather than a mere add-on to 
the electricity price. These included the expectation that investments, and decar-
bonization, would be delivered faster, at lower cost (since electricity providers 
would pay the government back when the market price exceeded the contracted 
strike price) and with greater certainty (DECC 2010b). The consultation notes 
positive experience with the instrument in Denmark and the Netherlands. Con-
tracts for Difference were also considered as ‘fitting’ better with a carbon tax, 
which would push up wholesale electricity prices, reducing the need for subsidies. 
But significantly, government also wanted an instrument that would in principle 
be suitable for nuclear (and indeed, CCS) as well as renewables.
The global recession contributed to renewed interest in industrial policy – also 
within DECC, which saw particular potential in offshore wind (HM Government 
2009b; Watson et al. 2010). While DECC led on policy development, in order to 
contain the aggregated cost of low-carbon subsidies, the Treasury established a 
ceiling for public levies, the Levy Control Framework (Lockwood 2016). Critics 
worried that a short-term outlook among Treasury officials, reflected in modelling 
practices and discount rates applied to evaluate policy, would lead to less effec-
tive renewables policies (see e.g. Mitchell 2012; Green Alliance 2014). Many 
civil servants had an ‘instinctive lack of sympathy with anything that doesn’t 
provide baseload power’ (Interview 3). The fact that the Chancellor (the Min-
ister of Finance) was a Conservative with little commitment to fighting climate 
change (Rayner and Jordan 2017) compounded DECC’s difficulties. In numerous 
meetings at official and ministerial levels, Treasury officials required DECC to 
demonstrate how the Contracts for Difference instrument was the cheapest way to 
deliver the investments required (Interview 9).
A wide range of interest groups contributed to the consultation. For some 
groups in the renewables sector, the consultation’s suggestion of entirely replac-
ing the Renewables Obligation with Contracts for Difference came as an unwel-
come surprise (Interview 8). Some renewable-energy trade interests favoured the 
feed-in premiums concept as it was applied elsewhere (Toke 2012: 15), while 
others feared the Contracts for Difference would prove less generous for smaller 
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projects (Toke 2011), or that the process would not provide adequate ‘routes to 
market’ for less resourced, non-vertically integrated players. Certain renewables 
sector organizations found, at least initially, that the doors were closed to them 
(Interview 8). Although they were subsequently more able to engage, ‘there was 
always a sense that [government] did not quite trust what we were telling them’ 
(Interviews 4 and 8). Most environmentalists expressed mixed opinions about the 
move away from RO, but the Green Alliance and consumer organizations, for 
example, welcomed it (Interview 15).
Opinion varied among the Big Six. In general, companies with substantial amounts 
of nuclear in their portfolios, such as EDF, or that planned to build new nuclear, 
such as E.ON, favoured Contracts for Difference (ECC 2011: para 129). Those with 
more renewables or fossil-fuel generation and less nuclear were more sceptical. For 
example, SSE, the UK’s second-largest supplier of electricity and gas and its larg-
est generator of renewable energy, saw Contracts for Difference as a ruse primarily 
intended to support nuclear (ECC 2011: para 93) without directly contradicting the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Agreement not to provide direct subsidies.
Unlike renewables-sector interests, some interviewees (7, 9, 10) saw the Big 
Six as having been quite influential. Civil servants indicated that the big utilities’ 
ability to be heard was related to their competence and ability to provide useful 
market information (Interviews 9 and 10). One Big Six representative suggested 
that their competence in modelling complex, interconnected energy systems was 
especially important (Interview 7), reassuring policy-makers of the workability of 
their own proposals.
In Parliament, the Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change, set up 
to monitor the work of DECC, was more open to inputs from independent, non-
vertically integrated generators than DECC. Concerns about routes to market 
problems for non-vertically integrated players received a hearing. The Committee 
expressed misgivings that, while contracts for difference were undoubtedly the 
best option for nuclear, the concept was less well suited to other types of low-
carbon generation. The government ‘should not distort the market merely to save 
political face about the precise meaning of the Coalition Agreement’ (ECC 2011, 
para 132). A further actor in the debate was the independent advisory body estab-
lished under the Climate Change Act 2008, the Committee on Climate Change, 
which supported introduction of a scheme incentivizing the nuclear technology 
that, at the time, was considered (wrongly) to be the most economical (Committee 
on Climate Change 2011).
Once legislation was passed (in the 2013 Energy Act), state-aid clearance 
was needed before the first contracts allocation round. This was duly granted in 
June 2014 – hardly surprising, given the close contacts between DECC and Com-
mission staff during the policy-making process, covering the content of soon-
to-be-adopted revised state-aid guidelines (DECC 2014: 12). Contacts led to 
‘material effects on the design of various instruments’ (Interview 9). In time, the 
Commission welcomed Contracts for Difference as a ‘fine example of how to 
promote the decarbonisation of the economy with market-based support mecha-
nisms, at the lowest possible cost for consumers’ (Commission 2014).
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Seven large renewables projects were offered early contracts in May 2014; the 
first formal auctioning round began in the autumn. Implementation coincided with 
the beginning of a wider energy policy ‘reset’, in which scaling back small-scale 
feed-in tariffs featured prominently. In 2013, reports (never denied) that David 
Cameron had ordered aides to ‘get rid of all the green crap’ in order to reduce 
energy bills (The Guardian 2013) exposed a long-simmering coalition quarrel 
over support for renewables. At the time, the feed-in mechanism had already had 
huge impacts on the numbers of micro-generators (including households), which 
reached a cumulative total of roughly 650,000 individuals by 2015 (Inderberg 
et al. 2016).4 A boom in companies assisting and selling installation services fol-
lowed, creating a new interest group. There was a clear trend of new, independent 
company formation, including producers such as Ecotricity as well as stand-alone 
suppliers. While the established Big Six remained largely fossil fuel- and nuclear-
based, a considerable share of the smaller newcomers’ portfolio was based on 
renewables. In 2014 the Big Six were still dominant, with about 92.4% of the UK 
gas and electricity market, but that share was down from 99.8% in 2009 (Corn-
wall Energy Associates 2014).
Winning a surprise majority in the 2015 General Election, the Conservatives 
found they could create a government alone. Their election manifesto, otherwise 
vague on energy policy commitments, promised to ‘halt the spread of onshore 
windfarms’ and put an end to subsidies (Brown 2016). The party was also strongly 
committed to increased nuclear production, with a significant element at best 
‘lukewarm’ towards the climate issue and visceral in its opposition to wind tur-
bines (PIRC 2011, Lockwood 2013; Cox et al. 2016: 5). Supported by a largely 
right-wing tabloid press, this element now seized its opportunity.
In November, the new DECC Secretary announced a ‘reset’ of energy policy, 
ostensibly to control costs for bill payers, with the implication that onshore wind 
(except on Scottish islands) would not be included in future auctions (Brown 
2016). Thus, while the architecture of the British renewables support mix remained 
unchanged, the new government applied what had been meant as an instrument 
to deliver cost-effective investments in a way that excluded the cheapest technol-
ogy – onshore wind. Legislation for Contracts for Difference allowed the govern-
ment great flexibility to determine, at very short notice and without parliamentary 
approval or statutory consultation, the technologies eligible for support in a given 
auction.
In addition, the government cut small-scale feed-in subsidies by 64% for 
household-scale solar, and community projects lost investment support (ENDS 
Report 2015). Feed-in tariffs for microgeneration were cut significantly across all 
technologies, bandings for size of installation changed, the degression mechanism 
accelerated and quarterly caps were introduced.
This renewables reset prompted a wide-ranging set of actors to voice concern, 
with large corporations such as Ikea and Panasonic joining investors, industry 
bodies like Energy UK and RenewableUK, the National Farmers’ Union, the 
Trades Union Congress and green and community groups (Business Reporter 
2015). Nearly 90% of respondents to the public consultation on the reset argued 
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that the proposed tariffs were too low to bring forward new generation (DECC 
2015), and early indications showed a significant downtrend in installations of 
new small solar panels (Inderberg et al. 2016).
Although the need for generous support for technologies such as photovoltaics 
had passed, thanks to the marked decrease in technology costs (ENDS 2015), the 
overall weakening of the policy framework led to an eventual admission from 
DECC that the 2015 reforms put delivery of the UK’s 15% renewables target for 
2020 further out of reach (ENDS Report 2015). Two years later, in 2017, invest-
ment in renewable energy was reported to be down by 56% (The Guardian 2018).
In sum, the period after 2010 saw significant developments: the shift towards 
the technology-specific Contracts for Difference scheme came as the result of 
intense negotiations involving organizational field actors, but it was ultimately 
restricted in its application (exclusion of onshore wind) by decisions made in the 
political field. Increased steering efforts by the EU do not appear to have been 
especially influential. In the remainder of this chapter, we turn to a fuller, multi-
field assessment of UK policy developments over all time-periods examined.
Discussions and conclusions
The historical phases outlined in preceding sections highlight that the UK has 
experienced several re-orientations of its renewable support mix. By 2016, it 
had a policy portfolio – including a technology-specific scheme for large-scale 
renewables, and also a technology-specific feed-in tariff for small-scale genera-
tion – that would probably have surprised a time-travelling policy analyst from 
the year 2000. While the radical cuts in support and more selective (politically 
motivated) application of auctioning after 2015 reduced the number of technolo-
gies that profited from the system, the schemes were no less technology-specific 
in nature.
As EU steering has gradually become more coercive, and many countries have 
turned towards systems based on feed-in premium combined with auctioning after 
2014, we expected the European environment to influence British renewables 
policy the most after 2010. That is not what we have found, however; the UK 
would have adopted Contracts for Difference regardless. Interestingly, however, 
the experience of the Netherlands and Denmark with similar systems was referred 
to favourably in the government’s 2010 consultation, suggesting an element of 
horizontal learning.
In the first of our periods, leading up to 2000, the EU had hardly any specific 
rules covering the design of support schemes. Nor were any clear trends evident 
among member states. Hence, it is not surprising that we do not detect Euro-
pean environment influence in this period. Later, the Commission was to hail 
the Renewables Obligation as a good design, though the instrument’s failure to 
spur much renewables production somewhat undermines this view (see Boasson 
2021a, this book).
In the 2000–2004 period, the UK shifted to an electricity certificate scheme: the 
Renewables Obligation. Evidence does not indicate that this choice was heavily 
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influenced by the prospect of new, indicative national targets in the 2001 Renewa-
bles Directive (de Lovinfosse 2008). Bucking the trend towards feed-in tariffs in 
this period, the UK headed further down the path of technology-neutrality and 
fluctuating support levels than it had with its first scheme. While this fit well 
with the preferences of the Commission, we do not find that such conformity was 
something that UK policy-makers actively pursued.
In the third phase, more specifically in 2007, the British Prime Minister sup-
ported ambitious, nationally binding targets to be set at the EU level. This would 
ultimately require the introduction of a more state-led renewables-support effort. 
Bound up with British efforts to be seen as a climate leader, significant pressure 
was placed on succeeding UK politicians and civil servants to develop new meas-
ures capable of delivering the 15% renewables target. Making the Renewables 
Obligation more technology-specific was the first response to this pressure. The 
extent to which the target drove adoption of feed-in tariffs for small-scale renewa-
bles is debatable, but figures included in the 2009 Renewable Energy Strategy 
show how small-scale technologies, of the kind supported by feed-in tariffs, were 
expected to deliver 2% of the projected required electricity demand (HM Govern-
ment 2009a).
In addition, in this period UK actors were influenced by the sweeping, EU-wide 
trend towards feed-in tariffs. The increased influence of the European environment 
between 2005 and 2009 is broadly in line with our expectation, with the intriguing 
twist that the increased EU steering resulted partly from UK political inputs: in 
2007, the UK first pushed through more ambitious renewables objectives at the 
EU level, which in turn underpinned changes in British support schemes.
The British shift towards a more technology-specific regime after 2010 con-
trasts with the Commission’s increased pressure towards technology-neutrality, 
but the UK was an early mover among EU member states in adopting a feed-in 
premium scheme combined with auctioning. The Commission may have influ-
enced some of the details of the Contracts for Difference scheme, but the instru-
ment seems much more inspired by the British organizational field, where actors 
(primarily Ofgem) had suggested core features of the new scheme significantly 
before the Commission became involved. While the UK after 2010 inspired oth-
ers to shift to feed-in premiums, it had itself been inspired by others to adopt fixed 
feed-in tariffs for small-scale only a few years earlier.
Like Solorio and Fairbrass (2017), we conclude that developments after 2005 
cannot be fully understood without reference to Europeanization, but we also 
detect some interdependencies. First, the UK was crucial for the EU’s adoption 
of binding renewables targets in 2009; second, the British Contracts for Differ-
ence scheme influenced the drafting of the 2014 EU state-aid guidelines (Boasson 
2021a, this book). Hence, in effect the UK repeatedly enabled the EU to increase 
its authority over national renewables support.
How and to what extent did the domestic organizational field affect develop-
ments? As the UK liberalized its electricity system early on, we expected to find 
a rather pluralist field with many criss-crossing conflicts, and thus low policy 
impact. However, the evidence does not support this.
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Introduction of the first support scheme coincided with the liberalization of 
the energy sector, so it is not surprising that the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation fits 
this context. However, the precise motives for including renewables within the 
scope of an instrument primarily intended to support nuclear introduction remain 
obscure. Since both could co-exist, however, it was acceptable to the big utilities 
of the day.
While liberalization led to consolidation around the Big Six and thus a state of 
near segmentation in the 2000–2004 period, company policy positions were by no 
means unified, reflecting their differing generation portfolios. The shift to a green 
certificate scheme (the Renewables Obligation) was more closely aligned to the 
market logic than the preceding scheme had been; technology-neutral and with 
a fluctuating support level, set by market forces. The new scheme did not cover 
nuclear but was still broadly supported by most large utilities. That is in line with 
our expectations, and the increasing degree of segmentation in the organizational 
field can largely explain this development. The field remained rather segmented 
in the 2005–2009 period, making the adoption of a feed-in tariff for small-scale 
generation – supported only by the still very marginal renewables actors and a few 
academics – counter to what we expected.
The prevailing market logic was increasingly questioned after 2010, as condi-
tions made necessary investments in new electricity production (nuclear in par-
ticular) unprofitable. Ofgem (and the nuclear corporation EDF) championed a shift 
to a more technology-specific support scheme for both renewables and nuclear, 
which eventually crystallized in the form of the Contracts for Difference scheme. 
Secondments to DECC from the Big Six highlight that the relationship between 
the utilities and key decision-makers was strong (based on the policy-makers’ 
need for certain kinds of industry knowledge). Hence, the field was still structur-
ally unified. However, the cultural-institutional character of the field had shifted 
towards a logic of technology development; it was now recognized that a greater 
degree of longer-term state planning was necessary to meet specific objectives – 
most obviously, maintaining a nuclear programme. Hence, cultural-institutional 
change within the field can largely explain the shift to Contracts for Difference.
Lowering of support levels for small-scale renewables after 2015 can to some 
extent also be understood as a result of organizational field developments. After 
all, the Big Six had no interest in supporting competition from smaller players. 
On the other hand, that a broad coalition mobilized against the policy reset shows 
how the organizational field had become more diverse. Thus, this perspective can-
not fully explain the shift.
Our finding here is in line with Catherine Mitchell’s (2012) argument that the 
UK government, compared to its German counterpart, for example, is in general 
more favourably disposed to more established technologies, and that of Kern et al. 
(2014), who highlight the ability of larger companies to steer policy in the con-
text of a ‘non-interfering’ state. Other interest groups, such as those representing 
renewables, did not have this level of access to the policy development process.
In sum, the promotion of small-scale feed-in tariffs and their subsequent 
retrenchment are hard to explain from an organizational field perspective. Can the 
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domestic political field shed more light? According to the multi-field framework, 
this field will be most influential when renewables policy has become of high 
political salience, and formal decision-making power rests with the legislative 
assembly. Does this apply also to the British political system, which is dominated 
by two strong parties and often has very powerful governments?
The political salience of renewable energy policy has fluctuated over time. Ini-
tially, renewables policy was not particularly politicized. The focus was on privat-
izing the electricity sector, which the incoming New Labour government of 1997 
largely accepted. In the second phase, responding to EU legislation and other 
dynamics, the Labour government gradually became more active on renewable 
energy issues, but the design of the scheme was not the subject of much political 
controversy.
In contrast, renewable energy policy became rather politicized after 2005. The 
biggest parties competed to ‘out-green’ each other (Carter and Jacobs 2014), 
and this clearly influenced the development of the support-scheme mix. First, 
Blair’s 2007 commitment to binding, ambitious renewables targets in the Euro-
pean Council went against the advice of his civil servants and later contributed 
to introduction of more technology-specific aspects in the Renewables Obliga-
tion, without which, it was feared, the UK’s target would not be reached. Second, 
while the civil service was never fond of feed-in tariffs, in response to a ground-
swell of parliamentary support, the new Secretary of State commanded his civil 
servants to present a proposal. On such occasions, despite running up against 
‘the departmental view’ (Barker and Wilson 1997), government politicians have 
proven themselves able to set ambitious goals and push new means of delivering 
them that go against established orthodoxies. Despite the great symbolic impor-
tance, politicians do not appear to have paid much attention to the details of the 
new support scheme.
In the fourth phase, some degree of party competition over climate change 
was still evident, but the growing political profile of the consumer-costs issue 
complicated the picture. From 2010, tensions within the incoming Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition over nuclear affected the development of renewa-
bles support, but a support scheme encompassing all low-carbon energy sources 
served to de-fuse the conflict. The ‘green crap’ controversy showed that the 
competition for green credibility related to supporting decentralized renewables 
was over: neither climate issues nor renewable energy had become enduring 
salient issues in British electoral politics (Lockwood 2013: 1342). The UK’s 
first-past-the-post electoral system has a tendency to lead to strong majority 
governments, shifting between Labour and Conservative, with heavy influence 
on policy direction and limited need for parliamentary support. The exception 
was the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, which experienced a greater 
need for parliamentary support – but, as this coincided with a de-politicizing of 
renewables, it did not increase the weight of the political field: the Contracts for 
Difference resulted primarily resulted from organizational field developments 
instead. However, a necessary condition was an explicit political decision in 
favour of nuclear.
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Following the 2015 election and the return of the Conservative Party with a 
full majority, the situation in the UK could be best labelled ministerial governing. 
With a clear majority, the Conservatives could largely do as they pleased; and, 
since electricity costs were the high-salience issue (and not renewables support 
per se), a ‘reset’ of policy looked attractive. Increasingly vocal opposition towards 
onshore wind within the Conservative Party also played an important role. As 
the new government generally agreed with sentiments of the dominant actors in 
the organizational field, it is hard to distinguish clearly between the importance 
of the two domestic fields here.
Still, our findings indicate that in a Westminster-type system, where the rul-
ing party usually also has the parliamentary majority, the multi-field framework 
expectation that the importance of political field will be strongest when the legis-
lators have the authority to adopt decisions and the issue in question is politicized 
does not accurately reflect how this political system works. While we see that the 
political field has clearly been more influential when renewables policy was sub-
ject to political competition, we do not find that variance in the formal authority 
of the Parliament strengthens the importance of the political field.
Tracing the many shifts in British policy for renewable electricity generation, 
we find that developments in the European environment, organizational and polit-
ical fields have all played important roles at different times, and are interrelated 
in complex ways. Briefly put, we find that prior to 1999, developments in the 
organizational field were the most decisive. Likewise, for the 2000–2004 period, 
the shift to the Renewables Obligation certificate scheme was primarily influ-
enced by the organizational field and its market logic. Between 2005 and 2009, 
a combination of developments in the European environment and factors in the 
political field, with interdependencies between developments in the two spheres, 
contributed to spur change. From 2010 to 2015, organizational field-level devel-
opments, supported by and interrelated to European environment developments, 
account for the shift towards Contracts for Difference. However, the evidence 
suggests that such an instrument would most probably have appeared even with-
out European Commission involvement. Our findings highlight the difficulty, long 
recognized by scholars of multi-level governance, of disentangling the European 
environment from domestic discussions.
Interviewees
1 Special advisor to Labour politician, 28 April 2016, London
2 Academic, consultant to environmental NGO, 23 May 2016, telephone 
interview
3 Conservative MP (now retired), 24 May 2016, London
4 Energy specialist, formerly with the Green Alliance, 7 June 2016, telephone
5 Former Liberal Democrat politician, 16 June 2016, London
6 Climate and energy policy lobbyist, formerly WWF, 16 June 2016, London
7 Large energy utility representative, 17 June 2016, telephone interview
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8 Renewable industry representative, RenewableUK, 27 June 2016, London
9 Former civil servant, Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 27 
June 2016, London
10 Special advisor to Labour politician, 28 June 2016, London
11 Civil servant in HM Treasury, 7 July 2016, telephone interview
12 Environmental NGO state-aid specialist, 21 March 2017, telephone interview
13 Consultant for regulatory assistance project, 28 March 2017, telephone 
interview
14 Former civil servant, DECC, 2017, 30 March 2017, Norwich
15 Former civil servant, DECC, 23 August 2018, telephone interview
16 Two consumer-interests representatives, Citizens Advice, 10 March 2017, 
telephone interview
Notes
 1 The scheme was closed to new applicants on 31 March 2019, leaving the future support 
for small-scale generation uncertain.
 2 The proportion for the 2006–2007 Renewables Obligation period (Ofgem 2008).
 3 The Utilities Act 2000 had made provision for this eventuality.
 4 The UK distinguishes between microgenerators, with installed peak capacity below 
50 kW, and small-scale generators, which have installed peak capacity between 50 kW 
and 5 MW (Wood and Dow 2011: 2232).
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7  Poland




In the European energy sector, Poland is certainly not seen as a renewable energy 
frontrunner. Critics have dubbed it ‘Coal-land’ – not only because of its reliance 
on coal-generated energy but also because it has argued strongly for safeguarding 
coal interests against climate policy. Yet, by 2015 the country ranked seventh in 
installed windpower capacity in the European Union (EU) and was on the path to 
meeting its renewable energy targets.
However, Poland has low investment stability for renewable energy (see 
Księżopolski and Pronińska 2017). As a journalist specializing in energy policy 
has pointed out, a fundamental piece of legislation – the 1997 energy law – had 
been revised 60 times by early 2017, on average every four months (Derski 2017). 
What can explain the apparently precarious character of Polish renewable energy 
policy, as well as its broader directions?
Why did Poland in 2015, after lengthy political debate, adopt volume-based 
auctioning as its main support scheme for renewable energy, since 2016 combined 
with net-metering for prosumers? This scheme is highly technology-specific, with 
separate auctions held for very narrowly defined sub-categories of renewables, 
while public administration determines both the frequency of these tenders and 
the volumes of electricity to be delivered.
This chapter may well be the first analytical attempt to explain the develop-
ment and instability of the Polish renewables support mix and trace the influ-
ence of external and domestic factors. Many studies of the Europeanization of 
Polish renewable energy policy do so on the margins of broader climate-policy 
analysis (Ancygier 2013b; Ceglarz and Ancygier 2015; Jankowska 2010, 2017; 
Skjærseth 2018). On the domestic level, Karolina Jankowska has used the concept 
of ‘policy capture’ and advocacy coalition theory to explain how Polish renew-
able energy policy developed until 2008 (Jankowska 2012). Andrzej Ancygier has 
complemented this bottom-up approach with a more top-down analysis, focused 
on Europeanization and the transposition of Renewables Directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2009/28/EC (Ancygier 2013a), whereas Jon Birger Skjærseth (2018) focuses 
on the policy feedback resulting from implementation experiences. Horizontal 
Europeanization and policy diffusion (or lack thereof) have also been explored, 
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hinting at the ways in which domestic political economy as well as beliefs can 
hinder learning and diffusion processes (Ancygier and Szulecki 2014a; Szulecki 
et al. 2015; Wedel 2016).
This chapter moves beyond the existing literature by discussing the evolution 
of Polish renewables policy until the end of 2016 and exploring how Polish politi-
cal and organizational fields have influenced the renewables support mix. The 
influence of the European environment is also taken into account. Poland joined 
the European Union only in 2004, but it was influenced by EU legislation already 
before that. With the EU (specifically, the Commission) gaining more competence 
in the area of renewable energy policy, its influence can be expected to grow. 
However, in the case of Poland, also a reversed dynamics may be expected – 
with the direct influence of the EU over Polish renewable energy policy gradu-
ally decreasing, with accession conditionality gone after 2004 and with Poland’s 
increasing assertiveness in negotiations with the EU. Europeanization is a ques-
tion not solely of the influence of the EU, but also, in its ‘horizontal’ form, of pol-
icy diffusion and harmonization between member-states. Do we find that Poland 
has been more influenced by the European environment when one policy recipe 
has dominated in the EU/EEA counties, or does Poland’s accession status make 
this different?
The case of Poland is particularly interesting since its political field lacks the 
stability found in most Western democracies: in the period 1993–2016, 17 parties 
were voted into the Sejm (lower chamber of the Polish parliament). Polish politics 
is characterized by ‘leadership volatility, party volatility, and electoral volatility’, 
and this creates ‘whirlpools of continuing uncertainty’ (Millard 2009: 218). Much 
of instability with respect to renewables support may be explained by the frequent 
and rapid changes in government composition and ruling coalitions. Is the Pol-
ish political field more influential when renewables support is politicized and the 
Sejm is engaged in decision-making, or does the political field conceptualization 
in this book fail to capture the Polish dynamics?
Lastly, how independent is the political field as regards the organizational 
field? Are the large, state-owned companies that produce energy from coal 
closely aligned with the governmental organizations? Does a segmented organi-
zational field control the design of the renewables support scheme? Or have pro-
renewables actors been able to disrupt the field, drawing on impulses from the 
European environment for greater impact?
Technology-specific renewables support mix
Poland’s main support scheme for large-scale renewables is an auctioning mech-
anism, based on tenders organized by the relevant ministry. However, caution 
should be exercised in making a link between the name of a scheme and how it 
actually functions: as many different measures may be subsumed under the label 
of ‘auctioning’. In Poland, following the 2016 amendment of the renewables act, 
these were tenders for volume-restricted feed-in tariffs, where the national regu-
lator (Urząd Regulacji Energetyki – URE) and Ministry of Energy control the 
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volume of energy that they will purchase, and bids are made only for the lowest 
delivery price, which then becomes a fixed feed-in tariff.1
The mechanism works as follows: the regulator divides renewable energy sources 
into categories (baskets), by technology and ‘size’ (capacity) (Księżopolski and 
Pronińska 2017). As of 2017, there were 21 different, highly detailed categories 
of renewables – for instance, biogas plants of less than 1 MW, or offshore wind, 
in seven baskets. The ministry sets reference prices for different technologies, 
determining technology-specific maximum support levels. The national regulator 
sets a maximum annual volume of renewable energy from various sources to be 
sold and purchased through auctions in a given year, as well as the order in which 
tenders will be held (sorted by technology). The regulator then organizes tenders 
for set volumes of renewable energy to be produced at prices close to the refer-
ence price. Only renewables producers who bid well below the reference price can 
count on winning the auction, thereby securing the possibility to sell the produced 
energy at the agreed price, as both simulation tenders and first renewables tenders 
in 2018 have shown (Gram w Zielone 2018). The reference price served as the 
maximum, and the regulator automatically ‘cuts out’ the top 20% most expensive 
bids. The price agreed in the auction then functions as a feed-in tariff, but for a 
fixed volume of energy (a certain amount of MWhs). This mechanism provides 
the government with fairly strong power to steer developments in renewables. 
Further, producers who were selling energy before 2016 may remain in the pre-
vious electricity certificate system for a maximum of 15 years after they began 
production, or they may opt to switch to the auctioning system (Księżopolski and 
Pronińska 2017).
In addition, since the 2016 amendment Poland has had two support mechanisms 
for small-scale renewables (Sejm 2016). First, a net-metering scheme for prosum-
ers – end-energy consumers who also produced energy for their own use could 
reclaim a certain volume of energy from the grid for every unit of energy they feed 
into it. For every 1 kWh sent to the grid, they receive 0.8 kWh back if they own 
an installation below 10 kW, and 0.7 kWh if it is over 10 kW. This was intended 
as an incentive for self-consumption, rather than turning micro-installations into 
an additional source of income for households: the optimization of household use 
is the goal. Second, businesses owning micro-installations could sell their surplus 
energy to a local distribution company at the average wholesale price for the pre-
vious quarter, which is announced by the regulator.
A final provision of the new scheme is the development of energy clusters – 
multi-stakeholder partnerships involving local governments, individuals, coop-
eratives, research institutes and companies functioning locally (in one county 
[powiat] or in a maximum of five municipalities [gminy]), together working 
towards the ‘generation, balancing, distribution and trade of energy from renew-
able sources and other sources in the distribution grid under 110 kV’ (Sejm 2016: 
2). The goal of this new scheme, which is clearly in line with the citizen-oriented 
elements of the Energy Union and the EU Clean Energy Package, serves to create 
conditions for the development of locally balanced and semi-autonomous distrib-
uted generation, increasing energy security in sustainable ways. However, there is 
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no special support scheme for these arrangements; the increase is meant to come 
through cooperation, local capacity building and synergies enabled by favourable 
regulatory and administrative measures.
Political uncertainty and coercive EU influence
Prior to 1999: renewables and emulating European modernity
Renewables had been a non-issue in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s; then, during 
the 1990s (and closely related to the fall of the Communist regime), the country 
adopted a wide array of relevant policies. After the Second World War, Poland, 
rising literally from the ashes, conducted a massive electrification programme 
based mainly on hard coal power plants. By 1980, Poland had become the second-
largest producer of coal in Europe, after the Soviet Union. Already in the early 
1970s the Communist authorities began to explore the possibility of achieving 
nuclear energy capacity in order to limit the dependency on coal (Szulecki et al. 
2015), as well as constructing several large-scale hydropower plants.
Renewable energy swiftly emerged as an issue after the Communist regime 
collapsed in August 1989. At that point, the electricity system was concentrated 
around large-scale hard coal or lignite power plants – almost 99% of power was 
generated in coal-fired plants. The environmental crisis of the late Communist 
period, caused by emissions from the industrial and energy sectors, led to greater 
awareness of ‘alternative energy sources’. However, plans for nuclear energy 
spurred massive societal protests, culminating in the blockade of construction 
(already very advanced) at the Żarnowiec site (Szulecki et al. 2015). In 1990, a 
15-year moratorium was emplaced on nuclear energy.
The energy and environment debate in Poland aligned swiftly to broader Euro-
pean discussions – unlike the case of the political system. The 1990s marked a 
transitional political and economic stage for Poland, with the shift from a cen-
trally planned economy and an authoritarian regime to a market economy with a 
consolidating democratic system. In fact, the political system that emerged after 
the fall of Communism in 1989 was a hybrid. To borrow a metaphor from Dryzek 
and Holmes (2002), much of the institutional ‘hardware’ of Polish politics had 
been inherited from the period of state socialism, while cultural ‘software’ was 
a hybrid of long-established ‘traditions’ plus the globalization and Europeaniza-
tion pressures of the early 1990s. The Polish Communist government had been 
divided into ministries, which maintained institutional continuity also after 1989. 
A multiplicity of political parties emerged, but none with mass memberships. 
They never became stable organizations with clear political programmes, as in 
Western Europe. Their main source of legitimacy was the mandate they received 
in elections.
Poland’s democratization in the 1990s emphasized representation over partici-
pation (Szulecka and Szulecki 2019). Seeking to tame the strong social move-
ments that had brought down the Communist regime, the new political elites 
hesitated to develop systematic procedures for consultation and dialogue with 
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societal groups. This forced insulation of policy-making from societal inputs 
resulted, among other things, in very low levels of trust in political parties and 
institutions.
The period 1990–1991 saw an eruption of environmental legislation in all 
domains, including energy (Szulecka and Szulecki 2019). In 1990, the Sejm 
passed the bill ‘Foundations for Poland’s energy policy until 2010’, stating that 
‘environmental protection should be the main factor influencing the choice of 
energy sources’ and indicating renewables as the preferred solution (Marszałek 
Sejmu 1990). The first windpower plant (150 kW) was built in 1991 in Lisewo as 
part of the Żarnowiec plant complex, financed mainly by the Danish government 
(AGH 2007). In the same year, the need to rationalize energy consumption and 
production was adopted as an official policy goal, with renewables support as an 
important instrument (Urząd Rady Ministrów 1991). As a result, there was a feed-
in tariff from 1993 to 1999 (Jankowska 2012). Tariffs were set at approximately 
30% above the energy market price, and the adjusted prices were announced only 
one year in advance by the Ministry of Finance. However, as the support level 
was low and the scheme lacked long-term predictability, it did not result in major 
investments (Ancygier 2013a: 239).
Nevertheless, the first Polish renewable energy developers began to appear. 
In 1994, the EC Baltic Renewable Energy Centre (EC BREC) was established 
by the European Commission (the Commission), becoming part of the Ministry 
of Agriculture in 1997. It swiftly became the main advocate of higher and more 
predictable renewables support (Podrygala 2008: 72). In addition, an array of 
smaller organizations promoted specific technologies, such as small-hydro, wind 
and solar. Together with environmental organizations, they became the main pro-
moters of renewables.
Even though Poland was not yet an EU member, the EU had influenced Polish 
energy-policy debates already in the 1990s – most clearly after Poland’s formal 
accession bid was accepted in 1994. This was evident especially at the rhetorical 
level, with clean energy as a noticeable element in the modernization project. 
In 1997, the Parliament adopted an ‘Energy Law’ clearly inspired by the Com-
mission’s energy papers from a few years earlier. This law explicitly mentioned 
the development of renewables as a goal for national energy policy, as well as 
established an independent national regulator, URE (Ancygier 2013a: 240–241; 
Sejm 1997).
The 1997 elections brought victory to the centre-right and a coalition govern-
ment, headed by Jerzy Buzek and supported by a parliamentary majority of the 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and Freedom Union (UW), both rooted in the 
anti-Communist ‘Solidarity’ trade union movement. This government aimed a 
restructuring the Polish energy sector towards greater liberalization, combining 
innovative, competitive and dispersed generation with environmental protection 
and energy security (Wiśniewski 2015: 45). In 1999, the Minister of Economy 
introduced a Renewable Purchase Obligation (Ministry of Economy 1999), 
replacing the phased-out feed-in tariff. This took place through an Executive Ordi-
nance, not a decision in the Parliament. Energy distributors were now obliged to 
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buy all the renewable energy from sources smaller than 5 MW available in their dis-
tribution region at a price not higher than their highest final user tariff. The scheme 
resulted in uneven but low support levels across distribution areas and actually 
served to disincentivize distribution companies from investing in renewables.
At the same time, the EC BREC was instrumental in the adoption of a parlia-
mentary resolution on increasing the use of renewable energy (Sejm 1999). The 
Sejm called on the government to prepare mid- and long-term renewables goals, 
adopt a strategy to foster the development of a renewables industry and to harmo-
nize the new renewables policy with the country’s energy and environmental poli-
cies. At that time, renewables fell under the Ministry of Environment and were not 
an integral part of the energy sector, which was under the Ministry of Economy. 
The resolution also recommended the active participation of private, civil soci-
ety, cooperative and communal stakeholders in the expansion of dispersed energy 
production (EC BREC 2000). However, the resolution was only an expression 
of political will; it would still need to be operationalized through the executive 
branch (Biuletyn 2003a).
Renewables arrived late as a political issue in Poland. Several policy elements 
were adopted in the 1990s, but the country did not develop transparent procedures 
for development and policy change. A nascent renewables industry emerged, but 
there was no clarity as to whether and how it should be involved in the political 
processes. The traditional coal producers still had a very dominant position.
2000–2004: pre-accession conditionality and  
interministerial struggles
In this period there was much political discussion on renewables, but no actual 
adoption of a new renewables support scheme. The Ministry of Environment 
swiftly followed up the 1999 Sejm resolution by proposing concrete regulations, 
proposing the development of renewables schemes along the lines discussed in 
Brussels at the time: ‘certificates, bidding competitions or tenders’ possibly adding 
some technology-specific elements (Ministry of Environment 2000). A pilot pro-
ject for wind energy development was prepared but never introduced (Wiśniewski 
2011). Interestingly, the Environment Ministry’s strategy did not define biomass 
co-firing as a green, renewable energy source – but, as we shall see, this soon 
emerged as the key renewables source in Poland.
At that time, Poland had reached the final stage of EU accession negotiations 
and was under strong pressure from the EU to implement renewable energy legis-
lation (Biuletyn 2003a). In 2000, the Ministry of Economy adopted an ordinance 
with targets for total share of renewables in the electricity market – at 2.4% in 
2001, set to increase to 7.5% by 2010 and 14% in 2020 (Ministry of Economy 
2000). However, these targets were only an expression of good will and were not 
binding. Compliance with EU law was the main driver for this hasty legislative 
change.
After the 2001 elections, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) together with 
Labour Union (UP), and the agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL), formed a 
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coalition government which was not as open to energy-sector reform as the Buzek 
government had been. Key figures in the new government had strong ties to coal 
mining and traditional utilities as well as a highly centralist attitude (renewables 
expert interview, 2018). Now the conflict between conventional incumbents and 
the coal-mining sector on the one hand and renewables – especially the growing 
wind industry – on the other became evident for the first time. The windpower 
lobby was growing in strength, trying to push for either universal renewables sup-
port or a targeted wind support programme. Opponents argued that wind farms 
would rely on imported parts and potentially replace jobs in the conventional 
energy sector, thus spurring negative social consequences (Biuletyn 2002). On 
the whole, the question of costs was becoming increasingly prominent (Biuletyn 
2001). Even a Member of Parliament who supported renewables stated: ‘with 
time the support for renewable energy will be a necessity’, but added that ‘[we] 
have to decide who will pay for this. Will it be the consumer or the state budget, 
and if it is the budget, where will the money come from. This is what it all boils 
down to’ (Biuletyn 2003b).
Renewables were not ‘politicized’ at the time but remained a technical and not 
overly salient topic for society. Still, some patterns with respect to renewables 
positions and links between particular interest groups and various political groups 
had emerged. The agrarian PSL and populist ‘Self Defence’ favoured bioenergy. 
The post-Communist left-wing SLD was split, with a majority in the party (and 
the affiliated UP) close to the mining sector and either openly opposed to renewa-
bles or simply ignoring it, or at most favouring biomass co-firing as a cheap way 
of achieving renewables targets without threatening conventional industry. How-
ever, one faction within the SLD was close to the nascent windpower industry. 
Finally, conservative and nationalist parties, such as the League of Polish Families 
(LPR) and later the conservative-nationalist faction in Law and Justice (PiS), had 
geothermal energy as their pet renewable, usually justifying this in terms of sover-
eignty and geopolitics – a Polish technology for tapping Polish natural resources. 
The liberal parties had little to say, apart from lip service to the need for meeting 
EU renewable energy targets. Solar power had scattered support, mostly from 
various individual MPs (renewables expert interview, 2018).
This period also saw a significant shift in responsibility within the government. 
Until 2000, the Ministry of Environment had been the main actor as regards (lim-
ited) renewables regulation. Responsibility was now shifted to the Ministry of 
Economy, thus moving renewables from the realm of environmental protection 
to that of energy policy (Biuletyn 2003a). Moreover, the relevant instruments fell 
under the competence of the Ministry of State Treasury (Biuletyn 2003a). How-
ever, several politicians complained in 2003 that the Ministry of Economy was 
utterly passive and even reluctant to join an interministerial team to move renew-
ables regulation forward (Biuletyn 2003a). Renewables supporters demanded a 
parliamentary bill that would regulate renewables and support mechanisms, with 
targets and a longer-term strategy.
The Purchase Obligation adopted in 1999 was, in principle, meant to trans-
late into a kind of fixed tariff system, where renewable energy would sell at 
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highest local retail prices. However, many distribution companies simply failed 
to abide by the regulation. According to the vice-president of the national regu-
lator’s office, 17 distribution companies in 2011 (over one half) did not follow 
the obligation and refused to pay the ordained fines, instead taking their case 
to the anti-monopoly courts (Biuletyn 2003a). This had severe consequences for 
some small-renewables investors (Biuletyn 2003b). In addition, renewables were 
subject to a 22% VAT rate, whereas conventional energy sources were under a 
7% VAT. Even worse, the transmission system operator PSE introduced an inter-
nal regulation in 2002, forcing energy sellers to report their production 48 hours 
in advance – effectively blocking all intermittent renewables from the whole-
sale market, and adding to the hurdles already encountered in the distribution 
zones. The centralist organizational logics of the energy sector was fragmented, 
and politically powerful conventional utilities were pre-emptively making market 
entry difficult for renewables. Some held that this showed that the coal industry 
was such a powerful monopoly as to be ‘above the law, and all this [renewables 
support] is a game of delusion’ (Biuletyn 2003a).
The Ministry of Economy, the TSO, and the conventional electricity utilities 
were all embedded in a mind-set dominated by engineering and coal, with cen-
tralized, national coal production and distribution regarded as the backbone of the 
Polish economy. This clashed with the vision of the 1999 Parliamentary Resolu-
tion. Members of Parliament began calling on the government to move forward 
quickly with a clear new support scheme – ideally green certificates (Biuletyn 
2003a), possibly with a feed-in tariff ‘like the one in Denmark, Spain or Germany’ 
as transitional support before a new system was in place (Biuletyn 2003a). How-
ever, it became increasingly clear that the Parliament was not able to enforce what 
it had adopted (Biuletyn 2003a).
Nevertheless, as Poland had joint the EU in 2004, it had to conform to the 2001 
Renewables Directive (Boasson 2021, this book). Both the Buzek and Miller gov-
ernments were clearly pro-European and eager to comply with EU regulations. 
Poland was also bound by emission reductions agreed in the Kyoto Protocol; 
however, due to structural changes in the industry, Poland fulfilled its reduction 
targets without needing to decarbonize its power sector. Thus, the international 
climate policy did not really serve as an incentive for Poland to reform its domes-
tic energy system and expand renewables.
Following negotiations between Poland and the relevant EU institutions in 
2002–2003, the 7.5% target for renewables by 2010 and other provisions of the 
ordinance were included in the EU Enlargement Treaty. That made the target a 
‘key driving force for development of further legislation and for the increase 
in the amount of renewable electricity in Poland’ (Wiśniewski, in Jankowska 
2010: 167).2
Despite the lack of liberalization reforms in the electricity sector, the deputy 
director of the Economy Ministry argued that ‘in energy, also renewable, we will 
be moving towards market solutions. Setting a fixed tariff, like in Germany, will 
not be right. We propose market mechanisms, so-called Green Certificates, a 
renewable energy market’ (Biuletyn 2003a). Representatives of the conventional 
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energy sector called for biomass co-firing to be included in the support scheme, 
which would allow the energy companies to benefit from renewables support.
With sectoral expectations mounting and Polish EU accession looming, the 
draft of a new renewables law was issued in the summer of 2003. It was prepared 
by the former EC BREC, by then transformed from a unit within the Ministry 
of Agriculture to an independent non-governmental think-tank – the Institute 
for Renewable Energy (IEO 2017) – and was sent to the Ministry of Environ-
ment. The draft proposed technology-neutral green certificates as the core sup-
port scheme. However, in November 2003 the Department of Instruments for 
Environmental Protection sent back a completely new draft, changing the balance 
between renewable energy technologies to be supported, clearly granting more 
competence to the transmission and distribution system operators and downplay-
ing the role of local governments and dispersed energy producers.
The new draft underwent a new round of consultations; but, while these were 
ongoing, in late December the Department prepared yet another draft, asking 
stakeholders to send in their comments within one day (Grużewski 2004). This 
was met with outrage among the interest groups concerned, and after heated dis-
cussions in the Ministry, another amended draft was sent out for consultations. 
However, renewable energy organizations and environmental groups were not 
included, whereas conventional energy industry companies were. At the time, the 
head of the Department was a former employee of the TSO, an engineer linked 
to the conventional power sector since the early 1980s – and his role in Poland’s 
energy governance and policy-making was described as a ‘personal union’ 
between the energy industry and government (Grużewski 2004).
The revised draft was, again, rejected after the governmental reorganization 
in May 2004. Now, the cabinet of Leszek Miller was replaced with a new one 
formed by Marek Belka, with a new Minister of Environment (Jankowska and 
Ancygier 2017). The new government implemented the Renewables Directive 
through Executive Ordinances and amendments, and little parliamentary involve-
ment (Ancygier 2013a: 246; see also ClientEarth 2013). In the majoritarian par-
liamentary culture that had emerged in Poland, dialogue with minority voices and 
thus the plurality of competing interests relating to renewables rarely featured in 
policy debates (Cianciara 2015: 74). As a result of the preferences of the tradi-
tional utilities, co-firing was added to the list of renewable energy technologies in 
2004; this was also in line with EU regulations. But when would the long-awaited 
support be introduced?
By 2004, renewables policy had been mainstreamed into energy policy in 
Poland. The Ministry of Economy, with its sectoral logic conditioned by the con-
ventional energy industry, set the terms of the debate. While Poland aligned its 
policies to the EU in a broad array of areas in this period, it did not align to EU 
procedures when it came to organizing transparent policy consultation processes 
(Cianciara 2015: 56–57). Top-down EU pressures, combined with bottom-up 
pressures from the growing renewables lobby, made the introduction of a support 
mechanism inevitable. However, that did not happen in this period, despite sev-
eral draft consultation processes.
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2005–2009: green certificates and learning EU energy governance
The emerging renewables industry failed to gain much influence in the period 
2005–2009. However, as we will see, Poland adopted a certificate scheme that 
had the paradoxical effect of strengthening its traditional coal-based electricity 
industry.
The parliamentary elections in September 2005 re-shuffled the political scene 
considerably, bringing an eclectic coalition of the conservative-right Law and 
Justice Party (PiS), the nationalist LPR and the agrarian-populist Self-Defence 
Party to power. Work continued on a renewables law that would be compliant 
with EU regulations. In October 2005, the Sejm adopted a ‘Renewable Energy 
Act’ – in fact an amendment of the 1997 Energy Law and the 2001 Environmental 
Protection Law (Sejm 2005), adding to the legal complexity. Tradable electric-
ity certificates were introduced, with a quota that obliged energy producers to 
generate a certain percentage of their power from renewable sources. Those who 
failed to meet the quota had to pay a ‘substitution fee’ – which was transferred to 
a governmental pool used for renewables investments. All renewable electricity 
was guaranteed access to the wholesale market (Biuletyn 2005). In addition to 
the green certificates, the scheme also included ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ certificates for 
high-efficiency cogeneration.
However, already the following year, an MP from the ruling coalition com-
plained that the main beneficiaries of the certificate scheme were ‘cogeneration 
plants co-firing biomass with coal and old hydro plants’ and indicated that the 
system needed immediate correction (Biuletyn 2006b). It was clear that such co-
firing was not spurring the development of new and renewables electricity tech-
nology (Biuletyn 2006b). The system favoured those who invested in the cheapest 
renewables (co-firing), whereas more expensive renewables were simply not 
developed. The agrarians’ ‘pet renewable’, biogas, widely seen as a technology 
that would boost both employment and agricultural production, also proved to be 
a loser in the new system.
The effects of certificates on anything but low-cost co-firing took longer to 
emerge, even if many developers showed interest in investing (Biuletyn 2006b). 
In 2006, Poland still had only two windfarms and some scattered turbines. A 
‘run on wind energy’ was observable, but the effects were late in coming, due to 
the burdensome administrative procedures as well as other problems caused by 
the conservative TSO. Yet, even the most vocal proponents of renewables noted 
that, without additional support for domestic investment, foreign investors would 
become ‘the greatest profiteers in this business’ and dominate the wind sector 
(Biuletyn 2006b).
Importantly, introduction of this new system coincided with a fundamental shift 
in the Polish energy market. Due to EU regulations (the Second and Third Energy 
Packages), Poland was encouraged to consolidate its existing energy producers – 
until then usually individual power plants run as semi-public companies – into 
large industrial energy consortia. Around 2006–2007 this led to the formation 
of the Big Four: Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE), Tauron, Enea and Energa. 
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This consolidation gave the conventional utilities an even more powerful position 
in the organizational field of stationary energy. Moreover, it became increasingly 
common to equate the interests of the large energy-industry players with the inter-
ests of the state (RES expert interview, 2016).
The certificate system was inherently unstable, as income for investors 
depended on the price of electricity and the price of green certificates (operating 
like equity with a price set by the energy exchange) – both of which fluctuated 
dramatically. Price drops were linked to an oversupply of certificates (reaching 
18 TWh in 2015) – with increasing renewables capacity and increasing volumes 
of co-firing. Additionally, until they were withdrawn in late 2013, other types of 
certificates (red and yellow for high-efficiency cogeneration) influenced the price 
of green certificates. The ‘substitution fee’ – which was fixed by the national regu-
lator each year – added to the investment risk, because under low prices it was 
cheaper for producers to pay the fee than to buy certificates. Hence, some funding 
that would have otherwise ended up financing renewables went into the govern-
mental fund. This generally high risk made investment possible only at a higher 
rate of return. Capital costs made the certificate system more expensive per unit 
of installed capacity than a feed-in scheme. The opposition criticized the govern-
ment for lack of vision, coordination, strategic thinking and focusing solely on 
fulfilling EU targets (Biuletyn 2006b). This resulted in the creation of a new posi-
tion, the ‘government’s plenipotentiary for promoting renewable energy’, charged 
with coordinating the work of five or six ministries in that area (Biuletyn 2006c).
Already in 2007, the coalition government established in 2005 collapsed. Snap 
elections brought the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) and agrarian PSL 
into power, with Donald Tusk forming the new government. While initially the 
pro-EU government was also seen as pro-environmental, it quickly opted for 
‘cheap growth’ with minimal emphasis on sustainability (Szulecka and Szulecki 
2013). In 2009, the differences in organizational logics between the Ministry of 
Environment and the Ministry of Economy came again to the fore. The Environ-
ment Minister and leading figures in the environmental movement called biomass 
co-firing ‘technological and economic nonsense’. Prime Minister Tusk accepted 
the resignation of Environment Minister Maciej Nowicki and transferred all com-
petences on renewable energy policy to the Ministry of Economy. The Ministry 
of Treasury, which managed the state-owned energy companies, wanted a con-
tinuation of the co-firing practice. This gave the impression ‘that the national 
‘champions’ do not defend national interests, but rather that the state defends their 
interests’ (Wiśniewski 2013). Importantly, Poland’s satisfactory fulfilment of EU 
renewable targets was based largely on co-firing, as had been clear from the start 
(Biuletyn 2006a).
The national debate now seemed gridlocked. Revision of the Renewables 
Directive at the EU level attracted scant attention, as the government focused 
primarily on the revision of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) (Jankowska 
and Ancygier 2017; Skjærseth 2018: 503). In parliamentary discussions, the MPs 
treated legislative work on matters like the 2020 targets as something that was 
going on ‘out there’ (Biuletyn 2007).
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Summing up, in this period green certificates were introduced, and, together 
with restructuring of the corporate sector, this strengthened the position of 
Poland’s existing utilities. The support scheme had long been awaited, and, under 
high certificate prices, the investment conditions were favourable. It was primar-
ily biomass co-firing that benefitted, but also, to a certain extent, wind farms. Dur-
ing these years, Poland also started to learn how to influence EU energy policy, 
moving from a passive receiver and becoming a co-shaper, at times even a veto 
player.
2010–2016: domestic struggle and EU assertiveness
After 2010, Poland became a more important player in EU policy development – 
and a less eager adopter of EU renewables policy. It also entered a period of 
opaque policy development processes relating to renewables support. In 2015, the 
country also experienced a shift to a single-party majority government that under-
mined the role of open political processes in the Parliament altogether.
As required by the 2009 EU Renewables Directive, Poland developed a 
national renewables action plan in 2010 (Ministry of Economy 2010). This plan 
aimed to meet the Polish target with wind, biomass co-firing and one new large 
hydropower plant (Jankowska 2012). Moreover, a new bill on renewable energy 
sources should be adopted in 2011 (Ministry of Economy 2010: 37). At that time, 
the ETS debate helped to establish a clear link between energy and climate policy, 
but the dominant sceptical attitude of the energy industry spilled over to renew-
ables regulation. The government began relying on a narrow group of trusted 
consultancies – most importantly EnergSys, a think-tank established by energy 
engineers with backgrounds in the conventional energy sector. By 2013 Energ-
Sys had become the government’s first-choice reporting body,3 with considerable 
agenda-setting power.
In the 2011 elections, renewables became a political issue for the first time. 
The strongest commitment and most concrete proposals came from the agrarian 
PSL. The newly formed Palikot Movement had a generally enthusiastic attitude; it 
became the third-largest party in Parliament shortly after it was created. The larg-
est party in the Sejm, PO, mentioned renewables only as part of EU obligations 
to be fulfilled. The main opposition force – PiS – voiced open climate scepticism: 
favouring coal, it called for rationalized renewables support that would give pri-
ority to national resources such as biomass, waste, hydro and geothermal energy 
(Kaczorowska 2013). After the elections, PO and PSL remained in power as a 
coalition, while the Palikot Movement, although it had been visible and active, 
dissolved by the end of the term.
Work on a new renewable energy act re-started in 2011, with the aim of fully 
transposing the 2009 EU Renewables Directive and streamlining the regula-
tion of the renewables. This was meant to be part of the ‘Energy Three-Pack’ 
– a joint and coordinated reform of all energy-related legislation, including a 
long-delayed update of the 1997 Energy Law, the Gas Act. The new laws partly 
resulted from pressure on the part of the Commission, which threatened Poland 
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with proceedings before the European Court of Justice for not implementing the 
Directive. In December 2011, a draft renewables law was presented, including 
radical changes to the existing support mechanism.
In March 2012, a Renewable Energy Department was created in Poland’s Min-
istry of Economy to deal with implementation of EU policy. After strong criticism 
of the 2011 draft, a significantly changed proposal was presented in July 2012. 
Following public consultations, the new department developed a proposal to 
introduce feed-in tariffs for smaller installations, and to reduce and ultimately 
abolish support for large hydropower and for co-firing. The Economy Minister 
accepted the proposal and asked the Institute for Renewable Energy to analyse the 
economic consequences of the proposed feed-in tariff (IEO 2016). The conclu-
sions were later included in revised versions of the draft.
Meanwhile, due to mounting pressures from the Commission, a parliamentary 
project of a ‘small three-pack’ – a provisional set of temporary amendments to 
the Energy Law – was introduced in the Sejm. This shifted attention away from 
the renewables work within the Ministry of Economy. The small three-pack was 
adopted by the Parliament in July 2013 (IEO 2016). It dropped feed-in tariffs and 
opted for the continuation of the green certificate scheme, but new technology-
specific certificate assignment would ensure that for each MWh produced in 
cheap co-firing, only 0.5 certificate would be granted, compared to 2.0 for solar. 
Renewable energy industry endorsed the changes but called for reduction of bar-
riers to small-scale renewables investments (IEO 2016).
Renewables investments continued to grow rapidly. Between 2004 and 2013 
the share of renewables in gross final energy consumption increased from 6.9% 
to 11.3%. But this golden age proved short-lived. In March 2013 Tusk stated that 
Poland would search for the renewables path that was ‘safest and cheapest for the 
people’, aimed at fulfilling the 15% target for 2020 – and ‘nothing beyond that’ 
(PAP 2013). This indicates that fulfilment of EU obligations was the main driver 
of renewables support in Poland, but also that the coming policy mix should give 
the government control over energy price. While there was strong willingness to 
invest in renewables at the local level (Ancygier and Szulecki 2014b), the com-
plex support mechanism, as well as the unfavourable conditions for prosumers 
and cooperatives, left the potential for small-scale developments untapped.
In November 2013, a new Minister of Economy was appointed. He presented 
a completely new renewables act proposal, erasing two years of drafting and con-
sultations. The project was prepared by a team in the Chancellery of the Prime 
Minister. The draft, heavily influenced by utilities and industrial energy compa-
nies, made nuclear the preferred tool for decarbonization (IEO 2016). The cer-
tificate scheme was replaced with auctioning, without giving priority to new and 
more costly renewables. The Ministry refused to conduct a new round of consul-
tations, claiming consultations had already been held, albeit concerning a very 
different draft.
At that time, new EU state-aid guidelines were under development, and while 
it was signalled that traditional feed-in would not be accepted, it still seemed as if 
certificate schemes would. The Polish authorities were concerned by the direction 
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this regulation was taking. In a consultative response to the Commission, the 
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection argued that renewables could 
play at best an auxiliary role in Poland, and it called for a more technology-neutral 
approach that would allow Poland to subsidize conventional generation and 
nuclear ‘due to geographical, geological and climatic conditions’ (UOKiK 2014).
The Polish Council of Ministers approved the draft Renewable Energy Act in 
April and in May sent it to the Commission, launching a notification procedure – 
which it soon discontinued. In July the draft Act went to the Sejm, where the 
opposition (PiS) demanded a public hearing, claiming that public consultations 
to date had been ‘fictitious’, and that the new renewables act had been ‘writ-
ten by lobbyists’, noting that windpower was allegedly favoured in the project 
(Komisja 2014).4 The public hearing was held in September 2014, with a record-
high 129 participants (Sejm 2014). Nevertheless, the haste with which the project 
of a new support mechanism (auctions) was pushed through the Sejm gave rise 
to objections. There were also fears that the new schemes might be dismissed as 
unjustified state aid, as this had not been notified to the Commission in due time 
(Komisja 2014).
In January 2015, the new Act was finally adopted in the Sejm. First auctions 
were scheduled for January 2016. The Act was criticized for its complexity (144 
pages of detailed regulations) and high up-front costs of entering the auction, 
making it difficult for municipalities and cooperatives to participate. In addi-
tion to the suggested auctioning scheme, the Sejm adopted a fixed feed-in tariff 
for installations below 10 kW, aka the ‘prosumer amendment’, proposed by 
a PSL deputy and supported by an unprecedented media campaign on the part 
of renewables actors and environmental organizations. An ad hoc majority that 
formed around the issue, including the coalition junior partner PSL, adopted the 
amendment against the will of the ruling Civic Platform party. The government 
and PO tried to topple the amendment in the Senate, which proposed its own, 
watered-down ‘prosumer amendment’; but in a second vote in February 2015, 
the Sejm adopted the Renewable Energy Act with a guaranteed price at the level 
of the average wholesale price from the preceding year. This price and market 
access guarantee, combined with preferential credit offered through public finan-
cial institutions, attracted wide interest.
Presidential and parliamentary elections in June and October 2015, respec-
tively, brought a new political situation, putting the long-term opposition party, 
the conservative PiS, in full control of the state administration. This time, the elec-
toral campaign was much more focused on energy and climate issues – with PiS 
supportive of local, dispersed generation, with the liberal PO and newly formed 
Nowoczesna sceptical to renewable energy and with the main proponents of 
renewable generation again among the agrarian PSL and on the left (United Left 
and Your Movement, neither of which gained seats in the Sejm) (Kijewska 2014).
A new Ministry of Energy took over energy governance competences from 
the Ministry of Economy (which was dismantled), and the long-time director of 
the Renewable Energy Department was dismissed. Understaffed, the new min-
istry was unable to continue legislative work on renewables policy. Already in 
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December 2015, a new amendment to the renewables act passed through the par-
liament. It extended the ‘green certificate’ system and postponed auctions until 1 
July 2016. Further, it gave the new Energy Ministry authority to insert changes in 
the small-scale feed-in scheme if investments seemed to be growing too fast. This 
extended the systemic instability for larger investors and left the angry prosumers 
in limbo. Those who invested or took up mortgages on their home photovoltaic 
installations were worried, because PiS – initially seen as prosumer-supportive 
(Szulecki and Ancygier 2015), began sending rather negative signals.
In June 2016, the Sejm, solely with the votes of the PiS majority, adopted 
another new amendment. MPs from PiS submitted the proposal in a format that 
allowed bypassing all public consultations and sped up the decision-making pro-
cedure. This was part of a larger trend, with the PiS using this special procedure 
to avoid public hearings altogether (only two were held in the first year) (Obywa-
telskie Forum Legislacji 2017). It was claimed that major stakeholders had been 
consulted, but that had not happened.
The 2016 amendment included co-firing, and the biomass-to-coal ratio needed 
to qualify as ‘renewable energy’ was changed from 30/70 to 20/80. As to the 
tenders, the government would now decide each year what kind of technologies 
would be required through an Executive Ordinance, defining the technology and 
amount of energy to be bought in an auction. In a separate act, the PiS introduced 
a localization regime highly unfavourable to wind farms, which, as ClientEarth 
noted, was harsher than for coal-fired plants (Chojnacki 2016). In October, the 
Ministry of Energy published a list of reference prices per MWh of energy (basis 
for auctioning), distinguishing 21 renewables categories, on the basis of technol-
ogy and size. For the first two years, no auctions for onshore wind were held: the 
first one came only in November 2018.
Discussion and conclusions
This chronological presentation has shown that the European environment has 
played a vital role in shaping Poland’s renewable electricity support-scheme mix. 
This research confirms Jankowska’s argument that, without external EU pressure, 
‘there would not have been an energy and climate policy in Poland even half 
as ambitious as it is now’ (Ceglarz and Ancygier 2015: 137; Jankowska 2010: 
168). In the first phase (until 1999), renewable energy seemed a rather distant, 
futuristic idea associated with ‘modernization’. At the time of political, social and 
economic transition from Communism, ‘the West’ – epitomized by the EU – was 
perceived as a role model (Ancygier and Szulecki 2014a; Szulecki and Kusznir 
2017). Poland was a relatively early adopter of a feed-in scheme; a main reason 
seems to have been influence from the early feed-in adopters in the EU. All this 
happened before Poland became an EU accession country, and long before Brus-
sels had any formal authority over Polish energy policy.
Later, EU conditionality gave the Commission superior authority over Poland 
across a range of issues, and harmonization of domestic policy with EU norms 
and expectations accelerated. In line with the findings of Jankowska and Ancygier 
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(2017), we can conclude that this explains why Poland adopted a certificate 
scheme. While feed-in diffused and became increasingly popular in other EU 
member states, Poland was influenced more by the Commission than were its 
peers. After accession, the carrot-and-stick of membership and conditionality dis-
appeared, but learning to navigate the new corridors of power in Brussels took 
time. Until 2010, Poland was still building up expertise and capability in energy 
policy-making and negotiations. Domestically, renewables were but a marginal 
issue.
Early in 2015, Poland adopted a support scheme for large-scale renewables, 
closely aligned to the approach recommended in the EU 2014 state-aid guidelines. 
As Poland already had a certificate scheme that was acceptable under the new 
guidelines, this change seems puzzling and cannot be interpreted as a direct result 
of the increased authority of the EU with respect to renewable energy issues (Boas-
son 2021, this book). Policy-makers and incumbents were clearly dissatisfied with 
the technology-neutral certificate scheme. As there was growing pressure from 
the outside (the Commission) and below (renewables lobby and environmental 
NGOs) for full implementation of the 2009 EU Renewables Directive, the new 
renewables act was seen as an opportunity to realign the support scheme and the 
political economy of renewables. On the surface, Poland seemed to be follow-
ing the crowd. It adopted a variant of auctioning, which was the Commission’s 
preferred price-setting scheme, adopted by several other member states – but the 
Polish authorities made sure it was highly technology-specific and easy to steer. In 
contrast, the Polish Parliament ensured that Poland adopted a support scheme for 
small-scale renewables apparently inspired by small-scale schemes in other EU 
member states (Leiren and Reimer 2021; Rayner et al. 2021).
We can conclude that the European environment has been very important for 
the development of renewables policy in Poland ever since the 1990s. Indeed, 
EU policy seems to have had prime importance when the EU has had the greatest 
authority (in the accession period, and after 2014). Poland has been affected by 
trends in the European environment, but the 2015–2016 changes show that these 
could be used more selectively and instrumentally.
Moreover, we cannot overlook EU influence in other areas that had repercus-
sions for the Polish renewable energy mix. While EU unbundling and electricity-
market regulation has had positive effects on the nascent renewables industry, the 
creation of a state-energy-industrial complex was also the result of EU pressures 
on horizontal and vertical consolidation (Jankowska and Ancygier 2017; Szulecki 
2018).
As to the organizational field, it remained segmented during all the periods 
examined here. While governmental ministries were very important initially, 
sectoral incumbents became more powerful after the EU induced consolidation 
around 2006. Responsibility for the development of renewable energy shifted fre-
quently between different ministries, and the utilities appear to have gained influ-
ence after responsibility for renewables was moved away from the Ministry of 
Environment in 2009. To some extent, external consultants with close ties to the 
large utilities served to strengthen the utilities’ control over information.
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Even though Poland had a market-based support scheme for a while, the market 
logic does not appear to have been strong in the organizational field. Nor do any of 
the institutional logics relating to climate mitigation appear to have a strong stand-
ing in the field, which remains dominated by a centralized and state-steered sys-
tem where conventional (coal) baseload generation is seen as the backbone of the 
Polish economy. The Ministries of Economy and later Energy and the regulator 
TSO, as well as the major state-owned utilities, all share this mind-set. There is a 
clear ‘revolving door’ issue, with considerable (re)circulation of experts (Szulecki 
2018). Renewables are frequently depicted as undermining state energy security 
(Szulecki and Kusznir 2017). Despite the dominance of the large utilities, we can 
find several examples where small renewables actors have been able to influence 
policy – most clearly with the adoption of the feed-in scheme for small-scale 
renewables in 2015. However, it did not take long before the major players in 
the field were able to weaken this scheme severely. Hence, the emergence of a 
small renewables community has not counteracted the other tendencies towards 
stronger segmentation in the field.
We may conclude that the logic of the organizational field, with increasing seg-
mentation, has become consolidated, its impact on policy growing over time. The 
outcome of the 2012–2016 legislative process is the most important evidence: it 
was the energy-sector experts, and not the challengers (despite increased politici-
zation of the issue), that got the upper hand.
Lastly, turning to the political field, it seems clear that prior to 2010, renewable 
energy in Poland was de-politicized, and the main governing method was ministe-
rial. This is supported by strong evidence: between 1997 and 2014 (except for the 
2005 Renewables Act), most regulation was conducted through ministerial ordi-
nances. However, a broader debate did open in 2011, gaining salience until 2015. 
This shifted the governing mode to legislative – and politicization ensured that 
the political field had significant influence on the renewables schemes adopted in 
2015, the small-scale support in particular. Since then, all new regulation has been 
conducted as amendments to amendments to amendments, passed through the 
Parliament. The period after 2010 can thus be seen as a time of increasing politi-
cization. However, with the single-party majority in power after October 2015, 
‘legislative’ itself becomes a problematic concept.
The political struggle immediately leading to the adoption of the 2015 Renew-
able Energy Act, with an ad hoc coalition forming around the ‘prosumer amend-
ment’, indicates that politicization of renewables policy has been uneven in 
Poland. Public awareness has indeed been growing, and, strengthened by the 
experience of neighbouring Germany, the focus is primarily on small-scale – not 
large-scale – renewables.
Despite the chaotic drafting and legislative action between 2010 and 2016, there 
has actually been relatively little political competition in the classic sense. Politi-
cal party programmes revealed a weak focus on renewable energy up until the 
2019 Polish electoral campaign. Throughout that period, the PSL and the Palikot 
Movement/Your Movement were the strongest advocates of renewable energy 
generation, whereas the position of the PiS is very difficult to pinpoint – strug-
gling between strong prosuming attitudes to open hostility towards windpower.
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Put in the language of political and organizational field theory, the dominant 
institutional logics of the organizational ‘conquers’ the political. This in turn is 
linked to the fact that in the case of Poland it is very difficult to draw a clear 
line between the two, although the organizational field appears dominant. This 
is additionally reinforced by the surprising ease with which individuals cross the 
frontier between political posts (parliamentarians, political ministerial officials) 
and organizational roles (leadership and supervisory positions in state-owned and 
private companies). This ease of passing through the proverbial revolving door 
is not seen as problematic, simply because the interest of large energy-industry 
players is equated with the interest of the state (Szulecki 2018).
That last point can be explained in purely rational terms, concerning how the 
political economy of the Polish energy sector is organized. If (partly) state-owned 
energy companies generate income that can be used by the state budget, the state 
will have an incentive to design policies that protect their business model and 
maximize budgetary profits. A switch to dispersed renewables would require a 
complete paradigm change – thereby challenging the existing hegemonic pro-
fessional logic with the energy technology development logic of the renewables 
actors. Large-scale renewables can be integrated into the centralized model, but 
that feat is much more difficult for small-scale and decentralized production.
Changes in government often bring policy reversals, but rarely a shift in the 
overall approach to energy policy. Even the otherwise drastic political rupture in 
Poland, when, after eight years in power, the Civic Platform liberal-conservative 
government was replaced by the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice Party, 
can be seen as an example of continuity in energy and climate policy.
The European environment has been crucial in pushing for stronger renewables 
support policies in Poland, while the apparent legislative instability is strongly 
linked to the highly conflictual political field. On the other hand, the choice of 
specific instruments, within the confines of options acceptable to the EU, is best 
explained by the stable and segmented organizational field, dominated by the pro-
fessional logic of the centralized, engineer-led coal sector, which in turn is linked 
to the importance of Poland’s natural resource endowment.
Poland’s current renewable energy policy mix seems optimal for the actors 
dominating the organizational field. Indeed, changing that situation would require 
a deep paradigm shift and a total reversal of the political economy of the energy 
sector.
Interviewees
1 Renewable energy consultant, 16 March 2016, Warsaw
2 Renewable energy consultant, 2 February 2018, telephone interview
Notes
 1 However, an amendment from 7 June 2018 has changed that system once again, intro-
ducing a feed-in tariff for small renewables installations (< 500 kW), an option of a feed-
in premium for mid-sized installations (500–1000 kW), and an auctioning scheme for 
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installations larger than 500 kW. The tender system is similar to the one established 
in 2016, but the resulting price is the basis for Contracts for Difference (CfD), and 
the number of technology ‘baskets’ was reduced to five: biogas and biomass; hydro, 
geothermal, liquid biofuels and offshore wind farms; agricultural biogas; onshore wind 
and photovoltaic farms; hybrid installations. These changes occurred after the project’s 
research period.
 2 During the important plenary meeting of the Commission for Environmental Protection on 
a Pilot Executive Program for renewables, 2003–2005, eight out of ten policy-makers who 
took the floor mentioned the EU as a direct or indirect influence. Additionally, six of the 
experts and civil servants also referred to EU regulation and influence, see Biuletyn 2003a.
 3 Personal communication with a Polish environmental movement expert, April 2013. In 
2016 the main expert of EnergSys, Bolesław Jankowski, became the vice-president of 
the state-controlled PGE energy company.
 4 In fact, at the time, legislative transparency was improving significantly. Cianciara 
reports that by 2009 formal consultations were taking place, but the legislators often 
organized them at the latest possible stage to fulfil the formal requirement but limit 
societal impact (2015: 66). A more recent study, however, found that by 2012, 93% 
of governmental legislative projects were subject to consultations and 50% of these 
involved consultation with more than 20 entities – signalling an increase in openness 
and transparency of the process during the second half of Civic Platform/PSL coalition 
period in office (Kopińska et al. 2014).
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8  France
From renewables laggard to 
technology-specificity devotee
Elin Lerum Boasson, Catherine Banet and  
Jørgen Wettestad
Introduction
France has an energy system and a climate policy dominated by centralized, large-
scale nuclear energy. Despite the emergence of an anti-nuclear movement in the 
mid-1970s and repeated bursts of protest, only the United States produces more 
nuclear electricity than France, and no other country is as reliant on nuclear power 
(Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 126). Early on, the French government chose 
to put all its energy eggs in the nuclear basket, developing a highly segmented 
energy sector with one monopolist utility, Électricité de France (EDF). From the 
late 1950s and for the next decades, the French energy system was increasingly 
nuclear-dominated.
This chapter tells the story of how and why France came to adopt a renewables 
support-scheme mix with the potential to transform the world’s most monocen-
tric electricity system radically, adding significant amounts of small-scale, decen-
tralized energy. We will also see how and why France ended up with a highly 
technology-specific renewable energy support mix.
France has great renewable energy resources available, with potentials for a 
range of associated renewables technologies: hydro, wind, solar and bioenergy. 
The country exploited much of its potential for large hydro in the first decades 
after the Second World War, but many years passed before it started to develop 
a broader array of renewable energy technologies. Precisely because the energy 
system was so heavily dominated by large centralized nuclear energy, it seems 
puzzling that the French government should decide to adopt a technology-specific 
approach, based on a mix of support measures, which could eventually challenge 
the highly centralized nuclear energy system. France had modelled its feed-in 
scheme basically on the German scheme. However, when the European Com-
mission (Commission) from 2012 began calling for less technology-specificity 
and greater exposure to electricity market prices, France was reluctant to adjust 
its scheme.
The story of France’s renewables energy policy has been given moderate atten-
tion in the literature on European energy transition. A few scholars have examined 
French climate and energy policy in general (see e.g. Szarka 2007, 2011; IEA 
2010, 2017; Meritier 2011; Whiteside et al. 2010), and certain specific aspects of 
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French renewables policy have been assessed (see e.g. Nadai 2007; Evrard 2012; 
Jacobs 2012; Cointe 2015, 2017; Boquillon and Evrard 2017). However, we are 
not aware of attempts at explaining the development of the French renewables 
support-scheme mix, or systematically exploring the relative importance of the 
French organizational field, political steering and EU influence in this respect.
Our multi-field framework rests on the assumption that the European environ-
ment will become more influential if one policy measure comes to dominate and 
Brussels gains stronger formal authority. Chapter 3 (Boasson 2021a, this book) 
shows that the EU has gradually gained more authority over national renewables 
support, and that feed-in premiums combined with auctioning became increas-
ingly popular after 2013. Against this backdrop, it would be natural to expect the 
European environment to influence France more and more over time. But can 
this explain developments in France? To what extent was France influenced by 
Brussels and the actions of other EU countries (such as feed-in frontrunner Ger-
many), and to what extent was the French renewables support scheme shaped by 
domestic factors?
Our general assumption in this book is that organizational fields dominated by 
a few actors that share a similar institutional logic will have strong policy impact. 
The highly segmented nature of the French stationary energy field, and the domi-
nance of its centralized nuclear energy technology development logic, would lead 
us to expect the French organizational field to be very powerful. But it is hard 
to see how a support-scheme mix that promotes a broad range of decentralized 
technologies fits with the traditions of the French organizational field of electricity 
production. Might it be that the liberalization of the 2000s has radically reduced 
the segmentation of the field, and thus its influence?
Finally, to what extent can French political steering explain why France ended 
up with a distinctly technology-specific support approach? Has political steering 
perhaps played an important role, changing the course of development at critical 
points? According to the multi-field framework, the political field will influence 
the development of renewables policy most when the national legislature has con-
siderable formal decision-making power and the issue is highly politicized. How-
ever, the French Parliament has not been a forceful actor in energy debates, and 
energy policy has apparently not often been politicized (Brouard 2013; Brouard 
and Guinaudeau 2017). Hence, we find no compelling reasons to expect the politi-
cal field to provide key explanations to the development of the country’s renewa-
bles support-scheme policy.
Technology-specific renewables support mix
By 2016, France had a technology-specific renewables support mix consisting of 
feed-in premiums (‘remuneration complement contracts’) for larger projects and 
fixed feed-in tariffs (‘purchase obligation contracts’) for small-scale renewables 
(RES Legal 2017). Certain smaller projects were entitled to feed-in tariffs, and 
thus a guaranteed price, but only the large-scale projects that successfully navi-
gated the competitive procedure would be awarded feed-in premiums (add-ons 
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to the electricity price). Feed-in premiums were awarded to projects that won 
calls for tenders or had been selected as a result of competitive dialogue whereby 
the government negotiates with bidders about their projects. French renewables 
support was distributed through a special governmental fund, financed by energy 
taxes (CJEU 2012a).
Only solar plants of fewer than 100 kW installed on buildings, as well as biogas 
and hydropower plants of fewer than 500 kW, could get traditional feed-in support 
(RES Legal 2017). Levels differed between technologies; for solar, the feed-in 
tariff would be adjusted every quarter. For most technologies, the support levels 
would be reduced during the lifetime of the plants, but reduction rules differed 
across technologies. The aim was for feed-in support to be progressively replaced 
with feed-in premiums, and support financed by the aforementioned governmen-
tal fund that compensates the EDF and other distributors for their extra costs 
(CJEU 2012a).
The French feed-in premium, the remuneration complement, was allocated 
either through direct guaranteed contracts (guichet ouvert), projects that won 
calls for tenders or competitive dialogue with pre-selected candidates (RES Legal 
2017). With the latter, the government negotiates with candidates that fulfil cer-
tain criteria, aiming to get the developers to improve their projects. The choice 
of procedure was to depend primarily on the technology and size of the instal-
lation, but the government had a certain leeway here. In practice, tenders have 
dominated, and they represent the largest volumes of added generation capacity 
(CEER 2018).
Various factors are to be taken into account in calculating the level of the feed-
in premium – such as investment and operation expenses, revenues, the capacity 
of the facility, actual electricity produced, market integration, reference tariffs (set 
by the government) and market electricity prices (RES Legal 2017; Norton Rose 
Fulbright 2018). The weight accorded to various factors differed slightly between 
renewables technologies, but for all technologies the level of the feed-in premium 
was to a certain degree influenced by electricity market price developments. Price 
was to be the main criterion for project selection in tenders or competitive dia-
logues process, but other criteria, such as contribution to industrial development, 
were also taken into account (ibid.: 15, 26). Because France divided the tenders 
into many different categories, the support levels varied significantly across tech-
nologies: solar photovoltaic, onshore wind, offshore wind and bioenergy. The 
technologies were divided into multiple sub-categories and each was, as a main 
rule, awarded support through differing tenders.
A multi-annual investment plan for energy has set out detailed technology-
specific investment targets and provides indicative timing for the national 
bidding procedures (RES Legal 2017). France has sometimes had technology-
neutral tenders where different projects applying the same technology competed 
(as with as diverse solar projects), but not tenders where projects based on dif-
ferent technologies competed against each other (CEER 2018: 37). In addition 
to the main schemes, France has had several tax exemption rules that favour 
prosumers.
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We can conclude that in 2016, the French support scheme was highly 
technology-specific. Small-scale projects were not exposed to electricity price 
development although large-scale projects were, to a certain extent. While eli-
gibility for small-scale support was primarily rights-based, large-scale support 
would normally result from a competitive procedure. In the following, we trace 
the history of the French renewables support mix back to the 1970s, showing how 
differing factors have influenced developments over time.
Historical phases: from nuclear monopolism to renewables 
pluralism
Prior to 1999: becoming a nuclear champion and a major electricity 
exporter
Unlike the case in many other Western European countries, the oil crises of the 
1970s did not lead France to increase its support to renewable energy – mainly 
because it had embarked on a nuclear path in the previous decade. Over time, 
France came to produce so much nuclear electricity that an important energy-
policy challenge became how to get rid of it all.
The development of the grandiose French nuclear programme resulted from 
efforts at restoring the economic, political and military status that France had lost 
during the Second World War (Hadjilambrinos 2000: 1114–1115). Technological 
prowess, catering to energy-intensive industries and centralized electricity pro-
duction, was a crucial element in this state-steered reconstruction. As domestic 
coal and large hydropower resources were limited, the government soon sought 
alternatives. Due partly to its military implications but also to energy-security 
concerns, nuclear technology gained important symbolic meaning in France. It 
was deemed essential to ensure that France could be restored to its former glory 
and international position.
By the entrance to the 1950s, several organizations dedicated to development 
of a centralized, large-scale, nuclear-based electrification of the French society 
were established. The nuclear technology research centre, the Commission for 
Atomic Energy (CEA), was created already in 1945 (Brouard and Guinaudeau 
2017: 127). The public utility EDF was created the same year through nationaliza-
tion of almost 2000 privately owned companies. It was granted a state monopoly 
for electricity export, import, generation, transmission and distribution. Initially 
the EDF primarily produced large hydropower, but the government steered it 
towards nuclear (Hadjilambrinos 2000: 1114). However, the state also required 
it to purchase hydropower at a special price, a practice quite similar to what later 
emerged with renewable energy feed-in tariffs schemes (Rusche 2015: 22).
France started up the world’s first commercial nuclear reactor in 1959 
(World Nuclear Association 2018). In 1973, the EDF started to implement the 
government’s nuclear ambitions under the slogan ‘tout électrique, tout nuclé-
aire’ (all-electric, all-nuclear). By the 1970s, the organizational field of elec-
tricity production had become very stable, highly centralized and centred on 
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construction and operation of nuclear reactors; the regulator CEA had superior 
expertise and authority, the EDF was the sole electric utility, Framatome the sin-
gle nuclear reactor supplier, and Alstom the only nuclear turbine-generator sup-
plier (David and Rothwell 1994: 296, Krieger et al. 2017: 277–278). The EDF 
was fully state-owned, but the state also had shares in the two latter companies. 
EDF was widely held to be powerful, often referred to as ‘l’Etat EDF’ (the state 
within the state) (van den Hoven and Froschauer 2004: 1083). The company was 
strongly centralized and hierarchical (Bauby and Varone 2007: 1056; Boquil-
lon and Evrard 2017). Military and civilian nuclear technology development 
remained closely related until the two activities were split in 1969 (Brouard and 
Guinaudeau 2017: 128).
A few wind turbines were set up in the 1960s, but by the end of that decade, 
renewable energy technology was seen as unable to provide the large volumes 
needed to cover societal needs (Laali and Benard 1999; Hadjilambrinos 2000: 
1115). The 1970s oil crisis was widely perceived as a severe threat to French pros-
perity. Prime Minister Messmer responded promptly by endorsing a nuclear power 
programme, aimed at constructing 200 nuclear reactors by 2000 (Hadjilambrinos 
2000: 1115). The 1974 ‘Messmer Plan’ was adopted without being debated in the 
parliament. An anti-nuclear movement emerged, calling for decentralization of 
both energy production and political power (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017; Had-
jilambrinos 2000: 1116). Mobilization against nuclear energy peaked in 1977 with 
protests against the Superphénix fast-breeder reactor (Brouard and Guinaudeau 
2017: 128). The movement had some success locally, but civil disobedience pro-
tests were met with increasingly harsh retaliation (Kitschelt 1986: 75).
To understand why the anti-nuclear protesters failed to win through, we need 
to take the character of the French political field into account. Ever since 1958, 
France has had two-round elections for the presidency and the parliament and 
a dual executive system, where the prime minister and the president each have 
significant formal authority over the government (Cole et al. 2013). The president 
nominates the members of the government and defines meeting agendas, but only 
the prime minister has formal authority over the individual members of the gov-
ernment. The French executive has a strong position, especially when the presi-
dent and the prime minister are from the same party – as was the situation from 
1958 to 1986 (Brouard 2013). Only a few interest groups (environmental organi-
zations not among them) had access to influence the French executive (Kitschelt 
1986: 65). The French Parliament has rather little political clout, the party system 
is instable and ‘French parties are famous for their weakness’ (Haegel 2016: 378). 
Moreover, ‘small parties are systematically underrepresented and large parties 
systematically overrepresented’ (Blais and Loewen 2009: 352).
In the 1970s, only a marginal Socialist Party was opposed to nuclear; there 
was hardly any promotion of renewables (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 134). 
Conservative Gaullist parties and the Communist Party were most in favour of 
nuclear, while the socialist-oriented parties were internally split (Brouard and 
Guinaudeau 2017: 136–138, 151). Prior to the 1981 elections, the Socialist presi-
dential candidate François Mitterrand tabled several proposals critical to nuclear, 
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for instance that national referendum be held (Hadjilambrinos 2000: 1117–1118). 
But the political resistance at this stage was far from sufficient to reverse the 
development towards nuclear: after being elected, Mitterrand halted construction 
of six plants, but eventually the referendum was cancelled and the nuclear roll-out 
continued. Key electricity industry actors feared that a scale-back would seriously 
harm them, so new nuclear was constructed even though it was well known that 
this would lead to more electricity production than the country needed.
Even though renewable energy was a minor issue, governmental bodies with 
responsibility for renewables were set up. For instance, a solar energy commission 
was established in 1978; in 1982 it merged with the French Energy Conservation 
Agency, which in turn merged with other agencies and became the French Envi-
ronment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME) in 1992 (Décret n°82–404). 
ADEME supports project developers, citizens and policy-makers with analysis 
and research and development financial support (IEA 2017: 152). At the ministe-
rial level, the energy portfolio was given to the ministry in charge of economy, 
finance and industry. A small renewable energy industries association, SER, was 
established in 1993, but it did not have much political clout (Boquillon and Evrard 
2017: 165). These actors were not much involved in the development of French 
energy policy: the ensuing five-year energy policy plans were developed and exe-
cuted by the cohesive nuclear energy policy community (Krieger et al. 2017: 295).
In the 1990s, the EDF became a truly Europeanized utility. By the late 1990s, 
the EDF was exporting nearly 20% of its electricity production (Hadjilambrinos 
2000: 1118; van den Hoven and Froschauer 2004: 1085). In parallel, it was 
involved in many countries outside France. Indeed, the company ‘transformed 
itself from a national monopoly responsible for providing public services into 
a multinational enterprise focusing on its development abroad’ (van den Hoven 
and Froschauer 2004: 1085–1088). Because of significant overproduction, 
France promoted the adoption of an EU policy that would open up neighbouring 
markets for its electricity export. Aiming to secure the EDF access to foreign 
markets, the French government eventually agreed to an EU policy that would 
open the French market to new electricity utilities, but the EDF still continued 
to dominate.
Climate change received only moderate attention in France in the late 1980s 
(Boquillon and Evrard 2015, 2017). As France had a much less carbon-intensive 
economy than most other well-off countries and plenty of cheap non-polluting 
domestic electricity production, the issue was not regarded as pressing. Carbon 
taxation was the main climate issue, but climate concerns also contributed to the 
adoption of the wind-generation programme ‘Eole 2005’ in 1996 (Deroubaix and 
Lévêque 2006; Laali and Benard 1999). The main aims of this programme were 
to explore the cost-effectiveness and competitiveness of wind energy and to spur 
development of a domestic French wind industry. Inspired by the UK non-fossil 
fuel obligation, Eole 2005 applied tendering (Nadai 2007; Interview 10). The 
EDF operated the scheme together with the French Ministry for Industry and the 
governmental agency ADEME. Fifty-five wind projects were selected through 
tenders, but few were realized – indicating both the criticism of and moderate 
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priority accorded to this programme by various actors (Szarka 2007: 323; 
Interview 10).
A green party with an anti-nuclear agenda had been established in 1984, but 
failed to gain much national political influence initially (Boy 2002: 64; Brouard 
and Guinaudeau 2017: 136). Eventually, the Socialists became more critical 
to nuclear, and prior to the 1997 general elections, they declared their intent to 
increase renewable energy incentives (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 138). The 
special two-round French election system makes it attractive for the parties to 
create pre-election alliances, and the Greens and the Socialists agreed on a gov-
ernment programme that would restrict the development of nuclear energy (Boy 
2002; Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 128). In the end the Greens won only 5% 
of the vote, but they still secured a position in the Socialist government. As a 
result, nuclear expansion was halted somewhat, and a feed-in renewables support 
scheme was eventually initiated (see the next section).
Thus, by the late 1990s, the organizational field of stationary energy in France 
was unified around nuclear energy. France adopted a windpower support scheme, 
but neither climate change nor nuclear energy were really central political issues. 
Although only a quarter of the reactors originally included in the overly ambitious 
1974 Messmer plan had actually been constructed, the country now produced far 
more electricity than it needed. As the EDF sought to sell its electricity abroad, it 
was on the verge of becoming a truly European company.
2000–2004: shifting to technology-specific feed-in
Despite producing far more electricity than it needed, France went on to adopt a 
more encompassing renewables policy in this period. This took place in parallel 
with a prudent liberalization of French electricity regulation.
Soon after the Eole 2005 programme had been adopted, French energy 
experts, various environmental movements, the renewables association SER and 
the environmental agency ADEME began criticizing the programme, seeing the 
German feed-in scheme as preferable (Boquillon and Evrard 2017: 167; Nadai 
2007; Interview 10). Now in government, the Green Party had better access to 
decision-makers than previously, and prominent Green Party politicians called 
for a shift to feed-in tariffs, primarily because they wanted to spur the develop-
ment of a new French renewables industry (Cointe 2017: 487). Even though 
this was not a headlines-grabbing debate, and only few politicians were actively 
engaged, it still influenced the law on ‘modernizing the electricity public ser-
vice’. This law was intended to transpose the EU’s first Electricity Directive, 
but it also introduced a technology-specific feed-in scheme and a new energy 
regulator: the Commission for Regulation of Electricity (CRE) (Bauby and Var-
one 2007: 1057). Thus, the feed-in tariff scheme was introduced even though it 
had hardly been discussed politically (Cointe 2015: 383). While Eole 2005 had 
aimed at ensuring cost-efficient renewables development and the development 
of a French renewables industry, the feed-in scheme was aimed primarily at the 
latter (Jacobs 2012).
156 Elin Lerum Boasson et al.
A multi-annual investment plan set a range of technology-specific investment 
targets, and a statutory order detailed the procedures for determining technology-
specific feed-in tariffs for various technologies (Jacobs 2012: 58, 106). For two 
years, the utilities, the ADEME, and industry representatives negotiated how the 
feed-in level should be calculated (Cointe and Nadaï 2018: 97; Cointe 2017: 485). 
In the end, it was decided that calculation of the tariff should be based on costs 
avoided compared to conventional power generation – the calculation method 
favoured by the EDF (Cointe 2017: 486–487). Hence, the tariff was not determined 
on the basis of actual investment costs. If renewables investments threatened to 
over-shoot the technology-specific targets in the investment plan, the government 
could use tenders instead of feed-in (Cointe 2017: 486). Grid operators (primarily 
the EDF) were obliged to buy renewable electricity at the pre-determined tariffs, 
compensated by funds raised through a tax paid by electricity consumers (CJEU 
Case C-262/12:2). The EDF had operated the earlier Eole 2005 scheme, but now 
it was one of the actors targeted by the new scheme. Despite disliking the new 
scheme, the EDF increased its windpower investments in France radically from 
2004 and onwards (EDF Renewables 2018).
France never reported its new support mix to the Commission as state aid 
(Rusche 2015: 91). In 2003, the validity of the French feed-in scheme was chal-
lenged in the French supreme court for administrative justice, the Conseil d’État. 
The court did not ask the CJEU to clarify the interpretation of EU state-aid rules. 
Instead, it ruled that, since the CJEU in 2001 had decided that the German scheme 
was not state aid, the French scheme was not state aid, either (Boasson 2021b, this 
book; Rusche 2015: 91). This was surprising, as the French scheme, unlike the 
German one, relied on a public fund to compensate electricity utilities for addi-
tional costs (CJEU Case C-262/12: 2). Later, it became clear that the Commission 
disagreed with the decision of the Conseil d’État, but many years would pass 
before the legality of the French support scheme was assessed by the Commission.
In 2001, the EU adopted a Renewables Directive that set the indicative, non-
binding target of a 21% renewables electricity share for France in 2010, 5% higher 
than in 2000 (Boquillon and Evrard 2017: 168; Rusche 2015: 60). Also in 2001, 
the government initiated several calls for windpower tenders, offshore and onshore 
(IEA 2010: 95; Banet 2020). After the Conservative Party won the 2002 general 
elections, attention to renewables decreased. President Jacques Chirac hailed 
nuclear energy as the key to climate mitigation. A climate plan aimed at radical 
cuts in French emissions was put forward, but with little attention to renewables 
(Boquillon and Evrard 2015).
While the modest liberalization of French energy regulation opened the French 
market for new actors, the EDF remained dominant. However, it did increase 
its engagement in renewables, 2004 establishing its renewables subsidiary EDF 
Energies Nouvelle (EDF 2005). The same year, the EDF changed from a state-
run company to a publicly registered company, but it remained fully state-owned 
(Bauby and Varone 2007: 1055). From the mid-1990s and onwards, it moved 
rapidly into liberalized markets in Britain, Germany and Italy (van den Hoven 
and Froschauer 2004: 10894). The EDF energy production portfolio in France 
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remained dominated by nuclear, and complemented by some hydropower, but in 
2005 the EDF decided to develop new windpower in France and abroad (EDF 
2005).
Thus, France radically changed its incentives for renewables development in 
this period, with the cost-efficiency arguments that had underpinned the Eole 
2005 support now replaced by a highly technology-specific feed-in approach (but 
still with moderate rates). Interestingly, France ignored the EU state-aid rules alto-
gether in this period. Renewable energy was only modestly politicized, and the 
participation of the Greens in the government was crucial for the shift of support 
scheme.
2005–2009: aiming to become an international climate champion
Much happened in French renewables policy in the years 2005–2009. For the 
first time in decades, there were serious discussions on reducing the country’s 
dependence on nuclear power. A substantial ramping up of renewables support 
also took place, setting off a rapid expansion of solar as well as wind (IEA 2018). 
Moreover, the international leadership ambitions of President Nicolas Sarkozy led 
him to commit more strongly to renewables at the EU level, in interaction with the 
development of renewables support domestically.
By 2005, some nuclear reactors had become so old that they had to be taken 
out of operation. France now built its first nuclear reactor in 15 years, and an 
energy law adopted in 2005 ensured that nuclear energy would remain a corner-
stone of the French energy system in the future (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 
128). Renewables received much more attention than earlier, but had also become 
far more politically controversial. As Alain Nadai (2007: 2717) has pointed out, 
‘wind power became a national issue and a genuine controversy’, invoking land-
scape issues and local opposition. Still, electricity price development was a more 
salient political issue than renewables. A 200% increase in wholesale electric-
ity prices between 2004 and 2008 created a political crisis that eventually led to 
stricter regulation of electricity price developments (Reverdy 2015).
Due to relatively low feed-in tariff levels, complex local planning procedures, 
lack of grid connections and lawsuits against windpower projects, France was 
not on track to reach the indicative target in the 2001 EU Renewables Directive 
(Nadai 2007; Szarka 2007; Rusche 2015: 60; Green Optimistic 2018; Reuters 
2018). But after 2007, renewables investments accelerated, thanks to the intro-
duction of more precise and ambitious renewables targets in the second multi-
year investment plan, and a doubled feed-in rate for solar photovoltaic (Jacobs 
2012: 58). The new feed-in tariff was a symbolic decision at the top level, prob-
ably made by Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin; it was not discussed in the 
Parliament and was against the will of the energy regulator CRE (Cointe 2015: 
154, 2017: 487). Moreover, the principle for calculating the tariff for solar was 
changed, from avoided costs to investment costs. No one expected solar invest-
ments to soar because of this change; the intention was rather to spur the develop-
ment of a new French industry (IEA 2010: 98).
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Back in 2005, the French people had rejected the proposed new EU constitu-
tion in a referendum, making the relationship to the EU an issue in the 2007 
presidential elections (Cole et al. 2013). Climate issues were also on the agenda 
(Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 136; Cointe 2017: 488). While the political 
platform of Nicolas Sarkozy’s centre-right Union for a Popular Movement party 
emphasized how the French nuclear programme would help to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, the Socialist presidential candidate Ségolène Royal argued that 
the renewables share of energy consumption should be almost tripled, to 20%, by 
2020 (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 136; Royal 2017). Climate issues gained 
attention after the popular TV presenter and leader of an environmental founda-
tion, Nicolas Hulot, formulated a manifesto calling for a massive reduction of oil, 
gas and coal consumption, a fourfold decrease of GHG emissions by 2050 and a 
strengthening of the Ministry of Ecology. Hulot managed to use the manifesto to 
pressure both candidates to clarify their climate positions; Sarkozy signed Hulot’s 
Pact in January 2007 (Whiteside et al. 2010).
Sarkozy won the presidential elections in May 2007; in the ensuing parlia-
mentary elections, the Conservative Party won an absolute majority (Cole et al. 
2013: 6). Sarkozy proved to be more involved in policy developments, including 
renewables, than most of his predecessors had been (Cole et al. 2013: 5). Standing 
forth as a leader at the European level was important for Sarkozy; already on elec-
tion night he declared, ‘ce soir, la France est de retour en Europe’ (Drake 2013: 
218). He was elected just after the EU had decided in March 2007 to adopt bind-
ing national 2020 renewables targets (Boasson 2021b, this book). When France 
assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half 
of 2008, Sarkozy developed a work programme that gave high priority to climate 
change and renewable energy (Drake 2013: 222). He did not support the Commis-
sion’s initiative for developing a directive that would leave it to the EU to steer the 
design of national support schemes, but the French government worked hard to 
facilitate internal agreement within the EU on a less constraining directive (Boas-
son and Wettestad 2013: 48, 92; Boquillon and Evrard 2017: 170).
In 2007, energy issues were moved from the Ministry of Industry to the Min-
istry of Ecology, slightly reducing the dominance of the cohesive nuclear-energy 
policy community (Cointe 2017: 489). However, the EDF remained the domi-
nant actor, although state ownership was now reduced to 85% (Bauby and Var-
one 2007: 1052). In addition, new renewable-energy actors were appearing at the 
generation stage. From 2006 on, membership in the renewable energy industries 
association SER increased, up to close to 400 entities (Interviews 2 and 3).
Sarkozy also initiated the Grenelle Environment Forum, a three-month col-
laborative consultation process where governmental organizations, local authori-
ties, trade unions, business and environmental groups participated in 2007. The 
Grenelle working group on climate and energy recommended increasing the 
share of renewables in energy consumption by 20% by 2020. In January 2008, 
Sarkozy announced that this should become an official French target (Renewable 
Energy World 2008). A more detailed renewable-energy action plan was launched 
in November 2008, outlining 50 measures for enhancing the development and 
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deployment of renewable energy in order to reach the Grenelle target – for 
instance, constructing at least one photovoltaic plant in each region by 2011 
(IEA 2010: 95). However, the French target was upped in the final Renewables 
Directive in 2009: the targeted overall share of renewable-energy consumption in 
France by 2020 was to be 23% (Directive 2009/28/EC). This increase was related 
to the French diplomatic offensive aimed at securing agreement on the Directive 
(Boquillon and Evrard 2017: 169).
The increase in renewables ambitions came at a time when investment costs 
were falling radically, and photovoltaic investments skyrocketed. However, the 
government lacked resources to steer these developments and close the gap 
between investment costs and the feed-in tariff (Cointe 2015, 2017). Few of the 
windpower projects selected through tendering procedures were realized (Furtey 
et al. 2015: 37–38). Thus, at the entry to the new decade, the French support-
scheme mix over- and underachieved simultaneously.
2010–2016: shifting to feed-in premium and more tendering endorsed 
by the EU
Unlike many other feed-in countries, France had for many years applied tenders 
as a method of selecting projects eligible for bioenergy and onshore wind support. 
In 2010 and 2011, the government issued the first calls for solar and offshore wind 
tenders (Feurtey et al. 2015: 37; Norton Rose Fulbright 2013) – even though many 
French renewables actors were critical of tendering as a selection method (Feurtey 
et al. 2015: 37–38).
In order to keep up with the rapid reduction in investment costs, the feed-in 
tariff was reduced twice in 2010, and the government introduced differing support 
levels for different solar technologies (Cointe 2015, 2017: 489–490). However, 
the feed-support was still criticized for contributing to the rising electricity prices 
and for profiting Chinese industry. To avoid a speculation bubble, the govern-
ment introduced a three-month photovoltaics moratorium in December 2010, 
and a public consultation process was initiated. This process was messy, with a 
wide range of actors including various equipment producers, large utilities, farm-
ers, environmental groups and several new solar-energy interest organizations in 
addition to SER. According to Beatrice Cointe (2015: 156–158) these actors had 
very different, sometimes irreconcilable, interests and objectives, and the process 
did not result in any consensus on reform of the support scheme. Against the 
wishes of most solar energy actors, the government finally decided to reduce the 
feed-in tariffs for small-scale projects, and a combination of feed-in premium and 
technology-specific tenders for larger projects was introduced. The feed-in pre-
mium was calculated on the basis of a complex equation.
In the midst of the support-scheme debate, the Fukushima nuclear accident in 
Japan in March 2011 spurred greater public debate over the future of nuclear as 
well as renewables. The French government and President Sarkozy responded 
by increasing spending on nuclear safety and promising greater investments in 
renewables (The Guardian 2011; Krieger et al. 2017: 289). They also argued: 
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‘renewable energy doesn’t allow for an abandonment of nuclear energy involv-
ing anything but an increased reliance on fossil fuels. A hurried abandonment of 
nuclear energy cannot be financially and environmentally neutral, so it can only 
be irresponsible’ (French Embassy in London 2011).
Public support for nuclear actually increased after Fukushima, probably result-
ing from the pro-nuclear campaigning performed in relation to the presidential 
and general elections in 2012 (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 142). While the 
Gaullist party stood by nuclear even though the costly replacement of old reactors 
was immanent, the Socialist challenger for the presidency, François Hollande, 
campaigned on reducing the nuclear share to around 50% (Brouard and Guin-
audeau 2017: 138). This would necessitate more renewables support, but renewa-
bles as such received less explicit attention than in 2007, due partly to how the 
financial crisis had affected France (Interview 11).
Hollande won the presidential elections in the spring of 2012; one month later, 
the left-wing parties scored a historic win of the majority in both chambers of the 
Parliament (Brouard et al. 2013: 36). The new government, a coalition between 
the Socialist Party and the Green Party, swiftly took three important decisions with 
implications for the energy transition process, formally committing to: reduce the 
share of nuclear power in electricity generation to 50% by 2025; shut down the 
country’s oldest nuclear station; and merge the climate and energy policy port-
folios in one ministry in charge of ecology, sustainable development and energy.
A new round of debate and consultations on energy policy started in the autumn 
of 2012: the ‘National Energy Debate’. Key issues included the place of renewable 
energy sources in the national energy mix and the design of the support schemes. 
At this stage, the general public was becoming more positive towards renewables 
and more negative towards continued reliance on nuclear (EWEA 2014). Moreo-
ver, the media reported that one of France’s two main labour unions (the CFDT) 
was, for the first time, now calling for more renewables (Energy Transition 2013; 
Interview 10). It also it became clear that the support regime for photovoltaic 
introduced in 2011 had led to a severe crisis in the industry. In an attempt to rem-
edy the situation, annual targets were increased and support levels were changed 
accordingly (Cointe 2017: 494).
In July 2012, an opinion issued by the Advocate-General of the CJEU concluded 
that the French renewables support scheme fell under the definition of ‘state aid’ as 
per the EU Treaty (CJEU 2012a). This view was confirmed in the judgement of the 
Court in December of the same year (CJEU 2012b). This implied that the French 
government would have to notify the Commission of its support schemes. The CJEU 
rulings created profound legal uncertainty concerning whether the Commission 
would dismiss any of the French state-aid practices as unlawful and thus decide that 
recipients would have to repay some or all of the support they had been granted. This 
uncertainty was amplified by the Commission’s then-ongoing revision of the relevant 
state-aid guidelines (Premier Ministre 2014). France engaged in dialogue with the 
Commission already in January 2013, but it took several years for the Commission 
to endorse all French support schemes (Norton Rose Fulbright 2013; Commission 
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2016; Commission 2017c). In 2013, it became clear that DG Competition aimed 
to introduced new state-aid guidelines that were inspired by some of the changes 
that France had already introduced, but also was pushing for renewables to be 
even more exposed to electricity market prices and greater technology-neutrality 
(Boasson 2021b, this book). France protested, calling for greater leeway (Premier 
Ministre 2014).
In the autumn of 2013, the French government launched a public consulta-
tion on the future of the French renewables support schemes. This consultation 
attracted massive interest in the sector (Interviews 2 and 3). For instance, the 
Commission for Energy Regulation (CRE) recommended several changes to 
the support schemes, basically wanting them to become more aligned to the EU 
guidelines (CRE 2014). The EDF warned against favouring renewables invest-
ments too heavily as compared with other energy sources (EDF 2014).
By now, several large European electricity utilities had entered the French 
electricity market, such as Vattenfall, Enel and E.ON (AFIEG 2012). A broad 
range of new actors had moved into solar energy and offshore wind development, 
giving rise to several new industrial consortiums between windpower develop-
ers and equipment producers and French electricity actors (Banet 2017; Cointe 
2015; Norton Rose Fulbright 2013). Moreover, the EDF had become a significant 
renewables investor in France, in wind as well as in solar (Cointe 2015: 156; EDF 
Renewables 2018).
A few months after the EU had adopted new state-aid guidelines in April 2014, 
the French Minister of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, Ségolène 
Royal proposed a new energy law that included a new multi-annual investment 
programme with technology-specific targets and a new support-scheme mix, intro-
ducing new equations for calculating feed-in premiums, increasing the use of com-
petitive tendering and reserving the use of fixed feed-in for smaller renewables 
projects (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 2–7; Energy Transition 2014). The Par-
liament started to debate the proposal in October 2014, but the future of nuclear 
and the overall direction and speed of the energy transition attracted more attention 
than the design of the renewables support-scheme mix (Interviews 10 and 11). The 
Greens advocated a radical phase-out of nuclear, but due to meagre support from the 
socialist parties, no agreement was reached on this (Brouard and Guinaudeau 2017: 
7). A final law was adopted in July 2015 (Energy Transition 2015b, 2015c).
France started formal notification of its scheme to the Commission in late 2014, 
but it took three years before deliberations with the Commission were concluded 
(Commission 2017a; Commission 2017b). The French government invested 
considerable resources in these negotiations with the Commission (US Press 
Agency 2016). While the law from 2015 was largely in line with EU state-aid 
guidelines, many details needed to be sorted out. The French authorities were 
particularly negative to the Commission’s calls for less technology-specificity. 
In December 2016, DG Competition finally announced that it had accepted the 
French support schemes for geothermal deposits, biogas, small hydropower, and 
wind farms that had applied for aid during 2016 (Commission 2016). Another 
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six months would pass before the DG Competition endorsed the French support 
schemes for large-scale renewables and the Commission agreed to the continua-
tion of technology-specific tenders (Commission 2017c). Large-scale solar energy 
had shifted to feed-in premium and tendering already in 2011; similar procedures 
were now developed for almost all large-scale renewables projects.
There have been no major changes in the support-scheme mix after Emmanuel 
Macron was elected president in 2016, and his new centrist party ‘La République 
En Marche!’ won a majority in the parliament. However, the leadership did aim to 
accelerate the development of windpower projects and continued support to solar 
(ENDS Report 2018; Reuters 2018).
Discussions and conclusions
This chronological account shows that the French support-scheme mix has 
emerged as the result of complex and often slow-moving developments. Different 
fields have played differing roles and had varying importance over time. By 2016, 
France had a highly technology-specific renewables support mix, where large-
scale projects were partially exposed to fluctuating electricity prices, and support 
was awarded primarily through some sort of competitive bidding. The feed-in 
premium was not a mere add-on to the electricity price; the price of electricity was 
calculated by applying technology-specific equations that gave varying weight to 
factors such as operating expenses, revenues, the capacity of the facility in ques-
tion, actual electricity produced, market integration, reference tariffs (set by the 
government) and market electricity prices. In addition, tendering based on price 
competition usually determined which projects were granted support. However, 
most small-scale projects were still awarded fixed feed-in support. All support 
schemes were technology-specific.
To what extent was this specific support-scheme mix a result of varying facets 
of the European environment? That is, to what extent was the French renewables 
support scheme shaped by EU steering and inspiration from other EU countries? 
The French renewables support story started in the mid-1990s, when France, 
inspired by the British tendering scheme, adopted a tendering system for wind-
power. A few years later the German scheme was hailed as superior, and France 
adopted a feed-in scheme. The tendering scheme was not abandoned, however. 
From the early 2000s, tendering and feed-in were combined for windpower, and 
gradually more and more technologies were granted feed-in after having won 
the tendering procedures. In order to understand the unusual combination of 
approaches in France, it is important to bear in mind the inspiration from two 
neighbouring countries, the UK and Germany, with very different approaches to 
renewables support.
For a long time, EU-level developments hardly influenced France. For instance, 
major political conflicts in Brussels concerning how and to what extent the 2001 
Renewables Directive should influence national support schemes did not influ-
ence French debates and decisions. That France did not reach its indicative target 
in the 2001 Directive indicates how little attention France initially paid to the EU. 
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Furthermore, by not notifying the EU of its support schemes, France was able to 
avoid DG Competition and CJEU influence over these. This was in part thanks to 
the 2001 CJEU ruling that the German support scheme did not fall under the EU 
definition of ‘state aid’.
After Sarkozy became president, the role of the EU increased, primarily 
because his European leadership ambitions led France to develop more ambitious 
renewables policies. France held the EU Presidency in the crucial autumn of 2008 
when the climate and energy package was finalized, and an even more ambitious 
EU RES target was accepted than previously adopted domestically. As the EU 
target was binding, this contributed to increase the willingness of French govern-
ments to improve existing support schemes, but there were repeated difficulties 
in setting feed-in support levels that could spur investments without leading to 
overcompensation. In order to perform better, France developed a type of feed-in 
premium relying on highly complex technology-specific equations for calculating 
support levels, and it stepped up its use of technology-specific tenders. Hence, 
France’s key role in the negotiations over the second Renewables Directive in 
2008 indirectly helped to make the French renewables support mix even more 
technology-specific.
The CJEU ruling in 2012, that French renewables support did indeed fall 
under the definition of ‘state aid’, gave rise to profound insecurity among French 
renewables actors – but DG Competition subsequently launched new and more 
constraining state-aid guidelines that proved to not require a shift to schemes 
radically different from the support mix France already had. Eventually, these 
guidelines led to the introduction of more competitive elements in the French 
support mix, but DG Competition did not succeed in persuading France to adopt 
technology-neutral tenders. Moreover, the liberalization of the French energy sec-
tor, driven by the EU, contributed to reduce the power of the EDF and probably 
also influenced the development of the French renewables support portfolio.
Initially, we had expected the European environment to influence France 
increasingly over time, since the EU gradually gained more authority, and feed-in 
has come to prevail as the most common support scheme for small-scale projects – 
and feed-in premium combined with tenders has become the dominant approach 
for large-scale projects. But this is not what we find in the case of France. France 
was early on influenced by the UK even though very few other countries copied 
its scheme, and it emulated the German scheme long before feed-in had become 
the most common support-scheme design in the EU. Moreover, France had intro-
duced widespread use of feed-in premium combined with tendering for large-
scale projects even before the DG decided to favour this support-scheme mix. 
Hence, the effect of greater EU authority in this issue-area after 2014 is less than it 
may appear at first sight. In any event, influence from the European environment 
cannot account for all aspects of French renewables policies.
Further, we had expected the French organizational field to have influenced the 
country’s support schemes most when the field was the most segmented; when 
one institutional logic dominated, and authority as well as information were con-
centrated. But, as it was difficult to see how a support-scheme mix that promoted a 
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broad range of decentralized technologies could fit with the traditions of the 
dominance of centralized nuclear energy in the French organizational field, we 
focused on whether it in fact was the EU-induced liberalization in the 2000s that 
slightly reduced the segmentation of the field, making possible the introduction 
of technology-specific renewables support.
The impact of the organizational field emerges as being more complex than 
we had expected. Initially it was highly segmented, with authority and infor-
mation controlled by a few players, with the EDF at the centre. In addition, the 
field was dominated by a technology-development logic, geared towards refining 
and improving only one technology: nuclear. From the 1950s and until the early 
1990s, segmentation hindered development of any renewables support. Moreover, 
the overly ambitious nuclear plan from the 1970s undermined the need for any 
more domestic energy production for decades to come. Only when the nuclear 
installations became so old that they needed to be replaced did renewables support 
development really became more of a priority issue.
Windpower is the renewables technology that offers the most centralized 
power production, so it is hardly surprising that this should be the first technol-
ogy to attract some kind of governmental support in France. The EDF accepted 
the introduction of tendering schemes for windpower, partly because this sup-
port method rewarded the least costly projects. In contrast, the adoption of the 
feed-in scheme in 2000 clearly took place despite resistance from the organiza-
tional field. True, the EDF was initially able to ensure feed-in tariffs too low to 
lead to much investment, but eventually the old ‘centralized nuclear technology 
logic’ gave way to an alternative ‘decentralized technology development logic’, 
where it was assumed that the state should ensure development of a broad range 
of new French industries rather than only protecting the old and established 
nuclear industry (Cointe 2015: 482).
In 2010, the industry development aspects of French renewables policy had 
become strong and a broad range of new renewables industry actors had emerged. 
At this point, the legitimacy of the French feed-in was deteriorating. Despite 
lack of coherence and considerable internal conflicts, the new actors managed 
to underpin continuation and gradual refinement of the French support-scheme 
mix. Over time, the ministry and agency for environment gained more formal 
authority over renewable energy; a new energy regulator was also established. 
Civil servants seem to have played key roles in the gradual changes in the sup-
port mix that occurred after 2010, and the dominance of the old nuclear policy 
community was clearly weakened. In particular, the EDF’s influence lessened, 
not least because the company struggled to develop clear priorities with regard 
to renewables support developments. It proved difficult to unite market thinking, 
centralized (nuclear) technology development logic and a decentralized technol-
ogy logic; significant internal conflicts and uncertainties ensued.
We conclude that the EDF played a key role in the launch of the tendering 
practice in France, but feed-in was adopted more in spite of than because of the 
French organizational field. Eventually, the de-segmentation of the French organi-
zational field and the emergence of a new decentralized technology development 
logic underpinned the adjustments and refinement of the support-scheme mix 
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from 2010 and onwards. Hence – contrary to our original expectations – it seems 
that the field actually becomes more important for the development of the support 
scheme when the degree of segmentation is somewhat reduced.
Research needs to include developments within the French political field in 
order to explain the French renewables story more fully. According to the multi-
field framework, the political field will influence renewable support developments 
most when the legislative assembly has the formal powers to make decisions, and 
when renewables are subject to political competition. But since the French Par-
liament is known to be weak, we had not expected to find that political steering 
played much of a role in the French case. Is that also what we found?
No, not quite. True, the political field played a very marginal role up until 2000. 
It is not all clear what sparked the adoption of Eole 2005, but it seems to have 
happened without any strong prior political involvement. At two later points in 
time, central politicians heavily influenced the development of renewables pol-
icy, despite the lack of intense political competition. Around 2000 the Greens 
were instrumental in ensuring that France introduced a feed-in scheme, and in 
2008 Nicolas Sarkozy ensured that EU renewables policy development contrib-
uted to strengthen the French feed-in scheme. In both cases, the political involve-
ment was driven primarily by other concerns besides strong views on specific 
support-scheme designs: the first was related to nuclear phase-out, and the second 
concerned strong EU leadership ambitions on the part of France. The French Par-
liament did endorse the introduction of feed-in, but the details of the scheme were 
later determined without parliamentary involvement. Sarkozy’s commitment to 
more ambitious French renewables targets was not endorsed by the Parliament 
until long after it had been included in the EU Renewables Directive.
After 2010, we see that the election victories of the French socialists, with 
their new stance on nuclear downscaling, underpinned the process of refining the 
French support mix in the years to come. Still, there does not seem to have been 
strong political involvement in the actual adjustments made to the overall scheme 
after 2010. Here we see that political involvement has been important also when 
the issue is not subject to political competition and the Parliament is not strongly 
involved. Simply put, the political field has been important in differing ways from 
those predicted by the multi-field framework.
We conclude that the French support-scheme mix is the result of intricate inter-
play between the European environment and developments in the domestic politi-
cal and organizational fields. The organizational field has gradually increased its 
impact and importance, but political steering has been vital at a few crucial points. 
Furthermore, while models in the European environment initially served as a cru-
cial source of inspiration, other parts of this environment later acted to constrain 
the processes of adjusting and improving the French support mix.
Interviewees
1 Electricity industry representative, Statkraft, 28 August 2017, telephone
2 Renewable industry representative, Syndicate of Renewable Energies, 8 
November 2017, Paris
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3 Renewable industry representative, Syndicate of Renewable Energies, 8 
November 2017, Paris
4 Independent energy law expert, 8 November 2017, Paris
5 Electricity industry representative, EDF, 23 January 2018, Paris
6 Electricity industry representative, EDF, 23 January 2018, Paris
7 Electricity industry representative, EDF, 23 January 2018, Paris
8 Civil servant, Ministry of Ecology, 23 January 2018, Paris
9 Civil servant, Ministry of Ecology, 23 January 2018, Paris
10 Energy policy researcher, CIRED, 23 January 2018, Paris
11 Energy policy researcher, University of East Anglia, 21 February 2018, tel-
ephone interview
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9  Sweden
Electricity certificate champion
Elin Lerum Boasson, Hugo Faber and  
Karin Bäckstrand
Introduction
In the late 1990s, electricity certificate schemes were strongly favoured by the 
European Commission (the Commission) as well as the electricity industry, but 
20 years later Sweden is the only EU/EEA country with certificates as its main 
renewables support scheme. In addition, the Swedish government offers tax 
exemptions and investment support for solar photovoltaics (PVs). Sweden seems 
to have been unaffected by the two dominant policy approaches to promoting 
renewable energy in EU countries: the diffusion of feed-in schemes in the period 
2000–2010, and the shift to feed-in premium combined with auctioning that has 
occurred since 2010 (Boasson 2021b, this book).
The research question that guides this chapter is: Why has Sweden electricity 
certificates combined with technology-specific solar investment support, appar-
ently without being influenced by European policy trends in renewable energy? 
The certificate scheme is technology-neutral. The amount of renewables in the 
scheme is subject to political decisions, but the supply and demand of electricity 
certificates determine the certificate price. The Swedish scheme was introduced 
as early as in 2003, and in 2016 the certificate scheme was prolonged until 2030, 
setting 2045 as an end-date of support to projects included in the scheme. This 
chapter traces the historical development of Swedish renewables policy from the 
1970s and onwards, and identifies factors that can explain the Swedish exception-
alism in renewable energy policy.
Sweden harnessed much of its potential for large hydropower in the post-Second 
World War era. In the late 1970s, nuclear energy became a highly contested politi-
cal issue, and an advisory referendum in 1980 determined that all nuclear should 
be phased out by 2010. The public contestation of nuclear power later paved the 
way for political willingness to promote alternative and new renewable energy 
sources, reinforced by the advent of climate-change threat in the early 1990s. 
For over 40 years, nuclear energy has been a heated political issue in Sweden. 
Renewables have seldom been at the centre of political conflicts.
A main assumption of this book is that the influence of what has been termed 
the ‘European environment’ will be strongest at times when the EU wields con-
siderable formal authority and where one policy recipe is dominant. However, 
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the Swedish case study runs counter to this expectation: the EU emerges as most 
influential when it has had less formal authority and when many competing 
renewables support-scheme designs were in circulation in Europe.
In order to explain why the EU has played this role, we explore the relation-
ship between Sweden and the European environment, examining the politics of 
renewables in Sweden, as well as the special character of the Swedish organiza-
tional field of stationary energy (Boasson 2021a, this book). Has Sweden opted 
for a largely technology-neutral support mix because this was embraced and pro-
moted by a segmented organizational field of stationary energy? Or is the explana-
tion that a political majority has fought for this through political competition? As 
we will argue, politics play a crucial role, not least due to the close relationship 
between renewables and the contested issue of nuclear power.
This chapter presents a case that has received limited attention from schol-
ars of Swedish energy and climate policy (for a notable exception, see Åstrand 
2005). To our knowledge, no other study has sought to explain the historical 
development of Sweden’s renewables support schemes, and no other study has 
investigated the relative importance of EU steering, national political steering 
and the influence of corporate actors and civil servants. We also take into account 
the influence of the EU’s renewables policy as well as EU’s state-aid rules. The 
Swedish case study is especially pertinent as it provides insights into a case 
where Europeanization that occurred at one point in time froze, and remained 
in place many decades after the EU had shifted its policy to promote radically 
different national practices.
Technology-neutral renewables support mix
Sweden has a mostly technology-neutral renewables support mix, with an elec-
tricity certificate scheme for large-scale renewables and an investment support 
scheme for small-scale renewables. The certificate scheme involves a government-
induced market for renewable energy securities (SOU 2017). Governmental regu-
lations determine the operation of the market, the key factor being the size of the 
quota that renewable energy producers are obliged to produce or purchase. The 
quota level is based on a domestic renewable energy target expressed in TWh. 
With higher targets, the quotas increase, thereby increasing the demand for cer-
tificates. This leads to higher prices, and thus to higher support levels for renew-
able energy. While the level of support is determined by supply and demand on 
the certificate market, demand itself is highly dependent on the quota obligation. 
What the purchaser of a certificate buys is not the actual energy, but a certificate 
confirming its economic contribution to the operation of green electricity.
One certificate for every MWh produced is allocated to producers of renewable 
electricity. Distributors are required to hand over a certain number of certificates 
to the government based on a percentage quota of their energy sales or consump-
tion. Energy-intensive industry is exempted from the quota obligation. If they do 
not produce renewable energy themselves, they must buy certificates from renew-
able energy producers, thereby creating a market where producers of renewable 
172 Elin Lerum Boasson et al.
energy can obtain additional funding. In the end, the additional expense of obtain-
ing certificates is added to the electricity price (Swedish Government 2003).
Wind, solar and tidal power, geothermal energy, new hydropower, existing 
small-scale hydropower, biofuels in Combined Heat and Power (CHP) and peat in 
CHP can be included in the scheme (Bergek and Jacobsson 2010: 1258). All pro-
ducers receive a bonus through the certificate scheme, corresponding to the value 
of certificates at that point in time. Thus, all are also exposed to the market price of 
electricity. Further, as all energy sources receive the same amount of certificates 
per MWh, this support is technology-neutral. It aims at expanding the most com-
petitive renewable energy sources and ensuring minimal societal costs by letting 
the market select the most profitable technologies (ibid.: 1257ff). The scheme has 
since been prolonged and expanded, but the design has not changed significantly 
after it was adopted in 2003. The price of the certificates has varied: in late 2016, 
prices were at an all-time low, around €7 per certificate (Ekonomifakta 2016).
Sweden adopted an investment support scheme for solar PV on public buildings 
in 2005. This support covers up-front investment cost, but not operational costs. 
In 2009, also private individuals and corporations became eligible for investment 
support for grid-connected solar power (Swedish Government 2009a). Initially, 
the programme covered 60% to 80% of installation costs. It has since been low-
ered gradually, and since the beginning of 2015 companies can get 30% and pri-
vate individuals 20% of their installation costs covered (Energy Agency 2015: 
8). Between July 2009 and September 2016, some €51 billion were distributed 
through the scheme; an addition €19 billion have been granted (Energy Agency 
2016). The programme has a fixed budget, providing support on a first come, 
first served basis. Each year, applications have exceeded annual budgets, leading 
to lengthy waiting times. The Social Democratic–Green Party government coali-
tion increased the budget of the system for 2016–2019, but waiting times have 
remained significant (Swedish Energy Agency 2015: 5). Those who feed electric-
ity back to the grid receive the current market price.
In addition, small-scale renewable energy producers can receive a tax reduction 
of €0.06 for every kWh they transfer to the grid, up to £2000 per year (Swedish 
Government 2014). Solar power is also included in the certificate scheme, and 
private persons who hire assistance to install solar cells in their own homes can 
also get a tax reduction based on the costs of this labour, in line with the general 
tax reduction for hiring workers to do home renovations in Sweden.
Renewables in the shadow of the nuclear controversy
Prior to 1999: politicization of nuclear and energy policy in general
Major political controversy surrounded nuclear energy in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The rapid expansion of nuclear power in these years spurred political conflicts 
that were to have repercussions for many decades (Energy Agency 2003: 8).
Sweden had developed a significant portfolio of large hydropower during the 
1950s and 1960s (SOU 2017: 96). This led to some minor protests, but energy was 
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not a salient political issue in the early 1970s (Kaijser 1992). Rather, experts – 
researchers, civil service officials, industry representatives – enjoyed considerable 
leeway in determining policies. Increased electricity consumption was largely 
regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth, industrial competitiveness, 
increased welfare and high employment in Sweden (Nilsson 2005: 212; Sarasini 
2009: 639). At this stage, state-owned Vattenfall – the national transmission sys-
tem operator and regulator as well as the country’s largest electricity producer 
(Högelius and Kaijser 2010) – saw nuclear electricity generation as the technol-
ogy of the future (Kaijser 1992: 449).
Sweden’s first large-scale nuclear reactor began operation in 1972, with seven 
more reactors in the pipeline (Kaijser 1992: 447). Then, the international wave of 
nuclear protest reached Sweden. Eventually, the Centre (formerly Agrarian) Party, 
the Communist Party and parts of the ruling Social Democratic Party became 
alerted to the environmental risks related to nuclear energy. The oil crises of the 
1970s spurred the politicization of energy policy and the contestation of nuclear 
energy, in turn paving the way for greater political attention to renewables (Söder-
holm et al. 2007: 368).
A windpower research programme, initiated in 1975, resulted in a few demon-
stration wind farms (Engström 2015: 32, 39–40, 203). In addition, direct govern-
ment support was introduced for bioenergy (Andersson 2013: 20). However, these 
were marginal developments compared to the rapid expansion in nuclear power. 
In the 1976 elections, nuclear energy became the main issue. The pro-nuclear 
Social Democrats lost power, for the first time in 44 years, to a coalition of the 
Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the (conservative) Moderate Party (Nohrstedt 
2005; Vedung and Brandel 2001: 220).
The Centre Party suffered a series of defeats to the pro-nuclear parties in the 
government, as the construction of new reactors was eventually permitted. So 
severe were the internal conflicts that the coalition resigned after only two years 
in power (Nohrstedt 2005; Vedung and Brandel 2001). The conflicts over nuclear 
expansion made it very hard to create stable governments (Nohrstedt 2005; Nord-
haus 1997). The nuclear issue divided the Social Democrats internally, but it also 
made it difficult for the liberal-conservative parties to form an alternative coali-
tion government. Five major reactors were already under construction in Sweden, 
but the political conflict regarding nuclear expansion continued. Thus the govern-
ment decided to hold an advisory referendum in 1980.
All three alternatives offered in the referendum implied an expansion of renew-
ables but were silent on how to achieve this. One alternative called for immedi-
ate decommissioning of nuclear plants, but this gained only 39% of the vote. 
A second alternative did not imply decommission but added that the state and 
municipalities should own all future energy facilities also gained 39% of the vote. 
Even though no alternative gained more than 50% of the vote, the outcome ena-
bled the minority government to gain stable parliamentary support in the Swed-
ish Parliament (Riksdagen) (Nordhaus 1997: 33–44). The referendum outcome 
was followed by a parliamentary decision to: (1) phase out nuclear power by 
2010, (2) reduce Sweden’s dependence on oil and (3) facilitate the transition to 
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‘an energy system based as far as possible on lasting, preferably renewable and 
domestic energy sources with least possible environmental impact’ (Kaijser 1992: 
445; Wang 2006). However, given the pace of nuclear expansion, the support for 
renewables was primarily symbolic (Nohrstedt 2005: 1048). When the last reactor 
was finalized in 1985, Sweden had a sizable electricity surplus (SOU 2017: 99).
In the period leading up to the 1980 referendum, the Swedish electricity indus-
try was unified and dominated by Vattenfall, the national transmission system 
operator and regulator as well as the largest electricity producer (Högelius and 
Kaijser 2010). Vattenfall collaborated extensively with the 11 other large energy 
corporations, and this ‘power club’ controlled 90% of Swedish electricity pro-
duction (see Högelius and Kaijser 2010: 2246). Many smaller municipal energy 
companies produced some 10% of the electricity as well as transmitted electricity 
from the large producers. Inga Carlman (1990) has shown that the utilities saw 
windpower in particular as a threat to nuclear. Sweden had a significant energy-
intensive industry, dominated by pulp and paper production. These consumers had 
rather strong ties to electricity producers and generally supported nuclear expan-
sion (see Högelius and Kaijser 2010: 2246).
Due to the long-term target of phasing out nuclear, renewables gained trac-
tion and greater political attention. In 1985, the Social Democratic government 
initiated more research and development on windpower alternatives (Åstrand and 
Neij 2003: 22). A few windpower projects were initiated, but the turbines were 
imported, and no domestic windpower industry emerged (Engström 2015: 53). 
Moreover, the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 reinforced Sweden’s political decision 
to phase out nuclear as well as to reduce support for its nuclear research and 
development programme (Högelius and Kaijser 2010: 2247; Kaijser 1992: 457).
At the end of the 1980s, energy policy was still among the most politicized 
issues in Sweden, but the country lacked both a support scheme for operation of 
renewable energy and a domestic renewable energy industry. The nuclear contro-
versy had given the politicians the upper hand in energy policy, at the expense of 
the electricity corporations, which lost authority and control over the issue-area. 
Swedish policies were clearly influenced by global anti-nuclear protests and ris-
ing climate ambitions. In the 1990s, economic liberalization and climate change 
had climbed the political agenda, in addition to the recurrent debate on nuclear 
power (Högelius and Kaijser 2010; Nilsson 2005; Sarasini 2009). Moreover, Swe-
den was headed for a serious financial crisis with wide repercussions for politics, 
economy and society.
In 1991, the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and the Liberal People´s 
Party agreed to introduce an investment support scheme for wind- and biopower 
(Åstrand and Neij 2003: 22). The scheme was technology-specific; funds were 
to be allocated continuously over the annual state budgets (Wang 2006: 1213), 
frequently leaving no support at the end of the budget cycle.
Simultaneously, economists forcefully argued the way the government regu-
lated and steered energy production and distribution came with significant soci-
etal costs, as seen in over-investment in nuclear energy (Högelius and Kaijser 
2010: 2248–2249). The government proposed a reorganization of the electricity 
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regulation, in order to ensure that profit maximization became the driving force 
in the energy market, rather than long-term state planning (Högelius and Kai-
jser 2010: 2248). The Ministry of Finance was supportive, but Vattenfall and the 
private electricity utilities were initially reluctant. However, this changed rather 
swiftly as the ensuring liberalization spurred significant merger and acquisition 
activities (Högelius and Kaijser 2010: 2249–2250). In 1992, Vattenfall was pri-
vatized, and transmission grid responsibilities were transferred to the new Swed-
ish transmission grid operator – Svenska Kraftnät (ibid.: 2250). Vattenfall lost no 
time in developing an international strategy, aiming to become a leading Euro-
pean energy company. Initially, it branded itself as a non-fossil fuel corporation, 
active primarily in the Nordic countries and the Baltics (Darmani et al. 2016: 12).
Sweden’s energy liberalization created significant political turmoil, not least 
due to internal conflicts among the Social Democrats (Högelius and Kaijser 
2010: 2252). However, the Swedish Parliament accepted a liberalization reform 
in 1995, and the Nordic electricity exchange opened in 1996. This immediately 
led to market concentration, with three major producers – Vattenfall, Fortum, and 
Sydkaft/E.ON – controlling 90% of power generation (ibid.: 2253). Even though 
Vattenfall Europeanized its activities, our interviewees agree that it did not take 
an active role in bringing impulses from the EU to Sweden.
Nuclear power remained central for Swedish energy policy in general (Höge-
lius and Kaijser 2010). A windpower production subsidy was introduced in 1994, 
after a parliamentary initiative from the Centre Party. The size of the subsidy 
corresponded to the electricity tax paid by consumers (Wang 2006: 1214; Åstrand 
and Neij 2006: 280). Further, societal cost-efficiency was to serve as a guiding 
principle for energy-market regulation as well as climate-change mitigation (Nils-
son 2005: 215).
Climate change gained increased salience with the new Prime Minister Göran 
Persson of the Social Democrats and his vision of the ‘Green People’s Home’. In 
1997, the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and the Left Party jointly endorsed 
an ‘ecologic energy transition’ agreement (Nilsson 2005: 216). This entailed 
establishing an Energy Agency with responsibility for renewables and energy effi-
ciency, instructing Vattenfall to become an ‘instrument for ecologic transition, and 
the decommissioning of two nuclear reactors at Barsebäck in southern Sweden 
(Swedish Government 1997). The need to compensate for this closure spurred 
further support for renewable energy (Wang 2006: 1212; Åstrand and Neij 2006: 
279). Investment subsidies for wind- and biopower were therefore extended until 
2002, small-scale hydro was included, and additional funds were secured for 
operational support to windpower (Swedish Government 2000: 20).
However, as the liberalization of the energy market led to decreasing electricity 
prices, the new support schemes spurred rather few investments in renewables 
(Energy Market Inspectorate 2005). It was primarily bioenergy projects related 
to existing industry activities that profited, a development that transformed many 
waste and pulp-and-paper actors, previously energy consumers only, into energy 
producers as well (Jacobsson 2008: 1492). The bioenergy expansion was espe-
cially significant as regards district heating (Andersson 2013: 11). However, new 
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domestic industries related to new renewable electricity sources, like wind or 
hydro, did not emerge (Andersson 2013). To the extent that such new renewables 
were developed, this was undertaken by the traditional electricity actors, first and 
foremost Vattenfall (Andersson 2013: 14; Wang 2006: 1215).
According to several interviewees, the renewables schemes were widely con-
sidered expensive and ineffective. The dependence on yearly allocations over the 
state budget and lack of flexibility to adjust support levels to the volume of appli-
cations created an unreliable stop-and-go system (Åstrand and Neij 2006: 277, 
292). Moreover, Sweden became a full member of the EU in 1995 – and the Com-
mission rather quickly signalled that the ‘environmental bonus’ to windpower was 
in conflict with EU state-aid rules (Åstrand 2005: 114).
In December 1999, a government task force was set up to develop a new com-
prehensive and long-term renewable energy support scheme that could replace 
previous measures. Civil servants dominated the group, but they had regular 
meetings with energy corporations as well as the political parties (Swedish Gov-
ernment 2000: 20, 1). The Commission and Eurelectric (the European confedera-
tion of the electricity industry) promoted certificates as the best support measures 
(Boasson 2021b). The Netherlands had implemented a voluntary certificate 
scheme and the Danish government had initiated a shift to certificates, but no EU 
countries had implemented a full-scale certificate scheme. The Swedish govern-
ment task force visited the two countries in its search for new and better renewa-
bles support schemes.
Our interviewees indicate that Swedish civil servants engaged in the then-
ongoing EU discussions about liberalization of energy markets and development 
of a pan-European certificate scheme. In the late 1990s, the financial crisis had led 
the Swedish government to instruct all ministries to set about developing innova-
tive approaches to cut state spending (Åstrand 2005: 112). The first EU Renewa-
bles Directive was in the making, and the negotiations ‘strengthened the belief 
among the Swedish civil servants, invoked by the state-aid rules, that the future 
of other instruments than a certificate trading system was limited’ (ibid.: 117). 
This view was supported by our interviewees. One interviewee (9) explained: 
‘Every ministry worked like crazy to come up with proposals for how to cut costs 
from the state budget. When we had discussions with the EU, with [name of EU 
official] and other enthusiastic people, then we at the energy unit thought, “oh 
my God, well, then, we can simply apply that [the certificate] idea” ’. Several 
interviewees state that the Commission’s initial response to the PreussenElektra 
court case led Swedish government representatives to assume that only certificate 
schemes would be endorsed in the future (see also Åstrand 2005: 115). How-
ever, no interviewees can recall that Swedish electricity utilities actively called for 
the introduction of a certificate scheme. Rather, these appeared to focus on other 
policy issues, such as nuclear energy, decommissioning, market streamlining, and 
Europeanization.
We have seen that the idea of certificates gained hold in Sweden as early as the 
late 1990s. It had come from the EU but was compatible with the dominant market 
modes in the Swedish organizational field since the energy market liberalization. 
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The certificate idea created an opportunity to support renewables without using 
state resources. Three large corporations dominated Swedish electricity produc-
tion, but they had little influence on renewables policy. Hence, civil service offi-
cials enjoyed considerable leeway regarding renewable energy support policies.
2000–2004: EU influence and the adoption of a certificate scheme
At the beginning of the new millennium, political divisions on energy were no 
longer an impediment to stable Swedish governments. However, nuclear phase-
out was still politicized, and the electricity industry had started to adjust its corpo-
rate strategy to the liberalized market. There was political consensus on the need 
to expand domestic renewables, and the Swedish government was highly aware of 
the ongoing negotiations of the first EU renewables directive and the PreussenEl-
ektra court case (Boasson 2021b).
In March 2000, the government task force issued an official report recommend-
ing the creation of a certificate scheme (Swedish Government 2000: 20). Anne 
Bergek and Staffan Jacobsson (2010) as well as Kerstin Åstrand (2005) conclude 
that the EU had major influence on the work of this Commission. Also, our inter-
views indicate that Commission officials were directly involved in the drafting of 
this report.
The government appointed an expert task force to develop a detailed proposal 
for a certificate scheme design (SOU 2001: 77). According to one interviewee (3), 
this task force paid special attention to the PreussenElektra court case, assuming 
the arguments of the Commission would be upheld by the European Court of Jus-
tice. The aim was to design a scheme that was as market-streamlined as possible 
and that did not involve direct use of state aid. The group discussed a technology-
specific design element whereby the most costly energy sources would receive 
more certificates, but this was rejected on the grounds that it would be difficult 
to ensure that the volume target was reached. The group then focused on devel-
oping a scheme that could be adopted by other countries, enabling the develop-
ment of an international certificate market (SOU 2001: 77). One interviewee (4) 
explained: ‘This was a couple of years after the deregulation of the electricity 
market so there was very much of a market focus really, and it was natural to also 
have a market-based instrument’.
The programmes of the Swedish political parties rarely refer to specific require-
ments concerning renewables support schemes (Centerpartiet 2001; Folkpartiet 
Liberalerna 2001; Kristdemokraterna 2002; Miljöpartiet de gröna 2002; Moderata 
Samlingspartiet 2001; Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 2002; Vänster-
partiet 2000). However, our interviews indicated that representatives from all 
political parties eventually supported the idea proposed by the governmental task 
force.
The final report of the expert task force was presented in October 2001, after 
which the government developed a law proposal and issued it for notification to 
the Commission. The scheme would expose renewables producers to market risks 
relating to fluctuating certificate prices, but they would be guaranteed a minimum 
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price in the first five years of the scheme. Two weeks after receiving the notifica-
tion, the Commission endorsed the Swedish proposal (Commission 2003). The 
guaranteed price was regarded as state aid, but in compliance with the exemptions 
allowed under the EU Treaty.
By now, the CJEU had sided with the German state in the PreussenElektra 
case, and the EU had adopted a Renewables Directive that did not require member 
states to develop certificate schemes (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 86–87). These 
developments failed to de-legitimize the certificate idea in Sweden. Quite the con-
verse: in April 2003, the Parliament decided to introduce a certificate scheme. The 
initial target was to produce 10 TWh of renewable energy until 2010 (Swedish 
government 2003). The Social Democratic, Centre and Left Parties saw the phase-
out of nuclear power as an important rationale here. In contrast, the Liberals and 
the Moderate Party voted against the bill, supporting nuclear energy and arguing 
that investments in renewable energy would be made also without support (Swed-
ish Parliament 2003). Also, the Christian Democratic Party opposed the bill, pre-
ferring a feed-in scheme. The Green Party abstained from voting, arguing that it 
would be better to extend the CO2 tax.
Our interviewees agree that the electricity industry was not very involved in the 
decision-making process. The electricity market was almost as consolidated as it 
had been in the late 1990s, with three large electricity corporations accounting 
for more than 80% of annual electricity production in Sweden (Energy Market 
Inspectorate 2005). Vattenfall was the largest, supplying almost half of the elec-
tricity, and was also the third-largest actor in the German market, with a portfolio 
dominated by incumbent coal power production (Darmani et al. 2016). Vattenfall 
had indeed become a commercial player, making investment decisions based on 
short-term profit concerns, removed from long-term objectives set by the Swed-
ish government. Several interviewees noted that, even though Vattenfall did not 
actively promote certificates, they were positive to this measure.
The scheme became an immediate success, in terms of expanding biopower. 
For the first years of operation, the certificate price was several times higher than 
the guarantied price (Ekonomifakta 2016). However, it took some time for the 
scheme to yield results in actual increased capacity other than biopower.
In this section, we have seen that EU influence played a major role in the estab-
lishment of the Swedish certificate scheme, and that the civil servants remained 
important. In the political field, Sweden’s renewable energy policy languished 
in the shadow of the nuclear issue, and most electricity producers were rather 
uninterested.
2005–2010: booming renewables investments, and modest industry 
diversification
In this period, the certificate scheme spurred a boom in biopower as well as wind-
power in Sweden. Investment support for solar power was introduced and proved 
far more popular than anticipated. The politically controversial issue was the lift-
ing of the ban on nuclear power expansion.
Sweden 179
Sweden has long had a large share of district heating, fuelled primarily by 
biomass and waste. The certificate scheme made biomass electricity a profitable 
by-product of already-existing district heating and the pulp-and-paper industry 
(Engström 2015; Jacobsson 2008). Windpower development did not immediately 
take off to the same extent. Gradually, Vattenfall became more interested; by 2005 
its declared aim was to be the largest windpower producer in Europe (Darmani 
2016: 13, 14). Vattenfall also experienced costly nuclear incidents in Sweden and 
abroad, increasing its interest in other energy sources (ibid.: 13).
With the bioenergy boom, the dominance of Vattenfall was reduced to 44% by 
2008, but Vattenfall, together with E.ON (earlier, Sydkraft) and Fortum, provided 
79% of Sweden’s electricity (Energy Market Inspectorate 2010: 24). No new 
renewables industry emerged, but the Swedish pulp-and-paper industry gained a 
more prominent role in the organizational field. The scheme has been criticized 
for favouring mature technologies, but it was generally popular within the indus-
try as well as in the political establishment (Bergek and Jacobsson 2010; Jacobs-
son 2008: 1505; Söderholm and Pettersson 2011: 521). Another development in 
the organizational field was that the utilities previously dominated by engineers 
became heavily influenced by the market thinking of economists (see Inderberg 
2012).
As part of a portfolio of measures introduced to enhance the energy performance 
of buildings, the first solar support scheme was introduced in 2005 (Näringsde-
partementet 2008). Publicly owned buildings now became eligible for up-front 
support covering part of the cost of investments. This scheme was initiated in 
relation to Swedish implementation of the EU Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive (Boverket 2009). The Directive promoted (in non-binding terms) instal-
lation of PV on buildings and encouraged member states to focus on public build-
ings. Our interviews indicate that the Parliament endorsed the scheme without 
political controversy. EU state-aid guidelines allowed for solar investment sup-
port, even though many countries, among them the UK and Germany, were opting 
to apply feed-in to promote solar (Leiren and Reimer 2021; Rayner et al. 2021, 
both in this book). The solar power support scheme was eventually designed to 
fit the requirements in the EU state-aid guidelines. Getting formal approval from 
the Commission took longer than expected, but it does not seem as if inputs from 
the Commission led to any significant changes in the scheme (Boverket 2009).
In 2006, the Social Democratic government proposed prolonging the certificate 
system until 2030, which meant expanding the target to 17 TWh by 2016 (Swed-
ish Government 2006). As in 2003, the Centre, the Left and the Social Democrats 
favoured the scheme, while the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party wanted it 
revoked (Swedish Parliament 2006). The Christian Democratic Party repeated its 
call for a feed-in tariff. The Green Party had many objections to design details and 
called for support to a wider range of technologies and a higher renewables target. 
After a revised version of the scheme was passed by the Parliament, windpower 
investments increased (Pettersson and Söderholm 2009: 2036).
In September 2006, Swedish national elections resulted in a shift of government, 
and the Moderates, the Liberals, the Centre Party and the Christian Democratic 
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Party formed the ‘Alliance’ coalition government. Describing energy as the most 
challenging issue for this government, one of our interviewees (15) stressed that 
the government managed to ‘keep peace publicly’, but the internal disagreements 
were significant. The Centre Party wanted to increase the targets in the certificate 
scheme; the others wanted to stall the nuclear phase-out.
In November 2008, the Swedish Ministry of Enterprise informed the Commis-
sion that it aimed to include private citizens and commercial actors in the solar 
investment support scheme (Näringsdepartementet 2008). The Ministry requested 
swift notification, arguing that, with the scheme for public buildings expiring 
soon, Sweden was about to enter a period without any functioning scheme. Cor-
respondence records show that it took several months of informal deliberations 
before the Swedish government managed to adjust the design of the scheme to the 
EU state-aid requirements (Commission 2009). In May 2009, the Commission 
endorsed the scheme – but the notification was valid only until December 2011 
and could not be prolonged without re-notification.
Interviewees indicate that the Centre Party used its leadership of the Ministry of 
Enterprise to promote the solar scheme, but there was also support from the opposi-
tion, solar power actors, and environmental protection groups. Although technology-
neutrality was accepted as a guiding principle for the government’s energy policies, 
all political parties, including the more nuclear-friendly Liberals and the Moderate 
Party, accepted the according of special treatment to solar energy. The Ministry 
of Finance, led by the Moderate Party, was sceptical – but our interviewees stress 
that solar was not expected to constitute a significant part of the energy mix, so the 
issue was regarded as of minor importance. The conflict was resolved at the highest 
political level, in internal negotiations among the coalition parties.
As so often before, the nuclear issue generated major political divisions in Swe-
den. In March 2009, the parties in government settled on a climate and energy 
agreement that opened up for replacing old nuclear reactors, which meant ending 
the ban on nuclear power expansion (Swedish Government 2009a, 2009b). At 
the same time, the government made decisions that reduced the profitability of 
nuclear: nuclear energy would not be eligible for subsidies, the safety require-
ments became stricter and the nuclear energy owners’ liability responsibilities in 
case of accidents were increased (Swedish Government 2009c). Moreover, the 
certificate scheme was given an expanded production target for 2020 and was 
prolonged until 2035 – thus, the last actors to enter by 2020 will be entitled to 
certificates for 15 years.
Several interviewees (1, 6, 15) held that the Centre Party called for higher 
ambitions in the certificate scheme in return for agreeing to lift the nuclear ban. 
Although ending the ban on nuclear energy was hard to swallow for the anti-
nuclear Centre Party, it could also be reasoned that subsidizing renewable energy 
without giving nuclear energy new state aid made it impossible in practice to con-
struct new reactors anyway: a question of ‘letting nuclear energy dismantle itself’ 
(Interview 9). However, some scholars claim that the 2009 agreement served to 
prolong the life of nuclear energy in Sweden, hampering the expansion of renewa-
bles (Sarasini 2009: 650; Tobin 2015: 148).
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The new Swedish agreement implemented the revised EU 2009 Renewables 
Directive. As with the first directive, actors favouring a pan-European certificate 
scheme failed to exert influence here. Interestingly, it does not seem as if the 
failure of certificates at the EU level served to de-legitimize the Swedish certifi-
cate scheme. The 2009 EU Directive entailed a binding renewable energy target 
of 49% by 2020 for Sweden, which the Swedish Parliament later raised to 50% 
(Swedish Government 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, the Swedish and Norwegian 
governments agreed that Norway should join the certificate scheme (Boasson 
2021c, this book). This spurred intense collaboration between the energy agencies 
of the two countries, but our interviewees agree that it did not lead to significant 
changes in design (see also Swedish Government 2010). The EU Directive also 
played an important role in the making of the 2009 Swedish agreement. The Alli-
ance government had initially planned to postpone any major energy-policy deci-
sions in order to keep peace internally. According to an interviewee (1) from the 
Alliance government, the need to implement the Renewables Directive was a key 
incentive for creating the 2009 agreement.
Thus, nuclear and renewable energy became more politically interconnected 
in this period, a development further reinforced after 2010 (see the next section). 
Influenced by the EU, Sweden introduced aid for micro-generation, but the rapid 
diffusion of feed-in schemes in the European environment did not affect Swedish 
support schemes.
2010–2016: certificate scheme prolonged against all odds
After 2010, the big Swedish utilities as well as the EU generally turned against 
designing renewables support as certificate schemes. All the same, the Swedish 
scheme was prolonged and made more ambitious. To understand this, we need to 
examine the extraordinary political situation in the Swedish Parliament and the 
increased politicization of renewables.
We observe a remarkable shift in the larger European environment in this period. 
The 2008 financial crisis and the steep reduction in the cost of renewable energy 
led to criticism of feed-in schemes, especially from the financially constrained 
electricity utilities (Boasson 2021b). Moreover, the EU’s steering of renewables 
support schemes became significantly more coercive in 2014, when the Commis-
sion issued guidelines that clearly favoured auctioning combined with feed-in 
premium. This created a shift from traditional feed-in schemes to auctioning plus 
feed-in premium all over the EU, also in feed-in champion Germany (Boasson 
2021b; Leiren and Reimer 2021, both in this book). Energy policy developments 
in Sweden were, however, of quite a different nature, and very few actors tried to 
bring ‘European’ developments to Sweden.
In May 2010, the Swedish Parliament endorsed implementation of the Alliance 
government’s 2009 energy agreement. The minority opposition favoured expan-
sion of the certificate scheme with 5 TWh more, called for additional technology-
specific feed-in tariffs and accused the government of being too nuclear-friendly 
(Bolund et al. 2010). Both the government and the opposition appeared as two 
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coherent blocs, and none of the parties that had previously opposed the certificate 
scheme voiced open criticism.
In the 2010 elections, the Alliance lost its parliamentary majority, and the right-
wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), entered the 
Parliament; however, the Alliance still had more seats in Parliament than the red-
green parties (the Social Democratic, the Left, and the Green Parties). As the red-
greens refused to cooperate with the Sweden Democrats, the Alliance continued 
as a minority government. The deep-seated conflicts over energy policy became 
fiercer, forcing the government to forge alliances with other parties in order to 
achieve parliamentary support (Interview 15).
The 2020 target of 50% renewables energy consumption was reached already 
in 2012 (Energy Agency 2014: 39). In that year, windpower became the dominant 
technology in the certificate system, as older biopower facilities were phased out 
and windpower investments were growing almost exponentially (Energy Market 
Inspectorate 2010, 2014: 24). Vattenfall, Fortum and E.ON dominated electricity 
production, with more than 83% of the market, but a range of new electricity pro-
viders had emerged as well (Bergek et al. 2013; Energy Market Inspectorate 2014: 
26). These new windpower investors had highly varying backgrounds (Darmani 
2015), but corporations that sold biopower based primary on waste management, 
pulp-and-paper and agriculture dominated. By now, Vattenfall’s European ven-
tures had become very, very expensive: turning from Europe, the Swedish home 
market became more important (Darmani et al. 2016: 15).
The 2014 Swedish elections brought a minority government consisting of the 
Social Democrats and the Green Party. As this government lacked a stable basis 
in the Parliament, Swedish politics became significantly messier, with alliances 
shifting across issues. In 2015, the new government gained parliamentary support 
to up the target for Sweden in the Swedish-Norwegian scheme to finance 30 TWh 
new renewables to 2020, replacing the earlier target of 25 TWh (Swedish Govern-
ment 2015a).
In addition to the existing solar investment scheme and certificates, the new 
government introduced tax reduction for small-scale renewable electricity. Inter-
viewees indicate that the solar industry association had initially pushed for a 
system that would reward who fed that electricity into the net, but the govern-
ment argued that this would not be compatible with EU state-aid and competition 
policy (SOU 2013). The renewable electricity industry, the red-green parties, and 
the Energy Agency disagreed, while the Sweden Democrats opposed any such aid 
(Jakobsson 2014; Nordin 2013; Motion 2014). All the same, the Swedish govern-
ment had to negotiate with DG Competition for more than a year before agree-
ment was reached on how to design the tax exemption (Swedish Government 
2014: 9).
In March 2015, the Swedish government appointed a parliamentary task 
force, instructed to propose a broad energy policy agreement by January 2017 
at the latest (SOU 2017: 29). The group was headed by the Minister of Energy; 
the directors of the Transmission System Operator, the Energy Agency and the 
Energy Market Inspectorate participated in all meetings. Corporate actors were 
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consulted but were not formally included in the task force. In January 2016, Vat-
tenfall, surprisingly, announced that all its Swedish nuclear power plants would 
have to close down because of the low electricity prices, the effect of the tax on 
nuclear power and the new safety requirements (Dagens Industri 2016). Not only 
would that mean enormous losses to the state-owned company, it would put the 
entire Swedish electricity system at risk (SOU 2017). Interviewees confirm that 
politicians from most parties deemed it critical to respond swiftly to Vattenfall’s 
latest move. Hence, they set about negotiating a new energy agreement – one 
year before the task force had planned to finalize its technically and scientifically 
informed assessment.
The traditional electricity industry had now turned more negative towards the 
certificate scheme, claiming that new renewables production was the main cause 
of the 65% drop in wholesale Swedish electricity prices between 2010 and 2015 
(Hirt 2016). Several interviewees emphasized that Vattenfall aimed at influenc-
ing the politicians’ decisions on nuclear, paying less attention to renewables. At 
the time of these negotiations, the Norwegian government had already decided 
to leave the certificate scheme after 2020, but this did not influence the Swed-
ish decisions much (Boasson 2021c, this book). Moreover, in 2014 the Commis-
sion issued new state-aid guidelines, requiring auctioning combined with feed-in 
premium. Certificate schemes could also be acceptable if certain design criteria 
were met (Boasson 2021b, this book). Interestingly, the final report from the par-
liamentary task force makes only a superficial reference to EU state-aid guide-
lines – indicating that these received little attention from the politicians (SOU 
2017: 67–68).
In June 2016, the parties in government (the Social Democrats and the Green 
Party) and three of the four parties of the former centre-right Alliance Govern-
ment (now in opposition) struck an energy policy deal. The overall goal was for 
Swedish energy production to be 100% renewable by 2040 (SOU 2017: 16). 
However, ambiguity entered the picture: this was ‘a goal, not an end date prohib-
iting nuclear power’, and it did not imply ‘a politically forced closure of nuclear’. 
This new agreement also removed the thermal effect tax on nuclear power produc-
tion, while ensuring that nuclear would not be allowed state aid in any form (SOU 
2017: 17). On the other hand, the certificate scheme was prolonged and expanded 
by 18 TWh worth of certificates until 2030, setting an end-date of 2045.
Interviews with politicians in the task force indicate that they were motivated to 
reach an agreement well in advance of the 2018 elections. A dominant view held 
by many actors in both the political and the organizational fields was that nuclear 
energy was central in delivering sufficient effect in the Swedish electricity system. 
In this view, reducing taxation was necessary to keep nuclear plants in business, 
thereby ensuring the safety of the power system and that ‘the lights didn’t go out’ 
(Faber 2018). According to our interviewees, the Centre and Green Parties pushed 
hard for expansion of the certificate scheme, whereas the other parties accepted 
this on the condition of reduced taxation for nuclear energy and large hydropower.
In a press release, the Green Party stated that the agreement meant ‘step by step 
leaving old nuclear power and fossil electricity behind us’ (Miljöpartiet 2016). 
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In contrast, the Moderate Party claimed that it had secured ‘the conditions for 
nuclear power to be an important part of Sweden’s energy supply for a long time 
to come’ (Moderaterna 2016). The Christian Democratic Party even proclaimed 
that they had ‘saved nuclear power’ (Kristdemokraterna 2016). By contrast, the 
Liberals and the Swedish Democrats opposed the agreement, which they felt 
would mean overly hefty subsidiaries to renewables (SOU 2017: 333, 338). The 
Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) also opposed the agreement, mainly because it was too 
nuclear-friendly (SOU 2017: 352).
The prolongation of the certificate system ran counter to the inputs from the 
electricity industry to a public consultation over the future design of the scheme 
in 2015 (Energy Agency 2015). Vattenfall, E.ON, several medium-sized electric-
ity utilities and the Swedish Energy Business Association (Svensk Energi, later 
changed name to Energiföretagen Sverige), criticized the system; it had been 
effective in the past, but it did not solve the current challenges. E.ON explicitly 
called for a system based on auctioning, similar to the system prescribed in the 
new EU state-aid guidelines (see Boasson 2021b). Fortum was the only major 
producer that did not voice criticism. The pulp-and-paper business association, 
the Swedish windpower organization and environmental NGOs supported con-
tinuation of the system. The bioenergy association criticized certificate schemes 
for not being market-based and for causing too-low prices.
The fate of Sweden’s certificate scheme was related to the sudden nuclear con-
troversy in 2016. The unstable parliamentary situation contributed to heighten 
the level of political conflict related to nuclear as well as renewables. Advocates 
of a prolonged certificate scheme were to a surprising degree unconcerned about 
the factors that undermined the legitimacy of this scheme. Also in this period, 
Swedish civil servants engaged in several lengthy negotiations with the EU on 
the detailed design of the two support measures for solar energy. Consensus was 
lacking on how to interpret the various EU rules, and the dialogue with the EU 
contributed to create instabilities in these support schemes (Interview 9).
Discussions and conclusions
Sweden’s renewables support mix consists of a certificate scheme for large-scale 
renewables with direct investment support for solar power and tax reductions for 
small-scale renewable energy. All schemes expose renewables producers to the 
electricity price, and almost all renewables investors and/or producers are eligible 
for support. The certificate scheme is not directly technology-specific (it includes 
both large- and small-scale renewables), whereas small-scale support applies only 
to small-scale renewables – in practice, mainly solar power.
To what extent and how has the European environment influenced the Swedish 
renewables support mix? From the late 1990s and onwards, Sweden’s support 
schemes have emerged in conjunction with developments at the EU level, but 
political constellations and conflicts in Sweden differ from those at the EU level. 
In Sweden, the large electricity utilities did not promote the certificate scheme, 
and feed-in was hardly mentioned as a serious alternative.
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Swedish civil servants transferred the green certificate idea from Brussels in 
the late 1990s, expecting that a pan-European certificate scheme would soon 
emerge. This led to the adoption of the certificate scheme. This did not happen, 
but instead feed-in schemes became much more common in Europe. These Euro-
pean developments had no significant effect on Sweden. The adoption of the 2009 
EU Renewables Directive with mandatory national renewables target had some 
impacts on the ambitions of the certificate scheme, but not on the design of the 
scheme itself. The Commission’s shift away from electricity certificates as the 
ideal model in 2014 had limited influence on Sweden’s energy policy.
The promotion of rooftop PV on public buildings in the 2002 EU Directive 
on Energy Performance of Buildings seems to have spurred the development of 
a solar investment scheme for public buildings, although the directive did not 
require this. The scope of the scheme was gradually expanded as commercial as 
well as individual households were included. The initial design of this scheme was 
neatly adjusted to the requirements of the EU state-aid guidelines, but Sweden 
applied an investment scheme, not a feed-in scheme like most other EU countries. 
Moreover, the time-consuming Commission notification procedures created sub-
stantial instabilities in the system, which in itself fostered demands for additional 
support schemes. This contributed to explaining why Sweden in 2015 introduced 
a tax reduction on top of its other support measures for solar power.
In contrast to the expectations set out in Chapter 3 (Boasson 2021a, this book), 
we find that the European environment had the most significant influence on 
Swedish renewables developments in a period when the EU had the least formal 
powers. EU influence was crucial for the development of the Swedish certificate 
scheme, and the idea later became consolidated and more resilient. Because it had 
been influenced by the Commission at such an early stage, by 2014 Sweden had 
a scheme that did not violate the new state-aid guidelines. In general, we can note 
that Sweden has been far more affected by the ideas advanced by the Commis-
sion and the European electricity industry, compared to the policies of other EU 
member states. Indeed, Swedish politicians held on to this instrument after 2010, 
despite substantial opposition from the domestic organizational field. The original 
EU impulse froze. Sweden held on to the technology-neutral idea of electricity 
certificates, even though very few other actors followed suite.
To what extent, when, and how has the Swedish organizational field of station-
ary energy production influenced the support schemes? In the 1970s, the field 
was segmented and the institutional logic of technology development had become 
highly institutionalized. The strong politicization of nuclear power came as an 
external shock to the field, but it did not lead to reduced internal unity of the 
field. Rather, nuclear expansion in Sweden continued for a full decade after the 
1980 referendum, creating an electricity surplus that served to reduce the need for 
renewables.
The Swedish organizational field is segmented, although there is some variation 
over time. In the 1990s, a modest de-segmentation process in the field began, as 
market thinking gained prominence and a liberalization reform was implemented 
in Sweden. Moreover, the rise of climate change on the political agenda weakened 
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Vattenfall’s control of the field somewhat. The Energy Agency was established – a 
powerful regulatory agency that to some extent could counter Vattenfall in author-
ity and knowledge. Moreover, the pulp-and-paper sector emerged as important 
energy producers, with more to gain from the development of new renewables 
(especially biomass) than the conventional actors. Together with E.ON/Sydkraft 
and Fortum, Vattenfall continued to control most of the Swedish electricity mar-
ket, but the shift in logic from technology development to market thinking created 
internal tensions. It was the public actors who promoted electricity certificates; 
commercial actors seemed rather uninterested initially. Further, from 2000 and 
onwards, the field became heavily dominated by market logic, among the elec-
tricity producers as well as the Energy Agency. This mind-set eventually became 
heavily institutionalized, as shown by the smooth implementation of the certifi-
cate scheme.
In the period 2010–2016, the big utilities began questioning the market logic, 
and there came an influx of new, smaller actors. The utilities had experienced 
major economic problems, caused partly by market reactions to increased inter-
mittent new renewables capacity, in Sweden and elsewhere. The utilities have 
neither resisted nor promoted the solar support schemes developed by the Energy 
Agency, even though this scheme is embedded in a technology development logic 
alien to the big utilities. At this stage, Sweden’s solar industry was small but grow-
ing, and there seems to be a constructive dialogue with the Energy Agency, and 
with the politicians. The influx of a diverse group of solar and wind energy actors 
in the field does indeed contribute to creating more internal conflicts and less 
unity, making the field more pluralistic. This is illustrated by the actors’ diverging 
perspectives to the 2015 consultation on the certificate scheme. In this period, the 
utilities, and especially Vattenfall, invested significant efforts in rescuing their 
nuclear facilities, while paying less attention to the renewables support schemes.
Therefore, we conclude that the segmented nature of the organizational field 
contributed to hindering development of ambitious renewables support in Swe-
den in the period leading up to the late 1990s. Subsequently, the shift to market 
logics and the diversity of actors involved served to make the field somewhat 
less segmented over time, but the change is modest. The adoption of the cer-
tificate scheme in 2003 was not precipitated by a united field but was rather a 
result of civil servants working to implement the political ambitions for renewa-
bles. From 2010 and onwards, we detect internal conflicts between the various 
groups of commercial actors over how to design renewables support. Importantly, 
the Energy Agency has been open to inputs from a range of actors, not only the 
dominant utilities. However, the field has still been rather segmented, and thus 
the Swedish Parliament’s decision in 2016 to prolong various renewables support 
schemes despite lack of support among the major electricity producers cannot be 
explained by de-segmentation of the field. Moreover, Vattenfall expended few 
resources on influencing renewables policies, focusing instead on nuclear; the 
renewables issue was sacrificed partly because another issue (nuclear taxation) 
appeared more important at that point. All the same, the utilities’ lack of political 
influence emerges as striking and contrasts with what we expected to find.
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Finally, to what extent and how did the Swedish political field influence the 
support schemes? The nuclear referendum in 1980 reinforced nuclear energy as 
a subject of intense political competition. The ambitious referendum result paved 
the way for a tradition of broad energy-political agreements in the Parliament. 
The structural power of the Parliament was further strengthened after the 2010 
elections, due not least to the unstable parliamentary basis of the new minority 
government.
From 1980 to 1999, renewable energy held significant symbolic value – but, 
as Sweden already had abundant electricity production, renewables policy had 
very little practical importance. In the early 2000s, a political majority decided to 
adopt a more potent renewables support scheme. Notably, however, the design of 
the scheme was not politicized but delegated to civil servants and experts. In the 
period 2000–2009, we also observe rather unstable and rapidly shifting political 
positions on certificate schemes, except for the firm support from the Centre Party.
However, political discussions on renewables support have been increasingly 
intertwined with nuclear energy. The politicization increased after 2005, but only 
after 2010 have renewables support schemes become a salient political issue in 
their own right. However, it is hardly possible to separate the two issues. With 
respect to both nuclear and renewables, politicians across the parliamentary par-
ties have tried to act in consistency with their former positions, presenting diverg-
ing interpretations of the ambiguous energy deal in the hope of being seen as 
winners. Thus, we see the dynamics of the Swedish political field as the main 
driver of developments in the renewables schemes after 2010 – whereas the influ-
ence of European developments or the organizational field has been limited. This 
explains why Sweden has extended the certificate period and upped the level of 
ambition. In addition, the investment support scheme and the tax reduction for 
solar energy production have achieved broad political support, although promoted 
by small and rather marginal actors in the organizational field. With political inter-
est in introducing such support, the design was primarily a result of bureaucratic 
support in the Energy Agency.
In all periods after 1999, Swedish actors have devoted considerable resources, 
and increasingly so, to ensure that the Swedish support mix is in line with EU 
state-aid guidelines. This has probably been frustrating for the actors involved, 
but the lengthy and protracted dialogues with the Commission have had minor 
importance for the actual design of the resultant schemes. If anything, this has 
sustained the impression of unreliable support, perhaps fuelling demands for addi-
tional solar energy support – the tax exemption.
Against this backdrop, we conclude that after 2005, political steering has been 
an important explanatory factor for the design of the renewables support mix, and 
the political field grew even more important after 2010. This is in line with our 
expectation: the political field has influenced the development of renewables in 
the Swedish context to a greater degree when power has shifted to the Parliament 
regarding key decisions and when renewables have been subject to political com-
petition. Ironically, the politicians made sure to ‘freeze’ an earlier EU impulse, 
implemented in a period when the civil servants ruled and political steering had 
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less importance. And, interestingly, we find that the importance of the European 
environment has not been determined by the strength of coercive signals from the 
EU (vertical Europeanization), or the diffusion of practices in the European envi-
ronment (horizontal Europeanization), but has been conditioned by the position 
of the two domestic fields.
Interviewees
1 Former political appointee (Centre Party), Ministry of Enterprise and Energy, 
6 April 2017, telephone interview
2 Electricity industry representative, Swedenergy and Vattenfall, 15 Novem-
ber 2016, Stockholm
3 Civil servant, member of Electricity Certificate Task Force 2000–2002), 18 
November 2016, Stockholm
4 Civil servant, Ministry of Enterprise and Energy, 13 March 2009, Stockholm
5 Former civil servant, member of Energy Task Force 2016–2017, 10 Janu-
ary 2017, Stockholm
6 Civil servant, Swedish Energy Agency, 14 October 2016, Oslo (identical to 
Interviewee 7 in Chapter 8)
7 Representative of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 16 Decem-
ber 2016, Stockholm
8 Representative of Svenska Kraftnät (the Swedish TSO), 18 January 2017, 
Stockholm
9 Former civil Servant of the Ministry of Industry, 18 January 2017, Stockholm
10 Former political appointee (Centre Party), Ministry of the Environment, 30 
March 2017, telephone interview
11 Electricity industry representative, Vattenfall, 15 November 2016, Solna
12 MP, the Moderate Party (liberal-conservative), 16 November 2016, Stockholm
13 Former civil servant (director), Swedish Energy Agency, 14 November 2016, 
Stockholm
14 Electricity industry representative, Vattenfall, 15 November 2016, Solna
15 Former political appointee (Centre Party), Ministry of Enterprise, and Energy 
and renewable energy industry representative, 16 November 2016, Stockholm
16 Renewable energy representative, Solar Energy Association of Sweden, 17 
January 2017, Stockholm
17 MP, Centre Party, 16 November 2016, Stockholm
18 Civil servant, Svenska Kraftnät (the Swedish TSO), 18 January 2017, 
Stockholm
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By 2016, Norway had the most technology-neutral support mix in Europe, which 
also offered very low levels of support. The story of how Norway ended up with 
this particular support mix involves a range of puzzling twists. Elsewhere in 
Europe, large electricity utilities and environmental organizations have clashed 
over how to design renewables schemes. In Norway, however, they joined forces 
in the early 2000s and campaigned for an electricity certificate scheme. It took 
more than ten years before they succeeded – and then, when this scheme started 
running in 2012, the utilities did an about-face and called for the system to be 
removed. At this point, it took only three years before the Storting (the Norwegian 
Parliament) followed suit and decided that no new projects were to be added to the 
scheme after 2021 (Innst. 401 S. 2015–2016: 30). Then, in 2015, Norway adopted 
a very modest investment support scheme for small-scale renewables. Hence, 
the country has ended with an exceptional ‘less is more approach’ to renewables 
development.
This chapter asks: Why did Norway end up with one of the most technology-
neutral and least-generous support-scheme mixes in Europe? When the pro-
duction of renewable electricity boomed elsewhere in Europe at the turn of the 
millennium, Norway already had close to 100% renewable electricity production 
(SSB 2020a; MPE 2008a). Why, then, did it develop a support scheme for renew-
able electricity? Norway had grown accustomed to being self-supplied in energy, 
but then came several years where it failed to provide all the electricity needed 
to cover consumption; moreover, the government and the electricity industry had 
been expecting further continuous growth in domestic energy consumption (NOU 
1998). Hence, there was a thirst for more domestic production of renewable elec-
tricity. Large-scale hydro had become controversial: due to nature preservation 
concerns there was political agreement on preserving Norway’s remaining major 
streams and waterfalls – not damming or regulating them for hydropower pro-
duction (St.meld. nr 37 2000–2001). This added to the surge of interest in other 
options – onshore windpower in particular.
As a European Economic Area (EEA) country, Norway is required to imple-
ment most EU rules concerning renewable energy (MPE 2019). However, 
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renewables support in Norway came to follow a different pattern than in the EU. 
When most EU member states adopted feed-in schemes, Norway adopted a cer-
tificate scheme for renewable electricity; and when other countries shifted to auc-
tioning and feed-in premium, Norway scrapped its large-scale renewables support 
(Boasson, Faber and Leiren 2021, this book). When we began to work on the 
present volume, we assumed that the influence of the European environment 
would prove to be strongest in cases where the EU wielded considerable formal 
authority and one policy recipe was dominant (see Boasson 2021a, this book). 
But in Norway, the European environment proved to have influenced Norway 
more when EU steering was rather weak and when an approach other than 
the one Norway adopted dominated. Why has Norway been influenced by the 
European environment in this unexpected way?
Can the answer lie within the Norwegian organizational field of electricity pro-
duction? Most of the time, this field has been as segmented as in many other 
European countries, but between 2000 and 2010 it was characterized by turf bat-
tles between large electricity utilities and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
(MPE). Further, environmental organizations in Norway have much closer rela-
tions with the electricity industry than elsewhere. Can these characteristics of the 
organizational field explain how the Norwegian support mix came to develop?
We expect the political field to be more important when renewables support is 
politically salient, and the formal authority over the issue is diffused, i.e. executive 
power is shared between several parties and the legislative assembly has signifi-
cant formal powers (Boasson 2021a). Politically, renewables support has rarely 
received major political attention in Norway, with the exception of the period 
around 2006–2007. Did politicization contribute to reduce the importance of the 
European environment or the organizational field? Or would the Norwegian sup-
port mix have developed in largely the same way regardless of the political field?
Researchers have examined the development of Norwegian climate policy, but 
few have delved into the renewables policy more specifically, and longitudinal 
studies – like the one presented here – have been missing. This chapter chronicles 
the development of Norwegian support to renewables electricity from the 1970s 
and until 2016. Some scholars such as Espen Moe (2012), as well as Anne Therese 
Gullberg and Guri Bang (2014), have compared Norwegian renewables policies 
and those of other countries. This chapter challenges some of their conclusions, 
particularly as regards the importance of EU steering and the role of the Norwe-
gian petroleum industry.1
Highly technology-neutral renewables support mix
The Norwegian support-scheme mix consists of two main elements: an electricity 
certificate scheme that provides extra support to renewables projects included in 
the scheme prior to 2021, and up-front investment support for small-scale renewa-
ble electricity in residential buildings. The latter is part of a larger support scheme 
that encompasses both energy efficiency and other small-scale renewable energy 
measures.
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In 2012 Norway joined the Swedish certificate scheme, and thus the Swedish–
Norwegian scheme emerged (MPE 2010c). The Norwegian government commit-
ted to financing 13.2 TWh in new renewable electricity production (including 
small hydro) by 2020 as their share of the common Norwegian–Swedish cer-
tificate market (MPE 2010a). All actors who transmit electricity to end-users or 
who consume the electricity they produce themselves were required to purchase 
green certificates (Lov om el-sertifikater 2016: §16). Norwegian renewable power 
plants with construction start-up date by September 2009 have been part of the 
certificate scheme. In addition, small hydropower plants constructed as early as 
January 2004 were included in 2015 (Lov om el-sertifikater 2016: § 8). The actual 
support level would change over time, as the value of the electricity certificates 
would depend on the relation between supply and demand of renewables certifi-
cates in Norway and Sweden.
Purchasers of green certificates do not buy the actual electricity; they buy a 
certificate that confirms their economic contribution to the operation of green 
electricity somewhere within the area where the scheme applies (see Boasson 
and Leiren 2020, this book). The number of certificates that actors are required 
to purchase varies according to a pre-determined ratio, growing annually and 
peaking in 2020, and then gradually falling until the end-year in 2035 (Lov om 
el-sertifikater 2016: § 17). Norwegian participation in the Norwegian–Swedish 
scheme expires in 2021, but all projects included in the scheme at that time will 
be awarded funding until 2035.
In 2015, Norway started to offer investment support to home-owners who pro-
duce their own renewable electricity and feed the surplus back to the grid (Enova 
2019, Teknisk Ukeblad 2014). The maximum support level per building is some 
€2500. The electricity may come from solar photovoltaics (PV), small-scale wind 
or biopower (up to 15 kW in installed effect). All residential buildings are eli-
gible for support, but not commercial or state-owned buildings. The scheme is 
technology-neutral, but it is primarily small-scale, roof-top PV that receive sup-
port (Enova 2018). Small-scale electricity production can also be included in the 
green certificate scheme, but due to the registration cost, it is not profitable for 
most producers to join the scheme (Norsk Solenergi 2019).
In addition to these two schemes, Enova awards funding to innovative energy 
solutions that can contribute to reduce emissions (Enova 2020). A new techno-
logical solution, or a new combination of different technological solutions, can be 
awarded support only once. Thus this is not support to the operation of renewables 
electricity, but is one-off R&D support for pilot projects and technology develop-
ment. Hence, this scheme falls outside the scope of this book.
Chronological Story: blooming late and withdrawing early
Prior to 1999: emergence of a liberalized large hydropower system
Abundant waterfalls with tremendous energy potential led Norway to develop 
a hydropower-based electricity system. Like many other countries, it struggled 
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to find the right balance between the volume of supply and demand of electric-
ity, and in order to solve this challenge, Norway liberalized its electricity system 
already in the 1990s. This led to a shift in the institutional logic of the organiza-
tional field of electricity – which was to have profound implications for discus-
sions on renewable electricity in the 1990s.
From 1945 until the 1980s, investments in large hydropower expanded radi-
cally (Midttun 1987; Thue 1996). This allowed for the emergence of a strong 
energy-intensive industry, crucial to the development of the Norwegian welfare 
state. The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate NVE (henceforth 
Energy Agency) was made responsible for hydropower investments, operations, 
transmission and energy regulation – an arrangement that encompassed the major 
power producer, the transmission system operator and a construction advisory 
body (Nilsen and Thue 2006; Thue 1996). The aim was to enhance the quality 
and effectiveness of large hydropower technology. There were some hydropower 
stations operated by smaller regional corporations, but these were of minor impor-
tance. Despite widespread protests against the construction of large dams and 
interference with waterfalls from the 1970s and onwards, massive hydropower 
developments continued.
A small nuclear reactor had been established for research purposes in the late 
1950s, and the oil crisis of the 1970s spurred further discussion of nuclear power, 
but all plans were shelved a few years later (Reinertsen and Asdal 2010). As sev-
eral large hydropower plants were under construction and oil had been discovered 
on the Norwegian continental shelf, there was no urgent need for more domestic 
energy production. This also meant that there were no actors pushing hard for the 
development of new renewable energy.
The Energy Agency had as a key goal to ensure sufficient supplies of electricity 
(Midttun 1987; Thue 1996). It regularly estimated future electricity demand, and 
the state and local municipality-owned power producers adjusted their invest-
ment plans in line with these estimates. The price of electricity was set by the 
government and did not necessarily reflect actual investment and operation costs 
(Bye and Hope 2005: 5269). As energy-demand predictions overestimated actual 
developments, electricity production capacity substantially exceeded demand in 
the 1980s. Moreover, the Energy Agency focused far more on achieving techno-
logical improvements than on ensuring cost-efficient production (Midttun 1987: 
102–109).
In 1986, Statkraft was outsourced from the Energy Agency and established as a 
state-owned utility controlling one third of Norway’s electricity production (Bye 
and Hope 2005: 5269). But this did not solve the problem of matching produc-
tion to actual consumption of electricity. Discontent with the economic losses 
of the state and municipal-owned production facilities underpinned demands for 
a profound liberalization reform. In 1990, a new energy law established a lib-
eralized electricity market, with a spot market for trade of interruptible power, 
providing all actors access to the grid, and outsourcing transmission grids from 
Statkraft to Statnett, the new state-owned Transmission Systems Operator (TSO) 
(ibid.: 5271). This liberalization reform did not mean privatization, so there was 
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no influx of new private electricity corporations. A common Swedish–Norwegian 
electricity market was established in 1996, with Finland and Denmark joining 
somewhat later.
Historians have described how the reform brought a shift among Norwegian 
power producers, from the logic of large hydro-technology development to a mar-
ket logic (Thue 1996; Nilsen and Thue 2006). Rather quickly the main objective of 
corporate actors changed, from constructing well-functioning large hydropower 
and ensuring specific volumes of power supply to a particular geographical area, 
to maximizing the profits from existing power stations. The overarching objec-
tive of the MPE also changed, as it now aimed at minimizing the use of public 
resources and the costs for consumers and ensuring that the energy producers did 
not reap excessive profits (Thue 1996; Nilsen and Thue 2006). By the mid-1990s, 
engineers had lost many central positions to economists in the electricity industry 
as well as in governmental organizations.
As the inflow of water in large hydro follows a stochastic pattern (Bye and 
Hope 2005: 5269), electricity prices in Norway after liberalization fluctuated 
according to variations in precipitation (NOU 1998: 4). Prices peaked during the 
dry winter of 1995–1996, and the Energy Agency and other experts elsewhere 
expected increases in a similar fashion as had been the case historically (NOU 
1998). Even though the price was set by the Nordic market and not by the Nor-
wegian government, this still became a politically salient issue. The price spike 
in 1996 was held to be caused by inadequate domestic production capacity, and 
politicians across the political spectrum voiced concerns about Norway becoming 
dependent on electricity imports (NOU 1998: 5).
Climate change had become an important political issue already in the late 
1980s, but renewable energy sources were not initially central in Norwegian cli-
mate discussions. However, the government started to offer modest R&D support, 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis (Gjerløw 1996). A windpower develop-
ment programme resulted in the construction of eight windpower turbines in the 
1990s, purchased abroad (NOU 1998: 335). At this stage, feed-in support schemes 
had started to spur renewables investments in Germany and Denmark, and the 
European Commission (the Commission) had begun preparations on a new renew-
able energy directive. Although these European developments received scant 
political attention in Norway (NOU 1998; St. meld nr. 29 1998–1999), Norway’s 
largest hydropower producers were involved in the European power-producers’ 
promotion of a common EU electricity certificate scheme (Boasson 2015: 115). 
Moreover, the first large-scale windpower construction in Norway was financed 
through the Dutch voluntary electricity certificates, and it eventually proved very 
profitable for Statkraft (Riksrevisjonen 2010: 48; Statkraft 2006). Hence, the elec-
tricity industry embraced this support-scheme idea; but, because Norway in 1994 
had voted against joining the EU, MPE officials were not involved in EU-level 
discussions of support to renewables (Boasson 2015: 111–119).
At this stage, there seemed to be no need for a support scheme for small pho-
tovoltaic (PV), as this energy source had been expanding rapidly, with as many 
as 70,000 units installed already by 1997 (NOU 1998: 317). These PVs were 
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primarily installed at holiday cabins where there were no grid connections. Nor-
wegian industry produced components for PVs, but mainly for export. In 1998, a 
governmental task force concluded that electricity from PVs was unlikely to make 
any significant contribution to Norwegian energy production in the foreseeable 
future (NOU 1998: 320, our translation).
The main climate-policy issue in Norway in the late 1990s was the construc-
tion of gas-power plants, adding fossil fuels to the renewable Norwegian elec-
tricity system. A political majority supported construction of gas-fired power 
plants, while the minority coalition government then in office opposed it (Boasson 
2015: 86). In 1999, the government, as part of a White Paper focused on constrain-
ing the development of gas power, proposed adopting more specific domestic 
renewables targets, aiming for 4 TWh renewable heating and 3 TWh windpower 
by 2010 (St. meld nr. 29 1998–1999). Paradoxically, the decreasing profitability 
of gas power now led the electricity utilities to intensify their search for profitable 
investment options in renewable electricity, while gas-power construction became 
more contested politically (Boasson 2015: 89–92). The utilities initiated a host 
of windpower projects in the late 1990s – but if these were to become profitable, 
a new support scheme would be needed (NOU 1998: 337). Hence, the govern-
ment set about preparing the development of a support scheme aimed primarily at 
large-scale windpower (St. meld nr. 29 1998–1999).
By the end of 1999, the Norwegian government was posed to create the coun-
try’s first renewable electricity support scheme, and the Norwegian utilities had 
embraced electricity certificates as the best support-scheme design. However, as 
we will see in the following, the corporate actors had a hard time convincing the 
public administration about the advantages of electricity certificates.
2000–2004: a cost-efficient renewables support regime fails to spur 
investments
What was to become a ten-year conflict over how to design the support scheme for 
renewables electricity started in 2000. In this section, we will see that the conflict 
about support to renewables remained an internal issue in the organizational field 
in the period 2000–2004.
In March 2000, the minority Centre coalition government resigned over the 
gas-power issue (Boasson 2015: 88–89), and a new minority Labour government 
took office. The gas-power conflict had been rooted in the government’s proposals 
in the White Paper that also proposed establishing renewables targets and a sup-
port scheme for renewables (St. meld nr. 29 1998–1999). On the same day that the 
government resigned, the Storting voted to increase annual domestic windpower 
production by 3 TWh by the year 2010. This represented a turning point, as it 
meant development of operational support for renewables. At this stage, a global 
cost-efficiency approach had become entrenched in Norwegian climate policy, 
with the national climate strategy relying on the application of the flexibility 
mechanisms in the Kyoto commitments, global emissions trading and opting only 
for domestic mitigation options with low costs (Boasson and Lahn 2017). Against 
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this backdrop, MPE was tasked with setting up support schemes for heating and 
electricity that would reduce governmental spending to a minimum; a new state 
enterprise, Enova, would operate the schemes (St. meld nr. 29 1998–1999; Ot. 
prp. nr. 35 2000–2001).
Only months after the Storting had decided to create a cost-effective Enova 
scheme for electricity, the majority of its members called for the Labour govern-
ment to consider an electricity certificate scheme instead (Budsjett-innst. S. Nr. 9 
2000–2001). Boasson (2015: 111–119) has shown that this decision came about 
because Statkraft and environmental organizations had joined in efforts to influ-
ence the Storting. At this stage, few political parties had developed firm views 
as to which support scheme for renewable energy they preferred: they simply 
wanted a more ambitious policy. Statkraft argued that Norway had to keep up with 
European developments and that the EU was now set to develop a pan-European 
certificate scheme, even though the certificate promoters in Brussels had lost the 
EU discussions over this (Boasson 2020b; St. meld nr. 37 2000–2001).
In his 2001 New Year’s speech, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (Labour) pro-
posed introducing a new ban on major new large-scale hydropower development, 
which later gained support from a firm parliamentary majority (St.meld. nr 37 
2000–2001). As most actors expected domestic energy demand to grow stead-
ily, this made the new support scheme more important. In 2001, a Liberal/Con-
servative minority coalition took office and allowed the MPE to develop a support 
scheme in line with the first parliamentary decision, rather than the later call for 
a certificate scheme. The Ministry designed a support scheme that neither resem-
bled the feed-in schemes elsewhere in Europe nor had much in common with the 
electricity certificate idea, as it offered support only to projects that needed the 
lowest level of support in order to achieve profitability (Boasson 2015: 120–121). 
In fact, this scheme resembled the feed-in premium auctioning schemes that 
would become widespread throughout the EU more than a decade later (see Boas-
son, Faber and Leiren 2021, this book).
In November 2002, the government issued a White Paper that rejected the 
creation of a Norwegian certificate scheme, arguing that it would be a good idea 
only if a pan-European scheme could emerge (St.meld. nr 37 2001–2002: 107). 
The White Paper also expressed doubt as to whether an EU renewable electricity 
scheme would fall under the EEA agreement (and would thus be legally binding 
on Norway). At this stage, Statkraft joined forces with other utilities and envi-
ronmental organizations in a coordinated campaign, calling for the Storting to 
instruct the new government to adopt a certificate scheme and implement the EU 
Renewables Directive (Boasson 2015: 121; Kollbeinstveit 2009: 22). Statkraft 
found the certificate idea intriguing; it saw opportunities for considerable profits 
from the voluntary certificate scheme (trade with guarantees of origin) rooted in 
the Renewables Directive. By this time, the Swedish certificate scheme was up 
and running (Boasson et al. 2021, this book).
The joint campaign from electricity utilities and environmental groups proved 
successful. After having left the executive government, Labour now changed 
its position on renewables certificates, joining the parliamentary majority and 
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instructing the new government to initiate negotiations with Sweden on joining 
their certificate scheme (Innst. S. 167. 2002–2003: 18–19). In line with inputs from 
the electricity industry, they also called for the Renewables Directive (2001/77/
EC) to be included in the EEA agreement, as they regarded this as a precondition 
to enable Norwegian actors to take part in ‘international certificate trade’ (Innst. S. 
167. 2002–2003: 18–19). This formulation gives the impression that the Directive 
underpinned the emergence of a pan-European scheme, but that was not the case 
(see Boasson 2021b, this book).
The certificate scheme idea fit hand-in-glove with Norwegian electricity indus-
try’s way of operating after liberalization. A wave of mergers among municipally 
owned companies ensured that, by 2008, the ten largest of Norway’s 200 energy 
producers controlled 70% of the country’s power production (MPE 2008a). Stat-
kraft alone represented 30% of production capacity; it had substantial minority 
ownership in a handful of other large power producers, and commanded superior 
economic and analytical resources (Nilsen and Thue 2006). It had also acquired 
power plants in several other European countries. Eventually, most electric-
ity producers joined together in the Norwegian Electricity Industry Association 
(later named Energy Norway) (Boasson 2015: 115). Coordination of lobbying 
efforts became a key task of this association, where Statkraft was the dominant 
actor. Both the MPE and Statkraft focused on economic efficiency – the former 
aiming at minimizing societal costs, the latter at maximizing corporate profits. 
The energy-intensive industry produced wafers for solar PVs, but these actors 
exported their products and did not take part in discussions on the Norwegian 
support scheme (Kollbeinstveit 2009). Hence, Norway did not have a new renew-
able energy industry that aimed at ensuring the development of renewable energy 
technology.
Precipitation was low in the winter of 2002–2003, and, as a result the price of 
electricity soared (St.meld. nr. 9 (2002–2003). The consumers had to pay, while 
the power producers reaped large profits. Because the state and the municipalities 
owned most energy producers, this led to increased public revenues. The media, 
however, were brimming with consumer protests. Labour was among the political 
parties that most forcefully blamed the Conservative coalition government for the 
high electricity prices (Innst. S. nr. 167 2002–2003). Still, it was the spikes in the 
price of electricity and the gas-power struggle that were subject of the most heated 
political arguments, not the tug-of-war between the government and the Stort-
ing about renewables support-scheme design. The repeated electricity certificate 
instructions from the Storting must be understood in light of the fact that Norway 
had three minority governments between 2000 and 2005. No matter which par-
ties were in opposition, renewable energy support provided a good opportunity 
to criticize the government. Because the political salience of renewable energy 
was limited, few politicians actually delved into the details of the green certificate 
scheme (Boasson 2015: 111–119).
EFTA Surveillance Agency (ESA) plays the same role in relation to EEA 
countries as the Commission does for EU member states. Most EU member 
states notified their first support schemes to the Commission (Boasson 2021b, 
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this book), but Norway did not notify ESA initially. In 2002, ESA called for Nor-
way to notify its schemes, and the MPE embarked on five years of tough nego-
tiations with ESA on whether the Enova support scheme violated the state-aid 
rules. Initially, the Ministry held that the Enova scheme did not fall under the EU 
definition of ‘state aid’ (MPE 2003). Later, it began arguing that the Norwegian 
renewable support scheme had been designed with a view to minimizing societal 
costs, and that, because no party would receive more state aid than needed to 
realize the production of renewable energy, it was not ‘state aid’ (MPE 2004). 
However, cost-efficiency was not the main concern of the ESA, which instead 
probed into why Norway did not follow the extra-cost methodology prescribed 
by the state-aid guidelines. This method was technology-specific: all projects 
that applied for state aid should be granted the support they needed in order to 
become just as profitable as conventional power production (Boasson 2021b, 
this book).
Two years followed in which Norway tried to persuade the ESA to accept that 
the Enova scheme could not be aligned to the extra-cost model (ESA 2005a, 
2005b; MPE 2004). The Ministry argued that because hydropower requires huge 
investments, using this as a reference technology would allow for unreasonably 
high levels of support (MPE 2003: 7, 2004). Eventually, it managed to persuade 
the ESA that the minimizing societal costs approach made more sense than the 
extra-cost model; but still, ESA first endorsed the modified Norwegian support 
scheme in 2006 (ESA 2005a, 2006).
By late 2004, the government had yielded to the instructions repeatedly given by 
the Storting and issued draft legislation for a certificate scheme for public consul-
tation (MPE 2005). A unilateral Norwegian scheme was never seriously discussed, 
primarily because economic calculations showed that a common scheme with 
Sweden would be far more cost-efficient (St.meld. nr 37 2001–2002: 109–123; 
MPE 2004). Energy economists were tasked with assessing the efficiency of the 
scheme; most of the ensuing reports were issued in 2005 (Kollbeinstveit 2009: 22). 
As the scheme would increase energy production, it might eventually reduce mar-
ket prices, but that effect was hard to predict (Energy Agency 2004).
Despite favourable wind conditions in Norway, there were few applications 
for windpower support from the cost-efficient Enova scheme in these years, and 
by 2005 only a capacity of 1.1 TWh windpower had been constructed. Although 
small hydro had not been included in the Enova scheme, a host of new, small 
actors initiated a rush of new projects (Yttri 2019). The coalition government 
(Christian Democrats, Conservatives, Liberals) encouraged this development 
(Yttri 2019: 333) and also promised that the forthcoming certificate scheme would 
reimburse some of the costs of small-scale hydropower plants constructed after 
January 2004 (Stavanger Aftenblad 2004).
Even though politicians had occasionally paid attention to renewable energy 
support in the period 2000–2004, it never became a salient political issue. Politi-
cians were more preoccupied with discussions over gas power and electricity price 
peaks, and the MPE staff were kept busy aligning Norway’s support schemes with 
EU state-aid regulations.
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2005–2009: politicization of renewable electricity support
By 2005, the lack of stable political steering signals about the renewables support 
design had led to frustration within the electricity industry. As the climate issue 
had an upswing in salience in general, renewables support finally gained political 
salience.
The 2005 elections brought a change of government, with the Labour Party 
forming a majority red/green coalition with the Socialist Left and the (tradition-
ally agrarian) Centre Party. Although renewable energy had not been high on the 
agenda during post-election negotiations, the new government readily declared 
that it would continue to negotiate with Sweden on a common green certificate 
scheme (Soria Moria 2005). In parallel, a string of energy economy reports, which 
had been ordered by the previous government, concluded that a certificate scheme 
would not be a cost-effective climate measure (see Kollbeinstveit 2009: 22). One 
report noted how a certificate scheme would bring an immediate increase in the 
price of electricity and a burden on the consumers (Golombek and Hoel 2005). 
Another report concluded that the increased renewables support would reduce the 
prices and thus the value of existing large hydropower production (Aune et al. 
2005). Hence it was unclear whether the utilities or the consumers would profit 
from a certificate scheme, but all reports agreed that companies with the most 
profitable windpower projects could reap higher profits that would be needed for 
overall profitability.
These reports led Labour to re-assess its position towards certificates. Labour 
politicians feared that the parliamentary minority would blame them if the scheme 
served to increase the price of electricity. As one interviewee (see Boasson 
2015: 119) concluded, ‘we were living in the shadow of the power price issue’.
The electricity utilities and environmental organizations continued to promote 
a shift, referring to the high support levels in the Swedish green certificate scheme 
(MPE 2007). They also continued to frame certificate schemes as the most suc-
cessful scheme in Europe and called for Norway to implement the EU Renewables 
Directive (see MPE 2005). Partly because few Norwegian actors were informed 
about recent European developments away from certificates and towards feed-in 
in Europe, these arguments gained a foothold.
Politicians recall it as demanding to collaborate with the administration in the 
MPE on the certificate issue (see Boasson 2015: 119). All along, the Swedish gov-
ernment demanded that Norway adopt a high renewables target, on the grounds 
that if the coherent target became too low, only the least costly projects would be 
realized – and these were to be found mainly in Norway, not in Sweden (Ener-
gimyndigheten 2005). Labour politicians and administrative actors alike wanted 
a low Norwegian target: the higher the target, the more likely that the certificates 
would gain a high value and corresponding increase in electricity price. Given 
the lack of greenhouse gas emissions from the Norwegian electricity sector, this 
would not be a cost-efficient climate measure. Thus, the Norwegian government 
held out for a far lower ambition level than the Swedes were ready to accept (MPE 
2006; see Kollbeinstveit 2009: 30–31).
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Now the electricity utilities competed for the best projects and enhanced their 
organizational capacities. Five of the ten largest utilities included windpower 
in their organizational structure, and many smaller companies created shared 
windpower development subsidiaries (see Agder Energi 2007; BKK 2007; NTE 
2004; Statkraft 2005). Only one rather large utility, EC-O, opposed the certificate 
scheme, worrying that new electricity production would reduce the profits from 
existing large hydropower (MPE 2005).
Eventually, negotiations with Sweden failed, due to Norwegian reluctance. 
The electricity industry reacted with an outcry, immediately gaining support from 
the political opposition (see Innst. S. nr. 205 2006–2007: 5). It was particularly 
surprising that the populist right-wing Progress Party joined the bandwagon. 
According to one interviewee (2), the party seized this opportunity to show that 
they had changed from basically denying climate change as anthropogenic, to 
supporting climate measures that would profit the consumer, believing that the 
certificate scheme would reduce electricity price-levels in general. In the com-
ing months, electricity shortages and soaring electricity prices in northwestern 
Norway contributed to make the negotiation failure seem even more severe (Nor-
mann 2015: 187).
With the political competition intensifying, the red-green government hastily 
initiated efforts aimed at sweetening the retreat from green certificate plans. It 
promised to develop an alternative scheme that would take account of the con-
cerns of all three parties in government: it would offer high support, but it would 
be financed by the state and not the consumers and would offer similar support 
levels to various technologies (MPE 2006). Further, the scheme would offer pro-
ducers an add-on to the electricity price – not a guarantee of a set electricity price, 
as other feed-in schemes in Europe did at that time.
It was first at this stage that political appointees in the MPE realized that the EU 
guidelines on state aid severely constrained their work on designing an alternative 
scheme (Boasson 2015: 121). After months of internal deliberations, the govern-
ment notified the ESA of their hybrid scheme (St.meld.nr. 11 2006–2007). But 
instead of straightforwardly following the same criteria they had applied with the 
previous Norwegian notification process, the ESA now referred to new precedents 
created by Commission notifications of EU support schemes over the past two 
years (ESA 2007). Thus, the Norwegian government came to realize that, due to 
deliberations with the ESA, substantial time would be needed to develop a new 
scheme. Given the current high political salience of the issue, this put the ruling 
coalition in a very difficult position.
According to two interviewees (1, 6) who played leading roles in develop-
ing the support scheme, the prospects of a long and cumbersome ESA process 
prompted the government to initiate new negotiations with Sweden about Nor-
way joining the green certificate scheme. After all, green certificate schemes were 
exempted from the general ban on state aid. A political appointee (Interview 6) 
noted that the government had much contact with the environmental organization 
Zero in this period. The minority in the Storting now lauded the government for 
‘finally coming to its senses’ (see e.g. Innst. S. nr. 145 2007–2008). In taking this 
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decision, the government was challenging the MPE administration, which did not 
favour such a scheme (see Gullberg and Bang 2014: 108). According to Åslaug 
Haga, Minister of Petroleum and Energy from 2007 to 2008, ‘the new negotia-
tions with Sweden about a common green certificate scheme would never have 
happened if the iron triangle [the MPE, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime 
Ministers’ Office] had got it their way’ (Haga 2012: 296, own translation). This 
shift to certificates took place despite the decreasing popularity of such schemes 
elsewhere (Boasson 2021b, this book). Interestingly, the European turmoil over 
the support-scheme-related content of the Renewables Directive attracted hardly 
any attention in Norway.
Conflicts over how to design the renewables support hindered actual invest-
ments in renewables in this period (Riksrevisjonen 2010). Aiming to compensate 
for this, in 2008 the government awarded Enova greater funding for its running 
scheme for windpower – and, between 2008 and 2011, windpower with an annual 
production of 1 TWh was constructed, most of which was operated by large Nor-
wegian utilities (Enova 2014: 5). Still, the target of 3 TWh annual production by 
2010 was not met.
The parties in government disagreed about how to approach the new round of 
negotiations. According to one interviewee (6), the Centre Party and the Socialist 
Left Party disagreed on whether to include small-scale hydro, whereas Labour 
was still reluctant to increasing renewables production significantly. In parallel 
with these tumultuous political discussions in Norway, the EU member states had 
agreed to introduce binding domestic renewables targets for later inclusion in the 
revised Renewables Directive (Boasson 2021b, this book). As the first version of 
the directive was already included in the EEA agreement, the Norwegian gov-
ernment readily accepted implementation of the revised one (Regjeringen 2007). 
Interviewees (1, 6) underline that the Norway–EU negotiations on the new direc-
tive and the Norway–Sweden negotiations about the certificate scheme were con-
ducted in parallel, without being interrelated. As small-scale hydro was less costly 
than windpower, it would be easier to meet new renewables targets if this tech-
nology were included. Thus, the inclusion of small-scale hydro in the certificate 
scheme made it easier for Labour to accept a rather high target for the scheme. At 
this point the political stakes had become high: the government would lose face 
if it withdrew from the negotiations with Sweden a second time. The parties in 
government found themselves with little leeway, and they had to accommodate 
the demands from Sweden.
Late in 2009 Norway and Sweden agreed on the main principles for the new 
scheme. Norway committed to a 13.2 TWh electricity target by 2020 – half of 
the joint Swedish–Norwegian 26.4 TWh target (MPE 2010a, 2010b). Negotia-
tions with the EU eventually resulted in Norway agreeing to increase its share 
of renewables in domestic energy consumption from 58% to 67.5% (NOU 2012: 
38), with the certificate scheme as the main measure for reaching this target.
In the shadow of the certificate dispute, plans for offshore wind were launched 
in 2005 (Norman 2015: 185). Many actors aimed at developing new technological 
offshore solutions, such as Statkraft and other major Norwegian utilities, but also 
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large petroleum companies (Statoil/Equinor and Shell) and petroleum equipment 
producers. The government had asked leaders from the electricity and petroleum 
industries to draft a special report on offshore wind. They recommended adoption of 
a technology-specific feed-in scheme for offshore wind only (MPE 2008: 20–21). 
The Storting responded with more R&D funding, but no additional support 
scheme was developed (Norman 2015: 186–187).
The years 2005 to 2009 saw considerable drama with respect to renewable 
energy, ending with a radical shift in policy. Norwegian politicians showed an 
unprecedented engagement in the development of a support scheme for large-
scale renewables; this finally resulted in a decision to join the Swedish green cer-
tificate scheme. Although financially powerful actors engaged to promote feed-in 
for offshore wind, they did not succeed; and technology-specific solar power sup-
port was not an issue at all.
2010–2016: an uncontroversial shift away from large-scale 
renewables support
After 2010, renewables were no longer a salient political issue. Norway was pro-
ducing more electricity than it needed domestically; electricity prices dropped, 
and the electricity utilities changed their position towards the certificate scheme. 
Eventually, all of this resulted in a significant policy shift.
The new Swedish–Norwegian certificate scheme was put into operation in Jan-
uary 2012 (MPE 2010a, 2010b). In the same year, a task force appointed by the 
Norwegian government, with politicians as well as experts, concluded that after 
2009, Norway would be producing significantly more electricity than it needed, 
and the power surplus would gradually increase (NOU 2012: 17). The task force 
did not come up with any recommendations about the future of the certificate 
scheme (NOU 2012: 74), but a few months later, the Minister of Petroleum and 
Energy announced that the scheme would run only until 2020 (Nettavisen 2012). 
An electricity utility interviewee (5) describes the industry’s initial promotion of 
electricity certificates as rooted in misplaced expectations as to developments in 
energy demand and electricity prices: in fact, the latter dropped significantly after 
2010 (SSB 2019). Introduction of new renewables electricity through the cer-
tificate scheme may have contributed to reducing the electricity prices, but many 
other factors were also involved – such as greater energy efficiency, increased 
inflow of water in many large hydropower plants, the financial crisis, lower costs 
of windpower equipment and the construction of fewer interconnectors than 
originally planned (NOU 2012) – so that the electricity demand failed to rise 
as expected. In 2015, Norway’s electricity corporations had the lowest profits in 
more than a decade (SSB 2020b), and Statkraft ended with a substantial deficit 
(Statkraft 2016).
In 2012 the certificate price was far lower than expected, only half of what it 
had been in 2008 (Energy Agency 2019). Interviewees (1, 6) say this came as a 
surprise, as the theory behind the scheme predicted that the certificate price would 
increase when the electricity prices drop. As this was a shared Swedish–Norwegian 
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scheme, it did not matter from which country the actual renewables certificates 
came: Swedish certificates could contribute to fulfilling the Norwegian targets, 
and the reverse. One interviewee (1) pointed out that Swedish investors knew and 
understood the certificate scheme, whereas the Norwegians had a ‘wait and see’ 
approach. According to two interviewees (1, 5), Norwegian utilities initially posi-
tive to market logic lost their enthusiasm when they experienced the fluctuating 
support levels in addition to low electricity prices.
Examination of the party programmes prepared for Norway’s general elec-
tions in September 2013 shows very little attention to the future of the certificate 
scheme (Arbeiderpartiet 2013; Fremskrittspartiet 2013; Høyre 2013; Kristelig 
Folkeparti 2013; Miljøpartiet De Grønne2013; Senterpartiet 2013; Venstre 2013; 
Sosialistisk Venstreparti 2013). The few parties that mentioned certificates merely 
called for minor adjustments to them. Many parties wanted to promote more 
expensive renewables technologies but were not very specific on how to design 
such schemes. The election outcome led the red-green coalition to resign. The 
Conservatives and the Progress Party agreed on a governmental declaration, stat-
ing that they would develop a new energy-policy White Paper, increase renewable 
power production, consider adjustments in the certificate scheme and offer tax 
deductions for energy-efficiency investments in residential buildings (Regjerin-
gen 2013). In the Storting, the new minority government had support from the 
Liberal Left and the Christian Democratic Party.
Once in office, the new government initiated encompassing public consulta-
tions in preparation for the new White Paper on energy policy (Meld. St. 25 2015–
2016). In 2014 a range of actors provided written inputs, but few paid attention to 
the certificate scheme (Regjeringen 2014), with two exceptions: Energy Norway, 
the business association of the Norwegian electricity industry, and Statkraft asked 
for no new projects to be included in the scheme after 2020. In 2015, small hydro-
power plants constructed as early as January 2004 were included in the scheme 
(Lov om el-sertifikater 2016: § 8). This significantly reduced the volume of new 
facilities that needed to be constructed in order to achieve the ambitions of the 
scheme.
According to interviewees 2 and 4, the MPE worked hard to ensure broad 
agreement on the need to remove the electricity surplus and to stop the certifi-
cate scheme by 2020. Initially, corporations with the most expansive windpower 
plans and the environmental organizations resisted, but ‘in the end no one was 
against’ (Interview 2). Interviewees 2 and 7 underlined that, because most elec-
tricity corporations had municipal owners, society at large would profit from a 
higher electricity price, as this would make the local municipalities richer. One 
environmental organization interviewee (4) said they had no chance of ‘winning a 
war for a prolonged scheme’, and in any event, ‘we had the feeling we had won, 
it was so cheap to develop wind power in Norway, it was almost profitable at 
market prices’.
In April 2016, the government finally issued its energy White Paper, where it 
concluded that no new objective for the Norwegian certificate scheme would be 
introduced for the period after 2021 (Meld. St. 25 2015–2016: 188). At this stage 
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Norway already had achieved a 69% renewables share of its energy consumption, 
higher than that required by the EU (Meld. St. 25 2015–2016: 187). Hardly any 
protests arose and a majority in the Storting endorsed the proposal, with the ‘crea-
tion of space for more technology-specific support schemes’ as a rationale but 
without proposing a new scheme (Innst. 401 S. 2015–2016: 30). Only the Social-
ist Left Party called for the certificate scheme to be prolonged.
The Energy White Paper discussed offshore wind, without any specific support 
proposals. Solar power was discussed primarily as a phenomenon outside Nor-
way; and although a modest investment support scheme for small-scale renewa-
bles in residential buildings had been introduced one year earlier, this attracted 
scant attention (Meld. St. 25 2015–2016: 188).
Interviewees 2, 3 and 4 explained that the small-scale renewables scheme was 
rooted in the government declaration’s promise of introducing tax deductions for 
energy-efficiency investments in residential buildings. According to these inter-
viewees, the government immediately encountered a problem with the introduc-
tion of such a measure, and therefore they turned to Enova and asked it to develop 
a support scheme instead (see also Teknisk Ukeblad 2014).
At this time, the environmental organization Zero, together with leading archi-
tects and building construction corporations, had started to promote rooftop PVs 
in Norway (Zero 2013). Zero joined forces with other environmental organiza-
tions and various business associations who already had a coordinated campaign 
aimed at influencing implementation of the energy-efficiency formulation in the 
governmental declaration (Norsk Teknologi 2014). Thus, it was a rather broad 
collation that eventually called for PV support to be included in the new energy-
efficiency scheme. In the end, Enova launched a scheme offering up-front invest-
ment support with equal support levels for a wide range of energy-efficiency and 
renewable-energy technologies, but solar PV was expected to be the most attrac-
tive technology (Teknisk Ukeblad 2014).
In other settings, MPE and the Energy Agency officials argued that decentral-
ized small-scale, costly renewables production did not fit the Norwegian energy 
system (Zimmermann 2018). But none of the interviewees recalled that these 
actors tried to prevent PV from being included in the new Enova scheme. Moreo-
ver, interviewees 2 and 3 underlined that neither the executive government nor 
the Storting played much of a role in this process. Later, the Liberals, one of 
the parties that had ensured the government a majority, succeeded in getting the 
government to accept that certificates could be granted to small-scale renewable 
electricity production, but because they had to pay a fee in order to be included in 
the scheme, few actually received such support (Statsbudsjettet 2016).
The organizational field of electricity production had remained rather 
unchanged, although Statkraft had increased its share of electricity production to 
some 35% (MPE 2019). Moreover, Statkraft had gained a more prominent posi-
tion in Europe, particularly as operator of hydropower in Sweden and as a wind-
power developer in the UK (Statkraft 2020). Statkraft was still fully Norwegian 
state-owned, with most of the remaining electricity production owned by regional 
and local governments. Cross-ownership became increasingly common, but 
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most hydropower producers were small: only 11 had more than 250 employees 
(Espelien 2017). Several petroleum-related corporations had started to develop 
offshore wind, but they focused primarily on markets outside Norway, as did pro-
ducers of solar PV equipment.
In 2016, windpower provided only 1.4% of Norwegian power production, 
and very few windpower corporations had emerged. Interviewees 1, 2, 4 and 
5 expected more construction in the final phase of the certificate scheme and 
held that windpower might soon become profitable even without support. Nor-
way has not seen an influx of new renewables actors, as was the case in some 
other countries. One interviewee (1) put it like this: ‘we sit here laughing at 
the Germans who are ruining themselves on feed-in. The costs have been enor-
mous – but then, they have gained new industry and jobs. Maybe we should have 
thought of that too?’
Discussions and conclusions
By 2020, Norway had a technology-neutral renewables support mix, with no pros-
pects of offering large-scale renewables investors any support after 2021. This 
policy outcome was the result of decades of complex decision-making processes. 
How have the European environment, the Norwegian organizational field of elec-
tricity production and the domestic political field contributed to the development 
of the support scheme, and how have these three spheres influenced each other 
over time?
We start with the importance of the European environment. Even though Norway 
had hardly any CO2 emissions from electricity production, climate change height-
ened the focus on renewable electricity in the 1990s. The Norwegian electricity 
industry soon became interested in electricity certificates, primarily through par-
ticipation in EU-level discussions and the Dutch certificate scheme that financed 
a Norwegian windpower project. The government in 1999 proposed to introduce 
a cost-efficient support scheme which resembled neither a certificate scheme nor a 
feed-in scheme. Hence, we cannot say that the European environment affected the 
actual decision on support schemes in Norway in the period leading up to 1999, 
although some actors had been inspired by EU-level developments.
In the early 2000s, Norwegian civil servants developed an auctioning scheme 
aimed at minimizing support. However, the utilities gained increasing interest in 
electricity certificates and, together with environmental organizations, they suc-
ceeded in getting the opposition, which had a majority in the Storting, to embrace 
their idea. As a result, the government half-heartedly started negotiating a com-
mon scheme with Sweden but later withdrew. Although European environment 
impulses from around 2000 had long-lasting impact on some key actors, they did 
not actually influence policy decisions in this period.
Gullberg and Bang (2014: 109) conclude that Norwegian members of Par-
liament simply did not consider alternatives to a joint Swedish–Norwegian 
certificate scheme in 2008 – but this is not fully accurate. The parties in govern-
ment had tried to develop another scheme, but EU state-aid rules obstructed the 
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development of a special Norwegian support scheme. Even though EU state-aid 
practice at this stage was quite open to more technology-specific schemes, the 
cumbersome process made the Norwegian government withdraw its proposal. 
Thus, the government turned to certificates again. The Swedish scheme had been 
up and running for a while, and although the certificates scheme had fallen out of 
fashion elsewhere, Norwegian actors seemed basically unaffected by feed-in gain-
ing prominence over certificates in Europe.
According to Gullberg and Bang (2014: 103), Norway’s willingness to join the 
Swedish certificate scheme was spurred by the binding domestic targets in the 
2009 Renewables Directive. However, the detailed process tracing shows that it 
was European certificate impulses from ten years earlier that now came to frui-
tion, while the binding target had little importance. The government was under 
pressure to show its support to renewables; and, because EU state-aid rules made 
it hard to develop a special Norwegian scheme, certificates appeared as the only 
viable option. Indeed, it seems likely that Norway would have adopted an electric-
ity certificate scheme at this stage irrespective of the binding EU targets.
Note that Norway did not adopt any scheme for small-scale renewables during 
the 2005–2009 period: thus, the growing focus on small-scale renewables and the 
popularity of feed-in in Europe did not influence Norway.
From 2014 and onwards, Brussels governed the development of renewables 
schemes in the EU and EEA countries, with the Commission gaining authority to 
require auctioning combined with a feed-in premium. Also in 2014, the EU decided 
against adopting binding domestic renewables targets for 2030. It is hard to say 
what Norway would have done if new domestic 2030 renewables targets had been 
imposed, but the lack of new targets made it easier to withdraw from the certifi-
cate scheme. Norway introduced investment support to small-scale renewables in 
residential buildings in 2015; but Norway adopted a far more technology-neutral 
scheme than did most EU countries. Thus, we see that the European environment 
played a very modest role for Norwegian developments in this period.
On the whole, then, the European environment influenced Norwegian actors in 
the early 2000s, when EU steering was weak and no particular scheme dominated. 
The European environment had less importance in Norway, when the EU later 
gained more authority and a particular support mix became dominant. This con-
trasts with our expectations (see Boasson 2021a) and shows that EU impulses can 
be important even when EU steering is weak; also, that it can take a long time before 
European impulses actually influence domestic policy developments in Norway.
Can the domestic organizational field explain more of the developments in 
Norway than does the European environment? The liberalization of the Nor-
wegian electricity system started back in the 1990s, and the institutional logic 
shifted away from technology development and towards market thinking. Until 
around 1999, the segmented field was quite united, focusing mainly on how to 
make existing large hydro more profitable. Although interest in windpower solu-
tions was rising, the technology-specific feed-in scheme that emerged in Europe 
contrasted with the economic institutional logics that had come to dominate the 
organizational field in Norway.
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In the 2000–2004 period, conflicts between the market based-economic logic 
of Statkraft and the cost-minimizing logic of the MPE led them to favour dif-
fering support schemes. While the latter wanted a scheme to the lowest societal 
costs, Statkraft wanted a scheme that would enable greater corporate prof-
its. The electricity certificate idea was in line with the logic of the corporate 
actors, whereas the government developed an auctioning/feed-in premium type 
of scheme. Failing to influence the MEP, Statkraft and other large electricity 
utilities targeted the Storting, with the backing of environmental organizations. 
Turf battles continued throughout the period, but the issue never gained enough 
saliency to ensure stable political steering signals. Hence, development of the 
support-scheme development was primarily determined by the MPE administra-
tive staff in this period.
Only when the government withdrew from negotiations with Sweden in 2006 
did renewables support become a salient political issue. There ensued a few years 
when policy development was determined mainly by the political field and not the 
organizational fields.
After 2010, however, the electricity utilities changed their preferences, siding 
with their former foes in the MPE. With the low level of investments in renewa-
bles, the organizational field did not experience fragmentation, instead becoming 
more segmented than before. As we expected (see Boasson 2021a), this has served 
to make the organizational field more influential. With the entrenched resist-
ance to certificates in the Ministry and Statkraft now going against a prolonged 
scheme, it is not surprising to find that more marginal actors see this reversal as 
unstoppable. The introduction of marginal support to small-scale renewables has 
come about through low-level negotiations between various actors on the fringe 
of the organizational field. Unsurprisingly, given the modest support levels and 
technology-specificity, the dominant actors have not mobilized against this. How-
ever, no support scheme for offshore wind has been developed.
Although some offshore wind promoters, such as Statoil (later Equinor), were 
powerful in their own right, they did not hold a sufficiently strong position within 
the organizational field of electricity production to succeed in their demands (see 
also Normann 2015: 189). According to Espen Moe (2012: 19), ‘Norway, with 
its powerful petroleum industry, has fed vested interests and built institutions to 
support the already existing industry, to the detriment of renewables’. The pro-
cess tracing undertaken in this chapter has shown another story, with petroleum 
actors having played no direct role in the development of Norwegian support to 
renewables.
Finally, we turn to the role of the political field. In line with our expectations, 
the political field has generally had little importance for development of the Nor-
wegian scheme in periods when the issue was not politicized. In the 1990s, poli-
ticians agreed that the government should promote renewables more than they 
had done, but they were not particularly engaged in how the support scheme 
should be designed. From 2000 and onwards, the Storting repeatedly asked for 
a shift to green certificates. But here we see the same pattern with most par-
ties in and out of government: when in opposition they embraced certificates, 
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but once in government they were convinced by the MPE administrative staff. 
We may say that they jumped onto the certificate-scheme bandwagon merely in 
order to symbolize their general support to renewable energy, without any deeper 
engagement.
The issue changed from low to high salience in the period 2005–2009. This was 
prompted by the government’s retreat from negotiations with Sweden, and the 
political optics proving highly negative. However, when EU state-aid rules were 
found to obstruct the rapid development of a special Norwegian hybrid scheme, 
the government had to re-initiate negotiations with Sweden in order to save its 
credibility at home. With the issue becoming increasingly salient, the government 
was now willing to agree to far higher renewables ambitions than before.
After 2010, support to renewable energy again faded as a political issue: for 
instance, the failure to meet the 3 TWh windpower target attracted scant attention. 
Moreover, in 2012, the same government that had taken Norway into the Swedish 
scheme now stated that it would not be prolonged after 2020, even though few 
new renewable-energy power plants had been constructed in Norway. A new gov-
ernment came into position in 2013, and in the following years, the political lead-
ership of the MPE worked to ensure unity within the organizational fieldWhen in 
2016 they finally recommended that the Storting pull out from the Swedish–Nor-
wegian scheme, this was readily endorsed without much discussion. The Storting 
called for replacement of the outgoing scheme but did not work to ensure that 
the government followed up. At this stage, the development of renewables sup-
port was determined by the segmented organizational field, whereas the political 
dynamics had limited importance. A few years later, a boost in windpower con-
struction in the final phase of the Norwegian certificate scheme made windpower 
highly controversial – but our material indicates that issues of nature conservation 
did not affect the 2016 decision.
Further, the political field has not been important for the introduction of the 
modest support offered to small-scale renewables for residential buildings. True, 
the scheme is rooted in the governmental declaration, but the initial political for-
mulation was exclusively about energy efficiency, with no mention whatsoever of 
small-scale renewables. The design of the actual support measure was negotiated 
between Enova and actors at the fringes of the organizational field, with little to 
no political involvement.
Against this wider backdrop, we again ask: why did Norway end up with the 
most technology-neutral and least-generous support-scheme mix in Europe? Here 
we can conclude that the main reason was that this was in line with the prefer-
ences of the structurally dominant actors in the segmented organizational field: the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, and Statkraft. Since it took so much time for 
Norway to introduce a well-functioning support scheme for renewables, no new 
actors with major interests in new renewable electricity development emerged. 
In the period 2005–2009, the Norwegian political field ensured that the Euro-
pean certificate idea came to fruition – but, after 2010, policy developments were 
steered primarily by the organizational field, with political dynamics playing a 
limited role.
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Interviewees
1 Civil servant, Norwegian Energy Agency (NVE), 22 February 2016, Oslo
2 Former political appointee (Progress Party), Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 21 June 2018, Trondheim
3 Environmental organization representative, Zero, 25 June 2018, Oslo
4 Civil servant, Enova, 21 June 2018, Trondheim
5 Electricity industry representative, Statkraft, 14 October 2016, Oslo
6 Former political appointee (Centre Party), Ministry of Petroleum and Energy; 
electricity industry representative, Energi Norge, 18 February 2016, Oslo
7 Civil servant, Swedish Energy Agency, 14 October 2016, Oslo (identical to 
Interviewee 6 in Chapter 8)
Note
 1 I have previously examined the development of the support schemes for renewables 
electricity and heating between 2000 and 2010 (Boasson 2015); parts of the chronologi-
cal story that follows draw on that earlier publication.
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and Jørgen Wettestad
Introduction
In this chapter, we systematically compare the development of renewables sup-
port mixes in Germany, the UK, Poland, France, Sweden and Norway, asking: 
what can explain the differences and similarities across countries and over time? 
Specifically, why have some countries developed technology-specific mixes, 
whereas others have focused on technology-neutral mixes? Further, we examine 
whether our findings are in line with explanations under the multi-field approach, 
as presented in Chapter 3 of this book. Systematic comparison of developments in 
four differing time-periods in the six countries enables us to offer answers to the 
sub-questions that have guided this book – namely, how and to what extent is the 
development of renewables support mixes affected by:
• the European environment?
• the domestic organizational fields?
• the domestic political fields?
And further: do developments in one field influence developments in others?
We present a range of systematic comparisons, showing that differences and 
similarities across countries can largely be explained by variance in the state of 
the domestic political and organizational fields and their differing interrelation-
ship with the wider process of Europeanization. Systematic comparative multi-
field assessment can offer new insights into the role of political and institutional 
dynamics for energy and climate transitions, as well as for policy change and 
stability more generally.
Our comparisons aim at answering the research questions of this book, one 
question at a time. This chapter draws on all the other chapters of this book but 
does not go in dialogue with scientific literatures on Europeanization, policy pro-
cesses or climate transitions. The more general implications for larger scientific 
discussions on these topics are presented in Chapter 12.
The European environment: spurring variation
Chapter 2 presented the story of the development of renewables support schemes 
in Europe. The ensuing case-study chapters have discussed how and to what 
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extent renewables support in each country in focus has been influenced by the 
European environment (see Table 11.1 for a summary of the main findings). We 
had expected the European environment to dominate the development of domes-
tic renewable energy policies more when vertical Europeanization was strong 
and when horizontal Europeanization was coherent, in the sense that one specific 
support-scheme mix had gained superiority (EU governing). While we do find 
that the European environment is more important for many countries under EU 
governing conditions, it emerges as generally more important than we expected 
also under other conditions. Indeed, we find that the actual effect of the European 
environment depends partly on developments in domestic fields.
The first row in Table 11.1 shows differences in the state of the European envi-
ronment over time, whereas the following rows describe how (horizontal and/or 
vertical) and to what extent (grey scale) the European environment has affected 
the countries. Light grey shading indicates the time-periods where the European 
environment has influenced the development of domestic support mixes, whether 
by supporting or by undermining developments in the domestic fields. Influences 
on small-scale as well as large-scale support schemes are taken into account. Peri-
ods when Europeanization processes have been of little importance are marked 
by a dash, in turn indicating the importance of domestic organizational and/or 
political fields in shaping policy developments in these periods. Note that the 
European environment has never been the main driver of changes or stabilities 
in the domestic support schemes, so there are no periods with dark grey shading.
Horizontal Europeanization refers to the diffusion of ideas, measures or policy 
designs across countries and fields within the European environment. The more 
Table 11.1 Comparing the role of the European environment across time and cases*
















Germany – – – Vertical and 
horizontal




Poland Horizontal Vertical Domestic fields Vertical
France Horizontal Horizontal Vertical Vertical and 
horizontal
Sweden Vertical – Vertical and 
horizontal
–
Norway – Vertical – Horizontal
* Light grey: some importance, white: almost no importance
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a specific policy recipe dominates within the European environment, the stronger 
the effect it may have on policy development at the domestic level. Vertical Euro-
peanization refers to top-down EU steering: the greater the structural power con-
trolled by the EU, the greater will be the impact on domestic policy development.
Chapter 4 described a gradual increased strength in vertical Europeanization, 
peaking after 2010 and with two peaks in horizontal Europeanization: a fixed 
feed-in trend from 2000 to 2009, and a feed-in premium trend combined with 
competitive auctions emerging after 2010. After 2010, the horizontal and verti-
cal Europeanization processes created an EU governing situation, so we should 
expect the European environment to have become especially salient for domestic 
support-mix developments after 2010. In fact, however, the pattern of European 
environment influence over time (see Table 11.1) does not fit this description. This 
calls for a more detailed assessment of the role of the European environment in 
differing phases, taking account of developments in all six case-countries.
The EU had little formal authority in the period leading up to 2000, and ver-
tical Europeanization was weak. The European Commission (the Commission) 
promoted a pan-European electricity certificate scheme, but the member states 
approached the issue in different ways, so horizontal Europeanization was also 
weak. From 1990 and onwards, the Commission started to regard renewables sup-
port as an EU state-aid issue, but it readily adopted all notified support schemes 
and did not perform actual steering. That was a 1000 flowers situation, where 
we would expect countries to test out a range of new solutions, without being 
deeply affected by developments elsewhere in Europe. However, we find that the 
European environment influenced three out of our six case-study countries in this 
period.
Poland adopted technology-specific feed-in (inspired by Germany), and France 
adopted rather technology-neutral tendering (inspired by the UK). Both develop-
ments seem to have come about because domestic actors looked to other countries 
to find new policy ideas – not because of strong pressures from the European envi-
ronment. In addition, Sweden was influenced by the Commission’s campaign for a 
technology-neutral pan-European certificate scheme. The vertical steering signals 
were weak, but domestic actors were receptive to the Commission’s arguments: 
hence, that Sweden adopted a certificate scheme was largely a result of drawing 
lessons from abroad. Interestingly, 30 years later, the domestic support mixes in 
Sweden and France bear the hallmarks of the initial European impulse from this 
period. In Poland, by contrast, this initial European environment impulse faded 
quickly.
The 2000–2004 period was dominated by horizontal harmonization. The Com-
mission argued that the EU member states had to adopt more technology-neutral 
schemes in order to act in accordance with the state-aid guidelines, but the CJEU 
PreussenElektra ruling ensured that technology-specific feed-in was recognized 
as legal under EU law. Hence, in this period, the Commission did not gain any 
forceful authority with a basis in state-aid rules. The EU adopted its first Renewa-
bles Directive – but, as the Commission’s proposal for a binding, technology-
neutral support-scheme was rejected, vertical Europeanization remained limited. 
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Moreover, feed-in diffused rapidly. Hence, the period was characterized by hori-
zontal harmonization, in turn underpinning the development of feed-in in France. 
Although feed-in (and not certificate schemes) gained in popularity during this 
period, Norwegian actors were receptive to the certificate idea from the Commis-
sion and the European electricity industry. Despite the absence of strong vertical 
Europeanization pressure for certificates, the idea gained acceptance in Norway, 
although it took years before it came into fruition.
The Commission had somewhat more authority over Poland because of its 
accession status, so Poland experienced stronger vertical Europeanization pres-
sures than the other countries in the 2000–2004 period. This partly explains why 
Poland prepared for a shift to a certificate scheme in this period (adopted in 2005), 
overruling the initial European environment effect on Polish developments (which 
had led Poland to adopt a feed-in scheme). However, EU steering cannot explain 
why the Polish scheme promoted co-firing of biomass in co-firing coal-power 
plants, and not wind and solar.
As Germany was the source of the European trend in this period, it was hardly 
‘a taker’ of European environment impulses. Further, neither the UK nor Sweden 
was much affected by European developments. Given the lack of strong vertical 
Europeanization, it is not surprising that the European environment affected dif-
ferent countries in different ways. Due to domestic differences, the European envi-
ronment contributed to introducing technology-neutrality in Poland and Norway, 
but technology-specificity in France (to which we return later). Moreover, the 
overall salience of the European environment proved to be higher than expected 
in this period.
In the 2005–2009 period, the authority of the EU increased, due to the intro-
duction of binding renewables targets. Hence, a certain indirect EU governing 
was added to the horizontal harmonization character of the European environ-
ment. These two modes of Europeanization existed in parallel because of the 
2007 European Council decision to adopt binding, domestic renewables targets 
for 2020, and because feed-in became increasingly dominant. The Commission 
could not steer how member states designed their support mixes, but it could pres-
sure them to adopt schemes that could fulfil the targets. Germany, already having 
high renewables ambitions and being the feed-in leader, was not much affected 
by the European environment, but we detect significant effects in other countries.
The UK and Sweden were influenced by the greater focus on small-scale pro-
duction all over Europe. Sweden, however, adopted a more technology-neutral 
instrument than the other countries. Despite the historically strong dominance 
of market logic in the UK, and the prior technology-neutrality of its large-scale 
scheme, the country adopted a feed-in for small renewables plants, influenced by 
the German feed-in. The UK also introduced greater technology-specificity in 
its large-scale support schemes. The shift towards technology-specificity in the 
UK came about partly because of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s bold support for 
adoption of binding domestic EU renewables targets. When the EU later gave the 
UK a high target (compared to its low initial share), this eventually strengthened 
the domestic actors that for a long time had argued that the UK needed greater 
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technology-specificity. This added to the effect of the strong vertical Europeaniza-
tion (due to the dominance of feed-in) and the high EU-wide focus on fostering 
small-scale renewables. Also in France, the EU-level actions of President Nico-
las Sarkozy boomeranged, strengthening the domestic actors that wanted greater 
technology-specificity.
The EU-wide emphasis on small-scale renewables and the new renewables tar-
gets also influenced Sweden. However, in line with its traditions, Sweden adopted 
technology-neutral investment support for small-scale renewables. Poland was 
rather unaffected by developments in the European environment in this period. 
Likewise, Norway remained rather isolated from the new European environment, 
although the old certificate impulse lingered. For instance, it seems that since Nor-
wegian politicians had not been involved in negotiating the Renewables Direc-
tive (as an EEA member, Norway is required to adopt certain EU laws but does 
not have formal access to the EU decision-making process), neither the adoption 
of new targets nor the diffusion of feed-in schemes in Europe attracted much 
attention in Norway. Overall, we find that most of the EU steering was directed 
at increasing the share of renewables, whereas horizontal Europeanization had a 
more direct impact on the support-scheme mixes. The authority of the EU had 
increased, but still the importance of the European environment was rather similar 
to prior periods.
After 2010, we see a clear upward shift in the salience of the European environ-
ment. It plays a significant role for all countries in this period, except Sweden, but 
it does not determine the course of developments in any of the countries. The EU 
steering of renewables support schemes was becoming radically stronger, through 
new state-aid guidelines that favoured auctioning combined with feed-in premi-
ums and promoted technology-neutrality. Electricity certificates were accepted 
by the EU but were not promoted by the new guidelines. In parallel with the 
deliberations over the new guidelines, the UK, France and Germany prepared a 
shift towards feed-in premiums combined with auctioning – in effect, a new trend. 
With vertical and horizontal Europeanization increasing in tandem, the European 
environment shifted to EU governing. Strong domestic forces underpinned devel-
opments in the UK, France and Germany, but the adoption of the new EU state-aid 
guidelines in 2014 stands out as decisive for domestic-level developments, espe-
cially in France and Germany. Interestingly, all three counties continued to have 
schemes that were more technology-specific than prescribed by the Commission.
The European environment did not have an equally strong impact on renewables-
support mixes in Poland, Norway or Sweden. Poland did change its large-scale 
scheme, but not because the new guidelines required this. After all, Poland already 
had a certificate scheme largely in line with the guidelines. Rather, it seems as if 
the shift in support scheme was primarily a strategic move, aimed at worsening 
the conditions for the development of large-scale renewable projects. Poland also 
introduced new schemes for small-scale renewables, but the process was opaque, 
and it is not easy to ascribe these developments to EU steering. Norway was influ-
enced by the greater European-wide focus on small-scale, introducing a modest 
investment support for small-scale renewables. However, that scheme was far 
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more limited and more technology-neutral than small-scale support schemes in 
the other countries. Moreover, Norway’s decision to not prolong the certificate 
scheme was not influenced by the European environment.
Support schemes in Sweden were not influenced by the shift in EU steering at 
all – hardly surprising, as Sweden already had a large-scale scheme largely in line 
with the new rules, and it had adopted a small-scale renewables support scheme a 
few years earlier. Interestingly, Sweden retained its electricity certificate scheme, 
although such arrangements had fallen out of favour almost everywhere else.
All six countries would have ended up with different renewables support mixes 
if it had not been for enablers and constraints within the larger European envi-
ronment. In fact, the European environment contributed to spur differentiation 
between the technology-specific and technology-neutral countries. As we will see, 
the growing salience of the European environment after 2010 occurred in parallel 
with domestic factors that also gained salience, which means that there is an inter-
relationship between domestic and European factors.
Organizational fields: crucial but not totally dominant
The case-study comparisons presented in Table 11.2 show that even though the 
organizational fields of stationary energy tend to be segmented most of the time 
in most countries, there is interesting variance in the policy salience of the seg-
mented fields. Initially, we expected that the organizational fields would dominate 
the development of domestic renewable energy policies more when the organiza-
tional field is characterized by centralized structural resources and one dominant 
institutional logic (segmentation). While we find that segmentation tends to make 
organizational fields more important for policy development, not all segmented 
fields are equally important. Hence, segmented organizational fields are crucial 
but not totally dominant – and are thus generally less important than we initially 
assumed.
A brief glance at Table 11.2 shows our expectations are largely sup-
ported, although there is still greater variance in the importance of segmented 
Table 11.2 Comparing the role of the organizational field across time and cases*
 Period
Country
Before 2000 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2016
Germany Pluralist Turf battle Turf battle Segmentation
UK Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation
Poland Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation
France Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation
Sweden Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation Segmentation
Norway Segmentation Turf battle Turf battle Segmentation
* Dark grey: high importance, light grey: some importance, white: almost no importance.
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organizational fields than we had expected. In all countries, the organizational 
fields played a considerable role in policy development in at least two periods. 
Their relative importance increased after 2010 – in some cases this happened as 
the degree of segmentation increased, but in other countries the importance of the 
organizational field increased even though the degree of segmentation remained 
roughly the same. At this stage, renewables had become more mainstream, and 
all countries had achieved some new renewables production. In Germany and 
Norway the variation in the role of the organizational field is generally in line with 
variation in segmentation, but this pattern is less clear-cut for the other countries. 
In Poland and Sweden, we find periods where the organizational field had less 
salience for policy developments, even though the degree of segmentation was 
high.
Let us then first assess the countries where the organizational field has domi-
nated support-mix developments more when it has been segmented than when 
characterized by turf battles or pluralist patterns: Germany and Norway.
In Germany, the organizational field became more important after 2010, when 
structural resources had become more concentrated and institutional conflicts 
were lower. In the first period, large utilities benefitted from exclusive supply 
contracts with the municipalities and established regional monopolies. Although 
such monopolies did not represent pluralism regionally, the field had a more plu-
ralist nature at the national level, with room for the political field to dominate the 
initial development of Germany’s support scheme. German reunification in 1990 
contributed to this pluralist nature by causing de-institutionalization; the merger 
of two different domestic fields of stationary energy production created a host of 
challenges for all actors involved. Dominant public and private actors had more 
pressing issues to attend to than concocting a new renewables support scheme.
After 2000, the initial feed-in scheme had contributed to the creation of a range 
of new renewable-energy actors, embedded in a technology development logic. In 
parallel, the traditional utilities became increasingly dominated by market logic. 
This spurred recurrent and tense institutional conflicts over renewables support. 
That the Ministry of Environment was given formal responsibility for renewa-
bles support served to strengthen the renewables actors and the technology logic. 
From 2000 to 2009, there were arguably two turfs, embedded in different log-
ics and each with rather significant authority and ability to process information, 
constantly challenging each other. Due to deep-seated conflicts at the organiza-
tional field level, other fields – both the domestic political field, and EU actors – 
were repeatedly mobilized to help in solving the fierce conflicts over renewables 
support schemes. The ongoing turf battles in the organizational field enabled the 
political majority in Germany to determine quite independently which organi-
zational field actors would gain the most influence. They often favoured the 
renewables actors over the incumbents and this resulted in a series of incremental 
changes to the initial feed-in.
After 2010, the boundaries between renewables actors and traditional utilities 
became less clear-cut as utilities invested more in renewables, and some renewa-
bles technologies became so profitable that they needed less technology-specific 
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support. Moreover, more actors seemed to combine elements from the two dif-
ferent institutional logics, aiming to come up with new business models and 
support-scheme ideas that could ensure that the rising share of renewables had a 
less distorting impact on the overall functioning of the German energy system. In 
addition, the traditional electricity utilities gained leverage – because they were in 
a dire economic situation, but also because responsibility for renewables support 
was shifted from the Ministry of Environment and into the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. The latter ministry also had with responsibility for other energy policy.
As the degree of segmentation increased, field-level deliberations, negotiations 
and developments became crucial to the ensuing shifts in the German support 
scheme. EU developments and political field changes also affected developments. 
The situation was highly complex, but the organizational field came to play a 
pivotal role in the end – and, in line with our expectations, a more important role 
after it had become segmented.
In Norway, the field was initially segmented, and because the dominant field-
level actors had little interest in developing new renewables support, no stable 
scheme emerged. However, by the end of the 1990s, the major utilities were 
becoming interested in windpower. Energy liberalization had made the commer-
cial sector align to market logics while the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
was embedded in a distinctly Norwegian logic of minimizing societal costs. This 
logic contrasted with the market logic in many respects. Auctioning, combined 
with a technology-neutral feed-in premium mechanism proposed by the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy and endorsed politically in 2000, was opposed by the 
utilities. The ensuing turf battles between the commercial actors and the ministry 
obstructed the implementation of the new scheme and new renewables projects.
Eventually the utilities, with support from environmental groups, gathered 
political support for a shift to a technology-neutral certificate scheme, but that 
shift was caused primarily by political dynamics. It took many years before Nor-
way joined the Swedish scheme – and when this finally happened, the utilities had 
realized that the increased electricity production resulting from the scheme would 
reduce electricity prices and thereby the profitability of their large hydro port-
folios. By now, public and private organizations had become more united, both 
voicing concerns about the low profits of the electricity utilities. The increased 
segmentation of the field continued to explain why Norway eventually decided to 
withdraw from the certificate scheme, even before the scheme had spurred many 
projects in Norway. Introduction of a marginal technology-neutral investment 
support for small-scale renewable energy projects also reflects the market logic of 
the segmented organizational field. Thus, in many ways, the Norwegian support-
scheme mix around 2016 can be said to be a product of a segmented field.
Neither in Germany nor in Norway were the shifts and changes in the support 
mix after 2010 exclusively the result of field-internal developments, but the field 
clearly played a more important role for policy development when it was seg-
mented. In both countries, the dominant corporate actors – the electricity utilities – 
quite significantly changed their preferences over time, with major consequences 
for the development of the renewables support schemes. In Norway, change in the 
Comparative assessments and conclusions 227
perceptions of the dominant utilities was the prime driver of changes in the large-
scale support scheme in 2010. The picture is more complex in Germany, where 
field-level developments were more intertwined with political field change and 
shifts at the EU level. As a result of a whole host of developments, the large Ger-
many utilities shifted from favouring technology-neutrality to accepting a fairly 
technology-specific renewables mix, whereas the Norwegian utilities changed 
from promoting a technology-specific mix to wanting to do away with all support. 
In both countries, the utilities changed their positions, but their preferences did 
not become more similar over time.
We now turn to the four case-study countries – the UK, Poland, France and 
Sweden – where the roles played by the organizational fields are less well aligned 
to our initial assumption, asking: Is the variance in the importance of the organi-
zational field explained by field-internal changes too subtle to be captured by our 
initial two-by-two model (see Chapter 3)? Or is it caused by developments in the 
political field or the European environment?
The British organizational field remained segmented for a long time. The new 
market logic that resulted from the liberalization process swiftly gained a foothold 
in the 1990s, and this influenced the design of the first British support scheme, 
although few organizational field actors were particularly involved in this initial 
phase. Then, from 2000 and onwards, segmentation increased further. There were 
six dominant utilities; they had a strong relationship with the regulators, and they 
were all embedded in a similar market logic. Since the initial technology-neutral 
scheme failed to result in significant new production, few actors had a vested 
interest in protecting the initial scheme. That circumstance made possible a swift 
shift to another technology-neutral support-scheme design. Eventually, however, 
around 2010, there came a shift towards technology-development logics among 
the traditional utilities, due partly to their interest in developing nuclear. At this 
stage, some renewables actors were sceptical to greater technology-specificity, 
because they feared that this could favour nuclear and not renewables. However, 
they did not attract much attraction in the policy debate – and the field remained 
segmented, although the number of renewables actors had increased.
Institutional change at field level resulted in the special British auctioning and 
feed-in premium system – the Contracts for Difference. Later, changes in the 
political field led to shifts in how this scheme was operated, with fewer auction-
ing rounds than expected and thus less support. Still, the design of the new scheme 
was a result of a shift in institutional logic within the organizational field. The 
British feed-in support for small-scale renewable energy projects, however, was, 
as we discuss later, primarily the result of developments in the political field. In 
most instances, shifts in the British support mix were underpinned by changes in 
the dominant institutional logic of the organizational field. The British case shows 
how the institutional logic in a field may change without spurring conflicts that 
reduce the degree of segmentation.
The upshot is that changes in the British scheme in the period 2000–2004 
and after 2010 were mainly the result of internal changes in the organizational 
field, while the field played a less clear role for developments before 2000. The 
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adoption of small-scale support in the period 2005–2010 is better explained by 
developments in British politics, whereas the organizational field was of greater 
importance for the development of the support scheme for large-scale, low-carbon 
projects.
Poland has always had a strongly segmented field; still, the organizational field 
has not completely dominated the development of support schemes. The field has 
a special kind of technology-development logic, focused on the continuation of 
coal production, rather than renewables development. This logic seems to have 
remained largely unchanged over time. Initially, ministerial actors had the upper 
hand, but the coal utilities gradually became structurally dominant. The instability 
in renewables support contrasts with the stability found at the organizational field 
level. The chief explanation for this mismatch may be that the powerful utilities 
seem to have been less concerned about the type of support, and more about its 
(in)effectiveness.
The initial technology-specific feed-in scheme was introduced as a token 
adjustment to Western values after the fall of Communism. It is not surprising that 
policy development in a period of upheaval should differ from our expectations, 
which were formulated for more mundane policy-development processes. Later 
on, Poland largely introduced wide-ranging support-scheme changes in response 
to EU steering and European trends, but the segmented organizational field under-
mined the emergence of Polish renewables actors. Hence, renewable production 
never really became institutionalized within the Polish energy sector. There was 
considerable political commotion after 2010, but eventually there came a shift 
towards giving large-scale renewable energy projects technology-specific support 
and a new, marginal support for small-scale producers (prosumers). The segmen-
tation of the organizational field thus had a major impact, bringing instability and 
hindering institutionalization of renewables support, even though it appears not 
to have had much influence on the design of the support scheme. Hence, we con-
clude that variance in the importance of the organizational field in Poland is not 
related to changes in the degree of organizational field segmentation.
Initially, the French field was segmented, with one totally dominant util-
ity, Électricité de France. (EDF). Historically, the EDF has been embedded 
in a centralized nuclear-technology development logic, although it welcomed 
some market logic features during the 1990s. To a certain extent, the French 
adoption of a tendering measure in the mid-1990s, inspired by the UK, was in 
line with the increased market focus in the EDF at the time. But this may also 
be understood as primarily a symbolic gesture, enabling the EDF to appear 
positive to market thinking and renewables, while at the same time assuming 
that the new measure would not actually lead to much new production. In the 
period 2000–2004, France first adopted feed-in, in contrast to EDF recommen-
dations, but later the EDF succeeded in reducing the strength of the feed-in. 
Eventually, however, the old centralized nuclear-technology development logic 
of all the dominant French actors was challenged by an alternative decentral-
ized technology-development logic, and the EDF was not able to stand united 
against change.
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By 2010, the generous French feed-in scheme had spurred a host of new renew-
ables actors, and the governmental organizations had gained experience in how 
various actors responded to differing support schemes. Moreover, the Ministry 
of Ecology had taken over responsibility for renewable energy. Even though 
this rendered the field slightly less segmented than before, the EDF continued 
to have a very strong position. In essence, the incremental changes in the French 
scheme came about by trial and error, deliberations and a modest strengthening 
of the decentralized technology development logic within the organizational field. 
The French field was less segmented than before, but segmented nonetheless. By 
now it included actors that were willing and able to focus on energy sources other 
than nuclear. Although the French case largely confirms our initial expectations, it 
is puzzling that the French organizational field became more important after 2010. 
This is a result of French developments moving in tandem with developments 
within the European environment.
In Sweden, civil servants introduced the technology-neutral electricity certifi-
cate idea (from the Commission). Eventually corporate actors as well as politi-
cians endorsed it, as it was in line with the recent liberalization of the Swedish 
energy market. From 2000 and onwards, all major field-level actors in Sweden 
seem to have accepted and underpinned continuation of the electricity certificate 
scheme. The small-scale renewables support that was adopted after 2005 was pro-
moted mainly by marginal actors inspired by European developments. They suc-
ceeded due to strong political support, and despite the crucial role that Vattenfall 
and a few other utilities played in the organizational field.
After 2010, the organizational field in Sweden largely turned against the elec-
tricity certificate scheme (although not all actors agreed) – but, surprisingly, this 
had no impact on decision-making. Even though the Swedish and Norwegian situ-
ations were quite similar after 2010, the organizational field was far less influen-
tial in Sweden than in Norway. Despite the field being rather segmented, and with 
both public and private actors questioning the existing scheme, Swedish politi-
cians agreed to prolong it to 2030. True, the Swedish field was somewhat less 
segmented than previously, not least because of a host of new renewables actors. 
Still, it is surprising that the field could be so completely overruled.
Hence, Swedish developments after 2010 run counter to our initial expecta-
tions. At this stage, the Energy Agency in Sweden had grown quite powerful and 
some new renewables actors had emerged, and this to some extent counteracted 
the influence of the dominant utility Vattenfall. The main reason that the organi-
zational field in Sweden was overruled after 2010 seems to be the special and 
intense situation of political salience, although a slight reduction in segmentation 
in the organizational field also contributed.
Against this backdrop, we conclude that differences in institutional logics 
between the organizational fields in Germany, Poland, France and the UK on the 
one hand, and Sweden and Norway on the other, contribute to explain the emer-
gence of the difference between technology-specific countries and technology-
neutral ones, although other fields also have played a role here. Moreover, we see 
that segmentation tends to ensure that the organizational field becomes the crucial 
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locus for changes and stabilities in renewables support mixes – but this field is 
never alone in determining policy developments. Most importantly, political field 
dynamics may overrule factors internal to the organizational field, even when it 
is segmented.
Political fields: surprisingly important
We find significant variance across countries, and over time, in how domestic 
political fields play into support-mix developments. To a certain extent, this is 
a result of changes over time in the degree of political salience and distribution 
of structural resources in the political fields. Initially, we expected the political 
field to dominate the development of domestic renewable-energy policies most 
in a situation characterized by distributed structural resources and high-salience 
(legislature governing). Indeed, we see that the political field is more important 
when it is in this legislature governing mode. However, the political field is also 
important under other conditions: on the whole, it emerges as more important than 
we had assumed.
Table 11.3 summarizes the roles played by the political fields in the develop-
ment of renewables support schemes in the six countries. The table indicates that 
up to 2005, the political field had low salience in most countries, but this changed 
significantly after 2005. The political field played a more central role between 
2005 and 2009 than in any other period, but it was also surprisingly important 
after 2010. This greater political salience had considerable consequences for 
small-scale support: in several countries, politicians initiated the adoption of spe-
cial schemes for small-scale renewables in this period. In fact, Norway appears 
Table 11.3 Comparing the role of the political field across time and cases*
 Period
Country
Before 2000 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2016



































* Dark grey: high importance, light grey: some importance, white: almost no importance.
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to be the only country where the adoption and design of small-scale support were 
not heavily influenced by political dynamics – but Norway also has a far less 
extensive small-scale scheme than the others.
Legislature governing is relatively rare, as we detect only five such periods: 
three in Germany (2000–2004, 2005–2009, 2010–2016) and two in Sweden 
(2005–2009, 2010–2016). In all these periods, the political field played a central 
role in the development of renewables schemes, and in three, the political field 
was dominant.
Ministerial governing is the most dominant political field mode, detected 12 
times; and in most of these cases, the political field had only minor impact on 
the development of the support-scheme mix. Given our initial expectations, it is 
still surprising to find that, in 3 of the 12 instances, the political field had substan-
tial importance for the development of support schemes. We identify six periods 
characterized by politicizing, and in all of them the political field played a sig-
nificant role in how the renewables-scheme mixes developed. Thus, the political 
field emerges as more important in such situations then we had expected. Let us 
now explore in greater detail why the political fields have played differing roles 
in different countries.
Germany stands out as a country where the political field has been the main 
driver of the development of the support mix, although its relative salience 
decreased after 2010. First, the political field was more important for initial adop-
tion in Germany than elsewhere. At this stage, politicians contributed to making 
the issue salient, but some time passed before the traditionally strong organiza-
tional field actors – the electricity utilities in particular – started to protest against 
the feed-in scheme. The push-back from these actors continued to ensure that the 
issue remained politically salient for a very long time. From 2000 to 2010, politi-
cal field dynamics played the dominant role in enduring the continuation of the 
German scheme; even though the scheme was adjusted several times, these were 
incremental changes, in line with the path embarked on in the early 1990s. Ger-
many has a strong parliament, and this created structural conditions that allowed 
legislature governing, while the decision to transfer renewables responsibility to 
the Environmental Ministry added to this.
The long period of legislature governing in Germany helps to explain why, after 
2010, Germany exposed renewables investments more to electricity price devel-
opments. That the politicians for a long period refrained from giving the utili-
ties what they wanted created a boomerang effect. Because the feed-in scheme 
together with other factors eventually contributed to weakening the economic 
position of the large utilities, and they were ‘too large to fail’, many politicians 
eventually changed their minds and allowed these actors greater influence on 
the development of support schemes. Moreover, the critical situation after 2010 
forced politicians, corporations and public officials to engage in deeper delibera-
tions with one another. Since the issue had high salience and structural resources 
were distributed between many political actors, the political field gained the upper 
hand: legislature governing spurred a succession of political conflicts and com-
promises. In the first periods, the German case fits with our expectations; but after 
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2010, the increased strength of the organizational field and the European environ-
ment led to a complex process of policy development that involved many actors 
from multiple fields.
Developments in the UK are not equally in line with our initial expectations. 
For many decades, ministerial governing remained dominant. However, in 2005–
2009, politicization became evident, when small-scale renewables became subject 
to political competition; this eventually led to the adoption of a feed-in scheme 
for small-scale renewables. In the same period, politicization also occurred as a 
result of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s engagement in EU deliberations, endorsing 
a high renewables target had implications for the UK’s support schemes, towards 
greater technology-specificity (more high-cost renewables were deemed neces-
sary to reach the target). After 2010, the large-scale scheme became radically 
more technology-specific. This obtained political endorsement, but the main 
explanation for the shift lies in the organizational, not the political, field. The 
2015 elections had a major influence on how the new technology-specific scheme 
would be operated, with very few auctions taking place. This shows that in the UK 
system, the political field can be very powerful even when an issue is dominated 
by ministerial governing.
The special political system in the UK appears to make ministerial govern-
ing both more prevalent and potentially more powerful than in other countries. 
The UK has a two-party system, where the party with a majority in Parliament 
tends to control the government. This makes the dynamics of the political field 
different from what we had expected; as the structural resources are never really 
distributed, this dimension is less analytically useful here. Control of the execu-
tive branch matters much more than in the five other countries, and this has had 
profound effects on the dynamics in the political field. In any event, in the UK the 
initial technology-neutrality and the eventual shift to technology-specificity came 
about primarily because of developments in the organizational field – the excep-
tion being the politically induced small-scale feed-in.
Despite the peculiarities of the Polish political system, the political field per-
spective captures central aspects of how politics have played into support-scheme 
developments. The exception is the initial adoption of a support scheme, which 
took place in a period where a new political system was in the making and was 
thus hard to capture analytically. From 2000 and until 2010, however, the Polish 
political field was in ministerial governing mode; and, in line with our expec-
tations, the political field had very little impact on policy development in this 
period. After 2010, the issue became politicized and the Polish Parliament influ-
enced the support scheme for small-scale, but soon a new parliamentary majority 
introduced less-favourable legislation. While we note considerable unpredictabil-
ity and shifts in the decision-making process, making it challenging to pinpoint 
what importance it actually had in this period, the political field had at least some 
impact on support-scheme developments, particularly for small-scale projects.
In France, the initial, rather technology-neutral scheme was adopted under 
ministerial governing conditions, and in line with our expectations, the political 
field had hardly any influence. After 2000, renewables became politicized, and 
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this had major importance for the adoption of the feed-in scheme. In 2005–2009, 
the political field influenced the revision of the scheme, but renewables support 
gained salience primarily because of the French President’s commitments to 
higher renewables targets at the EU level. Moreover, significant adjustments in 
the support scheme after 2010, towards more auctioning, were made without the 
political field apparently playing much of a role – as expected under ministerial 
governing.
In Sweden, the political field was not very important for the initial adoption of a 
certificate scheme. As expected, the political field started to influence the develop-
ment of the scheme only after the issue became salient in the 2005–2009 period, 
but it was not until after 2010 that the political field became the key driver, ensur-
ing protection of the technology-neutrality of the scheme. The latter point is truly 
remarkable, in view of the resistance from the organizational field after 2010. 
Indeed, this is the only case where we find a rather segmented organizational field 
being overruled by developments in the political field. This is an essential element 
in explaining the technology-neutrality of the Swedish scheme after 2016.
In Norway, the political field played a minor role for the development of sup-
port schemes in the years leading up to 2005. After this, conflicts at the level of the 
organizational field made the issue increasingly salient, until finally the political 
majority abolished the existing scheme and shifted towards technology-neutral 
electricity certificates. After 2010, however, the political majority merely rubber-
stamped proposals developed by dominant actors within the organizational field. 
By then, Norwegian utilities had had a change of heart and readily got political 
endorsement for not including more Norwegian projects in the certificate schemes 
after 2010. In short, political field dynamics contributed to Norway’s opting for 
technology-neutrality, but the key drivers for later changes lay elsewhere.
Overall, we see that the political field has been crucial for the development of 
renewables-support mixes. Indeed, under certain rare conditions, it can remain the 
main driver of policy stability as well as change for extensive periods.
Multi-field dynamics
The assessments presented thus far in this chapter show clearly that the renewables-
support mixes in our six case-study countries in the late 2010s all resulted from 
dynamic developments within multiple fields, and their interaction over time. 
Both domestic fields (the political as well as the organizational) and the European 
environment have influenced policy developments in all six countries. Indeed, 
we cannot gain a good understanding of any of the six domestic policy processes 
without taking this multi-field nature into account.
We now turn to how and to what extent the varying fields have influenced 
developments in other fields. More specifically, we show that
1 segmentation within the organizational field tends to produce ministerial gov-
erning within the organizational field, and this enhances the autonomy of the 
organizational field over time;
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2 while the social architecture of the organizational field tends to remain fairly 
(but not fully) inert, the political fields are more malleable, and this has pro-
found effects on how policy processes unfold over time;
3 domestic policy developments in some countries are far more interdependent 
and intertwined with EU-level developments than other countries; and
4 the multi-field process is not a zero-sum game: several fields may be impor-
tant simultaneously, and the more fields that have an impact, the more com-
plex and murky the policy process is.
Segmentation spurring ministerial governing
Let us first assess the relationship between the political and domestic fields. We 
have analysed how the organizational and political fields match over 24 periods 
(four periods in six countries), and the organizational field is segmented in 19 of 
these. In 12 sub-cases, the political field is in the ministerial governing mode. 
Indeed, the most frequent combination is segmentation in the organizational field 
and ministerial governing in the political field: it occurs twice in four countries 
(the UK, Poland, Sweden and Norway) and three times in France – but never 
in Germany. In these situations, the organizational field drives support-scheme 
developments, while the political field primarily performs rubber-stamping. But 
why do ministerial governing and segmentation go together so well? Systematic 
examination of the chronological relationship between the two modes may offer a 
better understanding of this causal relationship.
Let us first compare the cases where segmentation remained unchanged over 
several periods, but where the mode of the political field changed. In the UK, 
Poland, France and Sweden, ‘segmentation-ministerial governing’ situations 
changed to segmentation combined with either legislature governing or politiciz-
ing. Incremental changes within the political field spurred these shifts in the mode 
of the political field, sometimes combined with European environment develop-
ments. Ministerial governing was combined with another organizational field 
mode than segmentation in only one instance: Norway in the 2000–2004 period, 
when ministerial governing was combined with turf battle. This was a temporary 
situation, as the turf battle within the organizational field eventually created politi-
cizing within the political field. This shows that conflicts within the organizational 
field can spur changes in the mode of the political field – but in our sample, that is 
more the exception than the rule.
Germany is the only case where the organizational field was not segmented 
most of the time. Here, the conflicts between the two turfs at the level of the 
organizational field ensured that renewables support had high political salience. 
Comparison of Norway and Germany illustrates how the political field may 
respond to organizational field turf battles. In the Norwegian case, the political 
field was mobilized to solve conflicts at the level of the organizational field. It 
did take several years before the issue became salient, but eventually the politi-
cians responded by adopting a new support scheme. However, this decision did 
not spur the creation of new firms or business models that could undermine the 
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segmented state of the organizational field. Rather, together with other factors, it 
led to greater segmentation, and the issue was again dealt with as ministerial gov-
erning within the political field. Thus, later changes in the support mix in Norway 
after 2010 were solved through negotiations between field-level actors, merely 
rubber-stamped by the political majority.
In Germany, turf battles at the organizational field level had much longer-
lasting effects on the mode of the political field, but the impact also runs in the 
other direction: a series of political decisions challenged the dominant organiza-
tional field actors, the utilities. The initial renewables support strengthened the 
new renewables actors, and this in itself hindered segmentation of the field, in 
turn contributing to the continued high political saliency of the issue. Because 
the political majority had committed to technology-specificity, this approach was 
sustained, which again strengthened the position of the renewables actors. Hence, 
legislature governing decision-making hindered segmentation in the organiza-
tional field, which again ensured that the dominance of the legislature governing 
mode was remarkably long-lasting. The clashing dynamisms between the two 
domestic fields forced actors within both of them to devote considerable attention 
and creativity to the issue for a long time, eventually leading to creative processes 
and merging of two institutional logics previously regarded as opposites. When 
this happened after 2010, a segmentation process set in at the organizational field 
level. However, it took almost two decades before such collaborative and creative 
processes emerged.
The ‘segmentation spurring ministerial governing’ tendency means that we can 
expect major political decisions relating to segmented organizational fields to be 
resolved through negotiations between organizational field-level actors, and not 
through open political deliberations. Note that this does not necessarily imply that 
the commercial organizations have the upper hand; public governments may also 
be influential in such situations. Moreover, this is only a tendency, not a rule. It 
may require considerable effort, but politicizing issues under such conditions is 
not impossible. Indeed, we find many examples of political dynamics gaining sali-
ence also when the issue pertains to a segmented organizational field.
The inertia of organizational fields and the malleability  
of political fields
We detect rather few shifts in the degree of segmentation in the domestic organi-
zational fields over time. In most countries there have been only slight shifts from 
rather segmented to fully segmented, or the reverse. The German and Norwegian 
organizational fields are different. While the Norwegian field merely shifted from 
segmented to turf battle and back again, the German field changed incrementally 
and substantially over time, from pluralist to eventually becoming segmented. 
German reunification resulted in less unity within the organizational field of 
electricity than seen in most other European countries. Eventually, the German 
renewables support scheme contributed to the creation of a host of new actors that 
in turn led to conflicts and obstructed segmentation. In Norway, periods with less 
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segmentation were primarily the result of conflict between governmental organi-
zations and the utilities
In all the other case-study countries – the UK, Poland, France and Sweden – 
the organizational fields remained more or less segmented throughout the whole 
period. True, conflicts over renewables policy may have created slightly less unity 
within these organizational fields, but not enough to change the degree of segmen-
tation significantly. However, it should be borne in mind that renewables support 
schemes, or conflict over these schemes, are merely one among a whole range 
of factors that may undercut segmentation, or strengthen it. With the exception 
of Germany, renewables policies seldom influence the degree of segmentation 
within organizational fields.
Political fields are far more malleable to change. It is particularly the high/low 
salience dimension in the political field that changes, whereas the distribution of 
structural resources is less malleable. We have detected three main reasons for 
shifts towards greater salience. First, changes in salience may result from pro-
cesses internal to the political field. This may be due to changes in the political 
majority, to the emergence of new political alliances or to shifts in the size of 
various political parties in the parliaments after an election. For instance, politi-
cians from differing political parties created a surprising new alliance for feed-in 
in Germany during the 1990s, but later election results in Germany also created 
alliances that underpinned the salience of the issue. In other instances, marginal 
political actors almost single-handedly succeeded making renewables support 
more salient. The clearest illustration of this in our sample is the Green Party in 
France, which managed to politicize renewables support in the 2000–2004 period, 
in turn leading the other political parties to develop a more active approach to the 
issue as well. Part of the explanation to this shift was that the Green Party was 
included in the governmental coalition for the first time, giving the Greens far 
more authority to promote the issue than otherwise.
Second, high salience can result from conflicts at the level of the organizational 
field. This happened in Germany in 2010–2016, and in Norway in 2005–2010. 
In both cases, the political parties shifted their positions in response to develop-
ments in the organizational field; in the end, key actors from both fields engaged 
in negotiations and developed solutions that could gain acceptance within both 
fields. In Norway, it took many years before politicians responded to the organiza-
tional field conflict, and the politicization did not last long. By contrast, the issue 
remained politicized for a long time in Germany, and two decades of tumultuous 
conflicts between the political and the organizational field reinforced the enduring 
political salience.
Third, we detected two instances of issues becoming highly salient because 
political leaders made bold domestic commitments at the EU level, seeking to 
influence EU-level developments. In the 2005–2009 period, both French Presi-
dent Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Blair committed their countries to adopt-
ing the 2020 renewables targets that were binding on the EU level – and in both 
instances, this later bolstered the arguments of domestic actors calling for more 
elaborate domestic support schemes. Hence, the interrelationship with EU-level 
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developments helped to enhance the clout of the domestic political leaders, and it 
spurred politicization at the domestic level.
To a certain extent, the malleability of the political fields can compensate 
for the de-politicizing effect of high degrees of segmentation at the level of the 
organizational field. Even when an issue relates to a segmented organizational 
field, politicization is possible – if politicians follow the issue for some time and 
engage sufficiently to gain a good understanding of it, they may in the end make 
decisions counter to the arguments of powerful actors in the organizational field. 
It is especially interesting to note that national political leaders can use their Euro-
pean positions to enhance their clout in relation to strong domestic organizational 
fields.
Varying interdependencies between domestic fields and the European 
environment
The interdependence between the domestic and the European environment varies 
across countries, as well as over time. Germany is in a special category, as it has 
played a crucial role for developments in both vertical and horizontal Europeani-
zation, and it has also been highly dependent on EU decision-making for its own 
domestic policies. Germany has been the major determinant of EU policy devel-
opment, serving as the main source of inspiration for other European countries – 
but after 2010 it also significantly changed its support mix (partly) as a result of 
EU steering. Poland, France, Sweden and Norway have all been influenced by 
vertical as well as horizontal Europeanization, although at differing times and 
to differing degrees. The UK has played a special role, developing (over several 
decades) support-scheme models that the Commission later partly copied in its 
EU-level policies. Eventually, France also came to play a somewhat similar role 
to the UK in EU policy developments.
While this assessment has shown that the European environment approach can 
offer a useful and nuanced understanding of the importance of Europeanization 
to domestic developments, we have thus far not examined the differences in the 
interrelationships between domestic and European developments across the coun-
tries, as well as the implications for domestic and EU-level policy developments. 
Some countries tend to be more affected by EU developments than others; and, 
the reverse, developments at the EU level tend to depend more on domestic devel-
opments in some countries than in others.
Multi-field processes: not a zero-sum game
As the issue of renewables-support mix has grown in importance, so has the 
number of fields that have influenced its development. We have noted the slight 
tendency for all fields to become more important over time, indicating that devel-
opments in support arrangements for renewable electricity gradually become 
more and more complex. Some of this can be explained by the growth in the 
number of instruments in the domestic support mixes, but it also results from the 
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growing numbers of actors that pay attention to and have authority over the devel-
opment of renewables support schemes. Juxtaposing Tables 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3 in 
this chapter, we see that there is no neat pattern where it is easy to identify which 
field is most important in each of the six case-study countries or periods. Indeed, 
many countries have experienced one or several periods where three fields have 
been significant or important at the same time.
The period after 2010 is special in the sense that the organizational field gained 
significance in all countries, except Sweden, and it had high impact in four out 
of the six countries. In Germany, the UK, France and Norway, the organizational 
field became far more salient than in the previous period; and in Poland, it was as 
important as before. Here Sweden is the deviant case, as the organizational field 
lost in importance. However, we cannot find any other period where one of the 
fields has been so clearly superior in so many countries at the same time. This 
seems quite puzzling, as the European environment has had at least some impor-
tance in five of the six countries in this period, and it is in EU governing mode. 
Moreover, after 2010, the organizational field is segmented in all fields, also in 
Germany and Norway, in contrast to earlier periods.
As we have limited information about the interrelationship between domestic 
organizational field actors and key actors at the European level, it is difficult to 
know what to make of this pattern. It may indicate that greater domestic seg-
mentation helped spur the increased Europeanization that occurred in this period, 
including the shift in horizontal Europeanization from underpinning fixed feed-in 
to promoting feed-in premium combined with auctioning and greater degree of 
vertical EU steering. Except for Poland and Norway, the domestic organizational 
fields have been dominated by big electricity utilities active in many other Euro-
pean countries and with a strong presence in Brussels. This may have contributed 
to more direct relationships between utilities and EU-level actors. However, the 
political field was not marginalized in this period. 
Conclusions
Through systematic comparative assessments, across countries and over time, in 
this chapter we have offered answers to our research question: what can explain 
the differences and similarities in renewables support mixes across countries and 
over time? There is no single explanatory factor that explains why some coun-
tries have ended up with largely technology-specific support mixes, and others 
with technology-neutral mixes. Rather, we found it essential to account for devel-
opments in multiple fields, over long stretches of time, in order to understand 
why two groups of countries emerged, and why the technology-specific coun-
tries became more similar over time, while the technology-neutral ones became 
increasingly different. Moreover, it emerged that countries sometimes end up with 
rather similar support schemes, for quite different reasons.
Developments in the European environment around the turn of the millen-
nium were involved in creating a split between technology-specific Germany 
and France on the one hand, and technology-neutral Sweden and Norway on 
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the other. By contrast, developments in the organizational field at the country 
level can explain why Poland and the UK came to join Germany and France, 
while Norway became increasingly technology-neutral. The political field proved 
especially important for developments in Germany and Sweden, accounting for 
consistencies in the approaches taken by both countries. It was the political field 
that ensured that Sweden retained its support mix basically unchanged, whereas 
Norway came to scrap its support for large-scale renewables due to developments 
in the organizational field.
Overall, we find that the European environment has influenced domestic sup-
port mixes less than the domestic fields. Still, it has played a crucial role for 
support-mix developments in all countries, especially after it shifted to EU gov-
erning mode after 2010. Domestic organizational fields are especially important 
when segmented, but even under such conditions, other fields are never pow-
erless. Political fields are more prone to drive support-mix developments under 
conditions when the legislature governs, but they can also be important when the 
political field is characterized by politicization.
We have detected intriguing patterns in the relationships between multiple fields 
over time. Segmentation at the level of the organizational field tends to make the 
political field gradually less important, but this may shift if political actors suc-
ceed in politicizing an issue. In addition to developments within the political field 
itself, such politicization may also result from a wide range of dynamics: the 
broader European environment or conflicts at the level of the organizational field. 
We note the concurrence of EU governing and growing importance of segmented 
organizational fields after 2010, but we find it challenging to fully explain this 
pattern. However, it is clear that there is no zero-sum game between the multiple 
fields as regards influence. As renewables support mixes become more complex 
but also more important, many different fields become increasingly influential.
12  Implications for climate 
research and policy studies
Elin Lerum Boasson
Introduction
The multi-field approach was initially developed to examine climate policy 
change in one country, Norway (Boasson 2015), but in this book, we have shown 
how it can be applied to a much broader range of countries. While many excellent 
books on public policy focus on one rather narrow topic and contribute to one 
research frontier, this volume has been planned as more of a cornucopia, provid-
ing contributions to a broad range of ongoing scientific discussions. This chapter 
shows how the main conclusions emanating from Chapter 11 contribute to social 
science discussions on Europeanization, public policy processes, climate transi-
tions and more.
EU implementation and Europeanization research have blossomed – but still 
we lack analytical tools necessary to answer a crucial question: Under which con-
ditions does EU steering have the most profound impacts on domestic develop-
ments? With its conceptualization of the ‘European environment’, the multi-field 
approach used in this book opens up a new research frontier with precisely this 
question at the centre. Further, by introducing temporality into Europeanization 
studies, the contributions to this collection enhance our ability to examine the var-
ious ways in which Europeanization may affect domestic policy developments.
The existence of many public-policy frameworks has facilitated the emergence 
of multiple parallel research traditions, but the perennial competition among the 
dominant frameworks obstructs scientific progress with respect to central ques-
tions such as: Under which conditions are corporate actors and civil service the 
most influential? When do political actors have independent importance, and act 
not only as instruments for other actors? The multi-field approach enables us to 
explore such questions in a nuanced way. It also opens up for a broader range of 
temporal change patterns than the ‘long periods of stability, short periods of rap-
ture’ storyline so characteristic of policy studies.
Finally, many analytical approaches present climate-transition processes as 
dominated by neatly compartmentalized economic-technological changes, with 
key actors behaving in economically rational and easily predictable ways. In this 
book, we have shown that climate transitions tend to be complex, chaotic and 
partly opaque, with key actors having a hard time determining their preferences.
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Rather than encouraging researchers to compromise on crude simplifications, 
the multi-field framework allows for assessments that consider real-world intri-
cate conditions. It opens up for a wide diversity of behavioural patterns, pays 
attention to political and cultural-institutional factors and provides analytical tools 
for examining and capturing climate transitions in coherent and realistic ways.
Bringing temporality into Europeanization research
This book confirms some of the findings from the new wave of EU-implementation 
research while adding new elements to our understanding of Europeanization and 
EU implementation – in particular, by enabling us to consider the analytical impli-
cations of the temporal dimensions of Europeanization.
Early studies of EU policy implementation focused primarily on legal com-
pliance with EU rules. This research tradition eventually expanded to include a 
broader range of domestic effects of EU steering (see Héritier 2001; Mastenbroek 
2005). For instance, Eva Thomann and colleagues have shown that EU rules 
tend to undergo change during the process of domestic transposition: as a result, 
implementation of EU policies may in itself spur differentiation (Thomann 2015, 
2019; Thomann and Sager 2017). Our findings support this: in all our six case-
study countries, domestic conditions have played a major role in determining the 
effects of European impulses. This has been especially clear in periods where the 
EU has had little formal authority and vertical pressures towards Europeanization 
have been modest. For instance, the receptiveness of Norway and Sweden to EU-
level campaigns for electricity certificates helped to ensure that these two Nordics 
ended up with a far more technology-neutral support mix than other countries. 
Differences in how specific EU rules are interpreted and transformed during the 
implementation process can help to explain cross-country differences, but that is 
far from the only reason why Europeanization creates differences across countries.
Second, we have shown that both vertical and horizontal Europeanization play 
into domestic policy developments, and that both dimensions must be taken into 
account in order to understand why the European environment contributes to dif-
ferences and similarities across countries. These findings are in line with the con-
clusions reached by Israel Solorio and Helge Jörgens (2017) in their assessment 
of the Europeanization of renewable energy policy. The European environment 
has played into the developments in all countries, but at varying times, in differing 
ways and with surprisingly varied consequences. In most countries, the support 
mixes have been affected by vertical as well as horizontal Europeanization. In 
the early stages, vertical and horizontal change impulses tended to have oppos-
ing effects: the European Commission (the Commission) promoted technology-
neutral support, while at the same time the technology-specific German scheme 
diffused widely. Here, lack of consistency across the two dimensions spurred dif-
ferentiation. However, after 2010, both dimensions underpinned the shift to feed-
in premium combined with auctioning, although the effects of this have been less 
pronounced in Norway and Sweden. By examining both Europeanization dimen-
sions, we gain a fuller understanding than if we had focused on only one of them.
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Third, the effects of strong EU top-down steering (high degree of vertical Euro-
peanization) is higher when it occurs in tandem with one policy idea gaining popu-
larity across Europe (high degree of horizontal Europeanization). The importance 
of what we have termed the European environment increased after 2010, when 
the EU gained more authority as regards the design of support schemes, and one 
specific support-scheme mix became dominant. While others have juxtaposed the 
effects of horizontal and vertical Europeanization (see Börzel and Risse 2012), 
we explore the relationship between the two. Each of the two dimensions can be 
effective on their own terms, but the overall Europeanization effect tends to be 
stronger when they work in conjunction. However, it is by no means necessary 
for horizontal Europeanization to be strong in order for vertical Europeanization 
to produce consequences, or the reverse. For instance, EU rules gained greater 
salience after 2010 – but it had been relevant also in earlier stages when it was not 
combined with strong horizontal Europeanization.
Fourth, we gain a more thorough understanding of how Europeanization pro-
cesses affect domestic policy developments when the temporality of the process is 
taken into account. The literature on EU implementation (see review in Thomann 
2019; Saurugger 2014: 123–144) as well as the literature on Europeanization 
more broadly (Börzel and Risse 2012; Saurugger 2014: 123–144) has been fairly 
static, dominated by intense scrutiny of brief snapshots of Europeanization, with-
out following Europeanization over longer stretches of time. Because there has 
been so little stability in EU renewables support steering (see Boasson 2021, this 
book), examination of brief snapshots would give limited understanding of how 
the EU affects domestic renewables support. There is no reason to assume that 
renewables policy is special in this respect: the EU operates with a broad policy 
portfolio, repeatedly revising and transforming most of these policies (Chini and 
Borragán 2015). A better understanding of the temporal character of Europeaniza-
tion may facilitate studies of differences in the importance of the European envi-
ronment across issue-areas.
The temporal character of how domestic developments have interrelated with 
developments in the larger European environment was found to differ across our 
six case studies, but we can also note some commonalities. From our compara-
tive case studies, we can specify four Europeanization processes with different 
temporal dimensions, probably also with different long-term consequences for 
policy developments. Table 12.1 presents these four temporal patterns: layered 
Europeanization, frozen Europeanization, shallow Europeanization and shielded 
Europeanization.
Layered Europeanization has dominated in France, while also playing out to 
a more moderate extent in Norway. In France, the European environment has 
repeatedly influenced domestic-level developments; later effects added to, rather 
than replaced, earlier policies. Two horizontal Europeanization effects were 
important to France: UK inspiration led the country to adopt tendering in the 
mid-1990s, and Germany inspired it to adopt feed-in a few years later. After 2005, 
vertical Europeanization gradually became more important, first when the advent 
of binding targets underpinned domestic ambitions, and second when the new 
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Table 12.1 Four temporal Europeanization processes




Role of the Repeated high High impact Causes repeated Small
European impact initially, but change, but 
environment not later none become 
institutionalized
Degree of Domestic and Domestic European factors Domestic 
stability European factors factors
and change factors
determined by
Countries France, Norway Sweden Poland Germany, 
the UK
EU state-aid guidelines influenced the shift to feed-in premiums combined with 
auctioning. This resembles what Wolfgang Streek and Kathleen Thelen (2005: 24) 
describe as layering, where ‘active sponsorship of amendments, additions, or revi-
sions to an existing set of institutions’ and new elements ‘[set] in motion dynam-
ics through which they, over time, actively crowd out or supplant by default the 
old system’. Layering involves amendments, revisions or additions to existing 
support measures (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 16). While Thelen and colleagues 
focus on domestic causes to layering, we include only layering that results from 
Europeanization processes here. Most countries have renewables support mixes 
that reflect several layers of domestic policy outputs, but in France the layering 
has resulted more specifically from differing Europeanization effects over time.
Differing Europeanization signals have also led to layered Europeanization 
in Norway. First, weak vertical Europeanization, combined with some horizon-
tal inspiration from Sweden, caused it to adopt an electricity certificate scheme. 
Later, horizontal Europeanization contributed to the introduction of a very modest 
investment support for small-scale solar, whereas the EU decision to drop bind-
ing targets for domestic renewables underpinned the decision to not include new 
projects in the certificate scheme after 2021.
Frozen Europeanization occurs in Sweden and differs from layered Europe-
anization in that the initial impulse for change came primarily from the Euro-
pean environment, whereas later European processes of change hardly affected 
domestic-level developments. This is a well-known phenomenon in institutional 
theory: initial developments create feedback effects that lead to increasing stabil-
ity over time. In the words of Paul Pierson (2004: 11) ‘dynamics triggered by an 
event or process at one point in time reproduce themselves, even in the absence of 
the recurrence of original event or process’. Swedish policy-makers were initially 
influenced by EU-level actors to adopt green certificate schemes; this approach 
eventually became entrenched at the national level. Because the initial impulse 
for change was strongly institutionalized, Sweden later became basically immune 
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to later shifts and changes in the European environment. Indeed, the incremen-
tal changes in its domestic support mix resulted mainly from feedback effects 
and dynamics in the domestic political and organizational fields, not those at the 
European level. In Norway, the effects of the certificate scheme idea gradually 
undermined the certificate scheme while in Sweden, having politicians committed 
to the measure ensured stability.
Shallow Europeanization occurs when a country changes policies in response 
to vertical and horizontal Europeanization, without institutionalizing the new 
rules and practices. We detect this type of Europeanization in Poland. While 
both frozen and layered Europeanization resemble temporal mechanisms as 
described by historical institutionalist scholars, shallow Europeanization is 
more in line with the perspectives of sociological institutionalism. Domes-
tic policy-makers introduce new support schemes because they aim to main-
tain legitimacy, not because they aim to increase domestic renewable energy 
production (DiMaggio and Powell [1983] 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Actual developments within the organizational field of electricity production 
are largely decoupled from the renewables policy discussion, so new support 
schemes rarely gain a foothold (Brunsson 1989). We have noted the lack of 
institutionalization and thus constant instability and change in Poland. It has 
been very receptive to signals of change, in terms of horizontal trends and 
vertical EU steering – resulting in profound instability. Also, the UK has been 
marked by instability, but whereas that was caused largely by domestic actors 
changing preferences, Polish instability has been spurred primarily by shift-
ing signals regarding Europeanization. The renewables support changes result-
ing from Europeanization remain shallow in Poland and thus inherently open 
to new shallow changes. Because few successive support-scheme mixes have 
led to renewables investments and the organizational field has remained rather 
unchanged, they are not institutionalized.
Finally, shielded Europeanization played out in the UK and Germany. Despite 
significant differences between them, there are intriguing similarities in how they 
relate to Europeanization of renewables support. In both the UK and Germany, 
the domestic support schemes for renewables have inspired other countries and 
EU legislators, whereas the development of domestic policy seems generally 
unaffected by either vertical or horizontal Europeanization. Hence, both coun-
tries are entangled in broader processes of Europeanization, although it is difficult 
to specify the exact effect of these processes on domestic-level developments. 
However, the two countries differ as regards why they are shielded from being 
heavily affected by the European environment. Whereas German governments 
have worked hard to obstruct EU steering, engaging in repeated litigation, British 
governments have generally acted in line with broad EU rules. Therefore, neither 
the Commission nor the CJEU has actively challenged British practices, whereas 
German governments have repeatedly been involved in litigation, fighting hard to 
avoid having to change their practices because of EU steering.
Still, Germany and the UK resemble each other in the sense that change and 
stabilities in their support schemes result mainly from domestic factors. True, 
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there have been some instances of EU-level developments affecting domestic 
processes in both countries – with respect to the adoption of small-scale feed-
in support in the UK and the post-2010 changes in Germany – but also in these 
cases, domestic actors have been the most important, acting in tandem with the 
Europeanization pressures.
On this backdrop, we can develop four expectations that can be explored within 
other issue-areas:
• A country entangled in layered Europeanization will repeatedly add new ele-
ments to its policy in line with changes in vertical and horizontal Europeani-
zation processes. Stability and change in domestic-level policy developments 
will result from domestic as well as European factors and processes.
• A country entangled in a frozen Europeanization process will hardly be influ-
enced by ongoing processes of change in the European environment – as long 
as its rules are in line with EU rules. Whether the policy area is characterized 
by stability or change will depend mainly on domestic factors.
• A country entangled in a shallow Europeanization process will repeatedly 
change its policy in line with changes in vertical and horizontal Europe-
anization processes. Stability and change will depend largely on European 
developments.
• A country entangled in shielded Europeanization will not be particularly 
influenced by vertical and horizontal Europeanization processes. Stabil-
ity and change in domestic policy developments will result primarily from 
domestic-level factors and processes.
The organizational field lens shows how culture and 
structure shape policy
While it is common to assume that economically powerful corporations will be 
superior in policy development, this has rarely been so with developments regard-
ing renewables support in our six case-study countries. True, cultural-institutional 
and structural features play key roles in policy development, but not in the same 
ways that many political science theories would have us believe.
Firstly, although we conclude that organizational fields tend to be more 
important when they are segmented, we also show that the importance of organi-
zational fields should not be overestimated, not even under conditions of seg-
mentation. We find two instances where organizational fields were not important 
when segmented (Poland before 1999, Sweden after 2010), and many examples 
of segmented fields that have only been moderately influential when segmented. 
In France during 2000–2004, France and the UK during 2005–2009, Sweden 
during 2005–2009 and 2010–2016, as well as Germany after 2010, political 
dynamics reduced the importance of segmented organizational fields, causing 
developments that partly or fully contrasted with the positions of dominant 
organizations, public as well as private, within the segmented organizational 
fields. This indicates that the importance of segmented organizational fields 
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depends partly on developments in other involved fields, especially within the 
domestic political field.
Moreover, we detect a ‘segmentation spurring ministerial governing’ tendency, 
which means that policy development relating to segmented organizational fields 
often are dealt with by one ministry, and not the political field more broadly. 
Under such conditions, we can expect major political decisions to be resolved 
through negotiations among organizational field-level actors, and not through 
open political deliberations. Note that this does not necessarily imply that the 
commercial organizations necessarily have the upper hand; public governments 
may also be influential in such a situation. Moreover, this is only a tendency, 
not a rule. It may require considerable effort, but politicizing issues under such 
conditions is far from impossible. Indeed, we find many examples of political 
dynamics gaining salience also in relation to issues pertaining to segmented 
organizational fields.
Secondly, changes in institutional logics over time help to explain policy 
change over time, and differences in institutional logics across countries help 
to explain differences across countries. Our study, with its long time-perspec-
tive, has clearly shown that organizational field actors do not tend to have stable 
positions over time. Rather than acting on the basis of calculations of economic 
interests, actors draw on differing institutional logics; when these logics change, 
actors also tend to change their interest perceptions. With the exception of Poland 
and Sweden, the domestic support mixes after 2010 have largely reflected the 
institutional logics dominating the organizational fields. For instance, shifts and 
changes in the technology-specific approaches of Germany and France after 2010 
resulted partly from changes in the dominant institutional logics. In both coun-
tries, the technology-development logic and market logics merged to some extent, 
and the level of institutional conflicts decreased. Also, in the UK we can note a 
shift in logic, but there it caused a change away from technology-neutrality and 
towards technology-specificity. The clear exception is Poland, where actors in the 
organizational field have paid less attention to design features, focusing instead on 
distorting long-term stability and thus preventing the schemes from creating deep 
changes. In Sweden, changes in logics at the organizational field level have had 
less impact on the support mix.
While institutional logics have gained traction in business studies after 2005, 
to the extent that it has become established as a research school in its own right 
(Ocasio et al. 2017), we are (to our knowledge) the first scholars to apply this 
approach to explore policy stability and change. This has proved very fruitful, 
leading us to conclude that cultural-institutional features may well be more impor-
tant than generally recognized in the literature on energy and climate governance.
As organizational fields of electricity production tend to be segmented, we find 
limited variation in the degree of segmentation across cases in this study. For 
more general insights into the role of organizational fields across policy areas, 
we need studies of other policy areas, where organizational fields have other 
characteristics.
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Political dynamics can spur change but also ensure stability
The political field perspective fills a void in sociological field studies, as well as 
in studies of policy processes. Sociologists who study fields have generally paid 
scant attention to politics; and, although political scientists are understandably 
far more interested in politicians, there is no tradition of exploring the relative 
importance of political fields for policy developments. Scholars of comparative 
politics tend to focus on one aspect of the political field at a time (such as the elec-
tion system or patterns in legislative voting), and these studies are rarely related 
to policy developments. Students of policy processes as well as historical institu-
tionalists tend to assume that politicians play marginal roles within stable policy 
areas, whereas infrequent moments of change are associated with rare bursts of 
high political activity (Baumgartner et al. 2018; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; 
Herweg et al. 2018). These brief periods of change are described in slightly dif-
ferent ways and have been given various names, such as ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993), ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) 
or ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon [1984] 2011). In this book, we have docu-
mented temporal features of policy-change process other than those prescribed by 
such perspectives, and we find that the political field has played another role than 
these perspectives would lead us to believe.
First, we show that under certain conditions, political actors and political 
dynamics can influence domestic policy developments rather independently of 
what goes on in adjacent fields. The multi-field approach does not rest on a priori 
assumptions concerning the relative importance of the political field, but it pre-
dicts that political fields will play varying roles under differing circumstances. 
This enables us to assess and understand variance in the role of political dynamics 
across issue-areas, countries and time. We find that political parties, governments 
and legislators are not mere agents of voters and/or powerful economic actors, 
or carriers of domestic regulatory traditions. Rather, they can have independent 
importance and their behaviour is to a certain extent affected by the social archi-
tecture of the political fields, and both cognitive scripts and the distribution of 
structural powers can be relevant here.
Brief politicization leads politicians to approach a given issue in a very differ-
ent way from what they had done previously, and that can be enough to ensure 
that political field dynamics overrule impulses from the organizational fields. If 
an issue becomes salient and thus politicized, this often leads to change – as we 
can see in the 2005–2009 phase, where the growing salience of climate change in 
general, and renewables more specifically, led to the adoption of a range of sup-
port schemes for small-scale renewables projects in many countries. Moreover, in 
Norway and France, changes along the salience dimension primarily affected the 
development of support schemes for large-scale renewables projects.
Second, wide distribution of structural resources tends to make the political 
field more important. Germany and Sweden are the only countries where the 
political field has played a major role for policy development over a long period. 
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Both countries have political fields with significant distribution of structural 
resources; further, several ministries share responsibility for renewables policy 
issues, and there are strong parliaments and often-unruly parliamentary situations 
where several political parties share majority power. These conditions seem to 
underpin more enduring engagement on the part of political actors. While politi-
cal salience can give the political field importance in brief periods, it alone cannot 
ensure that the political field will remain important for longer stretches, unless the 
relevant structural resources are distributed.
The effect of the structural dimension was slightly different in the UK from the 
other countries: here the role of the political fields appears considerable also when 
formal powers are gathered in one strong party in government – whereas, in other 
countries, having distributed structural resources served to enhance the impor-
tance of the political fields. In several of our case-study countries, aspects of the 
structural dimension in the field change over time, such as how many ministers 
share responsibility and whether the government is in the majority – but we do 
not find similar variation over time in the UK. Indeed, the British election system 
seems to produce a political field with structural dynamics other than those in the 
other countries in our sample.
Third, political field dynamics can ensure both change and stability in policy 
development. Political actors and political dynamics play different roles in the 
policy-change processes presented in this book from what tends to be captured 
by studies guided by the dominant policy process frameworks and historical 
institutionalism. Historical institutionalist accounts generally show that policy 
stability results from social structures outside the political field, such as the gov-
ernmental apparatus and interest groups that depend on a certain policy outcome 
(Pierson 2004; Moe 2015). In multi-field language: such studies show that policy 
feedback effects within the organizational field tend to sustain or create incre-
mental changes in a policy area over time. Both historical institutionalism and 
policy-process framework usually see periods of dramatic change – termed ‘criti-
cal junctures’, ‘punctuated equilibriums’ (Baumgartner and Jones [1993] 2009) 
or ‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon [1984] 2011) – as times when politicians 
become more active. All these approaches lead us to expect that the political field 
can only drive change, not ensure stability; further, that when politicians become 
highly involved, they will aim for change.
There is nothing in our findings to indicate that the political field cannot drive 
change through brief, dramatic and intense periods of political involvement. 
Indeed, we saw some examples of this, for instance in Norway in the 2005–2009 
period, when conflicts at the level of the organizational field led the issue to be 
politicized, and the political field finally ensured a change in policy. The introduc-
tion of feed-in for small-scale renewables projects in the UK in that same period 
also resulted from such brief politicization. But on the whole, few of the salient 
twists and turns in policy have been characterized by brief, dramatic and intense 
periods of political involvement. Indeed, policy changes taking place outside the 
political field can be very important: this goes for most of the many changes in 
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the UK and Poland, as well as for the initial introduction of technology-neutral 
support in Sweden, and the policy change in Norway after 2010.
Moreover, we have found that strong involvement of the political field in policy 
developments can help to create stability – sometimes even ensuring policy sta-
bility despite change-impulses within the organizational field. This was particu-
larly clear in Sweden and in Germany, where many politicians worked hard for 
years, trying and suceeding to obstruct policy change. Thus we can conclude that 
both low political salience and high political salience may lead to change, or to 
stability.
Fourth, policy development may unfold in many different temporal patterns. 
The temporality of the policy change described in this book differs from stand-
ard accounts guided by historical institutionalism, punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones [1993] 2009) and multiple streams theory (Kingdon 
[1984] 2011). All these approaches assume a similar temporal pattern of policy 
development, where long periods of stasis are interrupted by short periods of hec-
tic change. None of our six countries developed its renewables support mix in 
ways that fit this description. For Sweden, we found no distinct periods of brief, 
dramatic and intense change: and the only period with intense political conflict, 
post-2010, led to stability, not change. In the five other countries there were many 
periods of change, often occurring five to eight years (or fewer) after the previous 
significant change. Overall, developments in support to renewables have been 
characterized by enduring change; and incremental or abrupt changes have often 
occurred in rapid succession, not after long stable periods.
On this backdrop, we conclude that in order to make sense of policy change 
and stability, we need to be open to temporal patterns other than the dominant 
‘long periods of stability, short periods of rapture’ storyline. Further, we must 
stop equating high political involvement with change, and low involvement with 
stability.
Lessons for climate and energy policy and transition studies
Energy and climate policy processes may indeed be messy. Still, it is possible to 
understand them, especially when the political and cultural-institutional aspects 
are recognized. Technological and economic factors are important, but they alone 
cannot explain similarities and differences across countries. Actors embedded in 
different social fields tend to understand and respond differently to similar techno-
logical and economic factors. Yes, economics and technology clearly matter – but 
when push comes to shove, it’s the politics and the culture, stupid!
We have followed up the call from transition scholars as well as political sci-
entists who have pressed for more attention to politics, and have recommended 
applying historical institutionalist approaches to capture the political dimensions 
of energy transitions (Andrews-Speed 2016; Geels 2014; Lockwood et al. 2017; 
Rosenschöld et al. 2014). They are correct in arguing that historical institutional-
ism offers promising analytical concepts that can help in explaining the role of 
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politics in climate transitions, but our findings indicate that this approach also has 
limitations. Neither the role that historical institutionalism prescribes for politi-
cians nor the temporal patterns of policy stability and change over time fit with 
the actual empirical patters we have identified.
Politics, both nationally and at the EU level, are of profound importance. 
Although politicians may not often become deeply engaged in policy develop-
ment, there are many exceptions. Politicians are not always instruments in the 
hands of powerful corporate actors: they can voice the concerns of marginal 
actors, they can come up with ideas on their own – and sometimes politics takes 
on its own dynamics, with unexpected results. This finding is probably not sur-
prising for practitioners with detailed knowledge of climate and energy policy, but 
political science has lacked theory-based approaches that can help to explain such 
features of political life. Moreover, politicians tend to act in line with the cogni-
tive scripts pertaining to political fields, so their behaviour may differ from the 
institutional logics pertaining to organizational fields. Persons unfamiliar with the 
cognitive scripts of the political field will struggle to understand why politicians 
act as they do.
We have shown that cultural-institutional features, such as institutional log-
ics and cognitive scripts, influence how climate policy, politics and transitions 
can unfold. Few scholars have paid attention to how cultural-institutional features 
shape policy development, although there are some exceptions. Two of the edi-
tors of this volume have shown elsewhere that cultural-institutional features have 
played key roles in development of other climate policy areas, at the EU level 
as well as in Norway (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Boasson 2015). In addition, 
sociologists have shown that such features have been crucial in other processes 
relating to climate mitigation. For instance, Ann Hironaka (2014) has highlighted 
how cultural change has underpinned the emergence of environmental organiza-
tions on the global scale; Andrew Hoffmann (2015) has shed light on how culture 
influences climate change debates. Those studies are interesting, but they do not 
assess the importance of cultural-institutional features for climate policy develop-
ment specifically.
Limitations: material conditions, entrepreneurship, public 
support
We have highlighted the many advantages of the multi-field approach, but prepar-
ing this book has made us aware that it also entails some limitations and blind 
spots. Most importantly, the multi-field approach does not specify how and to 
what extent material conditions, entrepreneurship and public support play into 
and shape policy development. To examine these factors, we need to combine the 
multi-field approach with other approaches.
First, the multi-field framework does not help to specify the actual impor-
tance of material conditions, in terms of technological developments, existing 
infrastructure investments, technological change, fossil-fuel resources, renew-
ables resources and other factors. While the case studies in this book indicate 
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that political processes may sometimes develop quite independently of techno-
logical and economic realities, there are limits to how long policy developments 
can remain decoupled from broader material developments, including material-
economic conditions. For instance, support schemes that undermine the function-
ing of the existing electricity system, threaten the economy of the largest utilities, 
or reward renewable energy investors with far too-high profits, will eventually 
change. In this book, we have not systematically explored the interrelationships 
between such material conditions and social multi-field dynamics. Because they 
are so intertwined empirically, it is hard to determine the actual effect of physical 
and economic realities on the one hand, and social features and processes on the 
other. We hope that others will take up this challenge and contribute to a deeper 
understanding of such relationships.
Second, this book highlights cultural-institutional and structural features and 
does not explore the role of policy or institutional entrepreneurship. That means 
we do not capture extraordinary achievements resulting from single actors or 
small groups of actors aiming to punch above their weight in policy development 
processes, nor do we examine why some have failed while others have succeeded 
here. Given our focus on examining so many countries over so many years, we 
could not trace such micro-mechanisms. This does not imply that we regard all 
actors as ‘cultural dopes’, unable to come up with innovative ideas, or to work 
in unconventional ways in order to ‘get it their way’. Indeed, as Boasson (2015) 
has shown, multi-field explanations may be combined with examination of policy 
entrepreneurship.
Finally, we have not given deep consideration to shifts and changes in pub-
lic support to renewable energy, or indeed to climate issues in general. This is a 
weakness, especially as resistance to renewables and other types of climate meas-
ures has increased after 2010. We hope that other scholars will take up the chal-
lenge and examine the relationship between political salience and popular support 
in greater detail.
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